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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation analyzes how Qing China (1636-1912) and three of its tributary states 
(Chosŏn Korea, Vietnam, Kokand) handled interstate refugees and criminals from the 1630s to 
the 1840s. I use Classical Chinese and Manchu memorials and diplomatic documents from Qing 
archives in Beijing and Taipei as well as Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese published sources to 
construct a bilateral view of these interstate relations and compare them. My research reveals 
multiple, flexible, and shifting conceptions of boundaries, jurisdiction, and sovereignty. 
Boundaries between Qing and its tributaries were not absolute to a Qing court that claimed 
universal rule, and the court often erased them by adopting tributary refugees as Qing subjects or 
encroaching on tributary domains. Further, the Qing court often asserted jurisdiction over 
tributary subjects committing crimes on its soil or against its subjects. In contrast, no tributary 
court openly asserted jurisdiction over Qing subjects. Together, these cases reveal two defining 
characteristics of the Qing tributary order: asymmetry and elastic sovereignty. They show how 
the political norms of early modern Asia defy post-Westphalian norms of inter-state equality and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of fellow sovereign states.  
 This work breaks new ground in Chinese history by highlighting Qing imperial projects 
outside today’s Chinese borders and by comparing borderlands in Northeast, Southeast, and 
Central Asia. It is also a work of world history that combines the connective method and the 
comparative method in a novel way, focusing on interactions across interstate boundaries in Asia 
while comparing these Asian borderlands with those in other early modern empires such as 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Lastly, my work engages with the field of international relations 
by reconstructing the contours of interstate affairs in early modern Asia before the introduction 
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of public international law to the region, thus answering the recent call by scholars for a more 
inclusive, pluralistic view of international relations.  
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CHAPTER I. 
Introduction 
 
 William Rockhill, an American diplomat and Sinologist, began his 1889 article on 
Korea’s historical relationship with China with a question: “Were they [Western nations] . . . to 
consider it [Korea] as an integral part of the Chinese empire, or should they treat it as a sovereign 
state enjoying absolute international rights?”1 Since the second half of the nineteenth century, 
Rockhill’s contemporaries, from lawyers to politicians to historians, were asking similar 
questions regarding Qing’s various tributary states. The way Rockhill phrases this question 
makes it look like a straightforward question. Under international public law in a world of 
nation-states, a state was either sovereign or not, and the line dividing the two was clear-cut. The 
reality in nineteenth-century East Asia, however, did not fit this straightforward and binary view 
of the world. Still, Rockhill held on to this ideal model and concluded in the rest of his article 
that Korea was indeed a sovereign state. Subsequent history seemed to eliminate this disjunction 
between theory and practice. Qing China went on to “lose” her tributary states to various colonial 
empires (e.g. Ryukyu Islands and Korea to Japan, Vietnam to France), and the collapse of these 
colonial empires after the World War II finally seemed to create a world of nation-states in East 
Asia.2 
                                                          
1 William W. Rockhill, “Korea in Its Relations with China,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 13 (1889), 1. 
 
2 On the disintegration of the Qing tributary world, see Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, “Late Ch’ing Foreign Relations, 1866-
1905,” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 11: Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part 2, ed. John K. Fairbank and 
Kwang-Ching Liu (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 70–141 and Okamoto Takashi, “Qing China’s 
Foreign Relations and Their Modern Transformation,” Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko 70 
(2012): 1–21. 
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As I will show in this dissertation, however, the Qing tributary world was based on the 
multiplicity and elasticity of imperial boundaries and jurisdictions. This elasticity makes it hard 
for us to answer Rockhill in simple terms, but his question is still meaningful because it prompts 
us to inquire further about the nature of tributary sovereignty as well as Qing imperial 
sovereignty. To what extent and in what ways did Qing China's official self-representation as a 
universal empire ruling “All under Heaven (Tianxia)” influence practical interactions along 
imperial frontiers? How were the frontiers themselves perceived? How did Qing conceptualize 
the East Asian political world? How did Qing rulers understand “sovereignty?” How did their 
views compare with norms of sovereignty and territoriality in post-1648 Europe—and in non-
European “world empires” other than China? Indeed, what is an “empire?”  
This dissertation approaches these issues by examining Qing imperial projects outside the 
central Qing domain. Specifically, it analyzes how the Qing empire and three of its tributary 
states (Chosŏn Korea, Vietnam, Kokand) handled interstate refugees and criminals from the 
1630s to the 1840s. Each of these Qing-tributary relations is treated in two chapters. Drawing on 
Qing, Chosŏn, Vietnamese sources, this dissertation offers a comparative analysis of boundaries, 
jurisdictions, and sovereignty in three critical Qing borderlands. These cases reveal two defining 
characteristics of interstate relations in early modern Asia—asymmetry and elastic sovereignty—
that defy post-Westphalian norms of inter-state equality and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of fellow sovereign states. In the remainder of this chapter, I will place Qing history in 
historiography and then elaborate on each of these points.  
 
I. Historiography 
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A. “New Qing History” and “China-Centered History” 
This dissertation is first and foremost a work of Qing history. Before the 1990s, the Qing 
state was often considered the last premodern or feudal Chinese dynasty, not fundamentally 
different from its dynastic predecessor of Ming (1368-1644). The historiography accordingly 
remembered the Qing state more as a victim of Western imperialism, which was widely agreed 
to have started with the First Opium War (1839-42), rather than an imperial power itself. The 
focus of historical analysis was on China Proper, consisting of provinces ruled by regular 
bureaucracy. In addition, territorial extension that happened during the Qing period was 
understood in the national framework of “unification,” while administration of such new 
territories was seen under the light of regional governance.3 
In the 1990s, however, a new generation of scholars began to challenge that view. Evelyn 
Rawski, in her 1996 Association for Asian Studies (AAS) presidential address, called for 
scholars to “reenvision” the Qing history. According to her, the Qing dynasty was qualitatively 
different from preceding dynasties because of its Manchu identity and Inner Asian traditions. By 
utilizing these traditions, Qing was able to transform potential rivals of the empire into personal 
subjects of the Qing emperor and rule over a multicultural, multiethnic empire. This drive to 
reenvision Qing history has met with enthusiastic response in the last two decades, giving birth 
to a growing body of scholarship often called “New Qing History.”4 
“New Qing History” has focused on two interrelated themes. The first theme is Inner 
Asian and early modern characteristics of the Qing state. Mark Elliott has shown in a pioneering 
                                                          
3 For one example, see Ping-ti Ho, “The Chinese Civilization: A Search for the Roots of Its Longevity,” The Journal 
of Asian Studies 35, no. 4 (1976): 547–54. 
 
4 Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese 
History,” The Journal of Asian Studies 55, no. 4 (1996): 829–50; Joanna Waley-Cohen, “The New Qing History,” 
Radical History Review 88, no. 1 (2003): 193–206. 
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study that Manchu “ethnic sovereignty” was a major foundation of Qing authority. The banner 
people, organized under the Qing institution of Eight Banners (Ma. jakūn gūsa, Ch. baqi), were 
distinguished from the Han Chinese civilian population by their separate residence in Manchu 
cities as well as the legal and occupational privileges accorded them. This differentiation 
between the conqueror and the conquered was precisely the cornerstone of universal Manchu 
rulership. Rawski, in a careful analysis of Qing history from the perspective of its Manchu rulers, 
has shown how the Qing ruler developed a multifaceted identity as a Confucian Son of Heaven, 
an Inner Asian khan of khans, and a reincarnation of bodhisattva of wisdom Manjusri. That 
identity was further legitimated by bureaucratic principles and ritual performance that tied 
Mongols and Tibetans personally to the Qing ruler in a patron-client relationship. In short, the 
Qing state was founded upon an Inner Asian tradition and incorporated other traditions, Han 
Chinese tradition being only one of many, to become a universal empire comparable to other 
contemporary Eurasian empires. Peter Perdue’s landmark study on the Qing conquest of Central 
Eurasia elaborated on this comparative aspect. In a careful analysis, Perdue presented the Qing 
conquest as a process of imperial competition among three Eurasian empires (Qing, Zunghar, 
and Russian), showing their commonalities as early modern Eurasian empires.5  
The second theme in “New Qing History” is the focus on Qing frontiers and borderlands. 
Indeed, it is exactly this spatial reorientation from the metropole to the periphery that has enabled 
these scholars to recognize the Inner Asian, early modern, and imperial characteristics of Qing. 
Perhaps the frontier that has received the most attention is Xinjiang. James Millward analyzed 
                                                          
5 Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001); Evelyn S. Rawski, The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial 
Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing 
Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005). 
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commercial, military, and cultural aspects of the Qing rule in Xinjiang, showing that Qing rule in 
Xinjiang differed fundamentally from that in China Proper. Building on Millward’s work, 
historiography on Xinjiang has seen something of a renaissance, with several impressive 
monographs published in recent years. These works on Xinjiang are notable for showing 
Xinjiang’s characteristic as an imperial frontier and for pointing out similarities in the ways that 
different Eurasian empires managed their frontiers.6  
Works on other frontiers have also shown how the complexities and ambiguities within 
the Qing empire defied a model of national state building. Qing governance of Southwest China 
is a good example. The older story of Southwest China, with its concentration of Tai and other 
tribal polities, was that it underwent a fundamental political transformation during the 
Yongzheng reign (1723-35). According to this narrative, best exemplified in work by Harold 
Wiens, the long-term trend of Han Chinese expansion in this region culminated in Yongzheng’s 
policy of replacing the native chieftains with regular bureaucrats (gaitu guiliu), which began the 
region’s irreversible incorporation into the Chinese nation-state. More recent work, however, has 
complicated the picture. For example, there was a cultural dimension in Qing frontier policy, 
akin to the “civilizing mission” ethos found in other colonial empires. Moreover, a focus on 
native agency has uncovered the transnational world in which these native chiefdoms dwelt, a 
world in which the Qing state and Han Chinese culture constituted only one set of repertoires 
available to these borderlands residents.7 
                                                          
6 James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998); James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007); David John Brophy, Uyghur Nation: Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China 
Frontier (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Justin M. Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese 
State (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016); Kwangmin Kim, Borderland Capitalism: Turkestan Produce, 
Qing Silver, and the Birth of an Eastern Market (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016). 
 
7 Herold J. Wiens, China’s March Toward the Tropics (Hamden, CN: Shoe String Press, 1954); C. Patterson 
Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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In summary, scholarship on the Qing empire has seen remarkable growth in depth and breadth in 
the past twenty years. Even with such growth, however, there remains a lacuna in the 
scholarship. Historians of the Qing empire, despite their emphasis that the Qing empire and the 
modern Chinese nation-state should not be equated, often unconsciously set the spatial and 
conceptual limits of the Qing empire at the national borders of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and Republic of China (ROC). Thus, even though they see the Qing empire as an imperial 
state, they often focus on Qing imperial projects inside today’s “Chinese” borders and have 
largely ignored Qing imperial projects outside those borders. However, the Qing empire’s 
borders extended beyond the borders of today’s Chinese nation-state, encompassing the Mongols 
that today constitute the nation-state of Mongolia. Further, as an imperial power, Qing also had 
clear agendas when dealing with its tributary states, and these agendas could be as intrusive as 
Qing projects in its core zone of China Proper and intermediate zones in Inner Asia. 
My project pushes the scholarly boundaries of Qing imperialism outward by looking at 
how the Qing state dealt with tributaries such as Chosŏn Korea, Lê/Nguyễn Vietnam, the 
Khanate of Kokand, and the Kirghiz tribes in and beyond Xinjiang. 
 This attempt is also closely linked to a general trend in American historiography of China 
called “China-centered history.” In a penetrating 1984 book, Paul Cohen criticized Western-
centric distortions that resulted from specific frameworks used in American historical writings on 
modern China, including the “Western impact-Chinese response,” modernization, and imperial 
narratives. Drawing attention to how the Vietnam War helped scholars move toward “other-
centered historiography,” Cohen urged American historians to take a China-centered approach 
                                                          
University Press, 2006); John E. Herman, Amid the Clouds and Mist: China’s Colonization of Guizhou, 1200-1700 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007); Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography 
and Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
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by basing their analytical criteria internally in China, focusing on regional and local history, and 
abandoning 1840 as a general time marker separating premodern and modern Chinese history.8 
The rise of China-centered history since then has fundamentally transformed the field of Chinese 
history in the U.S. As James Hevia noted, however, this approach comes with a danger of putting 
too much emphasis on endogenous factors in historical analysis of China.9  
 With this dissertation, I aim to show the utility of going beyond the China-centered 
approach by adopting the perspectives of China’s smaller neighbors in looking at the history of 
China. More specifically, I look at the Qing empire from perspectives of Qing and three of its 
smaller neighbors: Chosŏn Korea, Lê/Nguyễn Vietnam, the Khanate of Kokand. As they 
interacted with Qing as its tributaries, this dissertation also engages with the historiography on 
the Chinese tributary system.  
 
B. The Chinese Tributary System 
Exactly 50 years ago, John Fairbank proposed the thesis of a “Chinese world order.” 
Fairbank emphasized the Sinocentric and hierarchical nature of the tributary system as well as 
the gap between how the system worked in theory and in practice. As Fairbank emphasized, 
however, Korea, Vietnam, and Ryukyu were three “model tributaries,” where the theory of Qing 
supremacy corresponded most closely to reality.10 In all fairness, Fairbank was the first to 
acknowledge that the thesis was a working hypothesis rather than a definitive model on 
                                                          
8 Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1984). 
 
9 James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1995), 7-9. 
 
10 John King Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign 
Relations, ed. John King Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 1–19. 
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premodern Chinese foreign relations. Indeed, the rest of the volume consists of individual 
chapters that challenge this framework on empirical bases. Joseph Fletcher, for example, noted 
that Ming and Qing relations with Central Asian powers were more often conducted on basis of 
equality. Robert Sakai, analyzing the position of the Ryukyu king as a tributary ruler to both the 
Chinese emperor and the daimyo of Satsuma in Japan, showed Satsuma’s firm economic control 
over Ryukyu.11 
Since then, scholars have produced many more empirical critiques of this idea by 
showing the gap between theory and practice in various historical times. Morris Rossabi’s edited 
volume, for example, has convincingly shown a multi-state system, in which China was one state 
among equals, that existed in Asia between the tenth and thirteenth centuries.12 More commonly, 
scholars have produced case studies that emphasized the disjunction between theory and 
practice. John Wills Jr., perhaps the most well-known historian of the tributary system in 
Anglophone scholarship, has produced several meticulously researched works on Qing relations 
with maritime Europeans. These works have shown how the tributary system was in some 
respects an illusion and have pushed the boundaries of Qing interstate relations beyond the rubric 
of tributary relations.13  
                                                          
11 Joseph Fletcher, “China and Central Asia, 1368-1884,” in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign 
Relations, ed. John King Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 206–24; Robert K. Sakai, 
“The Ryukyu Islands as a Fief of Satsuma,” in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, 
ed. John King Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 112–34. 
 
12 Morris Rossabi, ed., China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 
 
13 John E. Wills, Jr., Pepper, Guns, and Parleys: The Dutch East India Company and China, 1662-1681 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974); John E. Wills, Jr., Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and 
Portuguese Envoys to K’ang-Hsi, 1666-1687 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 
1984). 
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And yet, there have been surprisingly few attempts to look at the praxis of the Qing 
tributary relationship with its “model tributaries.” One important exception is nationalist 
historiography on the foreign relations of these model tributaries. This scholarship must be seen 
in the context of colonial historiography that portrayed Korea and Vietnam as “little Chinas” and 
justified Japanese and French colonial rule over these societies. Writing against colonial 
scholarship, nationalist historiography often emphasized the tributary’s autonomy in its actual 
relations with China. It is, to a large degree, historiography more interested in the framework of 
autonomy and national sovereignty rather than actual tributary relations.14  
More recently, a few scholars have begun to focus on the praxis of Korean and 
Vietnamese tributary relations with China. These works have attempted to go beyond the 
dichotomy of Chinese superiority and tributary independence that was common in both 
Fairbank’s thesis and nationalist historiography. By doing so, these works have constructed more 
holistic overviews of these “model” tributary relations. With these recent works, we can begin to 
conduct a comparative overview of the Qing tributary praxis, and that is precisely what I attempt 
in this dissertation.15  
The necessity of such a comparative overview becomes even more apparent when we 
look at more theoretical critiques of the “Chinese world order” model. More specifically, several 
systematic critiques of the Fairbank thesis based on postmodern, postcolonial scholarship have 
appeared in recent decades. Perhaps the most well-known of these critics is James Hevia. In a 
                                                          
14 Liam C. Kelley, Beyond the Bronze Pillars: Envoy Poetry and the Sino-Vietnamese Relationship (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 1-36; Kim Sŏn-min (Seonmin Kim), “Mansŏnsa, Manhak, kŭrigo Manjuhak,” 
Myŏng-Ch'ŏngsa yŏn'gu 38 (2012): 89–122. 
 
15 Kathlene Baldanza, Ming China and Vietnam: Negotiating Borders in Early Modern Asia (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016); Sixiang Wang, “Co-Constructing Empire in Early Chosŏn Korea: Knowledge Production 
and the Culture of Diplomacy, 1392-1592” (Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2015). 
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well-received 1995 book, Hevia revisited the Macartney embassy of 1793, which had often been 
interpreted as a failed British attempt to bring China into the modern system of international 
relations as well as a missed opportunity for China’s modernization. Instead, Hevia framed the 
event as an encounter between two imperial worlds, each with its universal pretensions and 
worldviews. By doing so, Hevia successfully showed Britain to have been as immobile and 
inflexible as Qing. Just as remarkable to me, however, is the fact that Hevia embarked on a 
systematic analysis of the Qing imperial formation and yet allocated just three pages to model 
tributaries.16 
In this dissertation, I compare two of Qing’s model tributaries—Korea and Vietnam—
and a Central Asian outlier—Kokand—often considered to have been the antithesis of a model 
tributary. By focusing on how the Qing empire and these three tributary states handled refugees 
and criminals in their borderlands, my project highlights the meanings of boundaries, 
jurisdictions, and sovereignty in these sets of interstate relations. As such, my project engages 
with recent developments in the field of international relations as well. One of these 
developments is a renewed interest among international relations scholars in the tributary system. 
David Kang, for example, has looked at the tributary system as an East Asian system of 
international relations, emphasizing its stability over the five centuries before the mid-nineteenth 
century. Brantly Womack, by analyzing the entire period of Sino-Vietnamese relations, has 
postulated asymmetry as the defining characteristic of the relationship.17 
                                                          
16 Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, 50-2. 
 
17 David C. Kang, East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010); Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
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Through this dissertation, I will develop a working definition of elastic sovereignty that 
could be a useful analytical concept for international relations scholars. In doing so, I seek to 
move beyond recent revisionist views that have exposed Westphalian sovereignty as an 
“organized hypocrisy” or a “myth” even in the context of early modern and modern European 
history.18 Instead, I wish to answer as a global historian the recent call for a Global International 
Relations that moves from Eurocentrism and exceptionalism to a more inclusive, pluralistic view 
of the world.19 In this light, one aim of this dissertation is reconstructing sovereignty and 
interstate affairs in the Qing tributary world as part of a multifocal look at the early modern 
world.  
 
C. Law and China 
 Lastly, this dissertation engages with the historiography on law and China. For many 
reasons, including the hegemony of functionalism within comparative law and the dominance of 
the “Western impact, Chinese response” framework within Chinese history, Chinese law did not 
attract much scholarly attention until the 1980s. With the opening of the archives in China in that 
decade, however, many detailed legal records became available to Western scholars of China. 
This new availability led William Alford to express in 1997 his cautious optimism on the state of 
                                                          
18 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Luke 
Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2014). 
 
19 Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International 
Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2014): 647–59; Andrew Phillips, “Global IR Meets Global 
History: Sovereignty, Modernity, and the International System’s Expansion in the Indian Ocean Region,” 
International Studies Review 18, no. 1 (2016): 62–77. 
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Chinese legal studies, and the scholarly work on Chinese law in the past two decades has 
justified his optimism.20  
 On the one hand, some scholars have attempted to show that Chinese imperial law had 
concepts and institutions comparable to those usually considered to be unique to modern 
Western law. One aspect that has received the most attention is civil law. Philip Huang, for one, 
has argued that there was a law that dealt with civil matters (land, debt, marriage, and 
inheritance) and “civil justice” at the edge of the official Qing justice system. He went as far as 
to define that law as “Qing civil law.”21 Other scholars, in a similar vein, went on to “excavate” 
other aspects of Qing law that had traces of legal modernity.22 In doing so, these scholars were 
essentially trying to undo the stereotype of Chinese law as a tool of state tyranny, which had its 
roots in both China (Confucian literati who emphasized ritual over law) and in the West (ever 
since Max Weber), and to frame Qing law as early modern law, following the general trend 
among “early modernists” in the 1990s who searched for roots of Chinese modernity in the Qing 
period. Not surprisingly, this approach has received a fair share of criticism. Jérôme Bourgon, for 
example, criticized what he called the “civil-customary law” hypothesis, calling it another case 
of “invented tradition.”23 
                                                          
20 William P. Alford, “Law, Law, What Law?: Why Western Scholars of Chinese History and Society Have Not 
Had More to Say about Its Law,” Modern China 23, no. 4 (1997): 398–419; Teemu Ruskola, “Legal Orientalism,” 
Michigan Law Review 101, no. 1 (2002): 179-234. 
 
21 Philip Huang, Civil Justice in China, Representation and Practice in the Qing (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1996). 
 
22 See Melissa Macauley, Social Power and Legal Culture: Litigation Masters in Late Imperial China (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998) for an example. In this work, Macauley seems to have found in Qing litigation 
masters (songshi) legal professionals found in early modern Europe.  
 
23 Jérôme Bourgon, “Uncivil Dialogue: Law and Custom Did Not Merge into Civil Law under the Qing,” Late 
Imperial China 23, no. 1 (2002): 50–90. 
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 On the other hand, others have tried to show what imperial Chinese law was like in 
theory and in practice without an explicit mission statement of recovering China’s “lost 
modernity.” Matthew Sommer, for one, rejected using the Western paradigm of progress in the 
law as his starting point and instead used legal archives as a gaze toward the lower strata of 
society during the Qing period. By doing so, he was able to show that one of fundamental goals 
of Qing law was to keep proper gender order in society by regulating and penalizing “illicit 
sexual intercourse.”24 In my dissertation, I follow Sommer’s approach by using actual legal cases 
as my lens toward particular members of the Qing world: borderlands peoples who lived at the 
edges of geographical, cultural, and judicial boundaries of the Qing empire.  
 Historians of Chinese law, like historians of the Qing empire, have unconsciously set the 
spatial and conceptual limits of Qing law at the national borders of the PRC and ROC. One 
important exception is Pär Cassel’s recent work on extraterritoriality in Japan and China in the 
nineteenth century. In contrast with previous works on extraterritoriality in Asia, which almost 
always depict Asian states as victims of unequal treaties that imposed extraterritoriality on them, 
Cassel’s work shows how Japan and China actively used extraterritoriality to the advantages of 
their own subjects living in the other country.25 Following Cassel’s approach, I analyze Qing law 
at the edges of its jurisdiction by looking at how Qing law dealt with foreign subjects who 
committed crimes on Qing soil or against Qing subjects.  
 In doing this, my aim is to expand the spatial and conceptual limits of Chinese legal 
history as well as to put the scholarship in conversation with the burgeoning field of world legal 
                                                          
24 Matthew Sommer, Sex, Law, and Society in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). 
 
25 Pär Kristoffer Cassel, Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China 
and Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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history. Western legal history, in general, has not had much to say about Chinese law. Arthur 
Nussbaum, in his monumental study on the law of nations, made it clear that the law of nations 
and Chinese law had little, if any, relationship with each other until the mid-nineteenth century.26 
Even recent works do not fare much better. Laura Benton’s 2002 study, which is arguably the 
first work of world history to look at the use of law in colonial orders from both a comparative 
and a connective perspective, still has no room for Chinese law. Thus, although she convincingly 
shows that a global institutional order emerged as a result of constant jurisdictional jockeying 
between global legal regimes even before the formal emergence of international law, her global 
institutional order stands totally outside China.27 Similarly, her 2010 work on “layered 
sovereignties” of empires and a world of spatially and legally uneven empires gives no role to 
the Chinese empire.28 Daniel Heller-Roazen’s fascinating study on the place of piracy in the law 
of nations, likewise, argues that the pirate is the original enemy of humankind and the universal 
foe, and yet this “humankind” and “universe” have again no place for China.29  
 In my dissertation, I construct a regional history of law in Qing-centered Asia and 
develop a comprehensive overview of Qing legal pluralism in its borderlands. As such, it can 
serve as a bridge between the field of Chinese legal history and the field of global legal history, 
which could benefit much from each other.  
 
                                                          
26 Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, revised ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1954). 
 
27 Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
 
28 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
 
29 Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations (New York: Zone Books, 2009). 
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II. Sources and Languages 
 This dissertation mainly utilizes three sets of sources: Qing archival sources, diplomatic 
documents, and other published sources. Qing central archival sources from the First Historical 
Archives (Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan) in Beijing and the National Palace Museum (Guoli 
gugong bowuyuan) in Taipei constitute the most important body of sources for this dissertation. I 
have made much use of palace memorials (zouzhe) that were sent from Qing borderland officials 
directly to the Qing emperors in Beijing. This palace memorial system was developed in the later 
years of the Kangxi reign (1662-1722). Unlike routine memorials (tiben), which were formal and 
had to go through multiple levels of bureaucracy before reaching the Qing emperor, palace 
memorials were informal and personal channels of communication between an official and the 
emperor. Originally meant to ensure secrecy, these features are the reason that these documents 
are sometimes also called secret memorials.30 The palace memorials are well-known to historians 
of Qing, so not much explanation is needed here. One recent published collection from the First 
Historical Archives, however, merits a brief mention: the 283-volume collection of Manchu-
language archival materials from Qing Xinjiang (Qingdai Xinjiang Manwen dang’an huibian). 
This wealth of materials promises to change the ways we look at the history of Qing Xinjiang as 
well as history of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Central Asia, and I have benefited greatly 
from this collection in my chapters on the Qing-Kokand borderland.31  
 The second body of sources is diplomatic documents exchanged between Qing and its 
tributary states. Qing and Chosŏn, as we will see in Part I of the dissertation, had the most 
                                                          
30 Beatrice S. Bartlett, “Research Note: The Newly Digitized Archives Program at China’s Number One Historical 
Archives, Beijing,” Late Imperial China 32, no. 1 (2011): 1–12; Mark C. Elliott, “The Manchu-Language Archives 
of the Qing Dynasty and the Origins of the Palace Memorial System,” Late Imperial China 22, no. 1 (2001): 1–70. 
 
31 Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan and Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin, eds., Qingdai Xinjiang Manwen 
dang’an huibian (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2012) (QXMDH hereafter). 
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frequent and regular channel of interstate communications. The lateral communications (ziwen) 
between the Chosŏn king and the Qing Board of Rites (Libu) in Beijing were the norm of 
interstate communications. Lateral communications, within the Qing context, were horizontal 
documents exchanged between officials of equal status, unlike the vertical documents exchanged 
between superiors and inferiors. All the lateral communications between the Chosŏn king and the 
Qing Board of Rites were written in Classical Chinese, the official administrative language 
shared between the two courts. Fortunately for the researcher, many of these lateral 
communications have been preserved in a Chosŏn governmental publication called Tongmun 
hwigo. Originally published in 1784 and periodically updated until 1881, Tongmun hwigo was a 
collection of diplomatic documents that the Chosŏn court exchanged with the Qing court and 
Japan. It has since been reprinted by the National Institute of Korean History (Kuksa P’yŏnch'an 
Wiwŏnhoe) and fully digitized by the Northeast Asian History Foundation (Tongbuga Yŏksa 
Chaedan). Tongmun hwigo is also notable for preserving some routine memorials from early 
Qing that do not seem to have survived elsewhere.32 
 Qing and Vietnam, likewise, largely communicated through lateral communications 
written in Classical Chinese. Unlike the Chosŏn court, however, the Vietnamese court did not 
have direct access to the Qing Board of Rites. Most often, the Vietnamese court exchanged 
lateral communications with provincial officials of the three Qing provinces bordering northern 
Vietnam: Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong. Qing provincial officials often attached these 
lateral communications to their palace memorials to the emperors, and some of these lateral 
communications have survived as attachments within the Qing central archives.  
                                                          
32 Kuksa P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, ed., Tongmun Hwigo, reprint (Seoul: Kuksa P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, 1978). The 
digitized version can be accessed via http://contents.nahf.or.kr/id/NAHF.dh.  
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 As hinted above, Kokand entered the Qing tributary world at the height of Qing 
expansion in the 1750s. Perhaps due to this imperial self-confidence, the Qing court of the 1750s 
did not recognize any of the Central Asian polities that established tributary relations with it as 
states represented by kings, as Chosŏn and Vietnam were. Instead, they were regarded as “outer 
tribes” (tulergi aiman) ruled by chieftains—bii for Kirghiz nomads and beg for Kokand, for 
example.. Reflecting this low status within the tributary hierarchy, the Kokand begs reported to 
Qing officials in Xinjiang in a vertical manner. These documents, originally written in 
Chaghatay Turkic or Persian, were almost always translated into Manchu but sometimes into 
Classical Chinese as well. As in the Qing-Vietnamese case, some of these documents—whether 
original copies or in translation—survive as attachments to the palace memorials that Xinjiang 
officials sent to the emperors. With no proficiency in either Chaghatay or Persian, I have relied 
exclusively on the Manchu translations, which David Brophy has pointed out often involved 
much loss of nuance. Thus, my reconstruction of Qing-Kokand interactions has a more Qing 
centered perspective than that of other interactions, a situation I hope to remedy in the near 
future.33 
 The third group of sources consists of other published materials. The most important 
published materials consulted here are annals of the Qing and Chosŏn courts: Qing shilu and 
Chosŏn wangjo sillok (朝鮮王朝實錄). Sillok is especially important for providing some detailed 
information on the early history of Jin/Qing-Chosŏn relations as well as internal discussions 
within the Chosŏn court unavailable in Qing archives and diplomatic documents. Both these 
                                                          
33 David Brophy, “High Asia and the High Qing: A Selection of Persian Letters from the Beijing Archives,” in No 
Tapping around Philology: A Festschrift in Honor of Wheeler McIntosh Thackston Jr.’s 70th Birthday, ed. Alireza 
Korangy and Daniel J. Sheffield (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2014), 325–67. 
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annals have been fully digitized and are available online.34 For the chapters on Vietnam, Đại Việt 
sử ký toàn thư (大越史記全書) and Khâm định Việt sử thông giám cương mục (欽定越史通鑑
綱目) have been invaluable.35  
 Using these groups of sources, I have constructed a bilateral view of these interstate 
relations, ranging from the official documents exchanged between imperial and tributary courts 
to the self-perceptions and internal discussions within these courts. All these sources have 
contributed to the depth and breadth of this dissertation, allowing me to zoom in the details of 
each set of interstate relations and to compare all three sets of interstate relations.  
 
III. Outline of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation consists of three parts, each focusing on boundaries and jurisdictions in 
one of the three borderlands in question. Chapter two begins by analyzing wars between Qing 
and Chosŏn that resulted in a 1637 treaty delineating the subjects and domains of the two states. 
The Qing rulers, having just carved out a frontier khanate after decades of state-building and 
campaigns against their neighbors, sought above all to protect their newly acquired territories 
and subjects. These imperatives governed the ways the Qing and Chosŏn polities handled two 
recurrent issues. The first, subjecthood, concerned runaway Chosŏn and Han Chinese slaves 
from the Qing domain and Jurchen residents in the Chosŏn domain. The Chosŏn state, which 
initially protected these people, gradually succumbed to Qing pressure to send them back, thus 
                                                          
34 Both annals can be accessed through the Academia Sinica online database: http://hanchi.ihp.sinica.edu.tw. 
 
35 For the toàn thư, I have used the Chin Keiwa (Chen Ching-Ho), ed., Daietsu Shiki Zensho: Kōgōbon (Tokyo: 
Tōkyō Daigaku Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo Fuzoku Tōyōgaku Bunken Sentā, 1984) version. For the cương mục, I have 
used the version available on the digital collection of Vietnamese Nôm Preservation Foundation: 
http://lib.nomfoundation.org/.  
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acknowledging Qing claims that imperial prerogatives gave them ultimate jurisdiction over Qing 
subjects residing in tributary domains. This acknowledgment also influenced the second issue, 
territorial delineation. From 1637 to the mid-1800s, the Qing-Chosŏn borderland came to exhibit 
a much clearer level of physical demarcation, albeit favorable in every instance to Qing interests, 
than did Qing frontiers with Vietnam or Kokand. 
 Chapter three looks at interstate jurisdiction between Qing and Chosŏn. Reflecting its 
preoccupation with preventing infringements, from the 1630s to the 1770s the Qing state 
vigilantly investigated and punished Chosŏn subjects who illegally entered the Qing domain or 
engaged in illicit activities on Qing soil. This produced a joint jurisdiction, wherein Qing and 
Chosŏn judiciaries cooperated based on routine procedures drawn from precedents. But this was 
also an asymmetrical relationship, with the Chosŏn judiciary acting as the lower court to a Qing 
judiciary that reviewed the terms of adjudication and made all final decisions. Moreover, the 
Chosŏn judiciary, in contrast to its Qing counterpart, never asserted formal jurisdiction over 
foreigners entering its territory, merely repatriating Qing subjects in its territory. 
 Chapter four, which begins the second part of the dissertation, examines boundaries 
between the Qing empire and Vietnam. Because Vietnam voluntarily became a Qing tributary 
state in the 1660s, there was no treaty delineating the domains and subjects of the two states. A 
partial demarcation took place in the 1720s after a territorial dispute between the two states, but 
native chiefdoms in the borderland, only indirectly ruled by either state, constituted a “middle 
ground,” or buffer zone, that had been eliminated in the Qing-Chosŏn borderland. The 
consolidation of Qing rule over China proper in the 1680s gave rise to the Qing perception of its 
realm as unbounded and universal, which came to coexist with the early seventeenth-century 
view of a bounded Qing realm seen in chapter two. This universal pretension manifested itself in 
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at least two ways. First, the Qing state often encroached on the Vietnamese domain in cases 
concerning security and imperial prestige. Second, asserting its theoretical claim to rule over “all 
peoples under heaven,” the Qing often accepted Vietnamese who were bandits and rebels from 
the perspective of the Vietnamese state.  
 Chapter five looks at interstate jurisdictions between Qing and Vietnam. This borderland, 
far from the administrative centers of both states, saw only sporadic attention to interstate crimes 
until the early eighteenth century. With the Qing attempt in the 1720s to replace some native 
chieftains with Qing bureaucrats, however, interstate crimes began to receive more scrutiny. 
Without precedents for action and with less official reach, interstate jurisdiction here was less 
routinized than in the Qing-Chosŏn borderland and relied on more informal, ad hoc procedures. 
The Qing state repatriated some Vietnamese criminals but openly asserted jurisdiction over 
others, while the Vietnamese state mostly repatriated Qing fugitives, never openly asserting 
jurisdiction over them. 
 Chapter six, introducing Part III of the dissertation, examines boundaries between the 
Qing and Kokand states. Xinjiang was incorporated into the Qing domain during the height of 
imperial expansion in the 1750s. Here, an imperial vision of unbounded and unlimited frontier 
initially overshadowed the more linear and modest administrative boundaries of karun (guard 
post) lines. The existence in this region of nomadic Kirghiz tribes, some of whom moved freely 
between Kokand and Qing, defied an easy demarcation of peoples and domains. The Qing state, 
consistent with its expansive late seventeenth-century self-image, tolerated this ambiguity until 
the death of the Qianlong emperor in 1799. But his successors, recognizing the imperial 
overreach of the Qianlong reign (1736-95), gradually retreated to rely on fixed karun lines as the 
Qing-Kokand boundaries. 
 
 
21 
 
 Chapter seven looks at interstate jurisdiction between Qing and Kokand, with a focus on 
Qing jurisdiction over Kokand subjects. Scholars have interpreted the 1835 Qing-Kokand 
agreement as the first unequal treaty signed by Qing that accorded extraterritoriality to foreign 
subjects residing in the Qing domain. However, this chapter shows that the 1835 agreement was 
merely a continuation and affirmation of a Qing policy that dated back to the 1760s in Xinjiang 
and the 1630s in other borderlands. The Qing state was willing to let the Kokand merchant 
community in Xinjiang or the Kokand state itself handle minor criminal cases involving Kokand 
subjects. But in cases that it deemed to be important, such as large-scale smuggling or aid to 
rebellions by Xinjiang Muslims, the Qing state did not hesitate to assert jurisdiction over Kokand 
subjects.  
The dissertation’s conclusion puts the three borderlands in an explicit comparative 
framework. The Qing-Korea borderland shows the clearest delineation of subjects and domains 
as well as the most routine procedures for interstate trials. Here practical arrangements most 
closely resembled post-1648 European practices, even though the underlying 
political/philosophical assumptions were incomparable. The Qing-Kokand borderland was more 
of an open frontier, where movement was relatively free and interstate justice summary, 
unilateral, and improvisational. The Qing-Vietnam borderland occupied an intermediate position. 
All three borderlands, however, had these characteristics in common: multiple and shifting 
conceptions of boundaries and jurisdiction, an asymmetrical relationship between Qing and 
tributary states, and elastic sovereignty. They show an early modern worldview that defies post-
Westphalian norms of inter-state equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of fellow 
sovereign states.  
 
 
22 
 
 To put this early modern imperial worldview in perspective, the next section of the 
conclusion compares Qing with two other Eurasian empires: Romanov Russia (1613-1917) and 
the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922). The comparison with Russia focuses on the imperial 
competition between the Qing and Russian empires, starting from their clashes in the Amur 
River region in the mid-seventeenth century and ending with the Russian conquest of Central 
Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century. The comparison with the Ottoman Empire, on 
the other hand, will concentrate more on the general shared features of imperial rule. 
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CHAPTER II.  
The First Qing Borderland: Boundaries in the Qing-Chosŏn Borderland, 1630s-1840s1 
 
 In this chapter, I will look at how the Qing and Chosŏn states negotiated and maintained 
various boundaries in their borderland from the 1630s to the 1840s. The first section will analyze 
the two wars between Qing and Chosŏn that resulted in a 1637 treaty delineating the subjects and 
domains of the two states. The second section will then focus on the two groups of borderland 
residents—runaway slaves from the Qing domain and Jurchen residents in the Chosŏn domain—
to see how the boundaries between Qing imperial and Chosŏn tributary subjects were negotiated. 
The third section will move on to the issue of the territorial boundary by looking at how the two 
states delineated their domains and then sought to maintain that delineation. In the last section, I 
will turn to other boundaries that existed in the borderland, thereby showing how these 
boundaries worked in relation to state boundaries as well as how both state and other boundaries 
could be crossed by residents of this borderland.   
 
I. The Development of Jin/Qing-Chosŏn Interstate Relations: 1595-1637 
The story of how the Jurchens under Nurhaci (努爾哈赤; 1559-1626) built the frontier 
khanate of Jin (1616-36) and how the Manchus under Hong Taiji (皇太極; 1592-1643) 
transformed it into the imperial dynasty of Qing (1636-1911) is a familiar one. Frederic 
Wakeman Jr.’s two-volume masterpiece on the Ming-Qing transition is perhaps the best account 
                                                          
1 For transliteration of Chinese terms, I have followed the pinyin system; for Korean, the McCune-Reischauer 
Romanization; and for Manchu, the Möllendorff system. The dates are given according to both the original lunar 
calendar and the Gregorian calendar. 
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of this history. In his narrative, Wakeman focused on two themes. First was the recognition of 
this transition as a historically contingent and drawn out process that required constant 
experimentation and adjustments on the part of emergent Qing. Second, and more directly 
relevant to this dissertation, was the vital role that the social milieu of the Liaodong frontier 
played on the Jin/Qing state-building. According to him, this was a frontier inhabited by 
“transfrontiersmen” who lived at the intersections of Ming, Jurchen, and Mongol ways of life.2 
One aspect of the Liaodong frontier that has not garnered much attention in Anglophone 
scholarship on Ming-Qing transition, however, is the place of Chosŏn. Even though the 
importance of Chosŏn sources in reconstructing Jin history is often recognized, Chosŏn does not 
figure as an important actor in the narrative of Ming-Qing transition. In fact, Chosŏn constituted 
a major regional rival for a Jin state that was also hemmed in by the Ming state and various 
Mongol polities. Moreover, for the Qing state to become a credible imperial competitor with and 
eventually successor to the Ming state, the Qing state needed to incorporate tributary states and 
become the pivot of a regional world order that could rival the Ming tributary world. In that 
sense, Chosŏn’s incorporation as the first Qing tributary state in 1637 was an event that had a 
much broader spatial and temporal implication than previously considered.  
In what follows, I will narrate the story of Ming-Qing transition from the perspective of 
the Jin/Qing-Chosŏn interstate relationship. By doing so, I will show that Chosŏn, far from being 
a mere “flank,” was an indispensable part of the transformation of the Jurchens from a tribal 
polity to a frontier khanate and eventually an empire. In the following narrative, I focus on three 
aspects of this interstate relationship from 1595 to 1637: the nature of the relationship, the 
                                                          
2 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-
Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 
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territorial boundary, and subjecthood. I will end the section with an analysis of the ceasefire 
agreement that established the tributary relationship between the Qing and Chosŏn states.  
 
A. The Nature of the Relationship  
Any discussion of the Jin/Qing-Chosŏn interstate relationship must be preceded by a 
discussion of Ming-Chosŏn relations. As explained in the introduction, the picture of Korea as a 
model tributary, like other facets of the tributary system model, has come under increasing 
scrutiny recently. Donald Clark, for example, shows how Ming-Chosŏn tributary relations 
changed through several phases even while he maintains the view of Korea as a model tributary 
and the Ming period (1368-1644) as representative of the tributary system. There was the rocky 
first phase, which was characterized by the suspicion of the Hongwu emperor (r. 1368-99) 
towards the new Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1897). Then there was the more stable second phase that 
lasted until Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasions of the Korean Peninsula (1592-1598).3 
 Anglophone historians of East Asia are increasingly paying attention to Hideyoshi’s 
invasions as regional or world historical events that had far-reaching ramifications for the East 
Asian region.4 Among those ramifications was the sense of debt and gratitude among the Chosŏn 
elite towards the Ming for its military aid against Hideyoshi’s forces, which was neatly summed 
up in the phrase “the grace of rebirth” (Ko. chaejo chi ŭn, Ch: zaizao zhi en).5 Another 
                                                          
3 Donald N. Clark, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming,” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 
8, The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 2, ed. Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 272–300. 
 
4 Kenneth M. Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 
1592-1598 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009); JaHyun Kim Haboush, The Great East Asian War and 
the Birth of the Korean Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016). 
 
5 Han Myŏng-gi, Imjin Waeran kwa Han-Chung kwan’gye (Seoul: Yŏksa Pip’yŏngsa, 1999), 67-87. 
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ramification relevant to our discussion was the weakening of both the Chosŏn state, whose 
subjects were ravaged by years of warfare, and the Ming state, which expended enormous sums 
of money and manpower during the war. This weakening of state power and social turmoil were 
most apparent in the Ming-Chosŏn borderland.6  
It was in this context of Ming-Chosŏn relations that Nurhaci began his state-building 
efforts. Nurhaci was a minor chieftain of the Jianzhou Jurchens who built his state through his 
military genius and institutional savvy. The first phase of his career lasted from 1583, when he 
began his military career, to 1618, when he began his Liaodong campaign against the Ming. 
During this phase, his focus was on Jurchen unification, alliance with the Mongols, and 
institution building, the combination of which resulted in the founding of the Jin (Ma. aisin) 
khanate in 1616. This was a declaration of independence from the Ming world order in which the 
Jurchens had participated as tributary polities, and Nurhaci had succeeded in carving out a 
frontier khanate.   
It was early in this phase that Nurhaci made his first overtures towards the Chosŏn state, 
as Nurhaci’s campaigns against other Jurchen polities brought Nurhaci’s domain and the Chosŏn 
domain into direct contact along the Yalu River. In 1595, Nurhaci communicated with the 
Chosŏn state for the first time by repatriating 14 Chosŏn trespassers, only to learn that Chosŏn 
soldiers had killed 27 Jurchen trespassers around the same time. Over the next year the two states 
exchanged envoys and agreed on the future repatriation of trespassers. The Chosŏn court, 
however, rejected Nurhaci’s wish to establish a formal diplomatic relationship, citing the Ming 
prohibition on private relations between tributaries. The Chosŏn court granted its main envoy Sin 
                                                          
6 Masato Hasegawa, “War, Supply Lines, and Society in the Sino-Korean Borderland of the Late Sixteenth 
Century,” Late Imperial China 37, no. 1 (2016): 109–52. 
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Ch’ung-il (申忠一; 1554-1622), a minor official of rank 6b, the temporary post of the Manp’o 
(滿浦; in P’yŏngan) garrison commander (chŏmsa; rank 3a), and Manp’o served as the hub for 
the Jurchen-Chosŏn relations for the next two decades. The nature of Jianzhou Jurchen-Chosŏn 
relationship at this point was clearly unequal, as the Chosŏn court saw Nurhaci as being below 
even its own provincial governor (kwanch’alsa; rank 2b), but Nurhaci was content that the 
Chosŏn court had sent an envoy at all, according to Sin.7 
The Chosŏn policy towards Nurhaci was grounded in its overall Jurchen policy, which 
was based on a patron-client relationship. Since the early days of the dynasty, the Chosŏn court 
had used the institution of military post appointment, in which the Chosŏn king granted the 
Jurchen chieftains Korean military posts and established hierarchical relationships with them. 
These chieftains were permitted regular trips to Hanyang (漢陽; the Chosŏn capital and today’s 
Seoul) for audience and trade. It was a similar system to the Ming weisuo system, and some of 
the Jurchen chieftains in fact received posts from both the Ming and Chosŏn states. When the 
Ming court became aware of this situation, it became a diplomatic issue between the Ming and 
Chosŏn states. Eventually, the Chosŏn court acquiesced to the Ming demand that it cut its 
communications with the Jianzhou Jurchens after the Ming-Chosŏn joint campaign against the 
Jianzhou Jurchens in 1467. The Chosŏn court, however, kept its loose hierarchical relations with 
other Jurchen chieftains, using them as frontier buffers and sources of information.8 
                                                          
7 Kye Sŭng-bŏm, “Hyangt’ongsa Ha Se-guk kwa Chosŏn ŭi sŏnt’aek,” Manju yŏn’gu 11 (2011): 179–208; Kim 
Chong-wŏn, Kŭnse Tong Asia kwangyesa yŏn’gu: Cho-Ch’ŏng kyosŏp kwa Tonga samguk kyoyŏk ŭl chungsim ŭro 
(Seoul: Hyean, 1999), 25-43. 
 
8 Han Sŏng-ju, Chosŏn chŏn’gi sujik Yŏjinin yŏn’gu (Seoul: Kyŏngin Munhwasa, 2011); Kenneth R. Robinson, 
“Residence and Foreign Relations in the Peninsular Northeast during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” in Sun 
Joo Kim, ed., The Northern Region of Korea: History, Identity, and Culture (Seattle: Center for Korea Studies, 
University of Washington, 2010), 18-36; Adam Clarence Immanuel Bohnet, “Migrant and Border Subjects in Late 
Chosŏn Korea” (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 2008), 40-58. 
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Even the founding of the Jin state in 1616 did not fundamentally change the Jurchen-
Chosŏn relations. From the Chosŏn perspective, Nurhaci was still a chieftain (Ko. ch’u, Ch. qiu), 
and his followers were still bandits (Ko. chŏk, Ch. zei) or barbarians (Ko. ho, Ch. hu). In fact, 
according to Yi Yŏng-ok, the state title Jin does not even appear in the Annals (sillok) during the 
reign of Prince Kwanghae (光海君; 1608-23).9 
Rather, the real turning point in the relations came in 1618, when Nurhaci declared his 
“Seven Grievances” against the Ming and attacked the Ming garrison of Fushun (撫順). With 
this attack, Nurhaci was directly challenging Ming hegemony in the region as well as the Ming 
world order in which Chosŏn was an integral member. Thus, the attack on Fushun turned the Jin 
state into an enemy of the Chosŏn state. Nothing illustrates this point better than the 1619 Battle 
of Sarhū, in which 13,000 Chosŏn soldiers under the command of Kang Hong-nip (姜弘立; 
1560-1627) fought on the Ming side. Chosŏn participation in this disastrous battle officially 
made the Chosŏn state a part of the Ming-led coalition against the Jin state.10 By 1621, the Jin 
annexation of Liaodong was complete, and Nurhaci’s frontier khanate had incorporated a million 
Liaodong Chinese into its state. This conquest changed the nature of the Jin khanate. Despite the 
difficult Jurchen-Chinese relations, it was now a multiethnic state with a more solid agricultural 
base, and it had proven itself to be a regional rival of the Ming state. By the time Nurhaci died in 
1626, shortly after his defeat at Ningyuan (寧遠) at the hands of Yuan Chonghuan (袁崇煥; d. 
                                                          
9 Yi Yŏng-ok, “Kŭ irŭm pullŏjugi: Sillok ŭi Chosŏn∙Ch’ŏngnara hoch’ing punsŏk,” Myŏng-Ch’ŏngsa yŏn’gu 38 
(2012): 59–88. 
 
10 Evelyn S. Rawski, Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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1630), he had built a formidable regional polity that would form the basis for the future Manchu 
imperial state.11 
In the meantime, Jin hegemony over Manchuria changed Nurhaci’s attitude towards the 
Chosŏn state. Right after the Battle of Sarhū, Nurhaci as the Jin khan sent a letter to the Chosŏn 
king, asking that the king answer in a letter whether he would join Nurhaci’s campaign against 
the Ming. The reply from Chosŏn came in the name of the P’yŏngan (平安) governor and only 
said that the two states should watch over their boundaries and live in peace.12 For the next two 
years, as Nurhaci’s Liaodong (遼東) campaign progressed, Nurhaci kept demanding that the 
Chosŏn state abandon the Ming and join the Jin, even using the expression “imperial edict” (Ko. 
cho, Ch. zhao) in a letter delivered to Ŭiju (義州; in P’yŏngan). As Ŭiju had been the Chosŏn 
hub for relations with the Ming, Nurhaci was asking Chosŏn to accept the Jin state as the new 
hegemon in the region, which Chosŏn was unwilling to do.13 
The coup in the Chosŏn court in 1623 ousted Prince Kwanghae, who had shown some 
willingness to leave the Ming world order by refusing Ming edicts to send troops and drive the 
Liaodong refugees away from the Chosŏn domain. King Injo (仁祖; r. 1623-49) was installed as 
the new king, and he proved to be a staunch supporter of the Ming against the Jin, which further 
alienated the Chosŏn and Jin states from each other.14  
                                                          
11 Wakeman, Jr., The Great Enterprise, 49-86; Gertraude Roth Li, “State Building before 1644,” in The Cambridge 
History of China, Volume 9, Part 1: The Ch’ing Empire to 1800, ed. Willard J. Peterson (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 27-51. 
 
12 Qing shilu (QSL hereafter), Manzhou shilu (Manzhou hereafter) 5: 253b-256a, 256b- 258a; Chosŏn wangjo sillok 
(CWS hereafter) Gwanghaegun (Chŏngjoksan version) 139: 14a (11.4.16=5/29/1619). 
 
13 Kye Sŭng-bŏm, “Hyangt’ongsa Ha Se-guk kwa Chosŏn ŭi sŏnt’aek,” 189-201. 
 
14 Han Myŏng-gi, Imjin Waeran kwa Han-Chung kwan’gye, 305-73. 
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This alienation resulted in the first war between the two states. In 1627, Hong Taiji, the 
new Jin khan, sent 30,000 troops to the Korean Peninsula, listing the following grievances: 
“troop incursions across their mutual border; Chosŏn’s refusal to repatriate political and 
economic refugees from Liaodong; its participation in the 1619 Ming offensive against the Later 
Jin, and especially the harboring of a former Ming military officer, Mao Wenlong, who built a 
regional base within Chosŏn territory from which to launch attacks on Liaodong; and Chosŏn’s 
failure to send condolences upon Nurhaci’s death in 1626.”15 
The subsequent war, which lasted about two and half weeks, resulted in a ceasefire and 
the establishment of the first formal interstate relationship between the two states. The protracted 
nature of the discussion leading to the establishment of this interstate relationship shows the vital 
importance of interstate recognition in Jin state-building efforts. The Jin demanded that the 
Chosŏn state sever its relationship with the Ming, which the Chosŏn state flatly refused to do. 
The Jin accepted the status quo on that point but objected to the Chosŏn use of the Ming reign 
title (nianhao) of Tianqi in its communications, claiming that Jin was not a tributary state of the 
Ming, and insisted on the use of the Jin reign title of Tiancong. As a compromise, the Chosŏn 
state used the sexagenary cycle (ganzhi) in its future communications with the Jin, thereby 
proclaiming more of a neutral stance on the Ming-Jin conflict.16 We can see clearly here that the 
Jin challenge to Ming hegemony took place not only on battlefields but also through diplomatic 
documents.  
The Jin also insisted on an Inner Asian ritual involving the sacrifice of a black ox and a 
white horse as well as the taking of an oath. The Chosŏn court, considering this practice barbaric, 
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refused at first but eventually acquiesced. But it did so only after finding precedents in the Spring 
and Autumn Period (ca. 771-476 BC), thereby translating this ritual from a barbaric one to an 
ancient Chinese one.17 The ritual took place on April 15, 1627, and there are striking similarities 
between this oath and the Jianzhou Jurchen oaths with other Jurchen polities such as the Yehe, 
Hada, Ula, and Hoifa, as well as those with Mongol polities such as the Khalkha and the 
Khorchin. It seems clear that the Jin state sought to move the Chosŏn state further away from the 
Ming world and into the Jin sphere of influence in Inner Asia through this ritual.18  
In any case, both states agreed to regard each other as legitimate states on equal footing, 
with Hong Taiji to be regarded as the elder brother of King Injo. Contrary to the common 
assumption that East Asia has always been dominated by a strong China that lorded its power 
over other East Asian states by imposing tributary obligations, there were many Asian precedents 
for such equal interstate relationships. From the tenth to thirteenth centuries, for example, a 
multi-state system existed in East Asia, in which China was one state among equals. This 
particular historical precedent was familiar to the Ming, Jin, and Chosŏn courts.19 In the next 
decade, however, interstate conflicts over the territorial boundary and subjecthood as well as the 
continued success of the Jin imperial project, resulted in a war that would fundamentally change 
the nature of the relationship between the two states.  
 
B. The Territorial Boundary 
                                                          
17 CWS, Injo 15: 47a-48a (5.2.30=4/15/1627), 48a-49a (5.3.1=4/16/1627), 49a-50a (5.3.2=4/17/1627), 50a-51b 
(5.3.3=4/18/1627). 
 
18 See QSL Manzhou 2: 104b-106a for an oath with the Yehe, Hada, Ula, and Hoifa; QSL Manzhou 6: 285a-288a 
for an oath with the Khalkha; and QSL Manzhou 7: 366a-368b for an oath with the Khorchin. 
 
19 For such precedents, see Morris Rossabi, ed., China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 
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Nurhaci was a state builder who sought to carve out a frontier khanate in the face of 
competition from three political entities, the Ming dynasty, Chosŏn, and the Mongols. Interstate 
recognition of his subjects and territorial domain were therefore of utmost importance to him, 
and these issues were consistently reflected in Nurhaci’s interstate policies early in his career. In 
1608, for example, Nurhaci and two Ming officials in Liaodong erected steles along the Ming-
Jurchen boundary, making an oath to not trespass across the boundary.20 During the ceasefire of 
1627, the Jin and Chosŏn states had reiterated the principle of each state’s defending its own 
boundary (ge shou fengjiang). Encroachment on the domain of the other state was explicitly 
prohibited, and the boundary was understood to correspond roughly to the Yalu River.  
The ceasefire of 1627, however, did not result in a stable territorial boundary between the 
Jin and Chosŏn states. Even though both states had agreed to see the Yalu River as this boundary 
and not encroach on it, the presence of the Ming general Mao Wenlong (毛文龍; d. 1629) in the 
Chosŏn domain, on the island of Kado (椵島; Pidao 皮島 in Chinese sources) near the mouth of 
the Yalu River, complicated the issue. Mao was a Ming officer who stationed himself on the 
island of Kado after being driven out of Liaodong in 1621. Mao recruited Liaodong refugees 
who had fled to the Chosŏn domain and engaged in guerilla warfare against the Jin state. His 
initial success earned him support from both the Ming and Chosŏn states, which allowed him to 
set up a semi-personal regime in Kado. In her recent monograph, Evelyn Rawski compared 
Nurhaci with contemporary maritime merchants/warlords such as Wang Zhi, Li Dan, and Zheng 
Zhilong. The same comparison can be extended to Mao.21 
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In fact, a contingent of the Jin army was stationed near Ŭiju even after the ceasefire on 
the pretext of guarding the region against Mao’s troops. When the Chosŏn court requested the 
complete withdrawal of Jin troops from the Chosŏn domain, Hong Taiji sought assurance from 
the Chosŏn state that it was not going to let Mao’s troops land on the Korean mainland. The 
Chosŏn court intentionally gave an ambiguous answer, promising that it would defend its own 
domain and not let others occupy it.22  
After the withdrawal of the Jin troops, however, Mao’s troops landed on the Korean 
mainland so frequently that some Jin envoys to Chosŏn even encountered them and engaged in 
battle with them in the Chosŏn domain. Moreover, the Jin troops crossed into the Chosŏn domain 
to engage Mao’s troops on many occasions.23 Even the execution of Mao by the Ming general 
Yuan Chonghuan in 1629 did not solve the problem, for Kado continued to operate as a Ming 
outpost under Mao’s lieutenants until 1637. Until this changed, the territorial boundary between 
the Jin and Chosŏn states was bound to remain more of an ideal than a reality.24 
 
C. Subjecthood 
During the ceasefire of 1627, both states agreed to repatriate the subjects of the other 
state who had fled from their own domains.25 To Nurhaci and Hong Taiji, whose state-building 
efforts were centered on military conquests, accumulating new subjects and protecting them was 
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at least as important as expanding and defending their territorial domain. In his first letter to 
King Injo after the ceasefire, for example, Hong Taiji specifically claimed three groups of people 
as his subjects to be returned if they fled to the Chosŏn domain: Jurchens, the Han Chinese of 
Liaodong, and Chosŏn subjects who had been captured in the 1627 invasion.26 The Chosŏn court 
often contested his claim. 
The two states disagreed most on the subjecthood of the Chosŏn prisoners of war. The Jin 
state considered the captives, who had already shaved their foreheads in the Jurchen fashion and 
submitted, as its rightful possessions. Thus, the Chosŏn state would have to return these runaway 
slaves or purchase them from their masters at appropriate prices. The Chosŏn state, on the other 
hand, still considered these people to be Chosŏn subjects. Furthermore, it argued that turning 
them away would go against Confucian principles (yili), as these people had risked their lives to 
come home to their families. In short, the Chosŏn captives were Chosŏn subjects because of their 
former status as Chosŏn subjects and their family ties.27 This basic disagreement would become 
a cause of great tension between the two states. When the Jin state made an official request in 
1628 for repatriation of 1,300 runaways believed to have fled to Chosŏn, for example, the 
Chosŏn court recognized that hiding the runaways might jeopardize the peace between the two 
states and even result in another war. The Chosŏn court eventually decided on making only a 
minimal gesture by returning five runaways whose residence in Ŭiju was already known to the 
Jin state. Hong Taiji did not press the issue further for the time being, but the Chosŏn captives 
would remain an issue for as long as the two states held dissenting views on their subjecthood.28 
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 The two states also disagreed on the subjecthood of the Han Chinese of Liaodong. This 
disagreement had been an issue ever since the success of the Liaodong campaign prompted many 
Liaodong refugees to flee to the Chosŏn domain.29 The Jin state, having taken most of Liaodong 
away from Ming control, considered all residents of Liaodong as its rightful booty. In 1621, after 
the Jin captured Liaoyang, Nurhaci declared to the Chosŏn court: “Return . . . all the people of 
Liaodong. Now the officials and people of Liaodong have all shaved their heads and submitted 
(uju fusifi dahaha).”30  
The Chosŏn state objected. These people were still Ming subjects, and Chosŏn, as a 
tributary state of Ming China, was obligated to protect them. This sense of tributary obligation, 
we might note, had been further strengthened by the notion that the Chosŏn state owed its 
survival to the Ming military assistance during Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasions in the late 
sixteenth century.31 From the Chosŏn perspective, the 1627 ceasefire agreement, which had 
recognized Chosŏn’s tributary relationship with the Ming, reaffirmed the validity of this Chosŏn 
position. Thus, the Chosŏn state did only the most perfunctory job of repatriating the Han 
Chinese of Liaodong, preferring to let them stay on the Chosŏn mainland or join the Ming 
outpost on Kado Island. The Jin state was aware of this situation and accused the Chosŏn court 
of breaching the agreement between the two states, as it considered these Han Chinese now to be 
its subjects.32 
                                                          
 
29 Bohnet, “Migrant and Border Subjects in Late Chosŏn Korea,” 92-108. 
 
30 QSL, Manzhou 7: 330b. 
 
31 Han Myŏng-gi, Imjin Waeran kwa Han-Chung kwan’gye; Kye Sŭng-bŏm, Chosŏn sidae haeoe p'abyŏng kwa 
Han-Chung kwan'gye: Chosŏn chibaech'ŭng ŭi Chungguk insik (Seoul: P’urun Yoksa, 2009). 
 
32 CWS Injo 20: 14b-15a (7.3.9=4/2/1629), 20: 20a-21a (7.4.11=5/3/1629), 22: 32b-33a (8.4.26=6/6/1630), 27: 19a-
b (10.10.2=11/13/1632), 28: 3a-b (11.1.25=3/4/1633), 28: 14a-15a (11.3.6=4/13/1633), 28: 21a-b 
(11.4.28=6/4/1633), 32: 30a-31b (14.6.17=7/19/1636). 
 
 
 
36 
 
Finally, the two states disagreed on the definition of the Jurchens. Both states agreed that 
the Jurchens who had already pledged allegiance to the Jin state before 1627 were Jin subjects. 
The Chosŏn state, for example, had no qualms about repatriating two Jurchens who fled to the 
Chosŏn domain in 1628.33 The disagreement was over the Jurchens who were residing in the 
Chosŏn domain as of 1627.  
Until the sixteenth century, the Chosŏn state maintained a comprehensive Jurchen policy 
that distinguished between the immigrant (Ko. hyanghwa, Ch. xianghua) and non-immigrant 
Jurchens as well as between the Jurchens living north and south of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. 
As Kenneth Robinson has shown, the two sets of boundaries—personal and territorial—did not 
always correspond.34 For our discussion, this means that when Nurhaci began to focus his 
attention on becoming the ruler of all Jurchens in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
century, some Jurchens were living near or within the Chosŏn territorial boundaries of the Yalu 
and Tumen Rivers. This situation made Nurhaci’s quest for Jurchen unification an interstate 
issue. In 1609, for example, Nurhaci made a claim over the Jurchens living in and near the 
Chosŏn domain when he petitioned the Wanli emperor as follows: “The Warkas residing along 
the Chosŏn border are all mine (miningge). Let [Chosŏn] find and send them to me.” According 
to this record, the Chosŏn court ended up repatriating 1,000 households of Warkas to Nurhaci.35 
Nurhaci’s Jurchen unification took the form of political submission following military 
conquests. Nurhaci’s campaigns against the Ula Jurchens, based north of the Tumen River, are 
especially relevant here. To mobilize their manpower, both sides heavily recruited the Jurchens 
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living near the Tumen River. Those who wished to avoid enlistment sought to move south of the 
Tumen River and settle in the Chosŏn domain, but the Chosŏn court was more concerned about 
defending its frontier from all Jurchens and turned them away. With Nurhaci’s ultimate triumph 
over the Ula in 1613, he consolidated his rule over the Jurchens north of the Tumen River with 
Chosŏn acquiescence.36  
From the Chosŏn point of view, however, the Jurchens living in the Chosŏn domain had 
given allegiance to the Chosŏn state and lived as Chosŏn subjects for generations, even 
intermarrying with ethnic Koreans. Because their loyalty, place of residence, and family ties 
connected them to the Chosŏn state, these people were different from the Jurchens under Jin rule 
and should remain Chosŏn subjects. In 1633, for example, the Chosŏn state made it clear that it 
could not send the Jurchens who had been living in the Chosŏn domain since before 1627 to the 
Jin domain.37 
From the Jin point of view, however, these people formed a part of the larger Jurchen 
community of the Eight Banners, which was the backbone of the Jin state and would form the 
source of what Mark Elliott calls Qing “ethnic sovereignty.” According to Elliott, ethnic 
sovereignty and Neo-Confucian legitimacy formed two foundations of Qing imperial authority. 
Because their heritage and kinship linked them to the Jin state, these people should be a part of 
the multiethnic but Jurchen-centered Jin state.38 Hong Taiji, for his part, made it clear that the 
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Jurchens in Korea were an indispensable part of his state. In a 1632 letter to King Injo, he made a 
clear distinction between the Chosŏn captives and the Jurchens, stating that he would stop 
demanding that the Chosŏn court return runaway Chosŏn captives, but not the Jurchens, who 
were linked by “flesh and blood.” In 1634, a Jin envoy in search of these Jurchens stated that 
even though these Jurchens had lived in Chosŏn, they were originally Jurchen and thus had 
nothing to do with Chosŏn.39  
In sum, we see the multi-dimensional nature of subjecthood during this period. Both 
states listed many factors, such as submission, heritage, blood relations, or residence, in claiming 
these groups of people as their own subjects because subjecthood could not be determined by 
single factors in multiethnic states like Jin and Chosŏn. As long as the two states’ perspectives 
on these groups of people were so disjointed, no real categorical distinction could be made 
between Chosŏn subjects and Jin subjects. Such disagreements in claims of subjecthood would 
not be resolved until well after the Chosŏn state was forced to become a Qing tributary state in 
1637, when it had to accept the Qing delineation between Qing subjects and Chosŏn subjects. 
 
D. The Establishment of the First Qing Tributary Relations: The Tributary Treaty of 1637 
 The tension between the two states, which had been exacerbated by conflicts arising from 
the issues outlined above, was further heightened as the Jin state began insisting to the Chosŏn 
state on Jin equality vis-à-vis the Ming.40 These imperial pretensions from the Jin eventually 
culminated in the proclamation of the Qing empire in 1636. For it to become a truly universal 
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empire, this new Qing state needed not only to defeat the Ming state but also to incorporate 
tributary components of the Ming world order. That is why Hong Taiji, even after he took the 
dragon throne following the recommendation of his Han officials, Manchu princes (beile), and 
allied Mongol princes, decided to send a large mission consisting of Qing officials and Mongol 
princes to the Chosŏn court to declare the new Qing order. The Chosŏn court refused to accept 
this new order, which would downgrade the Chosŏn state to an inferior of the Qing state and the 
Chosŏn king to an equal of Manchu and Mongol princes.  
Now the Qing state would attempt to corroborate its imperial claim through the actual 
submission of the Chosŏn state and its incorporation into the new Qing imperial order.41 In 
December 28, 1636, Hong Taiji personally led a march into Chosŏn with more than 100,000 
soldiers, leading the Chosŏn court to flee Hanyang by January 9, 1637. As many Korean 
historians have pointed out, the 1637 Manchu invasion of Korea was an important first chapter in 
Qing imperial formation. However, rather than looking at this war as merely a step on the path to 
the Qing campaigns against the Ming, it is important to recognize it as the first war launched in 
the name of the Qing empire, as Evelyn Rawski and a few Korean scholars have done recently.42 
Looking at Hong Taiji’s imperial edict from February 22, 1637, is instructive in this sense. 
Most immediately, this edict urged King Injo to come out of Namhan Fortress, where the 
Chosŏn court had taken refuge, and surrender as a tributary ruler. This edict also set the terms of 
the new tributary relationship between the two states. There were a few measures that were 
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meant to ensure full Chosŏn participation in the Qing campaign against the Ming, such as 
holding Chosŏn princes as hostages or requiring the Chosŏn state to send out troops and ships for 
future Qing campaigns against the Ming. These measures would soon become obsolete with the 
fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644. At the same time, this edict laid out a few principles that 
essentially formed the backbone of the Qing-Chosŏn tributary relationship for more than two 
centuries. Not only that, as I will explore in more detail below, this ceasefire reads like a treaty 
agreement at many points and in fact shares many elements in common with the later Qing-
Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), often considered the first treaty that the Qing state signed 
with a foreign state. 
 First, the edict ordered the Chosŏn state to begin a tributary relationship with the Qing 
state. The Chosŏn state was to cut all tributary ties to the Ming empire. It had to stop using the 
Ming reign title (nianhao) and give up the patent of investiture (gaoming) and the seal (ceyin) 
that it had received from the Ming. Instead, it was to accept the Qing calendar system 
(zhengshuo) and enter the Qing tributary world in both spatial and temporal senses. Within this 
new relationship, the Chosŏn state was to observe the same forms of documents and rituals as it 
had in its previous relationship with the Ming. The Qing state was finally taking the Chosŏn state 
from the Ming tributary world.  
Second, the edict claimed two groups of people as Qing subjects: the Chosŏn captives 
and the Warka people. If the captives fled back to the Chosŏn domain after having entered the 
Qing domain, they would have to be repatriated or bought from their owners. As for the Warka, a 
tribal group forming the Wild Jurchens during the Ming period, who lived in the Chosŏn domain, 
they were to be sent to the Qing.43 If the Warka tried to return to Chosŏn after repatriation to 
                                                          
43 Li, “State Building before 1644,” 10. 
 
 
 
41 
 
Qing, they would also have to be repatriated. Never again was the Chosŏn state to claim them as 
its subjects. Hong Taiji thus sought to secure the allegiance of these borderland subjects, who so 
far had formed a “Middle Ground” in this borderland and thus threatened the security of his 
state.44 Hong Taiji and later Qing rulers, as we will see below, came to consider this provision 
the most important one in the ceasefire agreement. Here, I would like to stress that this provision, 
in both its language and perceived importance, is completely in line with article IV of the Treaty 
of Nerchinsk, which stipulated mutual repatriation of deserters from 1689 on. As Andrey Ivanov 
has recently demonstrated, the negotiations leading to Nerchinsk clearly show that securing the 
loyalty of mobile borderland subjects was more important than delineating the territorial 
boundary for both states.45 
Nonetheless, and third, the edict set the Yalu River as the territorial boundary between 
the Qing domain and the Chosŏn domain. As soon as the Chosŏn captives crossed the Yalu 
River, they would not be allowed to leave the Qing domain. The Yalu River clearly served as the 
point of no return and the beginning of the Qing domain. In short, this edict established some 
basic protocols for the Qing-Chosŏn tributary relationship, especially regarding issues of 
subjecthood and boundaries.46   
Protocols, however, do not automatically translate into practice. In the following sections, 
I will look at how the Qing and Chosŏn states implemented these protocols in practice by 
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focusing on the two most important boundaries established by this new tributary relationship: 
subjecthood and the territorial boundary. 
 
II. Subjecthood: Between Imperial and Tributary Subjects 
 
A. 1637-44: Expanding the Category of Imperial Subject 
In a perceptive analysis of the Pyrenean frontier of France and Spain, Peter Sahlins shows 
how the idea of jurisdictional sovereignty, most importantly the relationship between a king and 
the subjects who pledged him allegiance, was much more important than the idea of territorial 
sovereignty in seventeenth century Europe. For much of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, both notions coexisted in a state of complex interplay. On a similar note, Thongchai 
Winichakul has shown how, according to the traditional Siamese perspective, the sphere of a 
kingdom could be defined only by power relationships between the king and the townships that 
pledged allegiance to him.47 
Like these early modern counterparts, Hong Taiji was most interested in his control over 
people. As far as he was concerned, the allocation and demarcation of Qing subjects and Chosŏn 
subjects had been completed by February 22, 1637, when King Injo accepted the terms of the 
ceasefire agreement and formally submitted to him. For this demarcation to be maintained, 
however, the Qing state needed the cooperation of the Chosŏn state. As the Chosŏn state was an 
unwilling tributary state at best, though, the maintenance of demarcation was far from a foregone 
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conclusion at the end of the war in 1637. But within a few years, as we will see next, the Qing 
had mostly succeeded in inducing such cooperation from the Chosŏn state. 
 
1. Chosŏn Resistance (1637-40) 
From 1637 to 1640, the Chosŏn state was not a cooperative partner in maintaining the 
demarcation between Qing and Chosŏn subjects. First, the Chosŏn state showed little initiative in 
repatriating Chosŏn captives who fled back to Chosŏn. In 1637, soon after the ceasefire, King 
Injo was already petitioning the Qing Board of Rites that he be excused from returning the 
Chosŏn captives who had fled to his domain. The Board flatly refused this request.48 It is not 
surprising that King Injo and the Chosŏn court at large found it especially difficult to repatriate 
these people. After all, these captives had cried out to Injo when he was on his way to surrender 
personally to Hong Taiji: “Our king, our king, do you abandon us so?”49 As Han Myŏng-gi has 
pointed out, the legitimacy of the Chosŏn court after the war was very fragile. Returning the 
runaway Chosŏn captives would have meant abandoning these people twice and could have had 
serious political ramifications for King Injo.50 
As early as summer 1637, King Injo remarked to his officials that he was too grieved to 
send back the “returners” (Kr. chuhoe in, Ch. zouhui ren) and ordered that they be ransomed 
using the state treasury.51 It is important to note that the king used the expression “returning” to 
describe the runaway captives. He was emphasizing his view that these were Chosŏn subjects 
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simply returning home (Chosŏn) rather than fleeing from home (Qing). Redeeming the captives, 
however, was an untenable policy due to their staggering number and the steadily rising price for 
redeeming them. Redeeming all “returners” would have exhausted the treasury of the Chosŏn 
state, as the number of the Chosŏn captives during the 1637 war is estimated between tens of 
thousands and a half million.52 Thus, the Chosŏn court took a general policy of passively 
resisting the Qing order to send back all “returners.” 
Between 1637 and 1640, the Chosŏn court did send back runaway captives on many 
occasions. In 1638, for example, the Chosŏn court decided to return a Chosŏn captive who had 
fled to Korea with a horse he had stolen. Reasoning that the Qing authorities must have noticed 
his escape because of the stolen horse, the Chosŏn court sent him back to the Qing domain.53 The 
Qing court, however, continuously and correctly suspected the Chosŏn court of hiding many 
other runaway captives. 
Second, the Chosŏn state showed some ambivalence about the repatriation of Han 
Chinese runaways, who had not been explicitly mentioned in Hong Taiji’s February 22, 1637, 
edict. It is not clear from the sources when the Qing state first made a request for the repatriation 
of the Han Chinese and what its terms were, but the Chosŏn state was rounding up the Han 
Chinese living in the Chosŏn domain and sending them to Qing as early as the fall of 1637. That 
timing might have had something to do with the Qing conquest of the Ming outpost in Kado 
(Pidao), which the Qing considered both a military threat and a place of refuge for Han Chinese 
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runaways, in the summer of 1637.54 The Chosŏn state repatriated at least 23 runaways in 1638, 
four runaways in 1639, and 13 runaways through the fall of 1640. At the same time, however, 
165 Han Chinese who had fled the Ming outpost in Kado (Pidao) Island after its fall in 1637 
were still living in P’yŏngan province as of 1640 with active support from the Chosŏn state.55  
Third, the Chosŏn state continuously competed with the Qing state over the definition of 
Qing and Chosŏn subjecthood. The term Warka that Hong Taiji used in his February 22, 1637, 
edict is a good example. From the Chosŏn perspective, the term Warka was restricted to the first 
generation of the “naturalized Jurchens,” those who had submitted to Chosŏn rule themselves. 
Thus, the Chosŏn court claimed their descendants, who were born mostly of marriages with 
Chosŏn subjects, as Chosŏn subjects. The Qing court, however, extended its claim to these 
descendants as well.  
An exchange in 1638 between Crown Prince Sohyŏn (昭顯; 1612-45), held as a hostage 
in Shenyang (瀋陽), the Qing capital, and Qing Board of Revenue officials Mafuta (馬福塔; 
1594-1640) and Inggūldai (英俄爾岱; 1596-1648), who were in charge of Chosŏn affairs, is 
instructive.56 The crown prince maintained that the 1637 edict for the transfer of the Jurchens 
only referred to these naturalized Jurchens. The Qing officials countered that the descendants of 
Qing subjects were Qing subjects as well. Moreover, they argued that the Chosŏn court should 
send the Chosŏn family members of the newly incorporated Qing subjects so that they could live 
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as families. After this exchange, the Qing Board of Revenue gave a list of 690 Jurchens, with 
their names and places of residence, to the Chosŏn envoys returning to Hanyang. The Chosŏn 
court reluctantly found and sent 36 people on the list to Shenyang.57  
Even after this, the Chosŏn court took every chance to emphasize the distinction between 
the naturalized Jurchens and their descendants. In a 1639 lateral communication (Kr. chamun, 
Ch. ziwen) to the Qing Board of Rites on finding and sending seven Jurchens, for example, King 
Injo pointed out that four of seven Jurchens “were all descendants of the Jurchens naturalized 
(Kr. hyanghwa, Ch. xianghua) a long time ago and born of marriages with the subjects of the 
small state (i.e. Chosŏn; Kr. sobang, Ch. xiaobang).” Injo added that their names were even 
listed on Chosŏn military registers, but the Qing court did not accept this distinction and 
incorporated all seven as Qing subjects.58  
As mentioned, the perfunctory nature of the Chosŏn state’s cooperation did not go 
unnoticed, and on November 27, 1640, Hong Taiji issued an edict condemning ten crimes of 
King Injo. Three of the crimes had to do with the topic at hand: not returning runaway Chosŏn 
captives; not sending runaway Han Chinese and disguising them in Chosŏn attire; and doing a 
perfunctory job of tracking down and sending Chosŏn family members of the Warka.59 Hong 
Taiji sent Inggūldai and two other officials to Ŭiju to call to account King Injo for his crimes, try 
his ministers, and oversee the search for and repatriation of those he considered Qing subjects. 
King Injo’s statement to his officials during this diplomatic crisis shows that he was still 
reluctant to give up on runaway Chosŏn captives: “As for those who have returned (Kr. chuhoe 
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in, Ch. zouhui ren), words cannot describe the pity of their situation, and [the issue] concerns 
human feelings. Never can it be lightly allowed. First use a few naturalized [Jurchens] (Kr. 
hyanghwa, Ch. xianghua) to do the job nominally. Searching and repatriating runaway Han 
Chinese (Kr. to Han, Ch. tao Han) also cannot stop.”60 Clearly, protecting the runaway Chosŏn 
captives from repatriation was still the top priority of the Chosŏn state.  
By February 5, 1641, Inggūldai was back in Shenyang with the outcome of a major trial 
of Chosŏn ministers, which will be discussed in chapter three, and with the repatriation of 512 
people from Chosŏn: 151 Jurchen men, 3 Jurchen women, 124 Chosŏn men, 64 Chosŏn women, 
152 Han Chinese men, and 18 Han Chinese women. The Jurchens became “new Manchus (xin 
Manzhou)” and were incorporated into the Na-lin (納林) company of the Plain Yellow Banner 
and the Bang-na-mi (邦納密) company of the Plain Red Banner. The Chosŏn captives and Han 
Chinese were handed over to the Board of War so that they could be returned to their original 
masters.61 
 The fact that both the Qing and Chosŏn courts paid so much attention to relatively a small 
number of individuals suggests that the repatriation of these groups of borderland residents might 
have stood as a symbol of subjecthood and jurisdiction.62 From the Chosŏn perspective, the 
legitimacy of the court, which arose in part from its ability to protect its subjects, was at stake. 
From the perspective of Qing, with its economy still largely based on the spoils of war and then 
in the middle of an all-out war with the Ming state, it was the economic and military foundation 
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of the state that was at stake. Inggūldai’s mission to Ŭiju had the immediate effect of taming the 
Chosŏn court, which became a more cooperative partner overall, and especially in returning 
people the Qing court claimed as its subjects. The Chosŏn sources from 1641 to 1644 record 
numerous instances of this sort. 
 
2. Chosŏn Cooperation (1641-44) 
As we have seen above, the Chosŏn court effectively decided to give up on the Jurchens 
and the Han Chinese runaways to focus on Chosŏn runaways, whose protection was a top 
priority of the court. In fact, I have not been able to find any instance in which the Chosŏn state 
failed to send back Han Chinese runaways after 1640. In 1641, for example, eight Han Chinese 
runaways were returned to Shenyang as soon as they were discovered. In 1644, nine Han 
Chinese escaping from Shenyang were sent back.63  
This attitude is in line with how the Chosŏn court dealt with the new problem of Ming 
subjects entering the Chosŏn domain. In 1637, the Qing state had forced the Chosŏn state to cut 
off all ties to the Ming as a Qing tributary state and to treat Ming forces as enemy forces.64 Over 
the next few years, the Qing state required the Chosŏn state to provide manpower, ships, and 
resources for Qing campaigns against the Ming, and it repeatedly warned the Chosŏn state 
against maintaining relations with the Ming state. The Chosŏn court accordingly decided on and 
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maintained a policy of minimizing contact with Ming ships in the Chosŏn seas and not allowing 
Ming ships to land on the peninsula.65  
The Chosŏn state, however, like most premodern states, did not have a state apparatus 
adequate to control its borderlands. Indeed, as Eric Tagliacozzo and Adam McKeown have 
shown, border control has been a challenging task even for modern colonial empires and nation-
states.66 Its subjects, despite official state policy, often escaped the reach of the state and 
interacted with Ming ships. Ming ships also often evaded the Chosŏn authorities, landing on 
Chosŏn islands for extended periods of time. The Chosŏn court, moreover, revealed its 
ambivalence about cutting off all ties with the Ming court by secretly communicating with Ming 
ships, even sending a monk to the Ming and receiving an official lateral communication from the 
Ming official Hong Chengchou (洪承疇; d. 1665).67 
It was in this context that the Chosŏn court faced the complicated question of what to do 
with Han Chinese castaways from Ming China. In 1641, a Ming ship was shipwrecked off an 
island in Chŏlla (全羅) province, and six sailors survived. Even though they wished to be 
returned to Ming, the Border Defense Command (pibyŏnsa) recommended sending them to 
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Qing, reasoning that the Qing court knew everything that happened within Chosŏn. The king 
gave his assent, and the sailors were all sent to Shenyang.68  
Indeed, the Qing state did come to learn that the Chosŏn state had been maintaining 
communications with the Ming state, especially after the surrender of Hong Chengchou in 1642. 
Hong Taiji condemned the Chosŏn king in an edict and ordered him to send the provincial 
officials responsible to Fenghuangcheng so that they could be tried by Inggūldai and the Chosŏn 
crown prince. The details of the trial will be discussed in the section below, but it eventually 
resulted in the imprisonment of the chief state councilor (yŏngŭijŏng), Ch’oe Myŏng-gil 
(崔鳴吉; 1586-1647), in 1643.69 After this trial, the Chosŏn state maintained a more proactive 
policy on Ming ships. Later in the same year, Chosŏn forces engaged nine Ming ships in battle 
off the shores of P’yŏngan province, killing many Ming soldiers and capturing nine. The Chosŏn 
court decided to send them to Shenyang. Upon their arrival in Shenyang, two of them who turned 
out to be runaways from Qing were decapitated, while seven other Ming subjects were sent to 
Qing state farms. The Qing court praised the king for performing his duty as a tributary ruler and 
bestowed 500 taels of silver on him, proving that the Chosŏn court had made the right decision.70  
In a comparable manner, the Chosŏn court readily complied with Qing requests to find 
and send Jurchens residing in the Chosŏn domain. The court’s concern with filling the Qing 
quota, which was handed down to local officials, even resulted in ordinary Chosŏn subjects 
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being sent to Shenyang. Some of these cases have been vividly recorded in Simyang ilgi 
(瀋陽日記), written by the Chosŏn officials serving Crown Prince Sohyŏn in Shenyang. In 1642, 
for example, the Chosŏn court sent a Chosŏn man to Shenyang in a case of misidentification. 
Even though this man claimed that he was a Chosŏn subject after his arrival in Shenyang, he 
soon heard about the benefits of bannerman status from some Jurchens who had been 
incorporated as new Manchus. In the end, he claimed that his marriage to a naturalized Jurchen 
woman also made him a Qing subject, and the Qing authorities accepted his story without even 
verifying his claim.71  
The repatriation of the Jurchens would continue until May 1644, when the Qing court 
promulgated an edict to King Injo in the name of the newly enthroned Shunzhi emperor: 
“[Regarding] the Warka people in the east who have not been sent from your domain yet, our 
imperial father [Hong Taiji] thought that there was no difference (wuyi) whether they were in 
your country (er Chaoxian) or in our country (wo guo). [He] had long wanted to stop it, but 
never issued the edict . . . let sending of these people permanently stop (yong xing tingzhi).”72 
With the beginning of a full-on Qing conquest of China Proper, the obsession of the Qing court 
might have shifted from the Qing-Chosŏn borderland. 
When this edict was being promulgated, in fact, 14 Jurchens sent out by the Chosŏn court 
were approaching the Yalu River on their way to Shenyang. The Chosŏn court promptly turned 
them around, and they remained Chosŏn subjects.73 For the borderland Jurchens, the line had 
been drawn once and for all: Jurchens already incorporated as Manchu bannermen on the Qing 
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side of the river would remain Qing subjects, whereas Jurchens who remained on the Chosŏn 
side of the river would remain Chosŏn subjects.  
 
3. Qing Repatriation of Chosŏn Subjects (1637-44) 
We have seen how the Qing state successfully pressured the Chosŏn government to 
return the runaway Qing subjects and the Jurchens remaining in the Chosŏn domain from 1637 
to 1644. Korean scholars of the Qing invasions of Chosŏn have focused on this problem for a 
long time. Their analyses tend to focus on the avarice of Qing armies fixated on capturing as 
many captives as possible and thus emphasize the economic aspect of the “returner” problem.74 
This narrative conforms with the general Qing military strategy up to 1644 that focused on “hit-
and-run raids . . . for loot, bounty, slaves, and livestock.”75  
Despite its merits, this narrative tends to obscure the genuine Qing interest in maintaining 
the demarcation between Qing and Chosŏn subjects. Here, I will show how the Qing state kept 
up its end of the bargain from the February 22, 1637, ceasefire agreement. For one, the Qing 
acknowledged the transformation of the status of Chosŏn subjects as of February 22, 1637. 
Before February 22, the Qing state saw Chosŏn subjects as subjects of an enemy state who could 
be captured and incorporated as slaves into the Qing state. Hong Taiji’s edict to the Board of 
Rites on August 10, 1637, illustrates that perception. Recollecting the war, Hong Taiji contrasted 
the Chosŏn state, which had sinned against him, and the Qing soldiers, who had performed 
meritorious service for him. In letting the Qing soldiers capture Chosŏn subjects, Hong Taiji had 
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simply punished the Chosŏn state and rewarded the Qing soldiers.76 With King Injo’s surrender 
and the establishment of a tributary relationship between the two states, however, Chosŏn 
subjects were transformed into tributary subjects.  
About two weeks after he surrendered to Hong Taiji, King Injo entrusted the crown 
prince, who was traveling as a hostage to Shenyang with the Qing forces, with the mission of 
obtaining the release of the Chosŏn subjects who had been captured after the ceasefire. The Qing 
court complied with this request and on at least 16 separate occasions repatriated at least 64 
Chosŏn subjects captured after the ceasefire.77  
Qing acknowledgement of the “legal” transformation of Chosŏn subjects from enemy 
subjects to tributary subjects was reaffirmed in the summer of 1637, when Qing forces 
conquered the Ming outpost in Kado (Pidao) with the help of some Chosŏn troops. When Hong 
Taiji learned that some Chosŏn subjects had been captured on the island, he promptly repatriated 
them to P’yŏngan province.78 Again in 1643, the Qing state repatriated 16 Chosŏn soldiers who 
had escaped from the Ming garrison in Ningyuan. These soldiers, originally part of the Chosŏn 
contingency aiding in the 1640 Qing campaigns against Ming, had been shipwrecked and drifted 
to Ningyuan, where they were forced to serve in the Ming garrison until their escape.79 
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The other general policy that the Qing adopted to maintain the demarcation between Qing 
and Chosŏn subjects was not accepting Chosŏn defectors after the ceasefire. In early 1638, a few 
Chosŏn captives who had fled to Chosŏn in the summer of 1637 came back to Shenyang with six 
of their relatives from Chosŏn. The Qing authorities arrested these six and repatriated them to 
Chosŏn under imperial order despite their wish to submit to Qing.80 In 1640, King Injo requested 
that the Qing Board of Revenue repatriate 20 Chosŏn subjects who had fled to Yechun (也春; 
later Huncun). The Board of Revenue investigated the matter and determined 14 of them to be 
Warka who had fled to Chosŏn and come back and six of them to be Chosŏn subjects. Hong 
Taiji ordered the Board to repatriate the six Chosŏn subjects.81 
 
B. 1645-1690s 
 
1. Imperial Lessons: All the Emperor’s Men  
 As pressure from the Qing state tapered off with the Qing conquest of China Proper, the 
Chosŏn state reverted to passive cooperation in the repatriation of runaway Qing subjects. As for 
the runaway Chosŏn captives, the Chosŏn state developed a general policy of repatriating them 
only when the Qing state made specific requests for repatriation.  
As of 1645, for example, 24 runaway Chosŏn captives were detained in P’yŏngan 
province in case the Qing court requested their repatriation. With no such request forthcoming, 
the Chosŏn court decided to release some of them and hand them over to their relatives. In 1647, 
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the nine of the 24 who had no relatives to claim them were released as well.82 In contrast, in late 
1653, the Qing Board of Rites specifically named two runaway Chosŏn captives to be repatriated 
to Qing. The Chosŏn state repatriated them the following year, but it is doubtful that it would 
have taken any action without such a specific request from the Qing state.83  
This sense of complacency was shattered in 1666. It all started with a Chosŏn captive 
named An Ch’u-wŏn (安秋元), who escaped from 27 years of servitude in Shenyang and Beijing 
and made it to the Chosŏn domain in 1664. He still remembered the names of his father and 
grandfather as well as where he used to live before he was captured as a 13-year-old boy during 
the 1637 war. Instead of repatriating him, the Chosŏn court decided to move him to his 
hometown in Kyŏnggi (京畿) province, even providing him with food and clothing. Upon his 
arrival at his hometown, however, An discovered that all his family members had died. After 
spending about a year and half in his hometown with no means of livelihood, An decided to 
make his way back to the Qing domain. He was arrested in Fenghuangcheng (鳳凰城), and his 
case was eventually reported to Beijing.84  
The Qing court sent two officials from the Board of Revenue to Hanyang to investigate 
this and other unrelated incidents, and the envoys brought An (known as Xiao Er 小二 in Qing) 
along with them. Clearly realizing that the Qing court took this case seriously, King Hyŏnjong 
(顯宗; r. 1659-74) and his ministers had many discussions about damage control before the 
arrival of the Qing envoys. After all, the court had made a conscious decision not to repatriate 
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An, so it concocted a more acceptable answer: The court had originally meant to memorialize the 
emperor after letting An see his family, but he had unexpectedly escaped before that could 
happen. This answer, however, was not enough to satisfy the Qing envoys, who kept reminding 
the Chosŏn ministers that Hong Taiji’s February 1637 edict had strictly forbidden the hiding of 
runaway captives.85 The trial reached its climax when the Qing envoys declared the guilt of the 
Chosŏn high ministers: 
The [chief] envoy [Lei-hu] said: “As high ministers, they are responsible for governing. 
Yet they did not memorialize the emperor when a Qing subject (Ch. Shangguo zhi ren, 
Kr. Sangguk chi in) fled here and even shielded him, letting him stay for three years . . . 
This is a grave crime that should be punished by death (Ch. silü, Kr. sayul).” The king 
immediately stood up and kowtowed toward the north, saying: “This is my crime (Ch. yu 
zhi zui, Kr. yŏ chi choe). How dare I not ask the emperor for my punishment (Ch. qingzui, 
Kr. ch’ŏngjoe)?” The vice envoy [Mušu] also stood up and said: “We will inform the 
emperor upon our return about the king shouldering the blame. But today we are here to 
deliberate on the crimes of the ministers.” . . . The king said: “. . . How could the 
ministers’ crimes this time deserve death?” The envoy responded: “Hiding a Qing 
subject, what kind of crime is it?” . . . The king said: “The whole world belongs to the 
emperor. How can not reporting on one runaway lead to discussion of death?”86 
 
This dialogue is interesting because it shows two different perspectives on the status of 
An Ch’u-wŏn/Xiao Er. From the king’s perspective, or at least the perspective he decided to 
adopt in this political crisis, An had simply moved from one part of the Qing empire to another, 
so the crime of hiding him could not be that serious. After all, the Qing court had used this 
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rationale in its 1644 decision to exempt the Chosŏn court from finding and sending Warka 
people in Chosŏn to Qing. The Qing envoys, however, rejected the king’s claim. Xiao Er, as a 
Qing subject, was the Qing emperor’s property. The Chosŏn king and the ministers had thus 
committed a grave crime by hiding imperial property. This joint trial eventually resulted in an 
adjudication that sentenced King Hyŏnjong to a fine of 5,000 taels of silver, which marked the 
first time that the Qing judiciary carried out such a punishment against a Chosŏn king. The king 
and his ministers were humiliated by this outcome, which they considered to be the worst affront 
to the Chosŏn court since King Injo’s personal surrender to Hong Taiji at Samjŏndo.87  
The Qing state had finally taught an imperial lesson to the Chosŏn state. From then on, 
the Chosŏn state never failed to send back a runaway Chosŏn captive. In 1668, a runaway named 
Hong Nu-p’i was captured in P’yŏngan province. Despite identifying him as a “returner,” the 
Chosŏn court immediately decided to send him away. In 1669, a man named Kim Tae-sŏn and a 
man named Ch’oe Kil entered the Chosŏn domain on separate occasions. Even though the 
Chosŏn court interviewed Ch’oe, who had fled from Mongolia, to get information about the 
Mongols, it sent both from Ŭiju to Fenghuangcheng. Again, although the court recognized both 
individuals as “returners,” it had decided that they could not “return” to Chosŏn.88  
This conceptual shift within the Chosŏn court from “returners” to “Qing subjects” 
reached the next level in 1675, when a man named An Tan was captured in Ŭiju after crossing 
the Yalu River. Now, the Chosŏn court identified An Tan as “one Qing subject (Ch. Qing ren, 
Kr. Ch’ŏng in) who called himself a returner.” This linguistic shift foreshadowed An’s fate. 
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After An’s capture, the Ŭiju prefect immediately informed Qing envoys who happened to be 
staying in Ŭiju, and the envoys in turn sent An to Fenghuangcheng. Even though An lamented 
that he was being sent to his death, the Chosŏn court had finally been forced to admit that these 
“returners,” as Qing subjects, could not return home anymore.89  
This lesson applied to Han Chinese runaways as well. In 1675, three Han Chinese 
reached the Tumen River, begging for rice and expressing their wish to take refuge in Chosŏn. 
The local official declined the request and sent them away. In 1680, a Han Chinese crossed the 
Tumen River and entered Hamgyŏng province, saying that he had escaped from his cruel master 
and refusing to go back. The Chosŏn court appointed an officer to repatriate him to Huncun 
(琿春). When the Qing officer in Huncun refused to accept the Han Chinese, the Chosŏn officer 
persuaded him by saying that this matter would be memorialized to the emperor. The last episode 
is especially telling, because it shows how much initiative the Chosŏn state was taking in 
repatriating the Han Chinese runaways by this time.90 
The changing geopolitics in China Proper introduced a new group of people as potential 
Qing subjects: Han Chinese castaways in the Chosŏn domain. With the death of the Ming 
Chongzhen (崇禎; r. 1628-44) emperor and the Qing conquest of Beijing in 1644, the Qing 
declared the end of the Ming dynasty and claimed, as its successor dynasty, the former Ming 
domain and former Ming subjects. This, however, was a claim also set forth by various Southern 
Ming regimes: the Hongguang regime (1644-5) based in the Yangzi region, the Longwu regime 
(1645-6) based on the southeastern coast, and the Yongli regime (1646-62) based in Lingnan and 
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then the southwest. The Qing conquest of China Proper, therefore, was as much about military 
victories as it was about incorporating former Ming subjects and lands into its state. As a sign of 
submission, all the men incorporated into the Qing state were required to wear their hair in 
Manchu style, shaving their foreheads and braiding the remaining hair into queues.91 
This competition over the legitimacy of succession became a concrete problem for the 
Chosŏn state in the form of Han Chinese castaways. In 1644, a ship sailing from Guangdong to 
Nagasaki was shipwrecked off an island in Chŏlla province. The Chosŏn court recognized the 
extreme difficulty of dealing with the 52 castaways who had survived, especially considering the 
war-torn condition of China Proper at that moment. To further complicate the matter, earlier in 
the same year, the Chosŏn court had received requests from the Tokugawa shogunate (1600-
1868) to send people shipwrecked in Korea to Japan so that the Japanese authorities could find 
and punish Japanese Catholic fugitives hiding amongst them. In the end, the Chosŏn court 
decided to hand them to authorities on Tsushima Island, the hub of Chosŏn-Tokugawa relations, 
reasoning that they were bound for Nagasaki anyway. The shogunate thanked the Chosŏn court, 
saying that there were indeed five Catholics among them. It requested that the Chosŏn court 
investigate foreign ships and repatriate castaways to Japan in the future, and the Chosŏn court 
agreed to do so. The Chosŏn court did not report any of this to the Qing court.92 
Soon, the Chosŏn court was faced with another decision. In 1647, a ship sailing from 
Fujian was shipwrecked off Kyŏngsang (慶尚) province, and 51 merchants onboard survived. 
From Xu Sheng, the owner of the ship, the Chosŏn court learned about the fall of the Hongguang 
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regime, the enthronement of the Prince of Tang as the Longwu emperor, and the Qing conquest 
of nine Ming provinces. A discussion ensued within the Chosŏn court about what to do with 
them. On one hand, Qing envoys were on their way to Hanyang at that moment. On the other 
hand, the Chosŏn court had already promised to repatriate castaways to Japan. In the end, the 
Chosŏn court decided to hand over the castaways to the envoys so that they could be brought to 
Qing.93  
What happened in 1650 made it clear that the Chosŏn court had made the right choice in 
sending the Fujianese merchants to Qing. In 1649, the Kyŏngsang naval commander captured a 
foreign ship passing through Chosŏn waters. On board were merchants from Shanxi, Henan, and 
Hubei provinces, then firmly under Qing rule, who were headed to Japan. The Chosŏn court 
handed them over to Qing envoys on their way back to Beijing, and it also memorialized the 
Qing court about its worries that Japan, which had been acting suspiciously over the years, 
would be angered by the repatriation of these Han Chinese merchants to Qing. In its response the 
next year, the Qing court made its position on this issue clear. The Shunzhi emperor sent Qing 
envoys to investigate the officials responsible for memorializing, with an edict that asked: “The 
[Chosŏn] officials who reported, do they wish to make Han Chinese into Japanese and give them 
to Japan? Or do they think the Ming state still exists? Or do they wish to seize and send Our Han 
Chinese (zhen zhi Hanren) to Japan? . . . All Under Heaven (Tianxia) has already been unified, 
and the populace (yizhao) has all returned to the registers and maps (gui bantu).”94  
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This was another imperial lesson from the Qing court: All Han Chinese people belonged 
to the Qing emperor now, and all Han Chinese shipwrecked in Korea had to be sent to Qing. The 
Chosŏn court applied this new lesson on the definition of Qing subjecthood in future cases. In 
spring 1652, 28 Han Chinese merchants from Suzhou drifted to Korea. They had originally been 
subjects of the Hongguang emperor but had been sojourning in Vietnam since the fall of the 
regime. Just a few months before, they had shaved their foreheads and set sail from Japan to go 
back to China. Weakened and broken from their ordeal, however, they now pleaded with the 
Chosŏn court to send them back to Japan. In spite of this, the Chosŏn court decided to repatriate 
them to Beijing. The reaction from the Shunzhi emperor made it clear that the Chosŏn court had 
made the right choice. In an edict, he remarked that these Han Chinese were all “Our subjects 
(zhen zhi chizi)” and ordered them to be returned to their places of origin.95  
In 1667, the Chosŏn court sent Han Chinese castaways from Taiwan to Beijing despite 
their wish to be returned to Japan or to be allowed to sail on their own. Their claim that they 
were subjects of the Yongli emperor and the fact they had not shaved their foreheads aroused 
some protest within the court and much protest outside the court about the court’s decision, but it 
was not enough to counter the court’s concern over possible Qing retaliation. Also, even though 
the Chosŏn court did not know of Yongli’s death in 1662, it knew enough to speculate that these 
castaways were not Yongli’s subjects.96 Indeed, the exchange between the Chosŏn court and the 
castaways makes it clear that they were under the jurisdiction of Zheng Jing (鄭經; 1642-81), the 
son of Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga), who ruled Taiwan.97  
                                                          
95 CWS Hyojong 8: 35b-36a (3.3.30=5/7/1652), 3.6.14 (7/19/1652); QSL Shizu, 68: 537a-b (SZ9.9.15=10/17/1652). 
 
96 CWS Hyŏnjong 14: 2a-b (8.6.21=8/10/1667), 14: 2b-3b (8.6.23=8/12/1667), 14: 9a (8.7.14=9/1/1667), 14: 21b 
(8.9.22=11/7/1667), 14: 23a-b (8.10.3=11/18/1667), 14: 40b (9.3.4=4/14/1668). 
 
97 On the Zheng regime, see Tonio Andrade, How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization 
in the Seventeenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 208-245; Xing Hang, Conflict and 
 
 
62 
 
Not all Han Chinese castaways were repatriated to Qing, however. In 1670, for example, 
a provincial official in Cheju allowed a group of Han Chinese castaways to sail away. In 1677, 
the Chosŏn court employed two Han Chinese castaways as language teachers for their 
interpreters, emphasizing that they were subjects of the Ming dynasty.98 But in any case, the 
Qing forces finalized the conquest of the former Ming domain by suppressing the Rebellion of 
the Three Feudatories (1673-81) and then conquering Taiwan in 1683. All Han Chinese who 
found their way to the Chosŏn domain were treated as Qing subjects from then on. In that sense, 
we could argue that Hong Taiji’s desire to delineate a clear boundary between Qing subjects and 
Chosŏn subjects was only achieved in the 1680s. As long as there was the smallest hope for 
Ming restoration, a concept of Ming subjects distinct from Qing subjects could persist from the 
Chosŏn perspective. When even that faint hope disappeared, the Chosŏn court turned to other 
ways, mainly ritual, to commemorate the fallen imperial house of Ming.99  
 
2. Giving Back What Belonged to the Chosŏn King 
From 1645 to the end of the seventeenth century, the Qing state maintained the policy 
begun in 1637 of not incorporating Chosŏn subjects into the Qing state. During the Qing 
conquest of China Proper, the Qing state repatriated Chosŏn soldiers who submitted to Qing 
forces. In the summer of 1645, for example, the Qing state repatriated two Chosŏn soldiers 
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escaping from Southern Ming forces on an island in the Bohai Sea.100 In the winter of 1646, the 
Qing Board of Revenue again repatriated 64 Chosŏn soldiers, who had been captured in 
Shandong, under an imperial order, which reasoned that they should be sent back to Chosŏn now 
that the Central Plains (Zhongyuan) had already become Qing domain (ru bantu).101  
The Qing state also consistently turned away Chosŏn border residents who wished to 
defect to Qing. In 1648, for example, a 15-year-old boy crossed the Yalu River and arrived in 
Fenghuangcheng to follow the Qing official Gūlmahūn (Chŏng Myŏng-su) to Beijing. Gūlmahūn 
arrested and repatriated him to Chosŏn.102 In 1661, when an unnamed Ŭiju resident arrested in 
Fenghuangcheng expressed his wish to defect (tou chong), the Qing court again repatriated him 
to Chosŏn.103 In 1666, another Chosŏn subject named Ch’oe Sun-il (崔順一) was arrested in 
Fenghuangcheng. Even though he wished to defect as well, the Qing court repatriated him to 
Chosŏn.104 
Finally, the Qing state also found and repatriated members of the Chosŏn tributary 
mission who remained in the Qing domain after the mission’s completion. In 1661, Ch’oe Tŏk-
sang (崔德尙), a servant accompanying the Chosŏn tributary mission to Beijing, ran away from 
the mission in Xingshan (杏山) and hid at the house of a Qing subject. He was arrested and 
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repatriated to Ŭiju.105 In 1663, another Chosŏn subject who had been separated from the tributary 
mission due to illness was arrested in Guangning (廣寧) and repatriated to Ŭiju.106  
 
3. Between Imperial Subjects and Tributary Subjects  
From the discussion above, it has become clear that the Qing and Chosŏn states came to a 
shared understanding of the demarcation between Qing subjects and Chosŏn subjects. Was 
subjecthood in Qing-Chosŏn relations, then, a status that could not be transferred at all? In short, 
an official transfer was only possible by a Qing imperial order. Here I will provide two examples 
to show how the theoretically universal nature of the Qing emperorship could enable the transfer 
of subjecthood between the Qing imperial state and the Chosŏn tributary state.  
The first example is that of Princess Ŭisun (義順; d. 1662), a collateral member of the 
Chosŏn royal family. In 1650, the Qing regent Dorgon sent envoys to Chosŏn to choose a 
Chosŏn princess for him to take as his wife. The Chosŏn court selected Princess Ŭisun and sent 
her to Beijing to be married to Dorgon. She was soon widowed, however, as Dorgon suddenly 
died on the last day of 1650. After Dorgon was posthumously condemned and stripped of his 
rank less than three months after his death, she was married to Bolo (博洛; 1613?-52). By 1652, 
she had been widowed a second time and began her solitary life as a widow in the Qing court. In 
1656, her father, sent to Beijing as an envoy, requested during a banquet that he be allowed to 
take his daughter home with him. The Shunzhi emperor eventually granted his approval, noting 
                                                          
105 TMHG 65: 1b (zi from Board of Rites to Hyŏnjong; SZ18.i7.8=9/1/1661). 
 
106 TMHG 65: 2b-3a (zi from Board of Rites to Hyŏnjong; KX2.10.1=10/31/1663). 
 
 
 
65 
 
that his universal love (bo’ai) knew no boundary between the inner and the outer (neiwai). 
Princess Ŭisun could now return “home” as a Chosŏn subject.107  
The second example is that of Ming-a-na (明阿納). In 1681, Ming-a-na, a Manchu 
officer in Ningguta (寧古塔), petitioned Langtan (郎談; 1634-95), the vice commander-in-chief 
(fudutong) of the Manchu Plain White Banner, on the matter of his family. According to him, his 
father Er-ji-ken (爾濟肯) had been abducted by a Chosŏn subject as a child and gotten married in 
Chosŏn, and Ming-a-na himself had been born there. In 1637, he and his father returned to Qing 
as Qing subjects, but his mother was not allowed to come with them since she was a Chosŏn 
subject. His parents were barely 20 years old then, and neither of them had remarried though 
almost 50 years had passed since they parted. Now Ming-a-na was requesting that Langtan allow 
his family to be reunited. Langtan memorialized the Kangxi emperor (r. 1662-1722), 
recommending that the Chosŏn king find Ming-a-na’s mother and send her to Ningguta. The 
Kangxi emperor approved the recommendation, and Ming-a-na’s mother, Aehyang (愛香), was 
eventually sent from Kyŏnghŭng (慶興; in Hamgyŏng province) to Ningguta to be reunited with 
her family.108 
In both cases, there was a transfer of subjecthood on the virtue of family ties and the 
universality of imperial rule. Princess Ŭisun returned home as a Chosŏn subject, while Aehyang 
was reunited with her family in Ningguta as a Qing subject. This transfer of subjecthood makes 
bare the fundamentally flexible nature of the delimitation between Qing imperial subjects and 
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Chosŏn tributary subjects. We need to remember, however, that the Qing emperor remained the 
final authority that decided on this transfer. We have already seen how both states could invoke 
family ties and universal imperial rule in their claims over people. In the end, however, the Qing 
state could back up its asserted claims, whereas the Chosŏn state could not as in the case of An 
Ch’u-wŏn. The Qing emperor, as the ruler of a theoretically universal empire, reserved the right 
to determine and maintain the line between Qing imperial subjects and Chosŏn tributary subjects. 
This line could be crossed on rare occasions, but only on imperial terms. In short, there was a 
fundamental hierarchy between imperial subjecthood and tributary subjecthood. This same 
asymmetry can be found in the issue of territorial and other boundaries, which will be discussed 
in the next section, as well as in the issue of jurisdiction over interstate crimes, which is the topic 
of chapter three.  
 
III. The Making of a Territorial Boundary 
 
A. 1637-1690s: From a Potentiality to a Reality 
The effort to maintain a territorial boundary between the two states continued under the 
new tributary relationship. As mentioned above, this tributary relationship was based on the 
reaffirmed agreement that the Yalu River served as the territorial boundary between the two 
states.  
Between 1637 and 1644, Hong Taiji launched several campaigns against the peoples in 
today’s Heilongjiang (黑龍江). The Qing presence north of the Tumen River grew as new towns 
were built as the headquarters for these expeditions. The official Qing-Chosŏn interactions 
across the Tumen River grew accordingly. What happened on Xiongdao (熊島) Island, an island 
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near Kyŏnghŭng, in 1639 is a good example. On Hong Taiji’s orders, the Chosŏn state sent an 
expedition to the island against some Kurka (庫爾喀) who resisted Qing rule. After this 
expedition and Qing expeditions on nearby islands, the Qing state relocated some captives to the 
newly founded town of Yechun (也春) in the lower part of the Tumen River, later to be renamed 
Huncun (琿春).109  
From then on, Yechun became the center of Qing-Chosŏn interaction across the Tumen 
River. The main issue was the lack of food in Yechun. From 1640 to 1644, Manchus from 
Yechun came to Kyŏnghŭng and other Chosŏn towns south of the Tumen River on at least four 
separate occasions to look for food. From the beginning, the Chosŏn court recognized this as a 
security problem. In 1641, it requested that the Qing court stop Qing subjects from crossing the 
Tumen River, reasoning that even though the two states were one family now (yijia), each 
domain had its boundaries (jiexian). Hong Taiji, while blaming the Chosŏn state for the 
incidents, did acknowledge that such trespassing should be banned thereafter.110 As Yi Hwa-cha 
has shown, Chosŏn subjects also crossed the Tumen River to enter the Qing domain during this 
period. She sees in communications between the Qing and Chosŏn states regarding these 
incidents of river crossing the development of a mutual understanding between the Qing and 
Chosŏn courts that the Tumen River also served as a territorial boundary between the two 
states.111 The two states, in short, came to regard the Yalu and Tumen rivers as territorial 
boundaries between their domains.  
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This mutual understanding, however, did not transform these natural frontiers into 
borders overnight. The life cycle of borders proposed by Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel 
is instructive here. According to them, the borderland grows from its infant stage, when the 
recently drawn border is more of a potentiality than a social reality, into an adolescent stage, 
when the border has become an undeniable reality but still with a collective memory of the pre-
border period. In the 1640s and the 1650s, Qing-Chosŏn territorial boundary was still in its infant 
stage.112 Many residents of the Qing-Chosŏn borderland, accordingly, did not acknowledge these 
boundaries and continued crossing them freely. In 1649, two Chosŏn subjects were arrested in 
Ningguta after handing meat and rice to a Qing subject named Lai-da-hu (賴達胡). Even though 
both the Qing and Chosŏn courts reiterated the principle that territorial boundaries should not be 
easily crossed, these three borderland residents had most likely known one another and been in 
contact for some time.113 A homicide case in 1654, which will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter three, shows multiple crossings of the Tumen River in both directions. First, two Kurkas 
from Yechun crossed the Tumen River and bought two oxen at Kyŏngwŏn (in Hamgyŏng 
province). Then, when they did not return from their trip, their relatives and neighbors launched 
an investigation, following the footprints left in the snow. At the place of the crossing, they 
found the footprints of Chosŏn subjects who had logged trees on the Qing side of the river. 
Convinced that these Chosŏn subjects had killed the two Kurkas, the search party crossed the 
river to demand justice from the Kyŏngwŏn magistrate.114 Clearly, these frontier residents were 
crossing the Tumen River on a regular basis.  
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As we will see below, both Qing and Chosŏn states sought to stop unauthorized crossing 
of the rivers by severely punishing both trespassers and the local officials who had jurisdiction 
over them. Over time, such state-driven measures helped the territorial boundaries evolve from 
their infant stage to their adolescent stage, where they would come to be considered an 
undeniable reality for authorities of both states and for many residents.115 Take a scene from 
1661 involving the repatriation of Yu Kwi-kŭm (劉貴金) and another ginseng gatherer, for 
example. The Qing authorities from Fenghuangcheng stood on the Qing side of the Yalu River, 
while the Chosŏn authorities from Ŭiju stood on the Chosŏn side. The two parties looked at and 
conversed with each other from their respective sides, with neither party crossing the river during 
the repatriation process.116 To the local officials in the borderlands, territorial boundaries had 
become a reality that could not be violated. As more and more borderland residents were 
punished for crossing the boundary, these boundaries would become more of a reality for the 
residents as well. 
 
B. 1700s-1840s: An Early Modern Borderland  
What did that reality, then, look like in the early eighteenth century? An interstate 
homicide case in 1710 is instructive, as it shows both the reality and the limits of the Qing-
Chosŏn boundary. This case, discussed in more detail in chapter three, started when a group of 
Chosŏn subjects led by Yi Man-ji (李萬支) crossed the Yalu River in pursuit of ginseng. On the 
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Qing side of the river, they pillaged a tent set up by Qing ginseng gatherers, killing five of them 
in the process.  
By then, the notion that the two rivers served as the territorial boundary between the two 
states had become common knowledge in both the Qing and Chosŏn courts. In June 1711, for 
example, the Kangxi emperor reacted to the report on the Yi Man-ji case with the following 
remark: “Northwest of the Yalu River is the Chinese domain, [and] southeast of the river is the 
Chosŏn domain. [We] take the river as the boundary . . . Southwest of the Tumen River is the 
Chosŏn domain, [and] northeast of the river is the Chinese domain. [We] also take the river as 
the boundary. That part is all already clear.”117 It is hard to imagine a clearer affirmation of the 
Qing-Chosŏn territorial boundary. Moreover, this was a view that the Chosŏn court came to 
share as well. The following comment by King Sukjong (肅宗; r. 1674-1720) in his January 
1715 lateral communication to the Qing Board of Rites was a standard phrase used by Chosŏn 
kings when discussing the boundary between the two states: “The northern region of our small 
state borders the great [i.e. Qing] state and is separated by only small bodies of water, which 
serve as the boundary.”118 
 This territorial boundary between the two states, however, was not a clear-cut border in 
the modern sense. First, up to 1712, there had been no formal agreement on what exactly 
constituted the territorial boundary between the Qing and Chosŏn domains. The Qing court, in 
fact, had shown an interest in delineating the Qing-Chosŏn territorial boundary from the late 
seventeenth century. As is well known, Kangxi was an early modern ruler with a deep interest in 
cartography, an interest that culminated in several empire-wide projects such as the Da Qing 
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yitongzhi (大清一通志) and the so-called “Kangxi Jesuit Atlas” (Huangyu quanlan tu). In the 
context of this chapter, this resulted in Qing officials being dispatched to Manchuria to gather 
information for these projects.119 To do so, however, the Qing court needed cooperation from the 
Chosŏn court, and the Chosŏn court was in general against sharing geographic information on 
the Chosŏn side of the borderlands. It was not until 1711, amidst the Yi Man-ji case, that the 
Kangxi emperor could force the Chosŏn court to participate in an interstate survey mission to 
delineate the Qing-Chosŏn territorial boundary.  
Second, as Peter Sahlins has shown, natural frontiers, while often serving as interstate 
boundaries in early modern Europe, also left much room for ambiguity and negotiation.120 In this 
borderland, the main source of ambiguity lay in the area between Yalu River and the Tumen 
River. As Kangxi continued in his June 1711 edict from above, “the area between the Yalu River 
and the Tumen River, however, is not clearly known.”121 From Kangxi’s perspective, 
lawlessness stemmed from geographic ambiguity, and this mission would once and for all 
eliminate that ambiguity. What lay between the Yalu River and the Tumen River? The Changbai 
(長白) Mountains, from which both rivers flowed, stood here. During this delineation process, 
representatives of both states agreed that the Yalu and Tumen Rivers had constituted the 
territorial boundaries for a long time.  
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The problem lay with the delineation of the mountains in between. The Chosŏn court had 
already concluded before the mission that the Chosŏn representatives should claim all land south 
of Heaven Lake (天池) at the peak of the Mount Paekdu (白頭) as part of the Chosŏn domain. 
The representatives, headed by translator Kim Chi-nam (金指南; b. 1654), did exactly that, 
arguing that the land south of the lake had been in the Chosŏn domain from the beginning of the 
Chosŏn dynasty in the late fourteenth century. The Qing representatives, headed by the Hunter 
Ula (Ch. dasheng wula, Ma. butha ula) supervisor-in-chief Mu-ke-deng (穆克登), acquiesced, 
and the interstate mission went on to search for the heads of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers and 
erect a stele on the site of the riverheads just south of the Heaven Lake. The stele read: “[From 
here], west is the Yalu and east is the Tumen.”122 For the time being, the two rivers had been 
confirmed as the boundaries, and the Changbai Mountains had been divided for the first time. 
As Seonmin Kim has shown, however, the joint survey of the Changbai Mountains did 
not transform the Qing-Chosŏn borderlands into bordered lands. In fact, the exact delineation of 
the boundaries was not originally even on the Qing agenda. The very act of surveying the 
Changbai Mountains, rather than the outcome of the delineated boundaries, was the more 
important goal to the Qing court. The Chosŏn court, on the other hand, had been anxious to 
establish the exact location of the two riverheads for fear of losing part of its domain. In fact, 
when the Chosŏn officials recognized an error in the location of the Tumen riverhead, there was 
much debate within the court on how to proceed. Soon, however, the Chosŏn court came to 
realize that the Qing court was uninterested in the exact location of the boundaries. The stele 
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itself was small and of inferior quality, and there were even mistakes in the characters inscribed 
on it. Mu-ke-deng himself showed much indifference about the exact location of the stele, and 
there is no evidence that the exact location of the stele was reported to the Kangxi emperor. 
Moreover, the Qing court did not engage in another geographical survey of the Changbai 
Mountains until the second half of the nineteenth century. The joint survey of the Changbai 
Mountains thus did not result in the modern border between the two states, nor was that the goal 
of the survey.123 
After the joint survey, the Yalu and Tumen Rivers still constituted the territorial 
boundary between the Qing and Chosŏn domains. The Qing and Chosŏn states, however, were 
going in two different directions on how to regulate the territorial boundaries between their 
domains. The Chosŏn state preferred to keep the status quo of leaving the Qing side of the 
borderlands empty. In 1714, right after the joint survey of the Changbai Mountain, Chosŏn 
officials in Kyŏngwŏn noticed some Qing subjects building houses and farming just two or three 
li (i.e. between a kilometer and a mile) away from the Qing shores of the Tumen River. The 
Chosŏn court asked the Qing court to take action on this case. The Chosŏn court portrayed the 
current situation as the ideal situation. From its perspective, because the land outside the Willow 
Palisades, which separated much of Manchuria from China Proper and Chosŏn, had been left 
empty, there existed no motley throng (Kr. honjap, Ch. hunza) of Qing and Chosŏn subjects in 
the borderland. The Chosŏn court went on to portray what could happen if the land between the 
Willow Palisades and the rivers were populated. It would result in a situation where the smoke 
from both sides of the rivers converged and where the sounds of chickens and dogs could be 
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heard across the rivers. If the rivers froze, the boundaries would become meaningless and people 
would freely cross them. The Qing court agreed with this view, ordering the Ningguta military 
governor (jiangjun) to destroy the houses and making it illegal to build houses and farms near the 
rivers in the future.124 
The Chosŏn court used this precedent in similar cases going forward. In 1748, local 
officials in Kyŏngwŏn again detected a few Qing subjects building houses and farming a few li 
east of the Tumen River.125 In 1840, local officials in Kanggye (江界; in P'yŏngan province) 
detected yet more Qing subjects building houses and farming in two different locations just a few 
li from the Yalu River.126 In 1845, a similar incident was observed in Kanggye again, but with 
more people building houses and farming as close as 1 li from the Yalu River.127 In all these 
cases, the local Chosŏn officials, along with interpreters, stood on the Chosŏn side of the river 
and talked to the Qing subjects on the Qing side of the river. When the attempt at persuasion 
inevitably failed, the Chosŏn court would again ask the Qing court for action, citing the 1714 
precedent. The Qing court responded by ordering the Shengjing and Ningguta military governors 
to take action against these Qing criminals.  
Two Shengjing military governors in the first half of the eighteenth century, however, did 
not see the status quo as ideal and pushed for more Qing military presence along the Yalu River. 
In 1731, the Shengjing military governor Nasutu (那蘇圖; d. 1749) saw the current state of the 
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Yalu borderlands as inadequate, with brigands taking advantage of the numerous waterways and 
lack of supervision near the Yalu River to roam around freely. Nasutu proposed tackling this 
problem by building a guard post in Hu’ershan (虎耳山) near the river and permanently 
stationing ships in Mangniushao (莽牛哨) on the river. The Yongzheng emperor, however, 
remarked that the Chosŏn court needed to be consulted on the matter as the said locations 
bordered (lian jie) Chosŏn. The Chosŏn court, in its reply, requested that the Qing court keep the 
status quo. If the proposal were to materialize, it reasoned, the tents and ships from both sides of 
the river would be linked. The shallow body of water would not be a sufficient boundary then, 
and trespassing and criminal activity would increase rather than decrease, making it more likely 
for the Chosŏn king to sin against the Qing emperor. The Yongzheng emperor sided with the 
Chosŏn court and ordered Nasutu to put a stop to his plan.128 
In 1746, the Shengjing military governor Daldangga (達爾黨阿; d. 1760) came up with a 
similar but more sophisticated plan. Aware of his predecessor’s failure, Daldangga went into 
detail in his explanation on why the status quo would not do, including the availability of 
ginseng in the area that was the source of problems. He even predicted the opposition from the 
Chosŏn court and argued that the status quo was actually bad for the border defense of the 
Chosŏn state. Furthermore, he proposed stationing ships on the western shore of the Yalu River, 
which was within the Qing domain, and tried to construct it as a purely domestic issue. The 
Chosŏn court should be merely notified, rather than consulted, about this matter. The Qianlong 
emperor granted his approval. As expected, the Chosŏn court opposed the move, using similar 
logic as before. The Qianlong emperor, while acknowledging that the new garrison would be 
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built within the Qing boundary (jiezhi yinei) and thus had nothing to do with the Chosŏn 
boundary (yu Chaoxian bianjie wushe), saw how the close distance between the two shores of 
the river, which at times were only one or two li apart, could make the king worry about being 
held responsible for his subjects trespassing and causing problems in the future. Here again, the 
Qing emperor sided with the Chosŏn court and maintained the status quo.129  
Seonmin Kim points out that these two events show that border security and the clear 
delineation of boundaries were apparently less important to the Qing court than was the 
maintenance of the tributary relationship with the Chosŏn state.130 She goes on to argue that the 
establishment of the modern border was impossible under the tributary relationship: “All of the 
conditions—including a natural environment that promoted easy trespassing, a long history of 
coexistence between the Manchus, Chinese and Koreans along the border, and relatively loose 
surveillance in the border areas—were beyond what the tributary relations could transform.”131 
 The maintenance of the tributary system leads us to another crucial point that discouraged 
the formation of a clear Qing-Chosŏn border. After Hong Taiji proclaimed himself an emperor in 
1636, the Qing state in theory became a universal empire. This theoretical universality of the 
Qing empire became more of a reality as the Qing conquered Beijing in 1644, finalized the 
conquest of the former Ming domain in the 1680s, and secured a final victory over the Zunghars 
in the 1750s. This universality was paired with a universal worldview that looked at “All Under 
Heaven (Tianxia)” as belonging to the Qing emperor. In such a worldview, no territorial 
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boundaries between the Qing empire and its tributary neighbors could be a permanent feature. 
This worldview is demonstrated nicely in the Yongzheng emperor’s quotation from the Book of 
Odes (Shijing): “There is no land under Heaven that does not belong to the king (putianzhixia, 
mofei wang tu).”132  
Even though this “Tianxia” worldview was better maintained obviously in theory than in 
practice, there were many ways that the Qing emperor could invoke this worldview in relation to 
Chosŏn Korea. For example, as we will see in chapter three, various Qing emperors drew on this 
worldview, which saw no distinction between Qing and tributary states, in extending imperial 
pardon toward Chosŏn subjects convicted of crimes against the Qing state. As mentioned above, 
the 1644 Qing decision to stop repatriation of the Warka also originated from this worldview. If 
the emperor really ruled All Under Heaven, what difference did it make whether the Warka lived 
in the Qing domain or the Chosŏn domain?133 Even the Chosŏn court would invoke this 
worldview when needed, as King Hyojong did in 1666 in defense of his ministers who did not 
memorialize on the escape of An Ch’u-wŏn. What difference did it make whether An was in the 
Qing domain or the Chosŏn domain? He was living in All Under Heaven either way!  
In that sense, the clear delineation of boundaries was not in the best interest of the Qing 
court either, for it could go against the universality and elasticity of the empire that was at the 
heart of Qing rule. This was especially true in relatively secure borderlands like the Qing-Chosŏn 
one. In 1637, the Qing-Chosŏn borderland was still close to the heart of the nascent Qing empire. 
In 1644, as the Qing conquest of China Proper began, this borderland became a secondary 
concern. By the 1680s, when the Ming-Qing transition had been completed, the Qing-Chosŏn 
                                                          
132 QSL Shizong, 81: 74a (YZ7.5.21=6/17/1729) 
 
133 QSL Shizu 4: 52b-53a (SZ1.4.11=5/16/1644); CWS Injo 45: 22a (22.4.26=5/31/1644). 
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borderland no longer posed a security concern for the Qing state. Rather, the focus had moved to 
other borderlands such as the Qing-Russia borderland and the symbolic significance of the 
Manchu motherland. Notably, the Qing court actively sought to delineate the territorial 
boundaries in these borderlands and protect its territorial domain in its negotiations for the Treaty 
of Nerchinsk in 1689.134 
 
IV. Other Boundaries: Sartorial, Environmental, Linguistic 
The territorial boundary was not the only boundary that existed in the Qing-Chosŏn 
borderland. Borderland residents, when they crossed the territorial boundary, were often crossing 
the sartorial, environmental, and linguistic boundaries of this borderland as well. The rich 
ethnographic information contained in my sources shows that these boundaries variously defied, 
ignored, and acknowledged the territorial boundary.  
 
A. Sartorial Boundary 
First, there was the sartorial boundary. Soon after the Manchus conquered Beijing in 
1644, they began requiring all Qing subjects to shave their foreheads and wear the queue. 
Throughout the dynasty, this hairstyle remained one of the most conspicuous symbols of Qing 
rule over its subjects. Mark Elliott, for example, sees the queue, along with the separate Manchu 
cities, as one of the two most enduring and obvious manifestations of Qing rule. Philip Kuhn also 
stresses the symbolic importance of the queue to the Qing regime.135 Moreover, Qing officials 
                                                          
134 Peter C. Perdue, “Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinsk and Beijing,” 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 341–56; Elliott, “The Limits of Tartary.” 
 
135 Elliott, The Manchu Way, 89; Philip A. Kuhn, Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 58-9. 
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were required to wear Manchu-style clothing, and many commoners had also adopted Manchu-
style clothing by late Qing.136 Meanwhile, Chosŏn sartorial style, which was close to that of the 
Ming, had not undergone this transformation. This was a source of pride for Chosŏn literati, who 
liked to point out the “barbarity” of Qing fashion and lament the loss of “civilization” in China 
Proper in their travels to Beijing. The implication, of course, was that Chosŏn was the true heir to 
and the center of Sinic civilization following the Qing conquest of China Proper.137 
For the borderland residents, this meant that they would stand out in the foreign domain 
due to the sartorial boundary between Qing and Chosŏn subjects. In fact, many trespassers were 
arrested exactly because of these sartorial idiosyncrasies. In 1711, a Chosŏn subject in Kapsan 
(甲山; in Hamgyŏng province) reported to local authorities about three men wearing different 
styles (Kr. poksaek, Ch. fuse) of clothing, and these Qing subjects were promptly arrested.138 
When the officials in Onsŏng (穩城; in Hamgyŏng province) arrested Kim Si-jong (金時宗) and 
one other Chosŏn subject in 1739, for example, their Qing-style (Kr. sangguk, Ch. shangguo) 
clothing was noticeable.139  In one homicide case in 1764, this sartorial boundary gave clues to 
the identities of the murderers. When the Qing authorities found the corpse of a Manchu soldier 
near Fenghuangcheng, the existence of Koryŏ-style straw sandals (Gaoli suo chuan caoxie) and 
                                                          
136 Edward Rhoads, Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican 
China, 1861-1928 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 60-61. 
 
137 For one such example, see Pak Chiwŏn, The Jehol Diary, trans. Yang-hi Choe-Wall (Folkestone: Global 
Oriental, 2010). 
 
138 TMHG 61: 1a-2a (zi from King Sukjong to the Board of Rites; KX50.9.9=10/20/1711). 
 
139 TMHG 55: 7b-10b (zi from King Yŏngjo to the Board of Rites; QL4.6.29=8/3/1739) 
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the handle of a Koryŏ-style sickle (Gaoli lian daoba) near the corpse proved a breakthrough in 
the investigation.140 
 At the same time, this sartorial boundary was flexible. After all, all one had to do was to 
change one’s appearance at the outset. I have found at least three cases in which Chosŏn subjects 
tried to pass as Qing subjects by crossing the sartorial boundary. In early 1813, a Chosŏn subject 
named Kim Ch’i-yŏ crossed the Yalu River and joined Qing ginseng gatherers. Four months 
later, he began to wear Qing attire and went on to reside in the Qing domain for more than three 
years before his arrest.141 In 1830, two Chosŏn subjects fraternized with a group of Qing subjects 
in Jilin. One of them gave the Chosŏn subjects clothes to wear in exchange for ginseng, and 
another shaved their foreheads (tifa) for them.142 In an extreme case, one Chosŏn subject who 
entered the Qing domain in 1830 at the age of six ended up becoming a Buddhist monk in 1838 
before being arrested in 1841.143 This crossing of the sartorial boundary was not limited to 
Chosŏn subjects. Iacobus Zhou Wenmo (周文謨; 1752-1801), a Qing subject and the first 
Catholic missionary to Chosŏn, adopted the Chosŏn hairstyle and attire soon after he arrived in 
Chosŏn in 1795. As the queen regent Chŏngsun (貞純; 1745-1805) remarked, Zhou was dressed 
like a Chosŏn subject in all manners when he gave himself up to the Chosŏn authorities.144 
                                                          
140 TMHG 59: 13b-15b (zi from the Shengjing Board of Rites to King Yŏngjo; QL29.1.2=2/3/1764). Koryŏ and 
Chosŏn were often interchangeable terms in Chinese sources.  
  
141 TMHG wŏnp’yŏn sok pŏmwŏl 1: 3a-b (zha from the Shengjing military governor to the Ŭiju magistrate; 
JQ22.6.29=8/11/1817), 3b-5b (zi from Sunjo to the Shengjing military governor; JQ22.11.21=12/28/1817).  
 
142 TMHG wŏnp’yŏn sok pŏmwŏl 1: 12a-14a (zi from the Shengjing Board of Rites to Sunjo; 
DG11.11.18=12/21/1831).  
 
143 TMHG wŏnp’yŏn sok pŏmwŏl 1: 17a-19b (zi from the Shengjing Board of Rites to Hŏnjong; 
DG21.i3.15=5/5/1841), 19b-21a (zi from Hŏnjong to the Shengjing Board of Rites; DG21.7.12=8/28/1841).  
 
144 CWS Sunjo 3: 48b-49a (1.10.27=12/2/1801). 
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B. Environmental Boundary 
Second, there was the environmental boundary. Due to a variety of reasons, such as state 
policies on the environment and market demand that could impact the actions of borderland 
residents as well as the natural environments themselves, the ecology of the Qing and Chosŏn 
sides of the borderland differed.145 At least, the residents of the borderlands who trespassed into 
the other domain in pursuit of profit seem to have perceived such a difference.  
Some of these residents explicitly acknowledged this difference. In 1647, 23 hunters led 
by Kim Ik-kyŏm (金益鎌) explained that they went hunting on the Qing side of the Tumen River 
because there were more animals there than on the Chosŏn side.146 In 1661, Kim Hyo-sin 
(金孝信) and other ginseng gatherers acknowledged that they crossed into the Qing domain 
because there was not enough ginseng on the Chosŏn side.147 Similarly, Kim Sun-jŏng (金順丁) 
and others confessed in 1762 that they had crossed into the Qing domain when they could not 
find ginseng even deep in the mountains on the Chosŏn side.148 In 1662, Pak Yong-ŏp explained 
that he had to cross the Yalu River because there were no trees on the Chosŏn islands.149  
Even without such explicit acknowledgements, in many cases of trespassing, which will 
be discussed in more detail in chapter three, we can see that crossing the territorial boundary also 
                                                          
145 For the environmental history of the region, see Schlesinger, A World Trimmed with Fur, 55-91 and David A. 
Bello, Across Forest, Steppe and Mountain: Environment, Identity, and Empire in Qing China’s Borderlands (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 63-115  
 
146 CWS Injo 48: 37b-38a (25.10.9=11/5/1647). 
 
147 TMHG 49: 47b-49a (zi from Hyŏnjong to the Board of Rites; SZ17.12), 49a (zi from the Board of Rites to 
Hyŏnjong; SZ18.1.17=2/15/1661). 
 
148 TMHG 58: 3a-5a (zi from Yŏngjo to the Board of Rites; QL27.6.6=7/26/1762). 
 
149 TMHG 50: 7a-9a (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyŏnjong; KX1.3.23=5/10/1662). 
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involved crossing the environmental boundary. Some of these trespassers saw environmental 
resources to be exploited on the other side of the territorial boundary and clearly viewed their act 
of crossing more as an entrance into a new ecological domain than a territorial encroachment.  
 
C. Linguistic Boundary 
We know of all these instances of trespassing only because these trespassers were 
arrested and punished for their acts, leaving behind them a trail of historical documents. This is 
where our third boundary, that of language, comes in. An inability to completely cross this 
linguistic boundary was in fact the main reason behind the arrest of these trespassers. Kim Ch’i-
yŏ, for example, was arrested because he could not speak Chinese (guanhua) even after more 
than three years of residence in the Shengjing area.150 Part of the reason that Zhou Wenmo gave 
himself up was that he could not move around freely due to his imperfect Korean language skills. 
He could not cross the linguistic boundary even after seven years of residence in Chosŏn.151  
Of course, there were those who did cross this boundary. Kim Si-chong, for example, 
testified about a Qing subject named Wang Gaoshi who could speak Korean (Kr. Chosŏn ŏ, Ch. 
Chaoxian yu).152 The story of the Chosŏn subject who became a Buddhist monk in Jilin is even 
more fascinating. This man, who had lived in the Qing domain since the age of six, became a 
slave in a Manchu household in Huncun in 1830. In 1838, he took the name Pahai after escaping 
from the household. Later he became a monk and took the Buddhist name Jiekun. He seems to 
have experienced no linguistic difficulty. His crossing of the linguistic boundary was so 
                                                          
150 TMHG wŏnp’yŏn sok pŏmwŏl 1: 3a-b (zha from the Shengjing military governor to the Ŭiju magistrate; 
JQ22.6.29=8/11/1817). 
 
151 CWS Sunjo 2: 46b-47a (1.3.15=4/27/1801). 
 
152 TMHG 55: 7b-10b (zi from Yŏngjo to the Board of Rites; QL4.6.29=8/3/1739). 
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complete that we never even learn what his original Korean name was.153 And in most other 
cases where subjects of both states were interacting together, we must assume that they had some 
means of crossing this linguistic boundary.  
 
V. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen how two wars between Qing and Chosŏn resulted in a 1637 
ceasefire agreement delineating the subjects and domains of the two states. The Qing rulers had 
just carved out a frontier khanate after decades of state-building and campaigns against the 
neighboring Ming, Mongol, and Chosŏn polities. Therefore, they were dedicated to protecting 
their hard-won territorial domain and subjects against what they perceived as economic 
encroachments from neighboring rulers.  
This context influenced how both states maintained this delineation in two main ways. 
The first, subjecthood, concerned runaway slaves from the Qing domain and Jurchen residents in 
the Chosŏn domain. The Chosŏn state, which initially protected these people, gradually 
succumbed to Qing pressure to send them back, acknowledging the Qing definition of the 
boundary between imperial and tributary subjects. This acknowledgment is also seen in the 
second issue, territorial delineation. The two states agreed to acknowledge the Yalu River and 
the Tumen River as a natural territorial boundary between them. That shared understanding 
culminated in the 1710s in an interstate survey and the delineation of the Changbai Mountains.  
The Qing-Chosŏn borderland, as a result, came to show a higher level of delineation of 
subjects and domains than in other borderlands. As we will see in chapter three, this historical 
                                                          
153 TMHG wŏnp’yŏn sok pŏmwŏl 1: 17a-19b (zi from the Shengjing Board of Rites to Hŏnjong; 
DG21.i3.15=5/5/1841), 19b-21a (zi from Hŏnjong to the Shengjing Board of Rites; DG21.7.12=8/28/1841). 
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context was also responsible for the more routine procedures of interstate trials in this 
borderland. In comparison, as we will see in chapter six, the Qing-Kokand borderland was more 
of an open frontier. With the Qing notion of an unbounded empire during the height of imperial 
expansion, there was never a serious attempt at interstate delineation of the boundaries, and 
movement across the borderland was relatively free. The Qing-Vietnam borderland, as we will 
see in chapter four, occupied an intermediate position between these two extremes. 
The Qing-Chosŏn borderland, however, shared three important characteristics with the 
other two borderlands. First, there were multiple and shifting conceptions of boundaries, which 
encompassed more than the concepts of persons and space. Second, the relationship between the 
Qing empire and tributary states was asymmetrical. Finally, as a result, both Qing imperial and 
tributary sovereignties were fundamentally elastic. In the chapters to follow, we will see in more 
detail how this early modern worldview in Qing-centered Asia defies post-Westphalian norms of 
inter-state equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of fellow states. 
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CHAPTER III.  
Criminalizing and Punishing Borderland Activities:  
Qing-Chosŏn Interstate Law, 1630s-1840s1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
A. Qing and Chosŏn Judiciaries  
Before we delve into Qing-Chosŏn interstate law, it will be useful to give a brief 
overview of the histories of the Qing and Chosŏn judiciaries. In both states, we see a drive 
toward the systematization of operational laws into written laws by the end of the seventeenth 
century. The Qing state promulgated the first edition of the Qing Code (Da Qing lü) in 1646. The 
compilers of the first edition took the Ming Code (Da Ming lü) as its basis, adopting most of its 
statutes (lü) while changing much of its substatutes (li) to fit the needs of the time. The next two 
editions (1725, 1740) continuously focused on integrating operative substatutes into the Qing 
Code. For administrative law, Qing officials at first used the Ming administrative code (Da Ming 
huidian) but gradually found it to be inadequate and outdated for the needs of the new dynasty. 
The first edition of the new administrative code (Da Qing huidian) was promulgated in 1690, 
and two more editions appeared in the eighteenth century (1732, 1764) and the nineteenth 
century (1818, 1899) before the dynasty ended in 1912.2  
                                                          
1 For transliteration of Chinese terms, I have followed the pinyin system, and for Korean, the McCune-Reischauer 
Romanization.  
 
2 Zheng Qin, “Pursuing Perfection: Formation of the Qing Code,” trans. Guangyuan Zhou, Modern China 21, no. 3 
(1995): 310–44; Macabe Keliher, “Administrative Law and the Making of the First Da Qing Huidian,” Late 
Imperial China 37, no. 1 (2016): 55–107; Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law of Imperial China (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 52-75. 
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The Chosŏn state, for its part, had adopted the Ming Code as its basic code at the 
beginning of the dynasty in 1392 and kept it as the basic legal code throughout the rest of the 
dynasty. The Chosŏn state made the changes to its legal code by incorporating case law into 
supplementary legal references such as Kyŏngguk taejŏn (1485), Sok taejŏn (1744), and Taejŏn 
t’ongpy’ŏn (1785). Other than the publication of the references, the Chosŏn state in the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also sought to be more systematic in its legislation by citing 
the Ming Code on a more regular basis, promulgating special laws, and unifying procedures in 
general.3  
In short, both the Qing and Chosŏn judiciaries, from their common heritage of the Ming 
statutory tradition, were moving toward a more routine and systematic statutory basis. Moreover, 
that meant that they shared a set of not only basic legal concepts and assumptions but also 
specific statutes and substatutes. As we will see below, these legal commonalities formed the 
basis from which Qing-Chosŏn interstate law developed from the second half of the seventeenth 
century. Before we get to that point, however, let us first look at operational interstate law 
between 1637 and 1645, when the historical context of constant warfare between Qing and Ming 
states made the development of routine Qing-Chosŏn interstate law unlikely.  
 
B. Operational Interstate Law: 1637-1645 
We observed a general tendency to draw a line between the domains and peoples of the 
Qing and Chosŏn states in chapter two. This drive did not apply to the Qing and Chosŏn 
judiciaries. From 1637 to 1645, the Qing judiciary penetrated deeply into the Chosŏn judiciary, 
                                                          
3 William Shaw, Legal Norms in a Confucian State (Berkeley: Center for Korean Studies, University of California, 
1981), 3-42. 
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intervening in and sometimes usurping the Chosŏn judiciary when considering any incident that 
it deemed went against Qing interests. Gertraude Roth Li, in her description of Manchu state-
building before 1644, has credited Nurhaci with “creating a Manchu nation-at-arms.” 4 We can 
extend this observation to this period, when Hong Taiji had transformed Nurhaci’s frontier 
khanate into an imperial state and was engaged in an all-out war against the Ming empire. Hong 
Taiji was the military officer who stood atop the Qing empire-at-arms, to which Chosŏn now 
belonged to as a tributary state, and he ruled his empire through military-like discipline.  
In fact, the Qing-Chosŏn tributary relationship was established on the understanding that 
the Chosŏn state had sinned against the Qing state by breaking off the interstate relations 
established in the 1627 ceasefire and raising an army to prepare for a possible Manchu invasion. 
Hong Taiji, in his edict of February 22, 1637, repeatedly mentioned King Injo’s crimes (zui) and 
his need to repent and start anew (huiguozixin). The ceremony of surrender on February 24, 
1637, concretized this acknowledgement. King Injo (仁祖; r. 1623-49), as a guilty (youzui) man, 
was not allowed to come out of the main gate of Namhan Fortress and had to make his way out 
of the west gate. Neither was he allowed to wear the royal robe (Kr. yongp’o, Ch. longpao)—he 
was instead dressed in a plain blue robe, shorn of all insignia. It was in this state, stripped of all 
signs of his royal authority, that Injo kowtowed to Hong Taiji and formally showed his 
submission.5 
Furthermore, the Qing state gave this admission of guilt material representation, ordering 
that a trilingual (Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese) stele be installed at the site of King Injo’s 
                                                          
4 Gertraude Roth Li, “State Building before 1644,” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 9, Part 1: The 
Ch’ing Empire to 1800, ed. Willard J. Peterson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 27.  
 
5 QSL Taizong 33: 430b-431b (CD 2.1.28=2/22/1637), 431b-433a (CD 2.1.30=2/24/1637); CWS Injo 34: 20a-21a 
(15.1.28=2/22/1637), 34: 23a-24a (15.1.30=2/24/1637). 
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submission as a permanent reminder of Hong Taiji’s imperial grace. Now known as the 
Samjŏndo stele (Samjŏndo bi) in Korea for its location, this stele served as the physical 
manifestation of the Chosŏn guilt that formed the basis of the Qing-Chosŏn tributary 
relationship. In fact, one line from this stele reads: “The small state [i.e. Chosŏn] has sinned 
against the supreme state [i.e. Qing] for a long time.”6  
Moreover, someone had to be punished before this “fresh start” began. As a requirement 
for the ceasefire, Hong Taiji ordered King Injo to send a few of the officials responsible for 
breaking the Qing-Chosŏn alliance to the Qing camp, adding that he had originally intended to 
kill all Chosŏn officials. The Chosŏn court ended up sending three officials, Yun Chip (尹集; 
1606-37), Oh Tal-che (吳達濟; 1609-37), and Hong Ik-han (洪翼漢; 1586-1637), to Mukden, 
known as Shenyang (瀋陽) in Ming times. Accused of taking sides with Ming, breaking the 
alliance, and raising an army against the Qing, these officials were decapitated.7 Subjects of 
Chosŏn, now a tributary state of the Qing empire, were to see this execution as a warning to not 
go against Qing interests.  
The Qing state, in the person of the Qing emperor Hong Taiji, monopolized the right to 
decide what actions went against Qing interests and to criminalize such actions. Of course, this 
demonstrates the tautological quality of many charges labeling certain actions crimes against the 
                                                          
6 The full title of the stele is “stele [commemorating] virtues of the Great Qing emperor (Ch: Da Qing huangdi 
gongde bi; Ma: daicing gurun i enduringge han i gungge erdemui bei)” The draft of the text was first written by two 
Chosŏn officials in Classical Chinese in late 1637 and then modified by the Qing minister Fan Wencheng (1597-
1666) in Mukden in early 1638. The Chinese inscription was completed in between late 1639 and early 1640, and 
then it was translated into Manchu and Mongol by the three baksi who had come with the Qing envoy Mafuta. Pae 
U-sŏng, Chosŏn kwa Chunghwa: Chosŏn i kkum kkugo sangsang han segye wa munmyŏng (P’aju: Tolbegae, 2014), 
33-47. The Manchu transliteration of the text can be found in Sŏng Paek-in, “Samjŏndobi manjumun,” Tonga 
munhwa, no. 9 (1970): 117–48.  
 
7 CWS Injo 34: 21b-22b (15.1.29=2/23/1667), 34: 33b-34a (15.3.5=3/30/1637), 34: 45b (15.4.19=5/13/1637); QSL, 
Taizong 33: 430a-b (CD2.1.28=2/22/1637), 34: 440b (CD2.3.1=3/26/1637), 36: 465a-466b (CD2.6.19=8/9/1637), 
37: 492a-494a (CD2.7.26=9/14/1637). 
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state.8 Some of these actions were perennial issues such as ginseng gathering in the Qing domain 
by Chosŏn subjects. As ginseng was a lucrative commodity highly prized by the early Qing state, 
the Qing state deemed this activity a violation of its territorial boundary as well as of its 
economic prerogatives.9 Between 1642 and 1645, the Qing court asserted jurisdiction over at 
least three groups of Chosŏn subjects gathering ginseng in the Qing domain. In 1643, for 
example, 36 Chosŏn ginseng gatherers from of Kanggye were arrested while gathering ginseng. 
In response, the Qing court sent two envoys to try the officials of Kanggye.10 In 1645, separate 
groups of Chosŏn subjects from far northern P’yŏngan and Hamgyŏng (咸鏡) provinces were 
arrested for gathering ginseng in the Qing domain. The Qing court sent three envoys to Hanyang 
(漢陽), the Chosŏn capital, to investigate the criminals and the local officials responsible.11  
Other actions were specific to the period in question, when the Qing and Ming states 
were engaged in a full-blown war. The Qing court, for example, considered Chosŏn 
communications with the Ming state to be criminal. In 1641, the Qing court sent two baksi to 
Ŭiju (義州), P’yŏngan, to investigate a case involving a Chosŏn military officer named Ch’oe 
Hyo-il (崔孝一; d. 1644). He had defected to Ming with his family in 1639 and had kept in touch 
with his relatives remaining in Ŭiju.12 In 1642, Hong Chengchou (洪承疇; d. 1665), a Ming 
minister who had recently defected to Qing, informed the Qing court of communications that he 
                                                          
8 I thank Pär Cassel for making this observation. 
 
9 Seonmin Kim, “Ginseng and Border Trespassing Between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea,” Late Imperial China 
28, no. 1 (2007): 33–61. 
 
10 CWS Injo 44: 33b (21.9.21=11/2/1643). 
 
11 CWS Injo 46: 9a-b (23.3.1=3/28/1645). 
 
12 CWS Injo 42: 35b-36a (19.11.9=12/11/1641), 42: 37a (19.12.8=1/8/1642). 
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had received from Chosŏn officials in the past, which was described in chapter two. Hong Taiji 
sent four high officials—Inggūldai (英俄爾岱; 1596-1648), Cergei (車爾格; d. 1645), Garin 
(剛林; d. 1651), and Lošo (羅碩; n.d.)—and the Chosŏn crown prince Sohyŏn (昭顯; 1612-45) 
to the Qing border city of Fenghuangcheng (鳳凰城) for a joint investigation of P’yŏngan 
provincial officials.13  
The Qing court considered unsatisfactory Chosŏn performance in campaigns against 
Ming forces to be a crime as well. Hong Taiji’s November 1640 edict condemning the ten crimes 
of King Injo, discussed in chapter two, is a good example. Three of the crimes listed had to do 
with the insufficiency of the Chosŏn war effort: not sending cavalry, delay in the sending of 
ships, and delay in sending of the horses.14 This performance issue extended to the battlefield as 
well. In 1641, for example, two Chosŏn soldiers fighting as part of the Chosŏn contingency of 
the Qing campaign in Jinzhou (錦州) were disciplined by a Qing supervisor for their 
performance on the field. One soldier, who removed the bullets from his gun and fired empty 
shots at Ming forces, was beheaded, and the other soldier, who fired shots and, perhaps 
intentionally, missed his targets, was beaten.15  
 The Qing judiciary assumed full jurisdiction over Chosŏn subjects it targeted in such 
ways. In the trials held in the Qing domain, the Qing judiciary left no room for the Chosŏn 
judiciary to intervene. A case in 1639 involving two members of the Chosŏn crown prince’s 
retinue in Mukden is instructive. The case started with them accusing two Qing interpreters of 
                                                          
13 QSL Taizong 63: 860a-864a (CD 7.10.6=10/29/1642); CWS Injo 43: 22a-b (20.10.12=11/4/1642), 43: 24a 
(20.10.18=11/10/1642), 43: 24a-b (20.10.19=11/11/1642), 43: 24b-25a (20.10.20=11/12/1642), 43: 35b 
(20.i11.29=1/19/1643).  
14 QSL Taizong 53: 706a-707a (CD 5.10.15=11/27/1640). 
 
15 CWS Injo 42: 16b (19.5.4=6/11/1641). 
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demanding and receiving bribes from the Chosŏn court, a practice that Hong Taiji had explicitly 
prohibited. These interpreters, such as Gūlmahūn (d. 1653), a former Chosŏn subject by the 
name of Chŏng Myŏng-su (鄭命壽) who was captured by the Jurchens during the 1627 war, 
were in the service of high-ranking officials such as Inggūldai. The Qing Board of Punishments 
eventually concluded that these Chosŏn subjects had made false accusations (wugao) and put 
them on a trial. Even though the crown prince requested that they be sent to Chosŏn to be tried 
there, the Qing officials in charge claimed that Chosŏn subjects were also “our subjects” (wu 
min) and thus must be punished by “our law” (wu fa). They were strangled to death in Mukden.16  
 The Qing judiciary reserved full jurisdiction over trials held in the Chosŏn domain as 
well. Those Qing officials who were sent to the Chosŏn domain, as Hong Taiji’s representatives, 
largely made unilateral legal decisions and imposed them on the Chosŏn judiciary. The baksi 
sent to Ŭiju in 1641, for example, decided that Hwang Il-ho (黃一皓; 1588-1641), who was 
serving as the Ŭiju prefect in 1639, was guilty of not chasing after Ch’oe Hyo-il when he 
defected to the Ming and of releasing his Ŭiju relatives. They paid no attention to King Injo’s 
plea that Hwang be spared, or at least be strangled to death, instead beheading him alongside 
Ch’oe’s 12 relatives in Ŭiju.17  
The Chosŏn court was keenly aware of this judicial monopoly. In 1643, for example, 
when the two Qing envoys investigating the case of the Kanggye ginseng gatherers asked King 
Injo what he wished to do with the local officials, the king replied that he dared not decide and 
                                                          
16 CWS Injo 38: 8b-11b (17.2.6=3/10/1639), 38: 14a-b (17.2.9=3/13/1639). On Gūlmahūn, see Kim Sŏn-min 
(Seonmin Kim), “Chosŏn t’ongsa Kulmahun, Ch’ŏngyŏk Chŏng Myŏng-su,” Myŏng-Ch’ŏngsa yŏn’gu 41 (2014): 
37–65. 
 
17 Injo 42: 35b-36a (19.11.9=12/11/1641), 42: 37a (19.12.8=1/8/1642). 
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withdrew from the decision-making process. The envoys commented that the officials deserved 
death but eventually pardoned them with the application of imperial clemency. As we will see 
below, this use of Qing imperial amnesty toward Chosŏn subjects would become a routine 
feature of Qing-Chosŏn interstate law.18 In 1645, the three envoys sent to Hanyang interrogated 
P’yŏngan and Hamgyŏng ginseng gatherers and officials who had jurisdiction over them with 
high ministers of Chosŏn. After King Injo expressed his wish to follow their adjudication, 
however, the envoys adjudicated on the case on their own.19 
Perhaps most distressing to the Chosŏn court, the Qing judiciary could target any person 
of Chosŏn for punishment, including the king. Hong Taiji’s November 1640 edict, discussed 
above, highlighted this fact by listing ten crimes of King Injo, which centered on the theme of 
disobedience and violation of imperial orders (wei ming). Even though Inggūldai and other Qing 
officials sent to Ŭiju did not go as far as trying Injo himself, this edict perpetuated the notion that 
the Qing emperor could pronounce the Chosŏn king guilty. In that context, what ensued in Ŭiju 
is not surprising. The Qing officials summoned a few top Chosŏn ministers to Ŭiju to learn the 
identities of those who had openly espoused anti-Qing sentiments. When the names of two 
current officials and three literati were produced, the envoys brought these five back to Mukden 
to be tried there. These five anti-Qing individuals were eventually imprisoned in Ŭiju in 1642.20 
In the 1642 trial in Fenghuangcheng involving communications between Chosŏn officials 
and Hong Chengchou, chief state councilor Ch’oe Myŏng-gil (崔鳴吉; 1586-1647), the highest 
ranking Chosŏn official, as well as six current and former top officials were eventually 
                                                          
18 CWS Injo 44: 36b-37a (21.10.10=11/20/1643). 
 
19 CWS Injo 46: 9a-b (23.3.1=3/28/1645). 
 
20 QSL Taizong 53: 706a-b (CD5.10.15=11/27/1640), 53: 716b-717a (CD5.12.26=25/1641); CWS Injo 41: 12b 
(18.10.15=11/27/1640), 41: 25b-26a (18.12.20=1/30/1641), 42: 2b-3a (19.1.20=3/1/1641), 43: 1b (20.1.6=2/4/1642). 
 
 
 
93 
 
implicated. Ch’oe was accused of sending a monk and an official letter to the Ming official Hong 
Chengchou, while the others were accused of committing anti-Qing acts, such as not using the 
Qing reign title in their writings. The Qing court ordered the Chosŏn court to send them to 
Mukden. After their trial there, Hong Taiji eventually decided to pardon two officials who were 
related to King Injo by marriage, fine three officials originally sentenced to death, and imprison 
two in Mukden.21 
The Qing monopoly of interstate jurisdiction lasted for less than a decade. What 
happened during this brief period, however, had far-reaching consequences for Qing-Chosŏn 
legal interactions in the future. Whereas the Qing state sought to delineate the domains and 
peoples of the Qing and Chosŏn states during this period, there was no corresponding effort to 
delineate the judiciaries of the two states. Rather, there was more of an effort to use law as a 
political tool to impose its will on the Chosŏn state, leaving much room for interstate cooperation 
but even more room for Qing judicial domination. That set the tone for one of the two 
characteristics we will see below for Qing-Chosŏn interstate law: asymmetry in the relationship 
between Qing and Chosŏn judiciaries. Hong Taiji’s ability to create new precedents, which could 
be applied to everyone in the Chosŏn domain including the king and then become the norm in 
future legal interactions, was only the clearest expression of this asymmetry. 
 
II. The Incorporation of Chosŏn as a Qing Judicial Province: 1646-1690s 
From 1646, when the Qing forces had already conquered Beijing and defeated the first 
and most significant Southern Ming regime in Nanjing, the frequency and degree of Qing 
                                                          
21 QSL Taizong 63: 860a-864a (CD7.10.6=10/29/1642); CWS Injo 43: 22a-b (20.10.12=11/4/1642), 43: 24a 
(20.10.18=11/10/1642), 43: 24a-b (20.10.19), 43: 24b-25a (20.10.20), 43: 35b (20.i11.29=1/19/1643).  
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judicial intervention over the Chosŏn judiciary gradually decreased. Moreover, the operational 
interstate law that fit the exigencies of the total war between Ming and Qing gradually gave way 
to a more routine and shared process of handling Chosŏn subjects accused of committing crimes 
in the Qing domain. In this section, I will reconstruct this process stage by stage to draw 
attention to not only the aspect of asymmetry mentioned above but also the character of interstate 
collaboration.  
 
A. From the Arrest to the Decision in Beijing 
 The first stage of any given case was naturally detection of criminal activities and arrest 
of suspects. During this period, there were 16 trespassing cases in which Chosŏn subjects made 
unauthorized trips to the Qing domain, and Qing authorities made the initial arrest on 12 of these 
occasions. In some cases, these Chosŏn subjects were arrested red-handed. As in the previous 
period, some were arrested while gathering ginseng, such as Sim Hyang-ŭi (沈向義), who was 
arrested in the Shengjing region in 1652.22 Chosŏn subjects also pursued other forms of profit. In 
1647, for example, Kim Ik-kyŏm (金益鎌) and 22 Chosŏn subjects from Hamgyŏng province 
were arrested in the Ningguta (寧古塔) region while hunting with fowling pieces.23 In 1662, Pak 
Yong-ŏp (朴龍業) and another Chosŏn subject from Ŭiju were arrested in Fenghuangcheng 
while logging.24 In other cases, the Chosŏn subjects were arrested simply for entering the Qing 
domain without authorization. 
                                                          
22 TMHG 49: 6b-7a (edict to Hyojong; SZ9.11.7=12/7/1652). 
 
23 CWS Injo 48: 37b-38a (25.10.9=11/5/1647), 49: 7a (26.3.6=3/29/1648); TMHG 49: 3b-4a (zi from the Board of 
Revenue to Injo; SZ5.1.15=2/8/1648). 
 
24 TMHG 50: 7a-9a (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyŏnjong; KX1.3.23=5/10/1662). 
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Much less often, on four occasions, Chosŏn authorities made the initial arrest of 
trespassers. In two cases, they had detected the criminal activities first and then arrested the 
suspects. In 1660, for example, Kim Hyo-sin (金孝信) and 13 soldiers from Kanggye crossed the 
Yalu River to gather ginseng in the Qing domain and were attacked by Qing subjects, suffering 
three causalities. Despite the attempts by the Kanggye officials to cover up the matter, King 
Hyŏnjong (顯宗; r. 1659-74) eventually discovered the truth and arranged for the arrest of all 11 
criminals and the responsible officials.25 In the other two cases, the Qing authorities had detected 
the criminal activities and ordered the Chosŏn authorities to make the arrest. In 1685, for 
example, Han Tŭk-wan (韓得完) and 30 Chosŏn subjects crossed the Yalu River to search for 
ginseng and came across a Qing imperial cartographic mission led by a high-ranking banner 
official, the assistant commandant (xieling; rank 2b) Le-chu (勒楚). The two sides exchanged 
fire in the confusion, and this encounter resulted in the injury of several Qing subjects and the 
death of one Chosŏn subject. The Qing court ordered the Chosŏn court to arrest the criminals in 
preparation for a trial.26 
During this period, the illicit trade by Chosŏn subjects traveling as members of the 
tributary missions emerged as the other category of Chosŏn crime in Qing. Unsurprisingly, 
considering the nature of the crime, the suspects were arrested in the Qing domain in all 13 
cases. Sometimes, the arrest happened in Beijing, where the Chosŏn subjects engaged in private 
                                                          
25 CWS Hyŏnjong 3: 54b (1.12.4=1/4/1661); TMHG 49: 47b-49a (zi from Hyŏnjong to the Board of Rites; SZ17.12) 
 
26 TMHG 51: 3b-4a (zi from the Board to Sukjong; KX24.9.29=10/26/1685), 4a-b (edict to Sukjong; 
KX24.10.6=11/2/1685). 
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trade. In 1646, for example, an interpreter named Pak Sŏn (朴璇) was arrested in Beijing for 
selling ginseng.27 In 1663, two servants were arrested in Beijing while selling 100 marten pelts28 
More often, however, the arrest happened in Fenghuangcheng, where all the members of 
the Chosŏn tribute missions had to have their baggage checked before returning to Chosŏn. The 
list of goods detected and confiscated hints at the variety of illicit goods and the size of the trade. 
That possession of some of the goods led to confiscation or arrest is predictable. In 1657, for 
example, Kim Ch’u-ip (金秋立) and four Chosŏn subjects were arrested for possession of 
saltpeter (yanxiao).29 In 1660, Kim Ik-tong (金益同) was found to be in possession of four Qing 
horses and arrested.30 In 1661, Pak Sŏng-sŏn (朴成善) was arrested for carrying 20 jin of 
copper.31 The reasons other goods were illicit, as will be explained before, are not as 
straightforward. In 1670, Yang Chŏng-ch’an (梁廷燦) was arrested for his purchase of Sima 
Guang’s history book Zizhi tongjian (資治通鑒).32 In 1677, Sin Haeng-gŏn (慎行建) was 
arrested for carrying maps of various Qing provinces.33 
 Whether the arrest was made in the Qing domain or the Chosŏn domain, the case moved 
on to the next stage, the initial interrogation. If the arrest was made in the Qing domain, the 
suspects were transferred to the office of the military governor in Mukden or Ningguta (Jilin 
                                                          
27 TMHG  63: 1a (zi from the Board of Revenue to Injo; SZ3). 
 
28 CWS Hyŏnjong (4.2.11=3/20/1663); TMHG 63: 30a-b (zi from the Board to Hyŏnjong; KX2). 
 
29 TMHG 63: 5a-b (edict to Hyojong; SZ14.2.18=4/1/1657). 
 
30 TMHG 63: 18b (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyŏnjong; SZ17). 
 
31 TMHG 63: 19a-20a (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyŏnjong; SZ18.2.3=3/3/1661). 
 
32 TMHG 64: 8a (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyŏnjong; KX9.2). 
 
33 TMHG 64: 10a-11a (zi from the Board to Sukjong; KX16.4.8=5/9/1677). 
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after 1676) for personal interrogation by the military governor. If the arrest was made in the 
Chosŏn domain, the suspects were transferred to the office of the Ŭiju magistrate or the office of 
the provincial governor in Pyongyang (平壤) or Hamhŭng (咸興) for personal interrogation by 
the head official there. Either way, the news of the arrest and the initial interrogation would reach 
one of the Six Boards in Beijing via a lateral communication (z) from the Qing military governor 
or the Chosŏn king. Beginning in 1654, these lateral communications were bound to reach the 
Board of Rites, who had come to hold jurisdiction over all Chosŏn matters.  
 Because of this chain of communication, the decision on what to do with these suspects 
was made by the Qing court in Beijing rather than the Chosŏn court in Hanyang. In general, the 
Qing court had three options. The first option was to decline to assert jurisdiction, which 
happened on four occasions. In three trespassing cases, the Qing court saw no criminal intent and 
simply chose to repatriate the suspects: an unnamed man from Ŭiju who sought to defect to the 
Qing in 1661, Ch’oe Sun-il (崔順一) who tried to defect in 1666, and an unnamed woman who 
claimed to have gotten lost in the same year.34 These cases again show the Qing dedication to the 
maintenance of the boundary between Qing imperial and Chosŏn tributary subjects. In the fourth 
case, a 1699 case involving the purchase of some books by Cho Chon-byŏk (趙存璧), the Board 
of Rites merely reminded King Sukjong (肅宗; 1674-1720) of a prohibition on the purchase of 
history books by members of the tributary missions.35  
 The second option was pardoning the Chosŏn suspects, which also happened on four 
occasions. The pardon could come in the form of a general amnesty. In 1649, the Board of 
                                                          
34 TMHG 50: 1a-b (zi from the Board to Hyŏnjong; SZ18.4.12=5/10/1661), 16a-17a (zi from the Board of Rites to 
Hyŏnjong; KX5.2.27=4/1/1666), 17b-18b (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyŏnjong; KX5.2.27=4/1/1666). 
 
35 TMHG 64: 19b-20a (zi from the Board to Sukjong; KX38.5.9=6/6/1699). The Board reasoned that even though 
these books were not technically history books (shishu), some books contained passages having to do with history.  
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Revenue recommended pardoning two Chosŏn subjects, who were arrested in Ningguta after 
visiting their friend Lai-da-hu (賴達胡) and giving him meat and rice, in light of a new general 
amnesty (enshe) and received the approval of the imperial regent Dorgon (多爾袞; 1612-50).36 
As Brian McKnight has pointed out, amnesty in Chinese law was considered an act of grace that 
could only emanate from the emperor. The application of amnesty itself, then, can be understood 
as an act of asserting jurisdiction.37 In the three other cases, the Kangxi (康熙; r. 1662-1722) 
emperor pardoned the suspects individually. In the 1663 case mentioned above involving the sale 
of 100 marten pelts, the Kangxi emperor ordered the two servants to be pardoned despite the 
Board of Rites’ recommendation that the king hold a trial and report back.38 In two cases 
involving trespassers, Kangxi gave specific instructions that the trespassers not be punished 
while ordering their repatriation, perhaps in consideration of their circumstances: Cho Ye-nam 
(曹禮男) in 1685 because of his insanity, Ŏm Kwi-hyŏn (嚴貴玄) and two others in 1699 for 
having been driven by famine.39  
 Most commonly, and most importantly for our discussion, the Qing court also chose the 
third option of initiating a trial of these Chosŏn subjects as criminals of the Qing court. This 
decision effectively turned Chosŏn into a Qing judicial province, as the Chosŏn judiciary was 
positioned as the lower court to the Qing judiciary throughout the duration of the trial. In the 
section below, I will describe this process in detail.  
                                                          
36 TMHG 49: 5a-b (zi from the Board of Revenue to Injo; SZ6.1.10=2/20/1649). 
 
37 Brian E. McKnight, The Quality of Mercy: Amnesties and Traditional Chinese Justice (Honolulu: University 
Press of Hawaii, 1981), ix-xii. 
 
38 TMHG 63: 30a-b (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyŏnjong; KX2). 
 
39 TMHG 51: 1a-b (zi from the Board of Rites to Sukjong; KX24.2.14=3/18/1685); TMHG j. 52: 41b-42a (zi from 
the Board to Sukjong; KX38.10.16=12/6/1699). 
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B. The Trial: From Formal Interrogation to Adjudication  
 During this period, the Qing court chose to prosecute Chosŏn subjects as criminals of the 
Qing court on 23 occasions. In 12 cases, the Qing court sent high-ranking officials to Hanyang, 
the Chosŏn capital, for trials in conjunction with the Chosŏn court. There, the two judiciaries 
collaborated to interrogate the criminals and adjudicate the cases. In 11 cases, the Qing court 
delegated to the Chosŏn court either the interrogation of the criminals or the interrogation and 
the adjudication, with the Qing court reviewing the terms of adjudication and making the final 
decision. 
 
1. Joint Trials in Hanyang 
Considering the historical context, the joint trial in Hanyang may be considered as a 
diplomatic weapon to subdue the Chosŏn state and survey its internal affairs. After all, the 
Chosŏn state had only submitted to Qing rule after two military invasions, and as many scholars 
have pointed out, anti-Qing sentiments abounded not only within the Chosŏn court but also 
among the wider community of Confucian literati.40 Moreover, the Qing state during this period 
was competing with multiple actors to assert its political authority over China Proper and 
beyond: the Southern Ming regimes and bandits until the 1660s, and the Three Feudatories, the 
Zheng regime, the Zunghars, and the Russians from the 1670s to the 1690s.41 In fact, we have 
                                                          
40 Jahyun Kim Haboush, “Dead Bodies in the Postwar Discourse of Identity in Seventeenth-Century Korea: 
Subversion and Literary Production in the Private Sector,” The Journal of Asian Studies 62, no. 2 (2003): 415–42; 
Chŏng Ok-cha, Chosŏn hugi Chosŏn chunghwa sasang yŏn’gu (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1998), 9-25. 
 
41 On the Qing relations with the Russians and the Zunghars in the last three decades of the seventeenth century, see 
Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2005), 133-208. On the Southern Ming regimes, see Lynn A. Struve, The Southern Ming, 
1644-62 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). On the Qing victory over the Three Feudatories and the Zheng 
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one direct piece of evidence that shows the Qing court using the joint trial as a diplomatic 
weapon. In August 4, 1680, when the Kangxi emperor asked his ministers whether he should 
send officials to Hanyang for a joint trial over the case of Pak Si-ung and two other Chosŏn 
subjects logging trees on the Qing side of the Tumen River. Songgotu (索額圖; d. 1703) 
answered that Chosŏn needed to be disciplined (chengchuang) for trying to stir up trouble 
(shengduan) during the Chakhar prince Burni’s rebellion in 1675.42 
There is, however, much to be gained when we go past the façade of the joint trials as 
mere excuses for the Qing assertion of political authority over the Chosŏn state and focus on the 
praxis of the trials themselves. First, the joint trial, which occurred 12 times during this period, 
was reserved for the crimes deemed most serious by the Qing court, which usually resulted in 
capital punishments for the principals. Second, the joint trial was a collaborative effort between 
the Qing and Chosŏn judiciaries at every stage of the joint trial. 
The alleged criminal activities that resulted in a joint trial in Hanyang can be categorized 
into three groups. The first group involved trespassing by Chosŏn subjects in pursuit of profit: 
three cases involving the gathering of ginseng, three cases involving the felling of trees, and one 
case involving hunting. As mentioned above, the Qing state was particularly sensitive about this 
encroachment on its territorial and economic prerogatives. Moreover, the specific circumstances 
of a few cases seem to have justified Qing fear of and suspicion about these activities. Three of 
the cases, for example, had resulted in violent encounters between Qing subjects and Chosŏn 
subjects. In 1654, two Kurkas on their way back from purchasing two oxen from Kyŏngwŏn 
                                                          
regime, see Jonathan D. Spence, “The K’ang-Hsi Reign,” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 9, Part 1: 
The Ch’ing Empire to 1800, ed. Willard J. Peterson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 136-50. 
 
42 This referred to the attempt by the Chosŏn state in 1675 to buy some copper coins from the Qing state to use as 
currency. It is unclear why Songgotu saw it as an act of “stirring trouble.” Yi hwa-cha (Li Huazi), Cho-Chʻŏng 
kukkyŏng munje yŏnʼgu (Pʻaju: Chimmundang, 2008), 78-83. 
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(慶源), Hamgyŏng, were found dead north of the Tumen River, with the footprints of Kim 
Ch’ung-il (金忠一) and other Chosŏn loggers nearby.43 In 1685, there was the Han Tŭk-wan 
case involving an attack on a Qing cartographic mission. In 1690, Im In (林仁) and six others 
who crossed the Tumen River to gather ginseng eventually raided a tent set up by Qing ginseng 
gatherers and killed one of them.44 In one case, it was the possible collusion of Chosŏn local 
officials that alarmed the Qing state. In the Pak Yong-ŏp case (1662) mentioned above, the 
Board of Rites officials discovered on the bodies of the arrested Chosŏn loggers a permit with 
the seal of the Ŭiju magistrate.45 
 The second group involved the purchase of saltpeter and sulfur, which could be used in 
the production of gunpowder and were thus prohibited for export. We have already looked at the 
arrest of Kim Ch’u-ip and four others in possession of saltpeter in 1655. What made this case 
even more problematic was the intervention by the Chosŏn chief envoy Yi Yo (李㴭; 1622-58), 
Prince Inp’yŏng (麟坪大君), who tried to conceal the matter using his position but failed. This 
turn of events led to a joint trial in Hanyang.46 The discovery of sulfur in the baggage of Hŏ 
Yong (許龍) and Ŏn Nam (彥男) in 1663 and the discovery of saltpeter in the baggage of Ch’oe 
Sŏn-il (崔善一) in 1666 also resulted in joint trials in Hanyang.47  
                                                          
43 TMHG 49: 23b-26a (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyojong; SZ11.12). 
 
44 TMHG 52: 12a-13a (zi from Sukjong to the Board; KX29.9.15=10/16/1690), 14a-15b (zi from Sukjong to the 
Board; KX29.11.21=12/21/1690). 
 
45 TMHG 50: 7a-9a (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyŏnjong; KX1.3.23=5/10/1662). 
 
46 TMHG 63: 5a-b (edict to Hyojong; SZ14.2.18=4/1/1657). 
 
47 TMHG 63: 30b (zi from Hyŏnjong to the Board; KX2), 63: 31a (edict to Hyŏnjong; KX2.9.19=10/19/1663), 64: 
1a-b (edict to Hyŏnjong; KX5.5.13=6/15/1666). 
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The third group involved two cases that targeted the Chosŏn court at large, both of which 
have been examined in chapter two. To recap, one case involved a 1650 memorial by King 
Hyojong (孝宗; r. 1649-59) that expressed his worry about returning Han Chinese castaways to 
Beijing instead of the Japanese hostel (waegwan) in Tongnae (東萊). The other case involved the 
sheltering of the runaway slave An Ch’u-wŏn/Xiao Er in the Chosŏn domain from 1664 to 1666. 
The Qing court sent officials to Hanyang to determine the responsible party in the Chosŏn court 
and punish them. 
 All 12 instances of the joint trial, then, involved the cases that grabbed the attention of the 
Qing court because of the nature of the purported criminal activities. As we will see below, the 
Qing officials who arrived in Hanyang came with the understanding that these were capital 
punishment cases. But that did not mean that the Qing officials could always impose their will in 
these trials. Joint trials, despite their beginning as a political tool by the Qing state, created the 
space for the most protracted and intimate legal interactions between the Qing and Chosŏn states. 
The representatives of the Qing judiciary came into direct contact with the Chosŏn subjects 
involved, and they collaborated with the representatives of the Chosŏn judiciary in almost all 
stages of the trials. 
The Qing officials sent to Hanyang to participate in joint trials were all high-ranking 
bannermen. This conforms to Ku Pŏm-jin’s recent study, in which he has shown that Qing 
envoys to Chosŏn were almost always chosen from bannermen officials of rank 3 or higher, 
whereas the envoys to Vietnam and Ryukyu, the other “model tributaries,” were chosen from 
bannermen and Han officials of rank 5 or lower.48 These Qing envoys collaborated with Chosŏn 
                                                          
48 Ku Pŏm-jin, “Ch'ŏng ŭi Chosŏn sahaeng insŏn kwa "Taech’ŏng cheguk ch’eje," Inmun nonch’ong 59 (2008): 1-
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high ministers in interrogating suspects. Even though the list of ministers who participated 
differed slightly for each trial, the following ministers were usually present: three state 
councilors, ministers of the six ministries, the chief or second minister of the State Tribunal 
(ŭigŭmbu), heads of the censorate (inspector-general and censor-general), and other officials 
from the Ministry of Punishments.49 The king’s participation was often required as well. In 1686, 
for example, when King Sukjong failed to participate in the interrogation of criminals, the Qing 
envoys complained that they could not proceed on their own without Sukjong’s involvement as 
the imperial edict was clear that they were to “investigate with the king (yu wang tong cha).” 
Their plea eventually prompted Sukjong to participate in the trial.50  
Also, in all cases the Chosŏn king and the Qing envoys adjudicated these cases together, 
and this process was often full of negotiation and compromise on both sides. This joint 
adjudication process is how the Chosŏn ministers avoided death sentences in the 1650 case 
involving Hyojong’s memorial. We see the Qing envoys asking King Hyojong how he wished to 
adjudicate, to which the king replied he dared not speak his mind. The envoys, however, were 
adamant that the king could not shift his responsibility (tuiwei) for adjudicating and pressed the 
king for his opinion. Hyojong responded that banishment would cause enough suffering for the 
ministers, and the envoys conformed to his wishes by sentencing the ministers to banishment to 
Ŭiju.51 Similarly, in the An Ch’u-wŏn case, after King Hyŏnjong shouldered the blame, Lei-hu 
(雷虎; n.d.) and other envoys asked how the king wished to adjudicate the case. Hyŏnjong, 
commenting that there are many punishments less severe than capital punishment, urged the 
                                                          
49 CWS Hyojong 10: 1a-b (4.1.1=1/29/1653), 15: 16b (6.9.2=10/1/1655); CWS Hyŏnjong 5: 25a-26a 
(3.5.16=7/1/1662); TMHG 49: 26b-30a (memorial by Hyojong; SZ12.4.12=5/17/1655). 
 
50 CWS Sukjong 16: 53a-55a (11.12.1=12/26/1685). 
 
51 CWS Hyojong 3: 20b-21a (1.3.9=4/9/1650). 
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envoys to decide on one. The envoys complied with the king’s wish by sentencing the state 
councilors to cashiering and banishment.52  
The Pak Yong-ŏp case (1662) provides an even more vivid example of the joint 
adjudication process. King Hyŏnjong and his ministers, intent on saving the Ŭiju magistrate Yi 
Si-sul (李時術; 1606-72) from the death penalty, did not wish to list his name at the beginning of 
the memorial to the Qing emperor. They argued that his name should be moved down, since he 
was sentenced to a lighter punishment (death by strangulation) than the two criminals (death by 
decapitation). The chief envoy, however, opposed the move, remarking that all three committed 
capital crimes anyway and that there was no need to dwell on the minor details. He did not 
change his mind until Yi Si-sul’s son gifted him a precious sword called the seven star sword 
(七星劍) and the Chosŏn court gave the Qing interpreters 200 marten pelts and more than 1,000 
taels of gold.53  
Many aspects of the negotiation in these cases highlight both the common ground and 
differences between Qing law and Chosŏn law, providing a useful material for a comparative 
study of early modern East Asian law. The Kim Ch’u-ip case (1657) is one example. After 
sentencing the criminals in possession of saltpeter, the Qing envoys and King Hyojong moved on 
to discuss the guilt of the chief envoy Yi Yo. First, Qing envoys asked the king how one 
punished a taegun, to which King Hyojong answered there was no precedent. Then, the envoys 
asked what kind of title taegun was, to which the king answered it was equivalent to the Qing 
title of qinwang (Prince of the First Degree), for whose punishment there must be a precedent. 
                                                          
52 TMHG 64: 2b-7a (zouben by Hyŏnjong; KX5.9.20=10/17/1666); CWS Hyŏnjong 13: 43a-44a 
(7.7.17=8/17/1666). 
 
53 CWS Hyŏnjong 5: 24b-25a (3.5.15=6/30/1662), 27a-b (3.5.19=7/4/1662), 29a-b (3.5.22=7/7/1662), 29b-30b 
(3.5.23=7/8/1662). 
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Finally, the envoys explained that there were three ways of punishing a qinwang in Qing law. 
There was fine, removal of title, and fine and removal of title. Hyojong left the decision to the 
envoys, who settled on the fine of 2,000 taels of gold.54  
In the Han Tŭk-wan case (1685-86) as well, King Sukjong and the envoys had a lengthy 
discussion on how to adjudicate this unprecedented case. The envoys asked the king whether 
Chosŏn law had a more severe sentence than capital punishment. The king replied that the 
criminals’ families could be punished (Kr. yŏnjwa, Ch. yuanzuo) and their property confiscated 
(Kr. chŏngmol, Ch. jimo), and the chief criminals were sentenced accordingly. Adjudication on 
the Samsu (三水) garrison commander (ch’ŏmsa), who had already committed suicide, is also 
interesting. Envoys asked Sukjong how he would adjudicate if the garrison commander were 
alive, and Sukjong answered that he would add house arrest (Kr. wiri anch’i) on top of 
banishment. On their way back to Qing, however, the envoys realized that there was no statute 
for house arrest in the Qing Code and changed the sentence to 100 strokes of beating by heavy 
bamboo and banishment of 3,000 li.55 
When we look at the terms of adjudication, we can again see how seriously the Qing 
court took these cases. Out of 12 cases, all 10 cases involving regular Chosŏn subjects (i.e. who 
were not ministers) resulted in capital sentences for the chief criminals. For trespassing cases in 
pursuit of profit, the usual terms of adjudication were capital punishments for the chief criminals, 
various degrees of penal punishments for the local officials directly involved, and cashiering and 
demotion for negligent local and provincial officials. In the Pak Yong-ŏp case (1662-63), for 
example, King Hyŏnjong and the envoys sentenced the two criminals to death by decapitation. 
                                                          
54 CWS Hyojong 18: 23b-24a (8.4.2=5/14/1657). 
 
55 CWS Sukjong 16: 53a-55a (11.12.1=12/26/1685), 16: 55b (11.12.5=12/30/1685). 
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They also sentenced Yi Si-sul, the Ŭiju magistrate, to death by strangulation for having 
authorized the logging in that case.56 In the Pak Si-ung case (1680-81), using the Pak Yong-ŏp 
case as precedent, the king and the envoys sentenced the three criminals to decapitation, the local 
garrison commander to cashiering and banishment of 3,000 li, and three local and provincial 
officials to cashiering and demotion.57  
Unsurprisingly, homicide cases resulted in even harsher adjudication. The Han Tŭk-wan 
case (1685-86) serves as an example. Han and the five others who had fired shots at the Qing 
cartographic mission were sentenced to immediate decapitation, enslavement of their wives and 
children, and confiscation of property. Kim T’ae-sŏng (金太成) and 21 others who had not fired 
shots were sentenced to immediate death by decapitation. The Huju (厚州) garrison commander, 
who had jurisdiction over the criminals, was sentenced to 100 strokes of beating by heavy 
bamboo and banishment of 3,000 li, while the Samsu magistrate (kunsu) was cashiered and 
sentenced to banishment of 2,000 li. Four other local officials and three provincial officials were 
cashiered or demoted for their negligence.58 The Im In case (1690-92), which took the Han Tŭk-
wan case as precedent, resulted in similar terms of adjudication.59 
                                                          
56 TMHG 50: 9a-11a (memorial by Hyŏnjong; KX1.7.26=9/7/1662). 
 
57 CWS Sukjong 10: 22a (6.i8.14=10/6/1680); TMHG 50: 24b-28a (Sukjong; KX19.11.27=1/16/1681). 
 
58 CWS Sukjong 16: 53a-55a (11.12.1=12/26/1685); TMHG 51: 9a-20a (Sukjong; KX25.1.28=2/20/1686); QSL 
Shengzu 125: 329b (KX25.4.5=4/27/1686), 126: 337b-338a (KX25.i4.12=6/2/1686). The Huju commander had 
already committed suicide, so the adjudication was given merely as a statutory punishment.  
 
59 TMHG 52: 22a-34a (Sukjong; KX30.i7.7=8/30/1691). Im and the other criminal who fired shots were sentenced 
to immediate death by decapitation, enslavement of wife and children, and confiscation. Im Kye-sŏn (林戒先) and 
three others who did not fire shots were sentenced to immediate death by decapitation. The Kyŏnghŭng magistrate 
(pusa), who had jurisdiction over them, was cashiered and sentenced to banishment of 2,000 li, while four other 
local and provincial officials were cashiered or demoted for their negligence. 
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Moreover, even though the two joint trials over the Chosŏn ministers did not result in 
capital sentences, the Qing envoys firmly stated that the ministers responsible deserved death in 
both cases. In 1650, the Qing envoys concluded that Yi Kyŏng-sŏk (李景奭; 1595-1671) and 
Cho Kyŏng (趙絅; 1586-1669) were responsible for drawing up the highly inappropriate 
memorial on the repatriation of Han Chinese castaways. Yi, as the chief state councilor, had 
shouldered the blame, whereas Cho had overseen the Ministry of Rites (yejo), in charge of all 
tributary matters, when the memorial was drawn up. The envoys sought to execute the two for 
their crimes.60 We have also seen in the An Ch’u-wŏn case (1664-66) how adamant envoys were 
in seeking death penalties for the ministers who had hidden a Qing subject and thus broken the 
1637 agreement between the two states.61  
These two cases, however, did not result in capital sentences for the ministers due to the 
joint adjudication process. In the Yi Kyŏng-sŏk case, Hyojong and the envoys settled on the 
sentence of life exile to Ŭiju. This was a compromise between Hyojong’s position that a life 
exile would be a sufficient punishment and the envoys’ position that this punishment will 
eventually result in death anyway. In the An Ch’u-wŏn case, Hyŏnjong shouldered the blame 
after the envoys sought capital punishments for the officials. The envoys then asked how the 
king wished to adjudicate the case, to which the king replied that it was up to the envoys to 
choose from the many statutes below capital punishment. The envoys complied with the king’s 
wish by sentencing the state councilors to cashiering and life exile.62  
                                                          
60 CWS Hyojong 3: 17b-20a (1.3.8=4/8/1650), 20b-21a (1.3.9=4/9/1650). 
 
61 CWS Hyŏnjong 13: 41a-42a (7.7.12=8/12/1666), 43a-44a (7.7.17=8/17/1666). 
 
62 TMHG 64: 2b-7a (Hyŏnjong zou; KX5.9.20=10/17/1666); CWS Hyojong 3: 20b-21a (1.3.9=4/9/1650); CWS 
Hyŏnjong 13: 43a-44a (7.7.17=8/17/1666). 
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Despite its collaborative nature, the joint trial was a burden on the Chosŏn judiciary. Its 
representatives were forced to collaborate with the representatives of a foreign judiciary for the 
duration of the trial. Even the Chosŏn king, normally at the apex of the Chosŏn judiciary, had to 
consider the legal opinions of the Qing representatives in adjudicating cases involving his own 
subjects. As we will see a little later, this asymmetric cooperation continued in the next stage, 
judicial review, as the Chosŏn king was required to present the result of the joint trials in a 
memorial to the Qing emperor. The king’s terms of adjudication were subject to review by the 
Qing judiciary, with the result that the king lost his authority to have the final judgment on his 
subjects.  
 
2. Trials in Hanyang by the Chosŏn Judiciary 
 Compared to the situation seen above, the 11 trials in Hanyang by the Chosŏn judiciary 
gave the Chosŏn state a lot more room to maneuver. A careful look at these cases, however, 
shows that Chosŏn jurisdiction over these criminals was still circumscribed in these cases. To 
begin with, the Chosŏn king’s authority to try his subjects now emanated from the Qing emperor 
rather than from himself. These Chosŏn subjects had become criminals against and of the Qing 
emperor. This acute sense of limited authority is well illustrated in King Hyojong’s 1654 lateral 
communication (zi) to the Qing Board of Rites after his initial investigation for the murder of the 
two Kurkas: “They are all criminals of the [Qing] court (chaoting fanren), so I dare not judge 
and decide [on my own] and will respectfully wait for [your] decision.”63  
 Second, the imperial decision often gave the king only a partial authority to try Chosŏn 
subjects. In four cases, the Qing court delegated the Chosŏn judiciary with the interrogation of 
                                                          
63 TMHG 49: 26a-b (zi from Hyojong to the Board of Rites; SZ12.4). 
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the suspects and then the Qing judiciary with adjudication. The first such case occurred in 1646, 
when the Qing Board of Revenue delegated to King Injo the task of punishing Pak Sŏn for 
selling ginseng in Beijing. King Injo found two applicable statutes from Chosŏn law: one on 
smuggling prohibited goods proscribing death by strangulation, and the other on selling Chinese 
goods (Kr. Tang hwa, Ch. Tang huo) at the border proscribing 100 strokes of beating by heavy 
bamboo and penal servitude. Injo asked for an imperial decision on which statute to apply, and 
the Qing court settled on the lighter punishment of beating and penal servitude.64 Even though 
we see no explicit citation of this case as a precedent, three future cases involving the illegal 
purchase of goods were resolved in the same way: Yang Chŏng-ch’an’s purchase of Zizhi 
tongjian in 1670, Sin Haeng-gŏn’s possession of Qing maps in 1677, and Chang Ch’an (張燦)’s 
purchase of Da Ming yitongzhi (大明一通志) in 1691.  
In all three cases, the Board of Rites seems to have consulted a section in the yet to be 
published the Kangxi edition of the Da Qing huidian as the statutory basis. This section 
prohibited the selling of items such as history books and military equipment to members of the 
tribute missions in Beijing.65 Then the Board would memorialize the Kangxi emperor on the 
incidents with the recommendation that the Chosŏn king investigate the incident and 
memorialize the emperor. With imperial approval, the king would interrogate the suspects and 
memorialize the emperor, again noting that he would wait for the imperial decision and thereby 
expressing his limited legal authority.66 Upon the arrival of the memorial in Beijing, the Qing 
                                                          
64 TMHG 63: 1a (zi from the Board of Revenue to Injo; SZ3), 1a (SZ3; zi from Injo to the Board of Revenue), 1a-b 
(SZ3; zi from the Board of Revenue to Injo). 
 
65 Da Qing Huidian (Kangxi edition), 73: 12b-13b. On the Kangxi edition of the Da Qing huidian, see Keliher, 
“Administrative Law and the Making of the First Da Qing Huidian.” 
 
66 TMHG 64: 8a-10a (Hyŏnjong zou; KX9.3.16=5/5/1670), 13b-15a (Sukjong zou; KX16.5.12=6/11/1677), 18b (zi 
from Sukjong to the Board; KX30). 
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Board of Rites and the Kangxi emperor would adjudicate the case. In 1670, the Kangxi emperor 
applied the general amnesty to pardon Yang and the three envoys. In 1677, Kangxi approved the 
Board’s recommendation that Sin be cashiered and sent into military exile on the Chosŏn border 
and the three envoys be cashiered. In 1691, Kangxi approved the Board’s adjudication based on 
the 1677 precedent that Chang be sent into military exile to the border but pardoned the envoys 
from being cashiered.67 Thus, and this is a crucial point, the Chosŏn king had been deprived of 
his authority to sentence his own subjects. 
 Third, even in the seven cases where the imperial decision gave the Chosŏn king full 
judicial authority, the Qing court portrayed this delegation of duty as an exception. In two cases, 
the Chosŏn king seems to have been given that authority because of the minor nature of the 
crime. For Kim Ik-tong’s purchase of four horses in 1660, the Qing Board of Rites noted that it 
was a crime punishable by beating with heavy bamboo, citing a statute found in both the Da 
Ming Huidian and the Kangxi edition of the Da Qing Huidian. Hyŏnjong sentenced Kim to 60 
strokes of beating by heavy bamboo and put his name on the list for life exile and penal servitude 
(Kr. p’yŏnbae, Ch. bian pei). Regarding Chang Hyŏn (張炫)’s purchase of 25 fireworks 
(huapao) in 1691, the Board again noted that even though it was related to purchasing saltpeter 
or sulfur, it was not the same as purchasing military equipment (junqi). Sukjong demoted and 
transferred Chang in response. In both instances, the Board simply allowed the Chosŏn king 
punish the criminals and conclude the case.68  
                                                          
67 TMHG 64: 10a (zi from the Board to Hyŏnjong; KX9), 16a-b (zi from the Board to Sukjong; 
KX16.7.20=8/20/1677), 18b-19a (zi from the Board to Sukjong; KX30). 
 
68 TMHG 63: 18b (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyŏnjong; SZ17), 63: 18b-19a (zi from Hyŏnjong to the Board; 
SZ17), 64: 19a (zi from the Board of Rites to Sukjong; KX30), 64: 19a (zi from Sukjong to the Board of Rites; 
KX30). 
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 For the remaining five capital punishment cases where the king was given full authority 
to try his subjects, the Qing court presented this as an act of imperial grace. In November 1660, 
Yi Ch’ŏl-sŏ (李哲瑞) was arrested in Fenghuangcheng for carrying 2 jin and 10 liang of sulfur 
with him. By January 1661, the Board of Rites had proposed sending officials to Hanyang 
following the Kim Ch’u-ip precedent (1657) and obtained imperial approval. Before the officials 
could set out, however, the Board received reports on the arrest of two other groups of Chosŏn 
suspects: a report from the Shengjing military governor Ukuri (吳庫禮; d. 1665) on the arrest of 
Pak Sŏng-sŏn, and a report from King Hyŏnjong on the arrest of Kim Hyo-sin and 10 
trespassers. When the Board again recommended sending officials for the joint trials over these 
three cases, the Kangxi emperor changed his earlier position and ordered King Hyŏnjong to 
investigate and adjudicate the cases and then memorialize on the results. The Qing sources 
represented this decision as an unprecedented act of imperial grace (en) and virtue (de).69  
 Lastly, the king’s legal position in the above cases was comparable to that of the highest 
Qing provincial officials. In the Qing appellate system, provincial officials on their own could 
confirm all penal servitude (tu) and life exile (liu) cases not involving homicide. But they had to 
report all capital punishment and homicide cases to the Board of Punishments, where they would 
be reviewed by the Board, the Three Judicial Offices (sanfasi), and the emperor.70 Likewise, the 
Chosŏn king’s sentencing in capital punishment cases involving his subjects was subject to 
review by the Qing judiciary. It is to this review process that we turn now.  
 
                                                          
69 TMHG 49: 47b-49a (zi from Hyŏnjong to the Board of Rites; SZ17.12), 19a-20a (zi from the Board of Rites to 
Hyŏnjong; SZ18.2.3=3/3/1661); QSL Shengzu 2: 67b-68a (SZ18.5.25=6/21/1661). 
 
70 Bodde and Morris, Law of Imperial China, 113-143. 
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C. The Review by the Qing Judiciary  
 Two features of the review process vividly highlighted the asymmetry between the Qing 
and Chosŏn judiciaries. First, the Qing judiciary monopolized the review process and thus the 
final authority over these cases. Second, the Qing judiciary sometimes claimed jurisdiction over 
even the Chosŏn king, the head of the Chosŏn judiciary, by discussing and imposing disciplinary 
sanctions over him.   
 
1. The Qing Monopoly over the Review Process  
The first record of this Qing review comes from 1653. After Sim Hyang-ŭi was arrested 
in Shengjing and then interrogated in Beijing in 1652, the Qing Board of Rites came to recognize 
that there were more ginseng gatherers who had not been arrested and arranged for a joint trial in 
Hanyang. When King Hyojong memorialized the Shunzhi emperor with the terms of joint 
adjudication, Shunzhi entrusted the Three Judicial Offices with the review of the adjudication 
and himself made the final decision on the adjudication.71 
Afterwards, review of the king’s adjudication became a regular fixture in the trials of 
Chosŏn criminals. The Three Judicial Offices reviewed the king’s adjudication of the Kim 
Ch’ung-il case (1656), the Kim Ch’u-ip case (1657), the Yu Kwi-kŭm case (1662), the Pak Si-
ung case (1681), the Han Tŭk-wan case (1685), and the Im In case (1691).72 The Board of 
Punishments sometimes acted on its own, reviewing the king’s adjudication of the three cases 
                                                          
71 TMHG 49: 6b-7a (edict to Hyojong; SZ9.11.7=12/7/1652), 9b (Hyojong zou; SZ10.1.22=2/19/1653), 12a-13b (zi 
from the Board of Punishments to Hyojong; SZ10.4.26=5/22/1653); CWS Hyojong 9: 70a (3.12.18=1/17/1653). 
 
72 TMHG 49: 12a-13b (zi from the Board of Punishments to Hyojong; SZ10.4.26=5/22/1653), 49: 36b-39a (zi from 
the Board of Rites to Hyojong; SZ13.3.15=4/9/1656), 50: 5b-6a (zi from the Board to Hyŏnjong; 
KX1.3.5=4/22/1662), 50: 30b-31b (zi from the Board of Rites to Sukjong; KX20.3.28=5/15/1681), 51: 29b-32a (zi 
from the Board to Sukjong; KX25.i4.15=6/5/1686), 52: 35a-36b (zi from the Board to Sukjong; 
KX30.10.26=12/15/1691), 63: 17a (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyojong; SZ14). 
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from 1661: the Kim Hyo-sin case, the Chang Yu-sin case, and the Pak Sŏng-sŏn case.73 When 
these offices memorialized the emperor on the results of the review, the emperor would then 
revisit the case one last time. As in other legal cases in the Qing judiciary, the imperial review 
here was final, and this final decision was relayed to the Chosŏn king via a lateral 
communication from the Qing Board of Rites with an order to carry out the terms of the imperial 
judgment.  
 The king’s ruling usually was not changed drastically during the reviews in Beijing. In 
Yu Kwi-kŭm case (1661-2), for example, the king’s adjudication was unchanged after the 
appellate review by the Three Judicial Offices and the imperial review.74 Even when the reviews 
changed the ruling, the changes always resulted in lesser, rather than harsher, punishments for 
the criminals. For example, we have seen how King Sukjong and the Qing envoys originally 
sentenced both the six principals and the 22 accessories to immediate decapitation for the Han 
Tŭk-wan case (1685-6). In his final review, the Kangxi emperor saved the lives of the 22 
accessories by commuting (jiandeng) their death sentences.75 So the terms of review were often 
in favor of the Chosŏn criminals. Still, the Qing monopoly of the review process is significant for 
a few reasons. Most importantly, this monopoly could put the Chosŏn king, the top of the 
Chosŏn judiciary, in a position inferior not only to the Qing emperor but also to the various Qing 
metropolitan offices.  
 
2. How to Punish a Tributary King 
                                                          
73 TMHG 63: 23b-25b (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyŏnjong; SZ18.7.6=7/31/1661). 
 
74 The following was the adjudication: death by decapitation for the three criminals, cashiering and banishment for 
the garrison commander, and cashiering for the magistrate. TMHG 50: 2-6. 
 
75 TMHG 51: 29b-32a (zi from the Board to Sukjong; KX25.i4.15=6/5/1686). 
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 The inferior position of the Chosŏn king, itself the manifestation of the asymmetry in 
Qing-Chosŏn relations, was most vividly illustrated in the many discussions within the Qing 
court on whether and how to punish the Chosŏn king. Broadly speaking, the Qing court sought to 
punish the Chosŏn king for one of these two reasons: the king’s negligence as a tributary king or 
the king’s mishandling of a trial.  
 The first record of such discussion stems from the review of Kim Ch’ung-il case in 1656. 
The Three Judicial Offices, in their review, saw some mishandling of the case and recommended 
disciplinary sanctions (yichu) on King Hyojong and the Chosŏn officials who had participated in 
the initial interrogation. The Shunzhi emperor approved the review, delegating the task to the 
Board of Punishments. The Board, in turn, found that there was no precedent for punishing the 
king and officials of Chosŏn and asked for imperial instruction: Should the Board of Personnel, 
with jurisdiction over Qing officeholders, or the Board of Rites, with jurisdiction over Chosŏn 
affairs, handle the case? Shunzhi entrusted the Board of Rites with the task, and the Board soon 
recommended the following disciplinary sanctions: a fine of 1,000 taels of silver and other 
materials for the king, and demotion and cashiering for the officials. Even though Shunzhi 
eventually pardoned them (mian yi zui), this case created an important precedent.76  
 Most importantly, the Qing Board of Rites had acquired jurisdiction over the king of 
Chosŏn for future reviews. From this point on, the Qing Board of Rites would routinely reassert 
its jurisdiction over the Chosŏn king by discussing the guilt of the Chosŏn king. In its review of 
the Pak Si-ung case (1681), for example, the Board recommended a fine of 10,000 taels of silver 
for Sukjong. In reviewing the Im In case (1691), the Board again recommended the same fine for 
Sukjong. Even though the Kangxi emperor eventually pardoned Sukjong in both cases, we see 
                                                          
76 TMHG 49: 36b-39a (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyojong; SZ13.3.15=4/9/1656). 
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here a clear demonstration that the Qing judiciary had the power to punish and pardon the 
Chosŏn king.77  
 Moreover, the Qing judiciary did punish the Chosŏn king on several occasions. As we 
have seen in chapter two, King Hyojong was fined 5,000 taels of silver in 1667 for hiding An 
Ch’u-wŏn/Xiao Er, a Qing runaway slave and a former Chosŏn subject, in his domain. Here it 
might be interesting to compare this case with a similar case that concerned Prince Shang Kexi 
(尚可喜; 1604-76) and Prince Geng Zhongming (耿仲明; d. 1649). When the Qing court 
discovered in 1649 that the princes’ subordinates had harbored about one thousand runaway 
banner slaves, the Board of Punishments recommended that the princes be stripped of their titles 
and each pay 5,000 tales of silver.78 This comparison is interesting in two ways. First, it shows 
how seriously the Qing court took the issue of harboring runaway banner slaves in the early 
years of the dynasty. Second and more pertinently, it shows how thin the line between a Qing 
feudatory prince and a Chosŏn tributary king was at times, at least as it concerned attempts by 
the Qing emperor to discipline its clients and thus regulate these patron-client relationships. 
 That was not the last time that the king of Chosŏn was fined, either. In a 1685 edict on 
sending imperial envoys to Hanyang for a joint trial in the Han Tŭk-wan case, the Kangxi 
emperor explicitly stated that the envoys were to discuss the king’s own culpability. Indeed, the 
imperial envoys recommended to the emperor on their return to Beijing that the king should be 
fined 20,000 taels of silver. Both the Board of Rites and the emperor upheld this 
                                                          
77 TMHG 50: 29b-30b (zi from the Board of Rites to Sukjong; KX20.2.12=3/31/1681), 52: 16b-17b (zi from the 
Board to Sukjong; KX30.6.21=7/16/1691). 
 
78 Even though the Shunzhi emperor eventually decided to just fine them to 4,000 taels of silver each, Geng had 
already committed suicide without waiting for the verdict. QSL Shizu 46: 366b-367a (SZ 6.9.13=10/18/1649), 373a 
(SZ 6.11.27=12/30/1649), 47: 378a (SZ 7.1.25=2/25/1650); ECCP, 416-7, 635-6. 
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recommendation, and King Sukjong became the second and last Chosŏn king to be fined by the 
Qing judiciary.79  
 Why is this significant? The Chosŏn judiciary could not punish the Chosŏn king, for he 
stood on top of the judiciary. In that sense, the fact that the Qing judiciary could punish the 
Chosŏn king is the most vivid affirmation of Qing judicial superiority. Indeed, if the Chosŏn 
king himself could be punished by the Qing judiciary, what subjects of his could avoid the reach 
of Qing jurisdiction? During the seventeenth century, Chosŏn was incorporated as a Qing 
judicial province whenever the Qing court decided to prosecute Chosŏn subjects as its criminals. 
Even though the Chosŏn judiciary came to gain a larger role in these trials in the eighteenth 
century, with many procedures becoming routinized, this asymmetry between the two judiciaries 
would always remain at the heart of this interstate jurisdiction over Chosŏn subjects.   
 
III. Chosŏn between Asymmetry and Judicial Independence: Eighteenth Century 
Perhaps the most striking judicial characteristic of interstate jurisdiction over Chosŏn 
subjects during the eighteenth century is the routinization of judicial procedures. Many 
developments in the Qing-Chosŏn interactions from the second half of the seventeenth century 
contributed to this trend. 
The first development was the increasing concern on the part of both judiciaries about the 
statutory basis for decisions. During the early decades of joint jurisdiction, reports of 
adjudication often simply stated criminals had been sentenced to certain punishments according 
to statutes (Kr. yul, Ch. lü). Starting in the mid-seventeenth century, however, we begin to see 
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citation of specific statutes and substatutes, first in the review by the Qing judiciary and then 
gradually in the king’s adjudication. In 1656, for example, the Three Judicial Offices explicitly 
cited the first edition of the Qing Code in their review of the king’s adjudication on the Kim 
Ch’ung-il. It was basically an exercise in trying to find sections from the Qing Code that 
corresponded to the king’s sentencing on the criminals.80 Beginning in the late seventeenth 
century and throughout the eighteenth century, we see more and more cases of adjudications and 
reviews that had solid statutory bases, whether explicitly cited or not. This concern for statutory 
bases might have to do with the systematization of operational laws into written law in both 
states, as discussed in the beginning of the chapter.  
 The second and more explicit development that contributed toward the routinization of 
the interstate judicial procedures was an increasing use of precedents. In my sources, the Qing 
Board of Rites made the first explicit use of a precedent in 1661, when it recommended holding a 
joint trial in Hanyang for the Chang Yu-sin case by using the Kim Ch’u-ip case (1657) as a 
precedent.81 In the same year, the Chosŏn court used the Kim Ik-tong case from the previous 
year as a precedent in sentencing Chŏng Tu-sŏng (鄭竇性) to the same punishment as Kim Ik-
tong. In both cases, the criminals had illegally bought horses and were sentenced to 60 strokes of 
beating by heavy bamboo and banishment.82 From then, we see a steady use of precedents in the 
initiation, adjudication, and review stages of the cases throughout the rest of the century. By the 
eighteenth century, when the Qing court became aware of at least 20 cases of possible criminal 
                                                          
80 TMHG 49: 36b-39a (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyojong; SZ13.3.15=4/9/1656). 
 
81 TMHG 63: 19a-20a (zi from the Board of Rites to Hyŏnjong; SZ18.2.3=3/3/1661). 
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activities by Chosŏn subjects, one would be hard pressed to find a single case that did not include 
a discussion of precedents at some stage. 
 
A. The Continued Operation of Asymmetric Joint Jurisdiction 
 
1. Chosŏn as a Qing Judicial Province in the Eighteenth Century  
In the eighteenth century, as in the previous century, reports of the arrest of Chosŏn 
suspects eventually reached the Qing emperor. Unlike in the previous century, however, some of 
these reports bypassed the Qing Board of Rites. In the nine cases in which the initial arrest was 
made in the Chosŏn domain, the Chosŏn king always first notified the Qing Board of Rites via 
lateral communications (zi). In the eleven cases in which the initial arrest was made in the Qing 
domain, however, the Qing military governors bypassed the Board of Rites and directly 
memorialized the Qing emperor. This had to do with the development of the Qing palace 
memorial (zouzhe) system, in which top provincial officials could directly report to the Qing 
emperor and build a personal relationship with him, from the late Kangxi period to the early 
Qianlong period.83 
Regardless of whether the Board of Rites or the military governors memorialized the 
emperor, they regularly invoked precedents in their recommendations to the emperor. In April 
1704, for example, King Sukjong reported to the Board of Rites on the arrest of Kim Ye-jin 
(金禮進) and nine other Kyŏngwŏn residents who had crossed the Tumen River twice, robbed 
                                                          
83 Silas Hsiu-liang Wu, “The Memorial Systems of The Ch’ing Dynasty (1644-1911),” Harvard Journal of Asiatic 
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Qing subjects, and killed four of them. The Board, noting the severity of the crime and invoking 
the similar Im In case (1691) as a precedent, recommended sending envoys to Hanyang for the 
trial of the criminals and the investigation into the king’s culpability.84 In 1734, the acting 
Shengjing military governor Haišeo (海壽; n.d.) directly reported to the Yongzheng emperor on 
the arrest of Sŏ Kwi-gang (徐貴江) in a palace memorial. Noting that Sŏ had merely gotten lost, 
Haišeo recommended simply repatriating him to Chosŏn according to precedent.85 
Out of the 20 cases reported, the Qing court asserted no jurisdiction in six cases, 
including the Sŏ Kwi-gang case mentioned above, by simply repatriating the Chosŏn suspects. In 
14 cases, the Qing court asserted jurisdiction by four methods: the king’s trial subject to review 
by the Qing judiciary (seven), joint trial in Fenghuangcheng (three), adjudication by the Qing 
court (three), and pardon (one). In the first two methods, it was the Chosŏn king who adjudicated 
on the case and memorialized the Qing emperor on the result, and in his adjudication, he 
regularly invoked precedents as bases for his sentencing of the criminals. In his adjudication in 
the Kim Ye-jin case (1704), for example, Sukjong noted that there were three precedents to 
choose from. Eventually, he settled on the most recent precedent of the Im In case (1691) in his 
adjudication.86 
                                                          
84 TMHG 53: 1a-2a (zi from Sukjong to the Board of Rites; KX43.2.27=4/1/1704), 2a-3a (zi from the Board of Rites 
to Sukjong; KX43.4); QSL Shengzu 216: 185b-186a (KX43.4.9=5/12/1704). 
 
85 TMHG 55: 1a-2a (zi from the Shengjing Board of Rites to Yŏngjo; YZ12.2.8=3/12/1734); MWLZ 03-0172-0833-
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86 Kim Ye-jin and two principals were sentenced to immediate death by beheading, enslavement of wife and 
children, and confiscation. Six accessories were sentenced to immediate death by beheading. Two magistrates and 
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While this routinization of the judicial procedures brought a sense of predictability for the 
Chosŏn court, it also had the effect of solidifying the inferior position of the Chosŏn judiciary 
vis-à-vis its counterpart. After all, the precedents had been inherited from the seventeenth 
century, when Chosŏn had been frequently incorporated as a Qing judicial province. Thus, the 
collaborative but asymmetric relationship between the two judiciaries during interstate trials of 
Chosŏn suspects continued in the eighteenth century. Moreover, the routinization had its limits 
as well, as the Qing court retained a monopoly over the creation of new precedents.  
 
2. The Qing Monopoly over the Creation of Precedents 
The Qing monopoly over the creation of precedents was perhaps the most vivid 
demonstration of the asymmetry between the Qing and Chosŏn judiciaries. While both sides 
could draw on the same repertoire of precedents, the Chosŏn judiciary was firmly bound within 
existing precedents. In contrast, the Qing judiciary was fully capable of creating and imposing 
new norms on the Chosŏn judiciary.  
The instatement of the joint trial in Fenghuangcheng offers a good example of this 
process. In December 1710, the Chosŏn court became aware of a borderland homicide case when 
some Qing subjects came to the P’yŏngan border town of Wiwŏn (渭原) to avenge the death of 
five of their comrades at the hands of Yi Man-gŏn (李萬建) and eight other Wiwŏn residents. 
The Chosŏn court, recalling the Kim Ye-jin case narrated above, decided that it was better to 
take the initiative and immediately reported to the Board of Rites on this case without having 
arrested and interrogated all the suspects. This case, however, did not result in a trial by the 
Chosŏn king as in the Kim Ye-jin case. In Beijing, the Kangxi emperor was more interested in 
the identities of the Qing subjects killed. Noting that the Chosŏn envoy reporting on the case did 
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not know much about those murdered and that Shengjing officials had not reported to the court 
on the case, Kangxi decided on a novel procedure: one official from the Qing Board of Rites, one 
Shengjing official, and one Chosŏn official would meet in Fenghuangcheng for a joint 
investigation of the case.87 
 As this type of trial was unprecedented, the Kangxi emperor continuously created 
precedents throughout the trial. When the Qing officials selected for the joint investigation asked 
for imperial instruction, Kangxi ordered them to investigate the scene of the crime with the 
Chosŏn official to determine whether it lay in the Qing or the Chosŏn domain. After the joint 
investigation was concluded, the Chosŏn official in charge was to bring the criminals back to 
Hanyang, where the king was to conclude the case. This created a precedent for adjudicating this 
novel form of trial.88 Two future cases—the Kim In-sul case (1750) and the Cho Cha-yŏng case 
(1757)—would take this case as the precedent for holding a joint trial in Fenghuangcheng.89 
Kangxi created yet another precedent during the adjudication process. Among the 
principals in this case were two groups of brothers: Yi Man-gŏn and three of his brothers, and Yi 
Sŏn-ŭi (李先儀) and two of his brothers. Yi Man-gŏn’s father, surely knowing that he would be 
left without sons if this case followed its normal course, pled for mercy when the Qing officials 
were passing through Wiwŏn during their investigation. The Qing official in charge, Butha Ula 
supervisor-in-chief Mu-ke-deng (穆克登), expressed sympathy for the accused. Thus, upon his 
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return to Beijing, Mu-ke-deng mentioned what he regarded as special circumstances surrounding 
this case to the Kangxi emperor. Kangxi, noting that there was a Qing substatute on sparing one 
of the brothers to remain home and serve his parents if all were condemned to death, ordered 
King Sukjong to apply this substatute in his adjudication of the case. Sukjong complied, sparing 
Yi Man-gŏn (李萬建) and Yi Chun-wŏn (李俊元).90  
The creation of new precedents reached its height under the Qianlong (乾隆; r. 1736-95) 
emperor, which is unsurprising given Qianlong’s penchant for starting new projects. In 1740, for 
example, the institution of the Autumn Assizes was introduced into the Chosŏn judicial system 
during the review of the Kim Si-jong (金時宗) case. This case involved Kim Si-jong and five 
other residents of Onsŏng (穩城), Hamgyŏng. They had repeatedly crossed the Tumen River and 
fraternized with Qing hunters from 1737 until their arrest in 1739 by Onsŏng authorities. Upon 
receiving the report from King Yŏngjo (英祖; r. 1724-76), the Board of Rites cited the Kim Se-
jŏng precedent, which will be discussed below, to put Yŏngjo in charge of the trial. Yŏngjo 
sentenced everyone except for Chŏng Man-t’ae (鄭萬泰), who had cooperated with the Onsŏng 
authorities in the arrest of his accomplices, to immediate death by beheading.91 
When the Three Judicial Offices, the Board of Personnel, and the Board of War reviewed 
Yŏngjo’s adjudication on the case, however, they deemed Yŏngjo’s sentencing of immediate 
beheading for Kim Si-jong and four others to be too harsh. Under Qing law, there were two 
categories of capital punishments: immediate execution (lijue) and deferred execution (jianhou). 
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The Autumn Assizes (qiushen) were the institution for those sentenced to deferred execution. 
Every autumn, the emperor and his officials would review the cases and put the criminals into 
four categories: deferred execution, worthy of compassion, remaining at home, and deserving of 
capital punishments.92 The Qing offices, reasoning that the five Chosŏn criminals had neither 
robbed nor killed anyone, instead sentenced them to death by strangulation after the Autumn 
Assizes. The Board of Rites, however, soon realized in its communications with the Chosŏn 
envoy in Beijing that the Autumn Assizes did not exist in Chosŏn and thus the criminals would 
simply be executed after autumn. The Board, finding that doing so would go against the imperial 
will of saving lives as well as the law (lüli), recommended that these Chosŏn criminals be 
handled in the Qing Autumn Assizes of the next year. It made the further recommendation that 
this case serve as a precedent for the future cases. The Qianlong emperor approved both 
suggestions, creating another new precedent in Qing-Chosŏn interstate law.93 
 This case served as a precedent for all future cases that resulted in Chosŏn criminals 
going through the Autumn Assizes: The Yi Un-gil case (1747-53), the Kim Sun-jŏng case (1761-
78), the Pak Hu-ch’an case (1762-78), and the Kim Pong-su case (1764-77). The application of 
Autumn Assizes was more than a simple importation of a Qing legal device into the Chosŏn 
judiciary. Even though the Chosŏn subjects remained imprisoned in Chosŏn for the duration of 
Autumn Assizes, they were put under the firm hold of the Qing judiciary every fall. Kim Sun-
jŏng and five others, for example, received fourteen stays of execution (huanjue) in a row before 
they were finally pardoned. Waiting for the imperial decision on their lives every fall for more 
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than 10 years, they could not have helped but notice their status as criminals of the Qing 
emperor.94 
The creation of new precedents could even result in an almost total abrogation of Chosŏn 
jurisdiction over its own subjects. In 1764, the Qing authorities in Shengjing discovered Chosŏn-
style straw sandals near the dead body of a bannerman soldier (pijia). Their investigation led to 
the uncovering of an interstate smuggling ring consisting of residents in the Shengjing-P’yŏngan 
borderland. The Board of Rites in Shengjing, having secured the names of the possible Chosŏn 
suspects through the interrogation of the Qing suspects, requested that King Yŏngjo have the 
Ŭiju prefect escort seven suspects to Fenghuangcheng for an initial investigation there and for 
further trial in Shengjing. Yŏngjo declined politely, reasoning that there was no precedent for 
sending Chosŏn criminals to Fenghuangcheng without an imperial edict. Following precedents, 
however, Yŏngjo assured he would make all necessary preparations for the joint trial in 
Fenghuangcheng while awaiting an edict, and the local officials in Ŭiju produced the chief 
suspects Kim Pong-su (金鳳守) and Kim Se-ju (金世柱) under the royal order. The Board of 
Rites in Shengjing, in return, asked the king three more times to hurry up the process, indicating 
in its fourth request that it had indeed obtained an imperial edict on how to proceed with the 
case.95 
This edict proclaimed that there would be no joint trial in Fenghuangcheng. The 
authorities in Shengjing had concluded that this case, as a homicide case involving a bannerman, 
could not be compared to previous cases that were jointly tried in Fenghuangcheng. The Board 
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of Rites and the Qianlong emperor agreed with the recommendation and sent a bureau director 
(langzhong) from the Board of Punishments to Shengjing to try the criminals with the Shengjing 
authorities. Yŏngjo, oblivious to that decision, hurriedly appointed a commissioner and sent the 
two criminals to Shengjing for a joint trial. The Chosŏn commissioner was then sent back to 
Chosŏn, leaving behind only the functionaries and the criminals. The Qing authorities sentenced 
Kim Pong-su to death by decapitation after the Autumn Assizes and Kim Se-ju to death by 
strangulation after the Autumn Assizes using a Qing statute on intentional homicide, and the 
adjudication was confirmed during the review processes.96  
Both criminals were kept as prisoners in Shengjing until the Autumn Assizes of 1764, 
which resulted in the execution of Kim Pong-su in Shengjing and the staying of execution for 
Kim Se-ju. We learn about Kim Se-ju’s fate in the Autumn Assizes of 1769 and 1773, when he 
received stays of execution. From a 1777 lateral communication from the Shengjing Board of 
Rites to King Chŏngjo (正祖; r. 1776-1800), we learn that Kim Se-ju finally died in a Shengjing 
prison after surviving 13 Autumn Assizes in a row while being kept as a prisoner. Now the body 
was being returned to Chosŏn.97 Only death freed Kim from the reach of Qing jurisdiction and 
returned him as a Chosŏn subject. This case reminds us that procedures in these interstate legal 
cases, however routinized they might have become by the eighteenth century, could not be taken 
for granted in an asymmetric relationship where the Qing court maintained a monopoly over 
creation of new precedents.   
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B. Roots of Chosŏn Judicial Independence  
 
1. Using Routinization of the Procedures to Chosŏn’s Benefit 
Was the Chosŏn court, then, a passive victim of Qing legal interference without any 
agency? Not quite. Even though the Chosŏn court did not have power to create new precedents, 
it could compete with the Qing court within the realm of precedents. The Chosŏn court knew the 
precedents at least as well as, if not better than, the Qing court, and it was often able to use the 
routinization of the procedures to its advantage by finding and presenting the precedents that had 
worked in its favor in the past. Precedents could be what James Scott has termed “weapons of the 
weak” for the Chosŏn court.98 
The Chosŏn court found one such precedent in the Kim Ye-jin case (1704). We have seen 
above how the Board of Rites invoked the Im In precedent (1691) to recommend sending 
officials to Hanyang for a joint trial of Kim Ye-jin and other criminals. The Kangxi emperor, 
however, did not follow the Board’s recommendation. Instead, noting Sukjong’s usual 
respectfulness and his prompt reporting of the case, he let Sukjong adjudicate on the case.99 This 
was the first time that the Chosŏn king was put in sole charge of adjudicating a homicide trial, 
and the Chosŏn court was fully aware of that significance. Sukjong, in consultation with the 
State Council, the State Tribunal, and the Ministry of Punishments, decided to use the Im In case 
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instead of the Han Tŭk-wan case (1686), which had resulted in harsher sentencing in the end, as 
the precedent.  
The king’s adjudication was as follows: immediate death by beheading, enslavement of 
wife and children, confiscation of properties for Kim Ye-jin and two others who had participated 
in the killing; immediate death by beheading for six other trespassers; cashiering and life exile of 
2,000 li for two magistrates and one subarea commander (manho); cashiering for a governor, a 
military commander, and a subarea commander; and demotion and transfer for a magistrate. 
When Sukjong’s thorough memorial on the trial, 30 pages long, arrived in Beijing, the Kangxi 
emperor instructed the Board of Rites and the Three Judicial Offices to review the case. In their 
review, they recommended that the adjudication should stand and that Sukjong should be spared 
from a discussion of his culpability. In his final decision, Kangxi commuted the sentencing on 
the four trespassers from death and the sentencing on the two magistrates and one subarea 
commander from life exile. He also accepted the recommendation on not discussing Sukjong’s 
culpability.100 
In this case, the Chosŏn court had achieved two important goals: avoiding a joint trial in 
Hanyang and avoiding a discussion of the king’s culpability. Unsurprisingly, the Chosŏn court 
sought to use this case as a precedent whenever relevant. The Kim Se-jŏng (金世丁) case is a 
perfect example. In October 1733, the Chosŏn court became aware of a case of mass trespassing 
that involved the murder and robbing of Qing subjects by Chosŏn subjects and reported to the 
Qing Board of Rites. In Beijing, there ensued an intense debate between the Chosŏn envoys and 
the Board officials on which precedent to invoke. The Board officials wished to invoke the Im In 
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precedent (1690), which would have resulted in a joint trial in Hanyang and the discussion of 
King Yŏngjo’s culpability. Despite the protest from the Chosŏn envoys, the Board recommended 
that the guilt of Yŏngjo be discussed after the arrest and interrogation of all the criminals. With 
the approval of the Yongzheng (雍正; r. 1723-35) emperor, this case seemed to be headed in the 
direction of the Im In case.101 
 The Chosŏn court did everything in its power to prevent that from happening. First, it 
produced a most thorough report, which ran 33 pages long and included testimonies from all 28 
criminals and the four officials who had jurisdiction over them. It even divided the criminals into 
three categories, ready-made for adjudication: three who led the murder and plundering of Qing 
subjects, 17 accomplices, and nine who merely entered the Qing domain. Second, Sŏ Myŏng-
gyun (徐命均; 1680-1745), the Chosŏn envoy who carried this memorial to the Board of Rites, 
intensely lobbied on the behalf of his king. In the end, Sŏ succeeded in persuading the Minister 
of Rites San-tai (三泰; d. 1758) and his subordinates to cite the Kim Ye-jin precedent in their 
memorial to the Yongzheng emperor. When Yongzheng finally approved the Board’s 
recommendation that the king adjudicate the case and that he be exempt from discussion of his 
guilt according to the Kim Ye-jin precedent, the Chosŏn court could celebrate its successful 
manipulation of the system.102 
 
2. Increasing Role of the Chosŏn Judiciary  
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 The Kim Ye-jin precedent provided another lesson to the Chosŏn court of the eighteenth 
century: Chosŏn initiative in the detection of criminal activities, arrest of criminals, and initial 
interrogation was likely to result in a bigger role for the Chosŏn judiciary in the ensuing 
interstate trial. The December 1710 discussion within the Chosŏn court after the arrest of Yi 
Man-ji (李萬枝) and Yi Man-sŏng (李萬成) provides a glimpse into that realization. After 
discussing the precedents for trespassing cases that had resulted in deaths of Qing subjects, the 
court concluded that the Kim Ye-jin precedent showed the wisdom of taking the initiative and 
reporting to the Qing court right away.103 This trend continued throughout the eighteenth 
century, during which the Chosŏn court made the initial report in nine of 17 trespassing cases. 
Even more strikingly, the Chosŏn court made the initial report in five of six homicide cases. This 
initiative by the Chosŏn court in the eighteenth century is especially striking when compared to 
its passivity in the previous century.  
 The Qing court responded by giving a bigger role to the Chosŏn judiciary in handling the 
Chosŏn subjects suspected of engaging in criminal activities in the Qing domain. First, the use of 
joint trial decreased dramatically. Throughout the whole century, there were only three cases that 
were resolved by joint trials, as compared with 12 joint trials from 1646 to 1699. Moreover, all 
three joint trials took place in Fenghuangcheng instead of Hanyang, to the relief of the Chosŏn 
court. The joint trial in Hanyang was a highly burdensome event for the court in a few ways. The 
entire upper echelon of the Chosŏn court, including the king, was expected to participate in the 
trial, which could last weeks. Moreover, the trial often placed significant stress and financial 
burden on the court. Faced with a situation in which its prerogative to adjudicate on cases was 
shared with Qing envoys, the Chosŏn court often resorted to bribing the Qing envoys for ideal 
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terms of adjudication, as we have seen in the Pak Yong-ŏp case of 1662. Instead of joint trial, 
now the norm in the interstate trials of Chosŏn suspects committing crimes in the Qing domain 
was trial by the Chosŏn king subject to the review by the Qing judiciary. 
 Second, the Qing court during this century showed a generally more relaxed attitude 
about acts of trespassing that were not followed by further transgressions such as ginseng 
gathering. In addition to the initiative by the Chosŏn court, two interrelated factors may explain 
this shift. Manchuria in the eighteenth century was not as strategically important as it had been in 
the seventeenth century, when Qing rule over China Proper was still tenuous and the Russian 
threat loomed large in northern Manchuria. With the suppression of the Revolt of the Three 
Feudatories in 1681 and the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, however, the Qing court 
might have felt more secure about its Manchurian frontier.  
Moreover, the secure Qing rule also resulted in a shift in the attitude of the Qing court 
towards the Chosŏn court. With the threat of Ming loyalism a distant memory, the Qing court 
began to see the past Chosŏn loyalty to the Ming court in a more favorable light. In November 
1706, for example, the Kangxi emperor issued an edict in which he praised Chosŏn’s unswerving 
loyalty towards Ming and named Chosŏn “a state of propriety and righteousness (liyi zhi 
bang)”104 This transition is in line with the changing perceptions of the Qing court towards Ming 
loyalists. As Frederic Wakeman Jr. has pointed out, the Qing dynasty had generated its own 
loyalists by the 1670s. With the martyrdom of the Ma lineage in 1677 in Guangxi, “history had 
finally come full circle, and the Qing was now fully paired with the Ming, both successor and 
                                                          
104 QSL Shengzu 227: 225a-b (KX45.10.23=11/27/1706). 
 
 
 
131 
 
equal to it.” In this new context, Ming loyalists and Chosŏn could be praised for their universally 
Confucian virtue of loyalty.105 
Due to all these factors, the Qing court in the eighteenth century moved away from 
asserting jurisdiction in cases in which Chosŏn subjects entered the Qing domain in dire 
circumstances such as poverty. For example, in October 1714, Shengjing authorities arrested a 
Chosŏn subject named Kwak Man-guk (郭萬國) near the Yalu River. When the interrogation in 
Shengjing revealed that Kwak was a poor orphan who had crossed the Yalu River in search of 
food, the Shengjing Board of Rites notified the Board of Rites in Beijing with the 
recommendation Kwak be returned to Chosŏn with the Chosŏn tributary embassy. With imperial 
approval, Kwak was handed over to the Chosŏn embassy in February 1715.106 In November 
1729, Ningguta authorities arrested Sin Chŏng-yong (申丁龍) and six Chosŏn subjects who were 
hunting near the Tumen River. The Qing court of the seventeenth century would have certainly 
deemed this a criminal activity, as we have seen in the 1648 joint trial in the Kim Ik-kyŏm case. 
Yet the Ningguta military governor and the Board of Rites now merely recommended 
repatriating these Chosŏn subjects and received the imperial approval.107 The Chosŏn court 
executed the repatriated criminals in both cases without any interference from the Qing court.108 
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 This trend continued through the early years of the Qianlong reign. For example, 
Shengjing authorities arrested 20 Chosŏn subjects near the Yalu River in 1740, while Ningguta 
authorities arrested 25 Chosŏn subjects near the Tumen River in 1741. In both cases, the military 
governors determined that these were poor people who had trespassed in search of food. The 
Board of Rites agreed with that assessment. In its recommendation for the latter case, the Board 
remarked that all these cases had to do with the Chosŏn subjects fleeing for their lives (taosheng) 
and repatriating them would show the imperial virtue of saving lives (haosheng zhi de).109 The 
transition of Chosŏn from an enemy state, to be surveyed and punished for its collusion with 
Ming, to a loyal tributary state had finally made an impact on interstate jurisdiction over Chosŏn 
trespassers. No longer subjects of a disloyal tributary ruler, these trespassers were now fully 
worthy of imperial benevolence.    
 
IV. The Abandonment of Jurisdiction over Chosŏn Criminals: 1800s-1840s 
In the above section, we saw two facets of Qing jurisdiction over Chosŏn criminals in the 
eighteenth century: an asymmetric relationship between Qing and Chosŏn judiciaries coexisting 
with an increasing role for the Chosŏn judiciary. Here, we are going to turn to the first half of the 
nineteenth century. For this period, my sources show at least ten cases of Chosŏn subjects being 
arrested in the Qing domain. Unlike in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, however, the 
Qing court did not assert jurisdiction in any of these cases, simply repatriating the suspects to 
Chosŏn without any instruction. Let us look at these cases in more detail to see what had 
changed.  
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We see continuities with the previous century in five cases. In three cases, the Qing 
frontier officials determined the trespassing had been accidental. In 1805, for example, Ch’oe 
Tŏng-nae (崔德來) and five others were arrested on the Qing side of the Yalu River. When the 
interrogation in Shengjing revealed that they had accidentally trespassed while rafting along the 
Yalu River and hunting squirrels, the Shengjing authorities repatriated the six Chosŏn subjects, 
simply memorializing the Jiaqing (嘉慶; r. 1796-1820) emperor and notifying King Sunjo (純祖; 
r. 1800-34) of the repatriation.110 In two similar future cases, Chosŏn subjects were repatriated in 
a comparable manner. In 1827, two Chosŏn subjects from Musan (茂山), Hamgyŏng, were 
arrested in Jilin after getting lost while hunting. The Jilin military governor Fugiyūn (富俊; d. 
1834) sent them to the Shengjing Board of Rites for repatriation and then memorialized the 
Daoguang (道光; r. 1821-50) emperor about it.111 In 1846, Kim Sang-sil (金上實) and one other 
Kanggye resident were arrested in Shengjing after getting lost while collecting firewood. The 
Shengjing authorities simply repatriated them to Chosŏn without even memorializing the 
Daoguang emperor.112  
Two cases involved trespassers who were deaf and/or mentally challenged. In 1824, a 
man named Kim Chin-sŏng (金振聲) was arrested in Fenghuangcheng. As there was no way to 
interrogate him in Fenghuangcheng due to his deafness, the Shengjing authorities ordered the 
Fenghuangcheng garrison commandant (chengshouwei) to communicate with the Ŭiju 
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magistrate. When the communication revealed Kim’s identity, the Shengjing authorities 
repatriated him and memorialized the Daoguang emperor.113 In 1834, an unnamed deaf woman 
was arrested in Fenghuangcheng. When a similar procedure ascertained the woman’s identity, 
the Shengjing authorities again repatriated her and memorialized the Daoguang emperor.114 In 
short, the act of trespassing in the above five cases was deemed to be unintentional, which might 
have resulted in the same outcome of simple repatriation in the eighteenth century. 
The remaining five cases, however, all involved activities by Chosŏn subjects that would 
have been considered criminal in the previous century. As such, they show definite signs of 
changes in the Qing policy towards interstate crimes in this borderland. In three cases, the 
Chosŏn subjects in question trespassed into the Qing domain and thereafter engaged in illicit 
activities there. In 1817, Kim Ch’i-ryŏ (金致礪) was arrested in Jilin after crossing into the Qing 
domain in 1813, fraternizing with Qing ginseng gatherers, and becoming an adopted son of a 
house slave surnamed Xu and adopting the name Xu Jing (徐鏡). Lu-cheng (禄成; d. 1828), the 
Jilin vice commander-in-chief (fudutong), recommended in his memorial that the Board of 
Punishments try Kim. The Jiaqing emperor, however, ordered in an edict that Kim be repatriated 
to Chosŏn to be handled by the king due to Chosŏn’s respectfulness.115 This imperial decision 
stands in stark contrast to the previous Qing sensitivity about Chosŏn ginseng gatherers in the 
previous centuries. 
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The next two trespassing cases show that the Kim Ch’i-ryŏ case was not an anomaly. In 
1831, Chang Ho-gyŏng (張豪京) and his son were arrested in Jilin after gathering ginseng, 
hunting, fraternizing with Qing ginseng gatherers, and even having their heads shaved, thus 
falsely proclaiming themselves to be Qing subjects. While emphasizing that the Changs should 
be executed, the Jilin military governor Fugiyūn sent them to the Shengjing Board of Rites for 
repatriation and memorialized the Daoguang emperor.116 In 1841, a Chosŏn subject who had 
entered the Qing domain in 1830 as a five-year old boy and was living as a monk by the dharma 
name of Jiekun (戒坤) was arrested in Jilin. As in the previous case, the deputy Jilin military 
governor Weikin (惟勤; 1788-1863) was concerned more with the Qing subjects who had 
associated with Jiekun, simply recommending the repatriation of Jiekun in a memorial that 
sentenced the Qing collaborators. With imperial approval, Jiekun was repatriated.117 
Two final incidents involved Chosŏn subjects engaged in the illegal purchase of metal 
goods, which was an offense punishable by death in the previous centuries. Here as well, there 
was only minimal involvement from the Qing court. In 1808, a routine check at Fenghuangcheng 
revealed 4 sets of the Records of the Grand Historian (Shiji), 32.5 jin of copper products, and 
two and a half jin of iron products among the baggage of the Chosŏn embassy. The Board of 
Rites, while noting this was prohibited, recommended that Chosŏn be exempted from a thorough 
investigation (mian shenjiu). The Jiaqing emperor gave his approval.118 In 1812, the same routine 
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search found 105 pairs of iron scissors and one iron shovel in the baggage of the Chosŏn 
embassy. The Board of Rites, noting the prohibition and the precedent from four years before, 
again recommended letting the Chosŏn king handle the matter on his own.119  
In short, the Qing court did not assert jurisdiction in any of these ten cases. There was no 
directive from the Qing court on how to handle the repatriated suspects, and thus the Chosŏn 
suspects were outside the reach of the Qing judiciary once they were repatriated to Chosŏn. One 
episode from the Kim Sang-sil case (1846) clearly demonstrates this point. In their lateral 
communication to King Hŏnjong (憲宗; r. 1834-49), Shengjing authorities expressed the opinion 
that the repatriated Chosŏn subjects should be forgiven due to the accidental nature of their 
trespassing. In his reply, however, Hŏnjong flatly stated that the criminals could not be pardoned 
and merely reported on their execution in Ŭiju.120 This scene warrants further analysis. The 
Chosŏn king and Shengjing officials were on an equal footing, sending lateral communications 
to one another. Shengjing officials, lacking active involvement by the Qing court, had no 
authority over the Chosŏn king.  
In short, the Chosŏn court had finally achieved judicial independence in the first half of 
the nineteenth century. The Qing claim of jurisdiction over Chosŏn subjects, then, had come full 
circle. Whereas the Qing court had criminalized any Chosŏn action it deemed to be against its 
interests between 1637 and 1645, now the Qing court chose not to claim Chosŏn subjects as its 
criminals. Chosŏn subjects were to remain Chosŏn subjects, to be tried in the Chosŏn domain by 
the Chosŏn judiciary. In the following chapters, we will observe this major shift in the Qing-
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Vietnam and Qing-Kokand borderlands as well. In the first half of the nineteenth century, there 
was a general pattern of imperial retreat in all three borderlands.  
 
V. Personal Jurisdiction over Qing Criminals: 1630s-1840s 
 
A. Chosŏn Jurisdiction over Qing Subjects in Theory 
What did the Qing court expect the Chosŏn court to do when Qing subjects entered the 
Chosŏn domain without authorization? As early as 1646, the Qing court made it clear that the 
Chosŏn state was to arrest and repatriate Qing subjects who had reached the Chosŏn domain 
without authorization so that they could be tried and punished by the Qing judiciary.121 This 
principle was reaffirmed in 1694, when a Chosŏn interpreter in charge of repatriating a Qing 
trespasser to Fenghuangcheng lost him on the way. The Qing Board of Rites demanded that the 
king punish this translator for his negligence.122  
Other cases involved seafarers. Unlike Chosŏn trespassers, Qing trespassers often came 
by sea, especially after the Qing maritime ban (haijin), enforced in part to pressure the Zheng 
regime in Taiwan, was lifted in 1684. Most of the Qing fishermen who made their way to the 
Chosŏn seas were from Shengjing and Shandong, and they were after the sea cucumbers and fish 
available off the west coast of Korea.123 As the frequency and scale of these fishing expeditions 
increased, some of these fishermen even landed in the Chosŏn domain in search of water. The 
Chosŏn court became increasingly concerned and repeatedly appealed to the Qing court for some 
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action. As a result, a protocol for Qing subjects who sailed near the Chosŏn domain was 
established by 1701. The Chosŏn judiciary was to search for appropriate information recorded on 
the manifest (chuanpiao) and report to the Qing Board of Rites with that information so that the 
Board could forward it to the local officials.124 
Qing subjects continued to sail in Chosŏn waters. As the Chosŏn court saw this action as 
a trespassing of sorts, it repeatedly requested that the Qing court prohibit Qing subjects from 
sailing into Chosŏn seas. The Qing court, in response to these requests, granted the Chosŏn state 
more and more jurisdiction over Qing subjects in this situation. In 1711, in response to a request 
made in 1710, the Qing court gave the Chosŏn state the authority to arrest these Qing sailors and 
repatriate them (buhuo jiesong). If unable to arrest them, the Chosŏn state could also fire upon 
these ships to drive them away (fang pao quzhu).125 In September 1712, in response to a request 
made earlier in the same year, the Kangxi emperor issued an edict that authorized the Chosŏn 
state to kill Qing subjects in the Chosŏn seas during pursuit and to repatriate those who were 
captured alive. These people who had violated law (weijin) and secretly sailed across Chosŏn’s 
maritime boundaries, the emperor reasoned, were bandits (zeikou) and not to be treated as Qing 
subjects.126 Much as pirates have been considered the “enemy of all” in Western legal and 
political thought, these treacherous people did not deserve to be treated as Qing subjects but 
rather as “universal foes.”127 
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In 1723, the Qing court went as far as granting the Chosŏn judiciary jurisdiction over 
some Qing subjects. In an edict, the Yongzheng emperor declared that Qing subjects who 
possessed documents and had caused no trouble in the Chosŏn domain were to be repatriated as 
before. Those without documents who had caused trouble in the Chosŏn domain, however, were 
to be punished by Chosŏn according to its law (zhao yi lü). Yongzheng was careful to emphasize 
that such punishment would not be unauthorized punishment (sixing zhizui) of Qing subjects by 
the Chosŏn king, as it would be in accordance with his edict.128 In theory, then, Qing jurisdiction 
over Chosŏn subjects was matched by Chosŏn jurisdiction over Qing subjects by 1723.  
 
B. Chosŏn Jurisdiction over Qing Subjects in Practice 
But how did Chosŏn jurisdiction over Qing subjects work in practice? In short, it was 
virtually non-existent. Most importantly, we see no record of Chosŏn authorities killing Qing 
subjects in pursuit or of the Chosŏn judiciary openly trying Qing subjects according to Chosŏn 
law. From the 1640s to the 1840s, Chosŏn authorities consistently resorted to either driving Qing 
subjects away from the Chosŏn domain or arresting and repatriating them, effectively giving up 
any claim of jurisdiction over Qing subjects who had committed crimes in the Chosŏn domain. 
During that period, Chosŏn authorities arrested and repatriated Qing subjects who entered the 
Chosŏn domain without authorization on at least 16 occasions. More often, Chosŏn authorities 
stopped at driving Qing subjects away or simply releasing them after their arrest.  
Moreover, local and provincial Chosŏn officials often even refrained from using force to 
engage Qing subjects because of their fear that Qing subjects might be hurt or killed in the 
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process. Such was the case even when Qing subjects openly defied the Chosŏn authorities. In 
1733, for example, local authorities in Wiwŏn, P’yŏngan, executed a Chosŏn smuggler. Soon 
afterwards, a group of Qing subjects entered Wiwŏn and kidnapped three Chosŏn soldiers as 
hostages, demanding that the Chosŏn state pay the money that the dead smuggler had owed 
them. Instead of acting, the P’yŏngan governor Kwŏn I-jin (權以鎭; 1668-1734) merely 
recommended sending a lateral communication (zi) to the Board of Rites, which the Chosŏn 
court did. In the communication, King Yŏngjo merely explained that local officials could not 
capture the criminals because the incident had happened at night and because they dared not 
enter the Qing domain in their pursuit.129 In 1735, a group of Qing fishermen landed on an island 
in the west coast province of Hwanghae (黃海) and kidnapped two soldiers. When the local 
garrison commander approached them and demanded the return of the soldiers, these fishermen 
beat him almost to death. When this was reported to King Yŏngjo, he lamented that the local 
officials had failed to engage them with force as the Kangxi emperor had allowed.130 In 1738, 
when six Qing ships came near another garrison in Hwanghae, the local garrison commander led 
a group of Chosŏn soldiers to drive the ships away. Then, suddenly, 400-odd Qing subjects 
disembarked and attacked them, killing two soldiers.131 The picture that appears here is hardly 
that of Chosŏn jurisdiction over these Qing subjects. 
For its part, the Chosŏn court routinely requested that the Qing court prohibit Qing 
subjects from trespassing into the Chosŏn domain. The Qing court, while promising the arrest 
                                                          
129 CWS Yŏngjo 34: 6a (9.4.16=5/29/1733), 34: 12b (9.5.8=6/19/1733), 35: 4a (9.7.10=8/19/1733), 36: 16a-b 
(9.11.4=12/9/1733); TMHG 62: 1a-2a (zi from Yŏngjo to the Board of Rites; YZ11.5.29=7/10/1733). 
 
130 CWS Yŏngjo 40: 30b (11.5.25=7/15/1735). 
 
131 TMHG 62: 23b-25b (zi from Yŏngjo to the Board of Rites; QL3.7.16=8/30/1738). 
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and punishment of these criminals, often responded that the Chosŏn court should follow imperial 
edicts when handling these incidents. In 1738, for example, the Board of Rites observed that the 
Chosŏn state, instead of just reporting on these incidents, should arrest and punish these 
criminals as previous edicts had instructed.132 In fact, the Chosŏn failure to take a stern stance 
against these criminals even led the Qing court to openly rebuke the Chosŏn court. In 1727, for 
example, the Chosŏn state arrested and repatriated Guo Lianjin (郭連進) and other Qing subjects 
who were gathering ginseng in the Chosŏn domain. In his January 2, 1728, edict, the Yongzheng 
emperor stated that the Chosŏn state was at fault here. Recalling that both his father and he 
himself had given the Chosŏn king jurisdiction over these criminals, the emperor blamed the 
Chosŏn king for providing a place of refuge for Qing criminals by being lax and timid. If the 
Chosŏn state failed to capture Qing criminals in the future, the king would have to punish his 
officials for negligence and the Qing court would punish the king for his inability to obey and 
carry out imperial orders as a tributary king (fan wang buneng zunzhi feng xing).133 
Here, it might be worth noting that the Chosŏn king was the only tributary ruler who was 
explicitly authorized to arrest and even punish Qing criminals in his domain. Indeed, there was 
one instance in which the Chosŏn state did try and punish a Qing subject on its own. However, 
the circumstance surrounding this case makes it obvious that it was an extraordinary case. In 
1801, during the first large-scale governmental purge of Catholics, Iacobus Zhou Wenmo 
(周文謨; 1752-1801), the first Catholic missionary to Chosŏn, who had lived in the Chosŏn 
domain for the previous six years, gave himself up to the Chosŏn authorities. There was a heated 
and lengthy discussion within the court on what to do with Zhou. In the end, the court decided 
                                                          
132 TMHG 62: 25b-26a (zi from the Board of Rites to Yŏngjo; QL3.9.28=11/9/1738). 
 
133 QSL Shizong 63: 970b-971a (YZ5.11.21=1/2/1728). 
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not to repatriate Zhou for two reasons. First, the time spent on the whole repatriation process 
would slow down the purge. Second, Zhou possessed sensitive information, such as knowledge 
of widespread anti-Manchu sentiment within Korea, and therefore posed a security threat. Thus, 
he was beheaded less than a month after his arrest.134  
In its memorial to the Qing court, the Chosŏn court carefully presented the turn of events 
that led to Zhou’s execution. Even though there was a discussion on including the 1733 edict by 
the Yongzheng emperor, which authorized the Chosŏn state to kill Qing criminals, the Chosŏn 
court chose not to cite that edict.135 Instead, the Chosŏn court argued that it had executed Zhou as 
a Chosŏn criminal who had led a heretical sect within the Chosŏn domain. The court simply did 
not know that Zhou was a Qing subject until after his execution, since he was indistinguishable 
from other Chosŏn subjects in his speech and attire. In fact, the Chosŏn court had known that 
Zhou was a Qing subject, and Zhou had only limited fluency in the Korean language. The 
reaction from the Qing court was something of an anticlimax, for it simply praised the king for 
exterminating bandits within his domain.136 In any case, it is doubtful that the Chosŏn court 
would have made the decision to execute Zhou had he not been so embroiled in the high politics 
of the Chosŏn court and posed such a threat to the security of the Chosŏn state. Indeed, if this 
case shows anything, it is the unwillingness of the Chosŏn state to openly assert jurisdiction over 
Qing subjects.  
In short, there was a deep disjunction between theory and practice in Chosŏn jurisdiction 
over Qing subjects. Even as the Qing state portrayed Qing subjects in the Chosŏn domain as 
                                                          
134 Takemichi Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 
Modern Asian Studies 32, no. 2 (1998): 393-401. 
 
135 CWS Sunjo 3: 47a-48b (1.10.27=12/2/1801). 
 
136 Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians,” 393-401. 
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bandits and authorized the Chosŏn state to punish or kill them, the Chosŏn state kept seeing 
traces of Qing subjecthood in these “bandits.” As a result, the Chosŏn state kept treating Qing 
criminals in its domain as Qing subjects rather than criminals, with the result that the Qing 
subjects enjoyed what amounted to extraterritoriality in the Chosŏn domain. Here, we see 
another manifestation of judicial inequality between the Qing judiciary and the Chosŏn judiciary.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have seen how interstate jurisdiction over Chosŏn criminals developed 
over time. This jurisdiction was collaborative but also asymmetric. Even though the two 
judiciaries cooperated in arresting and repatriating borderland criminals as well as sometimes in 
trying and punishing them, it was a cooperation based on the premise of asymmetry. In all cases 
in which interstate trials over Chosŏn criminals occurred, the Qing judiciary remained the higher 
court to a Chosŏn judiciary forced to play the role of the lower court. As we have seen above, we 
may trace the roots of this asymmetry in the historical context of the early decades of Qing-
Chosŏn interstate relations, when Qing was fighting a war of survival against the Ming state, 
various Southern Ming regimes, and the Three Feudatories. In contrast, while the Qing judiciary 
granted the Chosŏn judiciary jurisdiction over Qing subjects committing crimes in the Chosŏn 
domain, the Chosŏn judiciary never asserted that jurisdiction in practice. 
 While that asymmetry was a constant feature of Qing-Chosŏn interstate jurisdiction, the 
characteristics of this asymmetry changed over time. During the seventeenth century, when the 
Qing rule over Manchuria and China Proper was still being consolidated, Qing legal intervention 
in trials over Chosŏn criminals was consistent and piercing. Very often, the Qing state chose to 
assert jurisdiction over Chosŏn subjects arrested under suspicion of committing illegal acts 
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against it. When it did so, the Qing state delegated a bigger role to the Qing judiciary than to the 
Chosŏn judiciary. In the eighteenth century, with Qing imperial might at its height and more 
initiative from the Chosŏn state over its borderland criminals, interstate legal procedures became 
more routinized. This routinization gave a bigger role to the Chosŏn judiciary, which could 
compete with the Qing judiciary in the use of precedents. At the same time, asymmetry remained 
because the Qing emperor, most notably the Qianlong emperor, remained the sole authority who 
could create precedents. In the first half of the nineteenth century, however, Qianlong’s 
successors refrained from asserting jurisdiction over Chosŏn subjects. This imperial retreat in the 
first half of the nineteenth century is something we will see in the Qing-Vietnam borderland and 
Qing-Kokand borderland. 
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CHAPTER IV.  
Drawing and Maintaining Boundaries in the Qing-Vietnam Borderland, 1660s-1840s1 
 
I. Introduction: Ming-Qing Transition in the South and Southwest, 1644-1661 
Korea and Vietnam were two model tributaries of Qing, and yet their paths to 
incorporation into the Qing tributary world could not have been more different. Indeed, a cursory 
look at Vietnam’s relations with Ming and Qing will reveal more differences than similarities in 
these two sets of interstate relations. For one, Chosŏn (1392-1897), despite the widespread 
political and social crises that arose from its wars with Japan (1592-98), Jin (1627), and Qing 
(1636-37), was a remarkably durable polity that survived for more than five centuries. It was also 
the only regime within the Korean Peninsula that was recognized as a tributary state by Ming and 
Qing. In the region that constitutes today’s Vietnam, on the other hand, the existence of multiple 
regimes was the norm from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Behind the conventional 
dating of the Lê dynasty (1428-1788) lay the complex geopolitics of state competition and 
interstate recognition within the Ming and Qing tributary world orders.2  
More specifically for the period under discussion, Qing-Vietnamese tributary relations 
must be examined within the regional context of the Ming-Qing transition. As many scholars 
have noted, Lynn Struve and Frederic Wakeman foremost among them, the Qing conquest of 
                                                          
1 For transliteration of Chinese terms, I have followed the pinyin system, and for Vietnamese the Romanized Quoc-
ngu. Abbreviations used in the footnotes are as follows: QSL (Qing shilu), GZD (Gongzhong dang zouzhe), JJCD 
(Junjichu dang zouzhe), MQSL (Ming Qing shiliao), SLXK (Shiliao xunkan), SZTWJ (Sizhitang wenji), DSZ 
(Daietsu shiki zensho), KVTC (Khâm định Việt sử thông giám cương mục). 
 
2 For a general history of Sino-Vietnamese relations, see Yamamoto Tatsurō, ed., Betonamu Chūgoku kankeishi: 
Kyoku shi no taitō kara Shinfutsu sensō made (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1975) and Yu In-sŏn (Insun Yu), 
Pet’ŭnam kwa kŭ iut Chungguk: Yanggukkwan’gye ŭi ŏje wa onŭl (Seoul: Changbi, 2012). 
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Beijing in 1644 was just the beginning of the Ming-Qing transition. That observation holds true 
for the Qing-Vietnamese relationship as well. The political situation in the 1640s and 1650s was 
complicated by the presence of and competition between multiple regimes on both sides of the 
Qing-Vietnamese borderlands. On the Chinese side, the Qing regime and various Southern Ming 
regimes were just beginning their competition for the Mandate of Heaven to rule over the former 
Ming territory. Even after defeating the Hongguang regime, based in the Yangzi region, in 1645 
and the Longwu regime, based on the southeast coast, in 1646, the Qing regime still had to fight 
the Yongli regime for control of the Liangguang (Guangdong and Guangxi) and Yun-Gui 
(Yunnan and Guizhou) regions. These were the regions that bordered Vietnam, and the Yongli 
regime survived in this region until 1659, when it fled into Burma from Yunnan.3 
In 1644, three regimes coexisted on the Vietnamese side: the Mạc (莫; 1527-1677) 
regime in the far northern highlands of Cao Bằng, which bordered Guangxi; the restored Lê (黎; 
1428-1789) regime under the military control of the Trịnh (鄭; 1545-1787) lords in the historical 
heartland of northern Vietnam, with its capital at Thăng Long (昇龍), today’s Hanoi; and the 
Nguyễn (阮; 1558-1777) regime occupying today’s central Vietnam, then considered the 
southern frontier, with its capital in Phú Xuân (富春), today’s Huế. Among these, the Mạc and 
Lê regimes had longstanding tributary relationships with Ming as of 1644. The Mạc regime had 
been founded by Mạc Đăng Dung (莫登庸; 1483-1541), who started off as a minister of the Lê 
court, usurped the throne by killing Lê Cung Hoàng (黎恭皇; r. 1522-27) in 1527, and 
established a tributary relationship with Ming China in 1528. This relationship entered a new 
                                                          
3 Lynn A. Struve, The Southern Ming, 1644-62 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Frederic Wakeman, Jr., 
The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985), 319-1127. 
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stage in 1539, when Mạc Đăng Dung surrendered to the Ming amidst rumors of a Ming 
campaign against his “illegitimate” regime. The Ming court accepted this surrender in 1541, 
downgrading Vietnam from a tributary state (guo) to a tributary polity (dutongshi si) and the 
Vietnamese ruler from a king (wang) to a 2b-rank dutongshi.4 This put Vietnam in an inferior 
position to other tributary kingdoms such as Chosŏn.   
This new dynasty, however, did not last long. The Lê restoration movement, led by two 
military families, the Trịnh and the Nguyễn, eventually succeeded in driving the Mạc out of 
Thăng Long in 1592. In re-establishing tributary relations with Ming, however, the Lê regime 
was forced to compromise on two fronts. First, at the insistence of Ming provincial officials, the 
Lê regime allowed the Mạc regime to survive as a regional regime based in Cao Bằng (高平) in 
the Ming-Vietnam borderland. The Mạc had already appealed the Ming state for protection, and 
a desire to have a buffer zone in this borderland might have provided another impetus for the 
Ming state. Second, despite the restoration of the Lê dynasty, the downgraded tributary status of 
the Vietnamese ruler remained in place. When the Lê tributary mission arrived in Beijing in 
1597, the Ming court refused the Lê request for royal investiture, instead granting Lê Thế Tông 
(黎世宗; r. 1573-99) the title of dutongshi as well. Thus, within the Ming tributary system, these 
two Vietnamese regimes held equal tributary status.5 Meanwhile, the Nguyễn regime in the south 
had no tributary relationship with Ming and had still not succeeded in establishing one with Qing 
by the time it met its demise in 1777 at the hands of the Tây Sơns. 
                                                          
4 Kathlene Baldanza, Ming China and Vietnam: Negotiating Borders in Early Modern Asia (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 86-90; K. W. Taylor, A History of the Vietnamese (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 242-9; Yu In-sŏn, Pet’ŭnam kwa kŭ iut Chungguk, 208-23. 
 
5 Niu Junkai, Wangshi houyi yu panluanzhe: Yuenan Moshi jiazu yu Zhongguo guanxi yanjiu (Guangzhou: Shijie 
tushu chuban Guangdong youxian gongsi, 2012), 21-44.  
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The Ming-Qing transition in the southwest altered the power balance between the Mạc 
and the Lê. In 1646, the Lê court decided to send a tributary mission to the last Southern Ming 
court of the Yongli emperor/Prince of Gui (r. 1646-62). The Yongli court recognized this gesture 
of allegiance and granted Lê Thần Tông (黎神宗; r. 1619-1643, 1649-1662) the title of King of 
Annam (Annan guo wang). Annam, it should be mentioned, was another name for Vietnam that 
originated when Vietnam was a province of the Tang dynasty (618-907). Because of its 
meaning—“pacified south”—Annam was used more often as an exonym than an endonym. 
Though the Mạc regime continued in Cao Bằng, the Lê ruler now enjoyed a higher tributary 
status than the Mạc ruler. This new arrangement lasted until 1659, when the Qing forces drove 
the Yongli emperor into exile in Burma. Sensing the final downfall of Southern Ming, both 
Vietnamese regimes acted. The Mạc regime submitted to the Qing governor-general (zongdu; 
rank 2a) of Liangguang in 1659, while the Lê regime sent a tributary mission to the Qing court in 
Beijing later the same year.6  
By 1661, the Qing court in Beijing had decided to follow the Southern Ming precedent. 
Like the Southern Ming, it recognized both Lê and Mạc rulers as tributary rulers: the Lê ruler as 
the Annam King and the Mạc ruler as the Annam dutongshi.7 In short, the Qing court had 
inherited these Vietnamese tributary states from its Ming and Southern Ming predecessors, a fact 
noted by Ku Pŏm-jin in his comparative analysis of Qing envoys to Chosŏn and Vietnam. Thus, 
                                                          
6 Yu In-sŏn, Pet’ŭnam kwa kŭ iut Chungguk, 224-9; QSL Shizu, 127: 988a (SZ16.8.8=9/23/1659), 130: 1008b 
(SZ16.12.20=1/31/1660), 140: 1079b (SZ17.9.1=10/4/1660). 
 
7 QSL Shengzu, 2: 58a-b (SZ18.4.5=5/3/1661), 61b (SZ18.4.21=5/19/1661), 62a (SZ18.4.23=5/21/1661), 62a-b 
(SZ18.4.24=5/22/1661), 68a (SZ18.5.27=6/23/1661) . 
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as Ku has shown, the historical contexts in which Qing incorporated Chosŏn and Vietnam into its 
tributary order were fundamentally different.8  
For the purposes of this study, this difference materialized in three main ways. First, there 
was no Qing invasion to induce Vietnamese submission, and consequently there was no ceasefire 
agreement stipulating the terms of interstate conduct, especially on the issues of boundaries and 
jurisdiction. Second, the Qing state in 1661 was in a more advanced stage of empire-building 
than when it drew up the treaty with Chosŏn in 1637. As an imperial successor to Ming, Qing of 
1661 was finalizing its conquest of China Proper and actualizing its claim on the former Ming 
domain and subjects. There was thus much more room for a universal worldview in Qing-
Vietnam relations from the beginning. Third, unlike the Qing-Chosŏn borderland, the Qing-
Vietnam borderland was not the Manchu homeland, where Manchu state-building had 
incorporated the potential elements for what Richard White calls the “middle ground.”9 Rather, 
this borderland formed a part of what James Scott calls “Zomia,” populated by hill peoples 
fleeing from state-making projects in the lowlands.10 As we will see below, the combination of 
these three factors would result in more ambiguity in the various interstate boundaries along the 
Qing-Vietnam borderland than in the Qing-Chosŏn borderland. 
 
II. Territorial Boundary 
 
                                                          
8 Ku Pŏm-jin, “Ch'ŏng ŭi Chosŏn sahaeng insŏn kwa ‘Taech’ŏng cheguk ch’eje,’” Inmun nonch’ong 59 (2008): 1–
50. 
 
9 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 50-93. 
 
10 James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2009), 1-39.  
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A. 1660s-1720s: Centralization Efforts by Qing and Lê States 
As hinted above, the Qing-Vietnam borderland of 1661 was an untamed frontier from the 
perspectives of Thăng Long and Beijing, far outside the reach of both states. First, much of the 
region was controlled by regimes not under the direct control of central Qing and Vietnamese 
states. On the Qing side, Yunnan and Guangdong, two of the three provinces bordering Vietnam, 
were ruled by two Han Chinese princes who had won the region for the Qing court: Wu Sangui 
(吳三桂; 1612-78) and Shang Kexi (尚可喜; 1604-76). These princes ruled their domains as 
autonomous fiefdoms, with authority tax their subjects and with every intention to pass their 
fiefdoms down to their sons. In fact, Geng Jimao (耿繼茂; d. 1671), the third such prince, was 
able to pass his title and fiefdom of Fujian to his son Geng Jingzhong (耿精忠; d. 1682).11 
This was a situation that the Kangxi (康熙; r. 1662-1722) emperor, who spent the first 
seven years of his reign fighting the Oboi regency for personal control over the central 
government, was unwilling to let continue. When Kangxi tried in 1673 to resettle Wu Sangui, 
Shang Kexi, and Geng Jingzhong to Manchuria, these three rebelled against Qing rule. Thus 
began the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories (1673-81), which leaned heavily in favor of the 
feudatories until 1676. From 1677 to 1681, however, Qing forces were able to hold their ground 
and eventually reconquer the former fiefdoms of the feudatories.12  
On the Vietnamese side, the coexistence of the Lê/Trịnh and Mạc regimes, both 
recognized as tributary polities by Beijing, resulted a situation of split sovereignty. This was 
                                                          
11 On the Three Feudatories, see Liu Fengyun, Qingdai sanfan yanjiu (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 
1994). On Wu Sangui, see ECCP, 877-80. On Shang Kexi, see ibid., 635-6. On the Gengs, see ibid., 415. 
 
12 Jonathan D. Spence, “The K’ang-Hsi Reign,” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 9, Part 1: The Ch’ing 
Empire to 1800, ed. Willard J. Peterson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 125-50. 
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particularly problematic for the Trịnh ruler Tạc (鄭柞; r. 1657-82), as the Trịnh regime and the 
Nguyễn regime were in the middle of an all-out interregional war that K. W. Taylor calls the 
“Fifty Years War” (1627-73).13 As Nurhaci and Hong Taiji worried about the unfriendly Chosŏn 
regime on their flank before campaigning against Ming forces, Trịnh Tạc also sought to secure 
his northern flank by personally leading a successful campaign against Mạc Kính Vũ (莫敬宇; r. 
1638-77)’s forces in 1667. 
What appeared to be an easy military victory, however, turned into an interstate 
diplomatic issue. This event will be described in detail below, so here I will present just a 
summary. Mạc Kính Vũ, driven out of Cao Bằng, fled to Yunnan to seek Qing assistance. The 
Qing court eventually sided with Mạc Kính Vũ, ordering Lê Huyền Tông (黎玄宗; r. 1663-71) to 
return Cao Bằng to Mạc Kính Vũ and live in peace. The Trịnh/Lê regime was forced to return 
four subprefectures (châu) of Cao Bằng to the Mạc regime but bided its time until another 
chance came to annihilate the Mạc. Taking the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories mentioned 
above as the perfect occasion, Trịnh Tạc sent out another successful campaign against the Mạc 
regime in 1677. This campaign and the Qing approval of it in 1679 left the Trịnh/Lê regime as 
the only tributary polity in today’s northern Vietnam.14 
By 1681, then, both central governments had eliminated regional competitors. This new 
setting, however, did not automatically extend the reach of the states into this frontier. That was 
because of the second factor behind borderland ambiguity and complexity: the presence of native 
chieftains (Ch. tusi, Vn. thổ ty) at the local level. For centuries, because of the limited reach of 
                                                          
13 Taylor, A History of the Vietnamese, 258-318. 
 
14 Chin Keiwa (Chen Ching-Ho), ed., Daietsu Shiki Zensho: Kōgōbon, Đại Việt Sử Ký Toàn Thư (DSZ hereafter), 
(Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo Fuzoku Tōyōgaku Bunken Sentā, 1984), 3: 982-3, 987-8, 1008-9; 
Khâm định Việt sử thông giám cương mục (KVTC hereafter), chính biên 33: 19a-20a, 22b-23a. 
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both states in the borderland, states often had to rule these areas indirectly via indigenous 
leaders. These leaders would pledge allegiance to imperial courts and be recognized as native 
chieftains with ranks within the imperial bureaucracy and a hereditary right to rule over their 
domains, which were incorporated into the administrative system of central states but always 
distinguished from regular administrative districts. In short, this was a tributary system on a 
smaller scale, one that was based on the patron-client relationship often found in mainland 
Southeast Asia and similar to the one that Ming and Chosŏn states maintained with Jurchen 
tribes.15 These rulers, who were overwhelmingly of Tai origins and called chao (lord), ruled over 
domains called muang (kingdom, domain). Within their domains, these lords were “local 
emperors,” to use Jennifer Took’s term, regarded as supreme rulers by the people under their 
rule.16  
The Yongzheng (雍正; r. 1723-35) emperor, Kangxi’s successor, was not a ruler who 
could tolerate such irregularities. As many scholars such as Miyazaki Ichisada, Madeleine Zelin, 
and Beatrice Bartlett have noted, Yongzheng was a ruler driven by statist ideals who sought to 
strengthen the central government control over the provinces as well as to centralize and 
bureaucratize his domain.17 It is not surprising then that this centralization drive reached the 
Qing-Vietnam borderland through the gaitu guiliu policy, which aimed to replace the hereditary 
                                                          
15 John Herman, Amid the Clouds and Mist: China’s Colonization of Guizhou, 1200-1700 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2007), 103-43; Wu Yongzhang, Zhongguo tusi zhidu yuanyuan yu fazhan shi 
(Chengdu: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 1988), 157-220. 
 
16 Jennifer Took, A Native Chieftaincy in Southwest China: Franchising a Tai Chieftaincy under the Tusi System of 
Late Imperial China (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 90-122; David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History, 2nd ed. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 6-10. 
 
17 Madeleine Zelin, “The Yung-Cheng Reign,” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 9, Part 1: The Ch’ing 
Empire to 1800, ed. Willard J. Peterson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 183–229; Miyazaki 
Ichisada, Yōsei Tei: Chūgoku no dokusai kunshu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1950); Beatrice S. Bartlett, Monarchs 
and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Chʻing China, 1723-1820 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1991), 17-134. 
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native chieftains with regular imperial bureaucrats. This policy was the brainchild of the 
famously activist official Ortai (鄂爾泰; 1677-1745), who along with Yongzheng directed what 
C. Patterson Giersch calls “new frontier militarism.” The Qing state during the Yongzheng reign 
put more and more of these native domains under its direct administration by asserting more 
control over native chieftains and confiscating the territories of those who resisted the reform.18 
 We will discuss the success of gaitu guiliu in more detail below. Here, it is enough to 
emphasize that some of the Qing native domains affected by this policy bordered Vietnamese 
native domains on the other side of the borderland. In short, it is in the context of centralization 
efforts by both the Qing and Vietnamese states that the interstate delineation efforts first arose in 
the 1720s.  
 
B. Drawing and Marking the Territorial Boundary: 1720s-1750s 
As is well known, the concept of a linear border separating two states is a modern 
concept. Recent studies, as noted in chapter two, have complicated the notions of territoriality 
and national borders, showing how historical processes shaped frontiers and introducing fresh 
theoretical perspectives.19 The territorial boundary in the Qing-Vietnam borderland from the late 
seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century was similarly complicated. If we too take a 
step back and do not assume a clear border between these two entities, we see that the two states 
and their subjects conceptualized the territorial boundary in their own ways. At times these views 
conflicted. 
                                                          
18 C. Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 43-6.  
 
19 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1989); Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1994). 
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As mentioned above, Qing-Vietnamese tributary relations were not established through 
an interstate agreement that drew territorial boundaries between imperial and tributary domains. 
In fact, delineation of territorial boundaries at the interstate level, involving both central courts, 
did not happen until the 1720s. This interstate delineation process, which happened over three 
stages, would end up being the only instance of delineation that involved both the Qing and 
Vietnamese states. As this process illustrates many of the characteristics of the Qing-Vietnamese 
territorial boundary, it deserves a close analysis.  
The first stage of the delineation process began in 1724, when Yunnan provincial 
officials put forward a proposal for developing a copper mine known as Dulong (都竜) in Qing 
and Tụ Long (聚龍) in Vietnam. According to Vũ Đường Luân, Tụ Long/Dulong was one of the 
most productive copper mines in early modern Asia, with an annual output of 220 to 280 tons in 
the late eighteenth century. Even though it is unclear how much copper was being produced in 
1724, the prospect must have been enticing to Yunnan provincial officials, who were looking for 
additional sources of revenue, such as taxes on salt and tea, to supplement the rising cost of 
administration that came with frontier militarism.20  
The initial investigation of the locale by the Kaihua (開化) regional commander 
(zongbing), however, revealed that this valuable mine belonged to Vị Xuyên (渭川) 
subprefecture, today’s Tuyên Quang. According to the memorial by Yun-Gui governor-general 
Gao Qizhuo (高其倬; d. 1738), the Duzhou (賭咒) River, 240 li south of the prefectural city of 
Kaihua, had served as the boundary between Kaihua and Vị Xuyên in the Ming period. During 
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late Ming, however, the Vietnamese state had encroached on the Ming domain by installing 
garrisons and renaming a small stream 120 li north of the Duzhou River as the Đổ Chú (the 
Vietnamese pronunciation of Duzhou) River. Further, continued Gao, the Qing state had lost 
more of its domain in 1683, as the Vietnamese state further encroached on the six villages south 
of the Mabai Garrison (馬伯汛), which lay 40 li north of the Đổ Chú River. As a result, the 
current Kaihua-Vị Xuyên boundary lay 160 li north of the original boundary at the Duzhou River 
and 80 li south of Kaihua city. Gao Qizhuo recommended rectifying this situation by restoring 
the old territorial boundary at the original Duzhou River. Even though he had notified Lê Dụ 
Tông (黎裕宗; r. 1705-29) of Qing territorial claims, Gao anticipated resistance from Vietnam 
due to the great profits that Vietnam reaped from the mines.21 
Unlike Gao Qizhuo, who claimed the former Ming domain in Yunnan as the Qing 
domain, the Yongzheng emperor felt the Đổ Chú River should serve as the boundary for two 
reasons. First, Vietnam had possessed the disputed region during late Ming, and thus the 
“encroachment” had not begun during “our dynasty” (wo chao). Here, we see the timeless 
question of whether a dynastic succession represents a continuation or a fresh start. From Gao 
Qizhou’s perspective, Ming-Qing succession was incomplete without reassertion of control over 
the entire former Ming domain. We might recall how the Northern Song failure to conquer the 
so-called “sixteen prefectures” and the Ordos region provided a source of anxiety to the court 
that saw it as a sign of unfinished dynastic succession.22 Yongzheng, on the other hand, was 
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content to see dynastic change as a fresh start, marking his current dynasty as distinct from the 
Ming dynasty.  
Second, Yongzheng stressed that Vietnam had been a respectful tributary state of “our 
dynasty.” In his view, it was unseemly for the Celestial Empire (Tianchao) to compete with a 
small state (xiaobang) over small land (chicun zhi di). Also, he considered both Qing and 
Vietnamese subjects to be his subjects (chizi) and thus had the wellbeing of all of them in mind.23  
Gao Qizhuo followed the imperial instruction. He again notified Lê Dụ Tông of Qing 
territorial claims and then ordered the Kaihua regional commander to erect boundary markers 
around Xielu, one of the six villages mentioned above, as well as to build houses and station 
troops there. Yongzheng received Gao Qizhuo’s memorial on this in the spring of 1725, around 
the same time he received a memorial from Lê Dụ Tông. In his memorial, Lê Dụ Tông claimed 
that 40 some years had already passed since the current territorial boundary had been set at the 
small stream near the Mabai Garrison (Mabai River hereafter). The west of the river belonged to 
Kaihua prefecture, whereas the east of the river belonged to the Tụ Long village (xã) of Vị 
Xuyên. After receiving both memorials, Yongzheng again reiterated his principle of universal 
emperorship. He ordered Gao Qizhou to withdraw troops from the disputed region and to begin 
negotiations for marking the territorial boundary.24 
The second stage of the delineation process thus began in November 1725. The following 
personnel were involved in the negotiation: the Guangnan (廣南) prefect Pan Yunmin (潘允敏) 
on the Qing side; court officials Hồ Phi Tích (胡丕績) and Vũ Công Tể (武公宰) on the 
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Vietnamese side. The main issue now had become the status of the six villages, as each side 
claimed them as its own. The Qing rested its claim on the facts that elders of these villages 
remembered providing provisions to Kaihua prefecture and that the villagers had once all shaved 
their heads and worn the queue (titou bianfa). The Vietnamese side countered with the fact that 
villagers now wore Vietnamese attire, grew their hair in topknots (chuiji), and walked barefoot 
(tuxian). Here, we are reminded of the importance of the sartorial boundary that we saw in 
chapter two. The queue, for the Qing state, was the most visible sign of Manchu ethnic 
sovereignty an Qing subjecthood. The Vietnamese state also saw the hairstyle and the attire as a 
marker of subjecthood. But the walking barefoot part also reminds us that this borderland 
remained its own region, far from the cultural and sartorial norms of the metropoles.25 
By now, Ortai had replaced Gao Qizhuo as the Yun-Gui governor-general. As we saw 
above, he was one of the two driving forces behind Qing frontier militarism in the region. In line 
with his general stance of frontier activism, Ortai repeatedly recommended to the Yongzheng 
emperor that the Đổ Chú River, which was south of the six villages, should stand as the 
territorial boundary and obtained imperial permission for this, thus settling the six villages as 
Qing property. Moreover, in August 1726, Ortai started the construction of a border gate near the 
Đổ Chú River and stationed 40 troops there. Despite the 5,000 Vietnamese troops stationed 
nearby, construction was completed by November 1726. Next to the gate stood a stele that 
marked the Qing territorial claim: “Every village within the upper reaches of the river belongs to 
China (Zhongtu); foreigners (waiyi) must not trespass or invade.” The erection of the border gate, 
however, did not conclude the matter. The Vietnamese actively contested continued Qing claims 
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over the six villages, now reified by the gate and stele. The delineation process moved on to its 
third and final phase.26 
In the first half of 1727, the Vietnamese court tried repeatedly to send a memorial stating 
its position to the Qing court. Ortai, however, turned it away and instead suggested to the 
Yongzheng emperor that a punitive campaign against Vietnam must be sent if the Vietnamese 
court did not renounce its claim on the six villages. Yongzheng was more cautious and sent an 
edict that was delivered to a Vietnamese native official (土目) in August 1727. This official, 
however, refused to accept the edict because he had been prohibited from receiving edicts or 
lateral communications without the king’s order. Incensed by this insolence, Ortai kept pushing 
for a campaign against Vietnam. 
Yongzheng, however, again emphasized his obligation as a universal ruler by granting 
the disputed land in which the six villages lay to Lê Dụ Tông. Meanwhile, in Vietnam, the court 
had also decided to accept the edict and sent envoys, who arrived in Beijing by March 1728. The 
document (biao) presented by the envoys was respectful and submissive in requesting the return 
of the disputed land to Vietnam. Yongzheng responded by sending imperial envoys to Thăng 
Long with an edict that granted that wish. Lê Dụ Tông received the edict in June 1728, and two 
steles, one on each side of the Mabai River, north of the six villages, were erected to mark the 
territorial boundary in November 1728. The steles recounted the delineation process and noted 
that the north bank of the river belonged to the Qing domain and the south to the Vietnamese 
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domain. This boundary (bianchui), it was said, would remain secure forever (yonggu), never to 
be replaced (fu ti).27  
This case of the Kaihua-Vị Xuyên boundary delineation is remarkable in so far as it 
resembles in several respects the modern concept of the international border. First, there is the 
use of rivers as natural borders. The principle of a river serving as a natural boundary between 
the two states had been well established in maps and written material by the Ming period and 
was still valid as of 1728.28 Second, and relatedly, the linear concept of the territorial boundary 
seems to have prevailed. Both the boundary set in 1726, on the Đổ Chú River, and the boundary 
set in 1728, on the Mabai River, took the rivers as linear boundaries separating two domains. 
Third, the delineation of the boundary was accompanied by an impulse, mainly on the Qing side, 
to mark the boundary in a physical form. Thus, the Qing state built a border gate and a stele in 
1726. In 1728, the Qing state led the erection of steles on both sides of the boundary. The 
boundary, which had existed textually in gazetteers and naturally in the form of the river, had 
now been marked physically with stele.  
An event in 1750-1751 further illustrates the “modern” characteristics of the Qing-
Vietnamese territorial boundary. In winter 1750, the Guangxi governor (xunfu; rank 2b) Šulu 
(舒輅; d. 1752) began to plant jinzhu, a kind of local bamboo known for its strength and thorns, 
in the Guangxi-Vietnam borderland as a physical marker of demarcation. When Šulu 
recommended that his successors continue this project, the Qianlong (乾隆; r. 1736-95) emperor 
gave his approval, and newly appointed Guangxi governor Dingcang (定長; 1705?-68) continued 
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the work. In 1751, however, two separate reports from Pingxiang (憑祥) and Siling (思陵), both 
native departments (tuzhou) in Taiping (太平) prefecture, Guangxi, grabbed the attention of 
Guangxi provincial officials. According to these reports, some unruly Vietnamese had destroyed 
the bamboo fences planted there. As these bamboo fences were originally planted to delineate 
the boundary between Guangxi and Vietnam, this was considered a serious affront to Qing 
border security.29  
Further investigation by the Zuojiang (左江) censor, however, showed Qing subjects to 
be at fault. Apparently, local leaders in these two departments had planted the bamboo fences 
beyond the boundary to occupy tracts of land belonging to their Vietnamese neighbors. Those 
Vietnamese implicated were only trying to protect their property when they burned down the 
bamboo fences. A trial personally attended by the top echelon of Guangxi provincial officials 
ensued. Two people in Pingxiang—Li Zikun (李滋坤) and Zhang Shangzhong (張尚忠)—and 
two people in Siling—Luo Fuli and Huang Qingmao—were found guilty of illegally occupying 
foreign land and fabricating reports to local authorities. Li and Zhang were banished to a place 
far from Guangxi, while Luo was sentenced to penal servitude in Chengdu and Huang to forty 
strokes of heavy bamboo and penal servitude of three years at a distance of 1,000 li. The 
Vietnamese lands illegally occupied were returned to their owners, the plan to use bamboo 
fences for boundary delineation stopped, and many local officials punished for their 
negligence.30 
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From the outset, it is striking that the Qing state made a conscious effort to delineate a 
visible boundary between the two states by building bamboo fences on the Guangxi-Vietnamese 
boundary. Clearly, Guangxi provincial officials felt the need to separate the two domains by 
physically marking the boundary between them. The physical transformation of the boundary, at 
the same time, presupposed the existence of a territorial boundary between Guangxi and 
Vietnam. At the local level, there clearly existed a boundary separating the Qing and Vietnamese 
domains, and it only needed to be marked physically. Also striking is the Qing respect for 
Vietnamese territoriality. The way that the Qing state swiftly and firmly punished its subjects for 
violating the Vietnamese domain is indicative. That the Qing recognized its interstate territorial 
boundary with Vietnam will be even more clear in chapter four, where we will see how seriously 
the Qing state took border security and punished Qing and Vietnamese subjects who violated the 
territorial boundary.  
Qing recognition of this boundary was connected to its respect for Vietnamese 
territoriality in cases beyond the punishment of Qing subjects illegally erecting fences. On 
several occasions, as already noted, the Qianlong emperor decided against sending troops into 
Vietnam out of consideration for what he recognized as a small country (xiao guo) that had been 
respectful and submissive (su cheng gongshun). In 1748, for example, Qianlong rejected 
Ts’ereng (策楞; d. 1756)’s recommendation for a punitive expedition against Vietnam for its 
failure to hand over a criminal suspect: “How could the Celestial Court, as a big state, create 
difficulties for a small state in desolate frontiers?”31 In 1753, the Qianlong emperor justified his 
decision against sending soldiers to capture Bàn Đạo Kiềm (盤道鉗) with similar language: 
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“[We] are afraid that Vietnam will be restless if Qing (neidi) sends out soldiers for [his] arrest.”32 
Vietnam, after all, was an important tributary state that had been respectful in its conduct 
towards the Qing state. In principle, its territoriality was to be respected. 
However, we must also note the lack of a systematic interstate delineation of the 
territorial boundary in this borderland. Kaihua-Vị Xuyên comprised only a small portion of 
Yunnan-Vietnam territorial boundary. The Guangxi-Vietnam delineation project, while wider in 
its scope, was a unilateral project stemming from Guangxi provincial officials that was 
eventually canceled. This lack is especially striking when compared to the Qing-Chosŏn 
borderland, where constant interstate handlings of trespassers and an interstate delineation in the 
1710s had established a high degree of territorial delineation by early modern standards.   
 
C. Remaining Flexibility and Ambiguity of Territorial Boundaries 
The Qing-Vietnamese territorial boundary was further complicated by two factors: the 
flexible and asymmetric conception of boundaries in the Qing imperial worldview as well as the 
survival of native chieftaincies in the borderland.   
 
1. Between Imperial and Tributary Boundaries: Flexibility and Asymmetry 
The idea of universal rulership was inherent in Qing-Vietnamese tributary relations. As 
we saw above, the Yongzheng emperor used this rationale to justify his decision to “grant” the 
disputed land in the Kaihua-Vị Xuyên borderlands to Vietnam: “We rule the entire world 
(huanqu). Every state (bang) that submits is my domain (wu tu). Why must [We] dispute over 
this trifling land of 40 li?” Yongzheng reiterated this point later in the same edict: “[If] this land 
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of 40 li is in Yunnan, it is Our inner domain (neidi). [If] in Vietnam, it is still Our outer vassal 
(waifan). There is no difference whatsoever.”33 In short, the Qing emperor was the universal 
ruler over All Under Heaven (Tianxia), including tributary domains. In this conception, the 
territorial boundary between the Qing imperial domain and the Vietnamese tributary domain was 
meaningless. As such, Qing-Vietnam territorial boundaries were bound to be more flexible and 
ambiguous than today’s national borders.  
This flexibility was manifested in the Qing perspective that the Qing-Vietnam boundary 
was not inviolable. Security considerations or imperial propriety overrode respect for 
Vietnamese territoriality on several occasions, and the Qing state did not hesitate to send its 
representatives into the Vietnamese domain in those cases. In 1750, a local native official (tumu) 
named Li Shichang (李世昌) led an authorized mission from Yunnan to apprehend Qing 
fugitives hiding in Vietnam. The official and his underlings were successful in their mission, 
capturing six fugitives led by Yi Changliao (矣常料), but faced difficulties when they tried to 
enter Guangxi from Vietnam. Reviewing the case afterwards, both the Guangxi governor and 
Qianlong commented that they were on a legitimate mission and should not have been stopped at 
the border. The local Guangxi officials were punished for their negligence. This case shows that 
both the Yunnan local official who authorized the mission and the top echelon of the Qing state 
saw nothing wrong with this encroachment into the Vietnamese domain. Furthermore, there is no 
indication in the sources that Vietnam was even consulted about this cross-border mission.34  
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In the 1760 Quan Tam (郡尋) case, discussed in more detail in chapter five, the Qianlong 
emperor rebuked Ai-bi-da (愛必達; d. 1771) for his decision not to send his soldiers beyond the 
territorial boundary to chase the Vietnamese bandits who had raided Qing border towns. 
Apparently, Ai-bi-da had feared that doing so would alarm the Vietnamese. Qianlong dismissed 
this fear: “Those entering (i.e. Vietnamese bandits) dared to encroach on the imperial boundary, 
and yet those chasing [them] (i.e. Qing soldiers) would not dare cross the foreign boundary?” 
Hot pursuit was allowed, since the matter at hand was defense of the imperial system (tizhi).35 
The imperial system was clearly more important than Qing respect for Vietnamese territoriality 
in this case.  
Qianlong’s recognition of two separate territorial boundaries is also worth noting. 
Accustomed to modern borders as we are, we often tend to think of one border dividing two 
states. To Qianlong, however, the Qing-Vietnam boundary had two sides: one for entering Qing 
and one for entering Vietnam. At least from his point of view, the only flexible boundary was the 
one for entering Vietnam. The boundary for entering China was inflexible and inviolable. 
Frontier security was clearly connected to imperial decorum (titong) in Qing eyes. It was for this 
reason that the Qianlong emperor explicitly commanded his provincial officials not to let a single 
foreigner inside China whenever there were disturbances on the frontier.  
The clearest connection between Qing “territoriality” and imperial decorum is perhaps 
seen in Ts’ereng’s secret memorial of 1747 regarding the Hoàng Phúc Ve case, also discussed in 
more detail in chapter five: “[This case] indeed concerns Vietnamese [soldiers] pursuing bandits 
unable to differentiate between [Qing soldiers and the bandits] in the darkness and 
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unintentionally killing [a Qing soldier]. But as it is a matter of frontier security and thus a matter 
of imperial decorum, regarding this case as an accident might slacken our defense against 
foreigners.”36 Here again, there is a subtle distinction in how the Qing state viewed the 
territorialities of the Qing and the Vietnamese states. The Qing state respected but could violate 
Vietnamese “territoriality” periodically, while it expected Vietnam to respect Qing 
“territoriality” always. This hierarchy of flexible and inflexible boundaries is a perfect 
manifestation of what Brian Womack has described in historical relations between China and 
Vietnam as “the politics of asymmetry.”37 This asymmetry would remain for the duration of 
Qing-Vietnamese tributary relations, which did not formally end until 1885 with the signing of 
the Treaty of Tianjin that ended the Sino-French War (1884-85).38 
 
2. Remaining “Middle Ground”: The Survival of Native Chieftaincies  
Furthermore, as recent scholarship has shown, the gaitu guiliu policy did not 
fundamentally change the structure of power relations in provinces such as Yunnan and Guangxi. 
Unlike Harold Wiens’s classic narrative, in which gaitu guiliu represented the final turning point 
of “China’s march toward the tropics,” C. Patterson Giersch has shown that frontier militarism 
during the Yongzheng reign was much more ambiguous and less successful than previously 
thought. The trend of direct administration was spotty at best, and fiscal and security concerns 
forced the Qing state to retreat from it on a periodic basis. As a result, many native domains in 
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Guangxi and Yunnan remained as such until the end of the Qing period. In fact, many survived 
the fall of the Qing dynasty and lasted into the Republican period (1912-49).39 
On the Vietnamese side as well, native chieftains seem to have retained relative 
autonomy until the beginning of the French colonization of Tonkin. The presence of 
subprefectures (châu), administrative areas ruled by native chieftains who reported directly to 
provincial governors, in far northern Vietnam throughout Lê, Tây Sơn, and Nguyễn periods is 
evidence of that autonomy.40 It is telling that even the Minh Mạng (明命; r. 1820-41) emperor of 
Nguyễn dynasty, who could be considered the Vietnamese counterpart of Yongzheng in his 
centralizing zeal, left the subprefectures intact.41 
The survival of these native chieftainships contributed to the complexity of the Qing-
Vietnam borderland in more than one way. Many of these Tai lords maintained multiple tributary 
relationships, further complicating the idea of the linear territorial boundary between the Qing 
and Vietnamese domains. According to Giersch, for example, it was typical for the Tai domains 
in the China-Burma borderland to pay tribute to both Burmese and Chinese rulers, giving rise to 
the common expression, “The Chinese as father, the Burmese as mother.” According to 
Thongchai Winichakul, this was practice widespread across mainland Southeast Asia, where 
small polities often paid tribute to multiple overlords as a strategy for survival. Thus, shared 
sovereignty and multiple sovereignty were widespread, so much so that there were even words 
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for polities that paid tribute to two or three overlords. As in the Siamese borderlands, this 
situation would not change until the Qing state had to negotiate with the French colonial state in 
Vietnam at the end of Sino-French War (1884-1885).42  
More to the point of this chapter, let us look at the “six muang (六猛)” that caused a 
territorial dispute between Qing and Vietnamese states in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. Between 1781 and 1782, the Yun-Gui governor-general Fu-gang (富綱; d. 1800) 
received lateral communications from Lê Hiển Tông (黎顯宗; r. 1740-86) on illegal occupations 
of ten Vietnamese subprefectures by Qing native chieftains. From the Qing perspective, 
however, these subprefectures were none other than the six Qing native domains of Mengsuo 
(猛梭), Mengla (猛辣), Mengnong (猛弄), Menglai (猛賴), Mengdou (猛蚪), and Mengding 
(猛丁). Located between the Lishe River (禮社江) and the Bafa River (巴發河) in Jianshui 
(建水) county, these native domains collectively known as “six muang” had come under Qing 
control as early as 1658 and were under the jurisdiction of Lin’an (臨安) prefecture, their 
payment of grain tribute to the Qing state well-documented. Based on this evidence, Fu-gang and 
the Qianlong emperor rejected Lê Hiển Tông’s request for territorial delineation in this region.43 
Similar requests by a Vietnamese official of Hưng Hóa (興化) in 1806 and by the Minh Mạng 
emperor in 1830 were rejected on similar grounds.44 
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From nationalist perspective, it would be tempting to try to determine which state was in 
the right during these disputes. In fact, the more relevant point is that the Qing refusal to 
acknowledge this as an issue prevented the delineation of an interstate boundary that the two 
states could agree on. Moreover, when we look at the issue from the perspective of the “six 
muang,” we discover that they belonged to the loose federation of Tai polities known as Sip Song 
Chau Tai (the Twelve Tai Cantons). This federation, with its center at Muang Lai (Qing’s 
Menglai and today’s Lai Châu), had historically paid tribute to various overlords such as Luang 
Prabang, Burma, China, and Vietnam. The existence of such an ambiguous and flexible political 
federation in the Qing-Vietnam borderland, unsurprisingly, made the task of drawing and 
maintaining a clear territorial boundary between two states impossible. In fact, Sip Song Chau 
Tai was even recognized by the French colonial government and survived as a political entity 
until 1954.45 
In short, the situation in this borderland stands in stark contrast with the situation in the 
Qing-Chosŏn borderland. As we have seen in chapter two, the historical context of early Qing 
state-building forced the Qing and Chosŏn states to negotiate and delineate the interstate 
territorial boundary from the 1620s to the 1710s and to continue maintaining it from this period 
onward. In contrast, the survival of the native domains as the “middle ground” and the emerging 
Qing imperial universalism made the Qing-Vietnam borderland much more ambiguous and 
complex. As the next section will show, we can see a similar trend in the boundaries between 
subjecthoods as well. 
 
                                                          
45 Jean Michaud, “The Montagnards and the State in Northern Vietnam from 1802 to 1975: A Historical Overview,” 
Ethnohistory 47, no. 2 (2000): 333–68. 
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III. Subjecthood 
Again, unlike the Qing-Chosŏn tributary relationship, the Qing-Vietnamese relationship 
was not founded on a treaty defining who was a subject of which state and stipulating protocol 
for repatriation of foreign subjects. The lack of an interstate agreement meant that the boundary 
between Qing imperial subjects and Vietnamese tributary subjects was an uncertain one. This 
fuzziness came to the fore whenever the subjects of one state sought refuge in the domain of the 
other state. Each decision on whether to accept or turn away these refugees served in effect to 
define a boundary between the subjects of the two states. Sometimes the boundary was drawn 
and maintained. Other times, the boundary was negated or overlooked. In what follows, I will 
compare how the Qing and Vietnamese states handled all sorts of emigrants from the other state 
and show asymmetry and elasticity as two defining characteristics of imperial and tributary 
subjecthood.   
The Qing state gradually developed two general policies on the Vietnamese subjects who 
crossed into the Qing domain. The Qing state could either repatriate the Vietnamese subjects as 
foreign subjects or grant refuge to the Vietnamese subjects as universal subjects. These two 
policies, in turn, represented the two facets of the Qing emperor: one as the ruler over Qing 
subjects and the other as the universal ruler of “All Under Heaven.” These two aspects are in line 
with what Kathlene Baldanza sees in the case of Ming-Vietnamese relations: Ming as a bounded 
China and Ming as an expansive empire.46 
 
A. Repatriation of Vietnamese Subjects as Foreign Subjects 
                                                          
46 Baldanza, Ming China and Vietnam, 92-6. 
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Repatriation of Vietnamese subjects happened on a regular basis under various 
circumstances. The Qing state identified some of these Vietnamese subjects as fugitives on the 
run from the Vietnamese judiciary and emphasized both their foreignness and their criminality as 
the reason for their repatriation. This repatriation of fugitives will be discussed further in chapter 
five, which looks at interstate judiciaries and jurisdictions between Qing and Vietnam. 
A careful look at the sources, however, makes it clear that these Vietnamese subjects 
were being repatriated regardless of their criminality. Starting in the early Qianlong period, the 
Qing state began to see far northern Vietnam as a region plagued with warfare due to frequent 
clashes between Vietnamese government forces and regional bandits and rebels. Whenever Qing 
officials in provinces bordering Vietnam—Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong—detected signs of 
trouble on the other side of the boundary, they allocated additional troops to the border passes 
connecting the two states. These passes, often collectively called “three gates and hundred 
passes” (san guan bai ai) in Guangxi, were meant to regulate the movement of borderland 
residents going in and out of the Qing domain. As will be shown in more detail in chapter five, 
the Qing state was particularly concerned about Qing subjects entering northern Vietnam to join 
the fighting there or even to start trouble there in some cases. But gradually, the Qing state came 
to be equally concerned about Vietnamese subjects entering the Qing domain.  
In 1755, for example, the Liangguang governor-general Yang Yingju (楊應琚; d. 1767) 
came to identify the illegal movement of borderlands people as the root of trouble: “Two 
prefectures of Tai[ping] and Zhen[’an] border Annam. Treacherous bandits (jian fei) of that 
country entering the interior (neidi- i.e. Qing domain), the treacherous Han (Hanjian) from the 
interior going [to Annam] to cause trouble, [these] all cause quarrels and troubles.” Yang’s 
 
 
171 
 
solution was to block all the gates and passes except for the two gates and one pass in Taiping: 
Ping’er Pass (平而關), Shuikou Pass (水口關), and Youcun Pass (油村隘).47 
As was the case for most premodern states, however, the Qing state did not have 
sufficient physical presence in these borderlands to block Vietnamese immigrants. Provincial 
officials were the first to recognize these limits. The stock phrase “three gates and hundred 
passes”, for example, was usually paired with the length of the Guangxi-Vietnam boundary these 
passes were guarding: 2,000 li (approximately 1,152 km). Because of this weak state presence in 
this borderland, it was hard to differentiate between fugitives on the run from the Vietnamese 
judiciary and displaced people merely escaping intolerable socioeconomic circumstances at 
home. The best option in such a situation would have been the arrest and repatriation of all 
Vietnamese subjects in times of trouble in far northern Vietnam.  
Indeed, Vietnamese subjects often were repatriated in times of warfare in far northern 
Vietnam. From 1740 to 1742, provincial officials of Guangxi were carefully observing the 
rebellion of Vi Phúc Quan (韋福琯), a native official of Lộc Bình (祿平), against the Lê/Trịnh 
court. Worried about the conflicts in Cao Bằng and Lạng Sơn (諒山) spilling over into southern 
Guangxi, Guangxi officials gave strict orders for border defense and deployed additional troops 
to the interstate boundary. Even though the rebellion was suppressed by early 1742, many 
residents of Lạng Sơn, the region that had seen most of the fighting, had already lost their means 
of livelihood and were suffering from hunger. They thus fled to various regions of Taiping 
prefecture to beg for food. Guangxi officials identified them as victims of famine (jimin) in need 
of assistance and treated them humanely. The old, the weak, the sick, and the hungry were fed 
                                                          
47 QSL, Gaozong 479: 1191b-1192a (QL19.12.30=2/10/1755). 
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and cared for. Those who could still walk were provided with food and traveling expenses. In the 
end, however, they were all returned to Lạng Sơn.48 
 Similarly, the arrest of Đinh An (丁安) and eleven other Vietnamese subjects in Zhen’an 
(鎮安) prefecture, Guangxi in 1779 occurred during a rebellion led by the native chieftain Hoàng 
Văn Đồng (黃文桐). Initial interrogation by local officials revealed that Đinh An was the 
concubine of the Bảo Lạc (保樂) native chieftain Nùng Hau Dong (農候冬) and that she had fled 
an attack led by Dong’s male cousin. Further interrogation by provincial officials led them to 
conclude that these Vietnamese subjects had indeed entered the Qing domain because of hard 
times (bei nan). They had neither committed crimes (fanzui) nor been involved in the rebellion. 
The Qianlong emperor agreed with this assessment but ordered the provincial officials to 
proceed with caution. They were to send a lateral communication to Lê Hiển Tông on the 
situation, escort Đinh An’s party to the Zhennan Gate (鎮南關), and hand them over to the 
Vietnamese officials only after this story had been ascertained (xunwen queshi).49  
 The Qing concern for border security became even more pronounced in the first half of 
the nineteenth century. Communications between Qing provincial officials and the Daoguang 
(道光; r. 1821-50) emperor from 1833 to 1835 provide perhaps the clearest example of this. 
Beginning in 1833, memorials on the rebellion of Nông Văn Vân (農文雲; d. 1835) reached 
Beijing from Yunnan and Guangxi. Daoguang maintained a consistent and clear-cut policy of 
closing the interstate boundaries. If Vietnamese rebels and governmental soldiers reached the 
border in their fight, the border officials were to expel or intercept them. They were prohibited 
                                                          
48 QSL, Gaozong 167: 125b (QL7.5.29=7/1/1742), 168: 136a-b (QL7.6.12=7/13/1742). 
 
49 QSL, Gaozong, 1089: 631b-632a (QL44.8.24=10/3/1779); JJCD 024553 (Li Shijie; 44.8.6/44.8.24); 
GZD403046108 (Guilin and Li Shijie; QL44.10.20=11/27/1779); DSZ 3: 1191-2; KVTC, chính biên 45: 16a-17b. 
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from letting even one Vietnamese subject in. Daoguang also warned the border officials against 
acting in pursuit of fame and causing trouble. They were prohibited from rashly killing even one 
Vietnamese subject and from accepting any request from the Vietnamese state for military 
assistance. Warfare and disorder, Daoguang reasoned, were common in Vietnam, and the 
Celestial Court (Tianchao) should pay no attention.50 As we will see below, this was very likely 
a reaction against the imperial overreach of the Qianlong period. Daoguang and his predecessor 
the Jiaqing (嘉慶; r. 1796-1820) emperor presided over an empire-wide retreat from the active 
frontier policies pursued under the Qianlong emperor, which had demonstrated the physical and 
political limits of Qing imperial power to his successors.51 
In any case, border officials followed Daoguang’s instructions. In January 1834, for 
example, the Taiping prefect during his tour of inspection discovered and detained 100-some 
people trying to climb up the walls of Shuikou Pass. According to an investigation by the prefect, 
local Hakkas had recognized some of them, and they all turned out to be foreigners (yiren) who 
had joined Nông Văn Vân’s rebellion. With the rebellion collapsing, they had plotted to enter the 
Qing domain by pretending to be Qing subjects (zha chong neidi minren). The prefect turned 
away these rebels by threatening to hand them over to Vietnamese officials if they did not leave. 
About two months later, the same prefect arrested two groups of six Vietnamese subjects after 
receiving a request for the repatriation of fugitives from the Lạng-Bằng (Lạng Sơn and Cao 
Bằng) governor. Upon their arrest, one group of the Vietnamese subjects, who had already 
shaved their foreheads, claimed to be Qing subjects trading in far northern Vietnam but were 
                                                          
50 QSL, Xuanzong, 242: 619a-620a (DG13.8.1=9/14/1833), 243: 648a-649a (DG13.9.18=10/30/1833), 245: 690a-
691a (DG13.11.12=12/22/1833); JJCD 064592 (Ilibu; DG13.6.10/13.8.1), 065136 (Lu Kun; ?/JQ13.9.19), 065742 
(Lu Kun; DG13.10.21/13.11.12). 
 
51 Alexander Woodside, “The Ch’ien-Lung Reign,” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 9, Part 1: The 
Ch’ing Empire to 1800, ed. Willard J. Peterson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 293-309. 
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soon recognized by the other Vietnamese group. All 12 were handed over to Vietnamese 
officials at the Youcun Pass. In total, the authorities in Taiping and Zhen’an prefectures had 
detained and repatriated 88 Vietnamese subjects by the spring of 1835.52 
Border security aside, Qing policy also sought as a matter of ethnic and territorial 
demarcation to maintain the boundary between Qing subjects and Vietnamese subjects. 
Vietnamese subjects belonged in the Vietnamese domain, and as such should be returned there. 
The Nguyễn Ngọc Hán (阮玉漢) case perfectly illustrates this dividing line. In 1751, Nguyễn 
Ngọc Hán and three other Vietnamese subjects were transferred from Guangnan prefecture, 
Yunnan, to Guishun (歸順) department, Guangxi, for their repatriation to Vietnam. An inquiry 
by the Guishun department magistrate before their repatriation at Shuikou Pass, however, 
revealed some inconsistencies. Two of them were actually from Fuzhou native department 
(土富州), Yunnan. While the two others claimed that they were Vietnamese subjects, their claim 
was also dubious because their foreheads were shaven (titou). Convinced that these were not 
Vietnamese subjects, Guangxi provincial officials sent them back to Yunnan for further 
investigation and memorialized on this case. The Qianlong emperor showed his frustration at this 
report and ordered Yunnan and Guangxi provincial officials to answer the one and only question 
that really mattered: Were they foreigners or Qing subjects (shi yi shi min)?53 
Yunnan provincial officials came up with a definitive answer, drawing from the original 
report from the Guangnan prefect and a new report from the Yunnan administrative 
commissioner (buzhengshi). It turned out that Nguyễn Ngọc Hán was a Vietnamese native 
                                                          
52 QSL, Xuanzong 251: 810b-811a (DG14.4.29=6/6/1834), 265: 76a (DG15.4.23=5/20/1835); JJCD 066772 (Qi 
Gong; ?/DG14.1.22), 067768 attachments (Hui-ji; DG14.3.24/14.4.27). 
 
53 QSL, Gaozong 396: 203b-204a (QL16.8.3=9/21/1751) 
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chieftain of Dong Bon (董奔) who had fled an attack led by his male cousin, while the other 
three were his retainers. When the prefect told them to go back to Dong Bon, they had pleaded 
with him, saying that they would be killed the moment they returned. Taking a pity on their 
situation, the prefect had transferred them to Guishun so that they could be handed over to 
Vietnamese officials in Cao Bằng. As for the hair, Hán and one of his retainers had shaved their 
foreheads to take refuge in the Qing domain. The other two retainers were indeed of Fuzhou 
origin, but their families had lived in Dong Bon for four or five generations already. The prefect 
had confirmed this fact by personally visiting the village from which they originated. In short, 
they were foreigners, not Qing subjects (shi yi fei min), and it was as foreigners, i.e. Vietnamese, 
that they were handed over to Vietnamese officials at Shikou Pass in 1752.54 
In one case, Vietnamese subjects had entered the Qing domain against their will. In 1738, 
local officials in Qiongzhou (瓊州) prefecture, Guangdong, today’s Hainan Island, discovered 
that local Hakkas were trafficking Vietnamese people. The Liangguang governor-general Omida 
(鄂彌達; 1685?-1761) turned his attention to not only the criminals but also the victims. He 
ordered local officials to take care of those trafficked while notifying Lê Ý Tông (黎懿宗; 
r .1735-40) of the incident via a lateral communication. These victims were then sent back to 
Vietnam with food and travel expenses for their return home.55  
From the cases above, we can see that the Qing state repatriated these Vietnamese 
subjects who entered the Qing domain regardless of their circumstances. In the cases above, 
                                                          
54 QSL, Gaozong, 402: 284a-b (QL16.11.1=12/18/1751); JJCD 007431 (Šose; QL16.9.26/16.10.29), 007436 (Su-
chang et al; QL16.10.1/16.10.30), 007437 (Su-chang and Dingcang; ?/QL16.10.30), 007805 (Sinju; 
QL16.12.19/17.1.22), 008075 (Dingcang; QL17.2.24/17.3.19); GZD 403000658 (Šose and Ai-bi-da; 
QL16.9.26=11/13/1751). 
 
55 QSL, Gaozong 70: 120b-121b (QL3.6.1=7/17/1738). 
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whether fugitives, refugees, or victims, these displaced Vietnamese people were all foreign 
subjects of Vietnam to the Qing state. As foreign subjects, they were returned where they 
belonged.  
 
B. Vietnamese Subjects as Universal Imperial Subjects 
 When the Qing state repatriated Vietnamese subjects to Vietnam, it was treating them as 
foreign subjects who belonged to a foreign state. The Qing state, however, did not always 
repatriate Vietnamese subjects who entered the Qing domain. At least as often, the Qing state 
intervened on behalf of Vietnamese subjects by granting them protection, either temporarily or 
permanently. In doing so, the Qing state was treating these Vietnamese subjects as universal 
imperial subjects of the Qing emperor. These seeming dualities show the elasticity inherent 
within tributary subjecthood.  
 
1. Tributary Rulers 
 Most notably, the Qing state intervened on behalf of its tributary rulers who stood on the 
losing side of regime changes within Vietnam and requested Qing assistance. As I hinted above, 
the first Vietnamese tributary ruler to ask for such assistance was Mạc Kính Vũ. In 1667, Trịnh 
Tạc, the head of the Trịnh family that held the actual power in the Lê court in Thăng Long, 
personally led a campaign against the Mạc regime in Cao Bằng. Mạc Kính Vũ and his followers, 
overwhelmed and driven out of Cao Bằng, fled to Yunnan. There, Mạc Kính Vũ memorialized 
on the incident to the Kangxi emperor, who initially arranged for Mạc Kính Vũ and his followers 
to be settled (anzhi) in Nanning (南寧) prefecture, Guangxi. At this point Lê Huyền Tông also 
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memorialized the Kangxi emperor, presenting this campaign as revenge (fuchou) against the 
usurper Mạc Đăng Dung and his descendants.56  
The Qing court did not find Lê Huyền Tông’s explanation satisfactory and decided to 
intervene on behalf of Mạc Kính Vũ. In an edict issued to Lê Huyền Tông, the Qing court 
ordered the Lê regime to cease hostilities and return the land and people of Cao Bằng to Mạc 
Kính Vũ so that each Vietnamese tributary regime could defend its own domain and live in peace 
(ge shoutu ansheng). The imperial reasoning was threefold. First, Mạc Đăng Dung’s usurpation 
had happened a long time ago. Second, Mạc Kính Vũ had submitted to Qing rule even before Lê 
Huyền Tông and had received the post of dutongshi. Third, Lê Huyền Tông should have 
memorialized and waited for imperial decree before campaigning against the Mạc.57 
The Qing envoys who carried the imperial edict to Thăng Long came back with Lê 
Huyền Tông’s memorial the next year. The Lê regime had agreed to return four subprefectures 
(châu) of Cao Bằng—Thạch Lâm (石林), Quảng Nguyễn (廣源), Thượng Lang (上琅), and Hạ 
Lang (下琅)—to Mạc Kính Vũ. The Lê regime must have realized the delicate situation in which 
the Qing-Mạc tributary relationship had placed it, as it also requested that Mạc Kính Vũ be put 
under the Lê jurisdiction (guishu). As per the recommendation of the Board of War, in charge of 
dealing with the Mạc regime because of the military post the Mạc rulers had received, the Qing 
court approved the Lê request. We do not know what exactly that process entailed, but the Mạc 
regime was able to survive as a regional regime until 1677 because of this Qing intervention.58  
                                                          
56 DSZ 3: 982. 
 
57 QSL, Shengzu 25: 355b-356a (KX7.4.22=6/1/1688). 
 
58 QSL, Shengzu 30: 407a (KX8.6.13=7/10/1669); DSZ 3: 987-8; KVTC, chính biên 33: 22b-23a. 
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Neither the Mạc regime nor the Lê regime was happy with this stalemate. In 1673, Mạc 
Kính Vũ memorialized the Kangxi emperor to ask for further Qing intervention. By his account, 
his old domain (gutu) also included two subprefectures—Bảo Lạc (保樂) and Thất 
Nguyễn/Nguồn (七源)—and 12 villages (xã) that had not been returned from the Lê regime. He 
was now requesting that the emperor issue an edict for Lê Huyền Tông to return these regions. 
The Qing Deliberative Council (yizheng wang dachen), however, recommended taking no action. 
Mạc Kính Vũ had not mentioned these regions when he sought refuge in 1667, and this was a 
foreign (waiguo) matter that had long since been concluded (jie’an yijiu). No further Qing 
intervention followed. The next year saw the new Lê ruler Gia Tông (嘉宗; r. 1671-75), 
requesting that Cao Bằng, which he called his territory (chen jiangtu), be returned to him. 
Seemingly aware that this request would not be granted without the dissolution of the Qing-Mạc 
tributary relationship, he presented evidence of Mạc insolence: an oath by Mạc Kính Vũ’s father 
that contained words disobedient to Qing (ni Tianchao zhi yu). The Qing court, in the end, 
rejected this evidence for being old and unclear. Thus, the stalemate continued.59 This stalemate 
presents unmistakable evidence of split sovereignty in northern Vietnam at the time, where two 
tributary regimes continued in an uncomfortable coexistence.  
The Lê/Trịnh regime, however, was determined to obliterate the Mạc regime and bided 
its time, as discussed above. Taking advantage of the civil war in the southern half of the Qing 
realm during the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories (1673-1681), the Trịnh sent out another 
successful campaign against the Mạc in 1677. However, this campaign was not reported to the 
Qing court until 1679, when Lê Hy Tông (黎熙宗; r. 1676-1705) sent a tributary mission 
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congratulating the court on the suppression of the Three Feudatories. Moreover, Hy Tông 
accused Mạc Kính Vũ of betraying the imperial grace and collaborating with Wu Sangui, while 
he himself remained loyal to the Qing. Now that the rebellion had been suppressed, Hy Tông 
continued, he was sending a tribute mission to Beijing. Moreover, much as the Qing court had 
suppressed Wu Sangui, the Lê ruler reported that it had suppressed the rebel (nidang) Mạc Kính 
Vũ. This time, the Qing court did not object to the campaign, thereby approving, ex post facto, 
the campaign that had already happened two years ago and putting an end to the Qing-Mạc 
tributary relationship.60 
The Mạc family, however, had not disappeared. In 1682, Mạc Kính Quang (莫敬光), 
Mạc Kính Vũ’s younger brother, entered Guangxi province and sought refuge there along with 
hundreds of his family members. The Guangxi governor Hao Yu (郝浴; 1623-83) remarked that 
there was no sign they had committed any wrongdoing. The Board of War, which had received 
an imperial order to deliberate on the matter, dwelled on these conflicting reports and eventually 
recommended two things. First, Mạc Kính Vũ should be punished for aiding Wu Sangui’s 
rebellion. But as he had already died by then, abolishing his tributary post would be enough. 
Second, as Mạc Kính Quang had led his family members, handed in the tributary seal, and 
surrendered, he should be pardoned. But as they were foreigners (waiguo zhi ren), it was 
inappropriate to let them stay in the Qing domain (neidi). So Guangxi provincial officials should 
send them back to Vietnam with a lateral communication (zi) to the king to settle them there 
instead of killing them. These recommendations were approved by the Kangxi emperor and some 
350 people were repatriated to Vietnam via the Zhennan Pass by June 1683.61  
                                                          
60 QSL Shengzu, 86: 1094b-1095a (KX18.11.21=12/23/1679).  
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What had happened? Why were the Mạc refugees allowed to take refuge in the first 
instance and not in the second? I believe that the answer comes down to the peculiar historical 
situation of the dual tributary relationship that the Qing state had maintained with two separate 
Vietnamese regimes. In the first instance, Mạc Kính Vũ was given refuge in the Qing domain as 
a tributary ruler. Furthermore, the Qing court even felt compelled to intervene on his behalf 
against another Vietnamese tributary ruler, Lê Huyền Tông. In the second instance, however, 
that dual tributary relationship had formally met its end as the Board of War had decided to strip 
Mạc Kính Vũ of his tributary post. Now there remained only one tributary ruler in Vietnam, a 
situation that turned these Mạc refugees from loyalists of a tributary ruler into mere “foreigners” 
who could not stay in the Qing domain. From now on, the Qing state would only recognize one 
regime in Vietnam as a tributary regime, but this was not to be the last time that the Qing state 
intervened on behalf of a tributary regime in Vietnam.  
The next tributary ruler to ask for Qing assistance was Lê Duy Kỳ (黎維祁; 1765-93). Lê 
Duy Kỳ was the crown prince of the Lê court during the Tây Sơn Uprising (ca. 1773-89) that 
ousted both the Nguyễn regime of southern Vietnam and the Lê/Trịnh regime of northern 
Vietnam. In 1788, the displaced members of the Lê court, including Lê Duy Kỳ’s mother and 
sons, came to the Guangxi-Vietnam boundary asking for Qing protection. The Qing sources 
portray a dynamic scene, where the Lê loyalists, with Tây Sơn soldiers in hot pursuit, swam 
across a river to avoid capture and received temporary shelter from the Taiping, Guangxi, 
prefectural authorities.62  
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The Liangguang governor-general Sun Shiyi (孫士毅; 1720-96) and the Qianlong 
emperor, however, did much more than give them protection, launching a military campaign 
against the Tây Sơn regime under the pretext of restoring the tributary royal house of the Lê. As 
is well-known, the seemingly successful campaign ended disastrously for Qing when Tây Sơn 
forces under the command of Nguyễn Huệ (阮惠; 1753-92) routed the Qing troops around the 
Lunar New Year of 1789. This is where the story ends for most studies of Qing intervention 
against the Tây Sơn regime.63 The story of what happened to the Lê loyalists after the failure of 
the Qing intervention, however, has not received as much attention. As far as I know, Sun 
Hongnian, a leading scholar of Qing-Vietnamese relations, is the only one to have analyzed the 
topic in any detail. My analysis below builds on his excellent study, but also utilizes Qing 
archival materials that he did not use.64  
In February 1789, the defeated Qing forces and the Lê loyalists were hurrying back into 
Guangxi. Lê Duy Kỳ and 20-some of his followers, including his mother and son, for example, 
had reached the Zhennan Pass on February 1. They were temporally placed in Nanning by the 
Guangxi governor Sun Yongqing (孫永清; 1732?-90) until the Qianlong emperor ordered them 
to be moved to the provincial capital of Guilin (桂林).65 As more reports of the retreat piled up, 
Qianlong showed a keen interest on the whereabouts of two other groups of Lê loyalists in a 
                                                          
63 Truong Buu Lam, “Intervention Versus Tribute in Sino-Vietnamese Relations, 1788-1790,” in The Chinese World 
Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, ed. John King Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1968), 165–79; Fuma Susumu, “Ming-Qing China’s Policy toward Vietnam as a Mirror of Its Policy towards Korea: 
With a Focus on the Question of Investiture and ‘Punitive Expeditions,’” Memoirs of the Research Department of 
the Toyo Bunko 65 (2007): 22-7; George E. Dutton, The Tây Son Uprising: Society and Rebellion in Eighteenth-
Century Vietnam (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006), 43-56. 
 
64 Sun, Qingdai Zhong Yue guanxi yanjiu, 296-302. 
 
65 QSL, Gaozong 1321: 867b-869a (QL54.1.25=2/19/1789), 874a-b (QL54.1.27=2/21/1789); GZD 403056233 
attachment (Sun Yongqing; QL54.1.10=2/4/1789). 
 
 
 
182 
 
February 24 edict: “Who else has exerted himself like Phan Khải Đức (潘啟德)? And where are 
the long-time Lê ministers (jiu chen) such as Nguyễn Huy Túc (阮輝宿), Nguyễn Đình Mai 
(阮廷枚), Lê Quynh (黎炯) right now? Investigate whether they have accompanied all the others 
entering the pass and memorialize.”66  
Phan Khải Đức was the Tây Sơn governor of Lạng Sơn who had surrendered to Qing 
forces and had acted as a guide for them.67 “Long-time Le ministers,” on the other hand, were 
those who had followed the Lê cause even before the Qing invasion. Nguyễn Huy Tuc and Lê 
Quynh, for example, had led the Lê royal family and 60-some people to Taiping prefecture, 
Guangxi, to seek assistance from the Qing state.68 Nguyễn Huy Tuc, in particular, was so pleased 
by the Qing decision to send out an army against the Tây Sơns that he wrote a poem entitled 
“Pleased that the Qing Troops Have Crossed the Border and Are Coming to Our Assistance.”69 
These two groups of Lê loyalists had joined the Qing/Lê cause under different circumstances, but 
neither group could have expected to fare well in Vietnam under Tây Sơn rule. Qianlong seems 
to have been aware of this situation. 
In a March 27th edict, Qianlong first expressed his wish to settle the loyalists in the Qing 
domain. The loyalists like Đức, who had exerted themselves (chuli) in the campaign, would be 
given rank buttons (dingdai) and employed (luyong) by the Qing state. Other loyalists who 
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lacked such achievements but still wished to become Qing subjects (neidi minren) for fear of 
persecution by the Tây Sơns would be provided with food and resettled. In the coming months, 
communications between Qianlong and Fuk’anggan (福康安; d. 1796), the new Liangguang 
governor-general, worked out the details of the resettlement plan. All Lê loyalists who had 
entered the Qing domain after the failed Qing campaign were resettled in Guilin and other cities 
in Guangxi, with housing and expenses provided. Those loyalists with merits were given posts in 
the Green Standards, the secondary Qing military organization composed of non-bannermen, 
without actual responsibilities. Đức, for example, received the 4a rank of brigade vice 
commander (dusi).70  
As the Qing state and the Tây Sơn state negotiated for the establishment of a new 
tributary relationship, however, the presence of the Lê loyalists in Guilin emerged as a thorny 
issue. Nguyễn Huệ, the Tây Sơn ruler, expressed his concern about the proximity of Guangxi to 
far northern Vietnam, where Lê loyalists were still leading attacks against his regime. To 
accommodate the Tây Sơn ruler, Qianlong ordered Lê Duy Kỳ to wear the queue and Qing attire. 
He also made sure the Tây Sơn tribute envoys would see Lê Duy Kỳ in this new sartorial 
persona, so that they could see that Lê Duy Kỳ had absolutely no intention of returning to 
Vietnam. In fact, other Le loyalists had already adopted the queue, and it served as the most 
physical manifestation of their new membership in the Qing state. These loyalists, as Qianlong 
emphasized, had now become common subjects (qimin) of the Qing state.71 
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By December 1790, when Nguyễn Huệ had already been established as the tributary king 
of Vietnam, Qianlong seems to have accepted the Tây Sơn position that the existence of Lê 
loyalists in Guilin posed a problem. Qianlong expressed in his edict to the Grand Council that 
Guilin’s proximity to Vietnam raised the possibility that the Lê loyalists would cause trouble in 
the borderland. As a result, a new settlement plan had emerged by the spring of 1791. Members 
of the Lê royal family, Lê loyalists who had held ranks in Vietnam, and Lê loyalists who had 
received posts in the Green Standards were to be incorporated as Hanjun bannermen in Beijing, 
with Lê Duy Kỳ and prominent officials serving as hereditary banner officers. This group 
comprised about 160 refugees out of about 360 refugees in Guilin. The remaining 200 or so 
refugees were to be sent to four provinces far from Vietnam—Jiangnan, Zhejiang, Anhui, and 
Sichuan—to be enlisted in the Green Standards commands under provincial officials.72 
Under this new plan, the Lê refugees were more thoroughly incorporated into the Qing 
state. The refugees in Beijing became members of the Hanjun Bordered Yellow Banner and put 
under the jurisdiction of Gingiyan (金簡; d. 1794), the commander-in-chief (dutong) of that 
banner.73 Refugees settled in provinces were put under the jurisdiction of provincial officials. For 
example, Sun Shiyi, now the Sichuan governor-general, enlisted them under the governor-
general’s command (dubiao) and rented them government land. Sun’s comprehensive planning 
was praised by the Qianlong emperor.74 The Jiangsu governor Fusung (福崧; 1747-93), on the 
other hand, was rebuked by Qianlong for his plan of settling the refugees in three separate areas: 
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Nanjing, Suzhou, and Anhui. These refugees, Qianlong reasoned, would have to be settled 
together where provincial officials were stationed so that they could be constantly supervised. 
Qianlong also faulted Fusung for merely providing these displaced people with food and living 
expenses. It was, Qianlong stressed, not a long-term solution (fei jingjiu zhi fa).75 Qianlong 
ordered other provincial officials to follow Sun’s examples. As the Qianlong emperor had 
previously emphasized in a fall 1790 edict, the goal was to settle the refugees together for 
constant supervision and to provide them with a permanent means of livelihood.76  
Almost as soon as they had been settled in Beijing and the provinces, some of the 
refugees voiced their desire to return to their homeland. The first such request came in late 
autumn 1790 from Cao Xuân Vượng (高春旺) and other refugees settled in Sichuan. Knowing 
that Nguyễn Huệ had become a tributary king, they wished to follow him and be reunited with 
their family members who remained in Vietnam. The emperor, considering this a reasonable 
request, ordered other provincial officials to inquire whether there were refugees under their 
jurisdictions who wished to return to Vietnam. Those who wished to stay could stay as Qing 
subjects, whereas those who wished to return to Vietnam could return as Vietnamese subjects.77 
 Further investigation indeed revealed more refugees who wished to return to Vietnam: 
81 in Beijing, 23 in in Jiangnan, 14 in Anhui, and 59 in Zhejiang. Many refugees, however, 
remained as Qing subjects. In Jiangnan, for example, 47 refugees were reportedly content with 
their current lives and stayed, as opposed to 23 who returned. While coordinating their return to 
Vietnam via Guangxi, Qianlong also had Fuk’anggan, the Liangguang governor-general, relay an 
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imperial message to Nguyễn Huệ: Nguyễn Huệ, as the king of these returners, was to treat these 
people with kindness unless they caused further trouble. If they did, the king did not need to 
worry about the fact that they had once lived in Qing. He could deal with them accordingly 
without reporting to the Qing court. This message clearly showed the transfer of subjecthood that 
was happening with the repatriation.78 
The refugees who stayed in the Qing domain lived as Qing subjects for the next 13 years, 
subject to Qing law. In summer 1791, for example, Gingiyan investigated the Vietnamese 
bannermen under his jurisdiction regarding Lê Duy Kỳ’s request to be settled in four far northern 
provinces (Cao Bằng, Lạng Sơn, Tuyên Quang, and Hưng Hóa) of Vietnam, a request recalling a 
similar Mạc request more than a century ago. Gingiyan identified Hoàng Ích Hiểu (黃益曉) and 
three other bannermen as the instigators behind this request and recommended exiling them to Ili 
(伊犁), Xinjiang to serve as soldiers. He also identified 20 other bannermen as troublemakers 
and recommended settling them in places like Nanjing. The Qianlong emperor approved his 
recommendation.79 In 1803, Lê Quynh and Lý Bỉnh Đạo (李秉道) of the Firearms Brigade 
(huoqiying), were arrested for unauthorized travel from their residence in Landianchang 
(藍靛厰), Beijing, to Zhuozhou (涿州) department, Shuntian, where Lê Quynh’s son was staying 
as a member of the Vietnamese tribute mission. As these two had already been arrested and 
pardoned once in 1800, the Jiaqing emperor put the Board of Punishments in charge of their 
interrogation. When the Board concluded that their regimental commander (canling) had granted 
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them permission without reporting his superiors, the refugees were reinstated in the Firearms 
Brigade.80 
The second and final repatriation of these expatriate Vietnamese occurred later in the 
same year. By then, Vietnam had gone through another regime change. The new ruler was 
Nguyễn Phúc Ánh (阮福映; 1762-1820), the only surviving member of the Nguyễn clan 
destroyed by the Tây Sơns and the future Gia Long (嘉隆; r. 1802-20) emperor. He had defeated 
the Tây Sơn regime and established a tributary relationship with the Jiaqing emperor, and in fact 
the tributary mission mentioned above had been sent by Nguyễn Phúc Ánh. Obviously aware of 
this regime change, Lê loyalists in Qing began to express their wish to return to Vietnam and 
bring Lê Duy Kỳ’s skeleton with them, a wish approved by the Jiaqing emperor.81 
The Qing court paid their travel expenses and took administrative steps, such as releasing 
the loyalists who had been exiled to places like Ili and Heilongjiang, to facilitate their 
repatriation via Guangxi. One episode during that process is notable for illustrating the extent to 
which these refugees had been immersed in their local societies. According to a 1804 memorial 
by the Guangxi governor Beling (百齡; d. 1816), the refugees from Nanjing had brought the 
servants they had purchased in Nanjing to Guangxi, prompting Beling to intervene and redeem 
the contracts of the servants. The Jiaqing emperor was dismayed by the fact that these people, 
who he specifically called foreigners now, had been able to buy servants in the first place and 
then tried to take them back to Vietnam. An act presumably unproblematic when the loyalists 
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were living as Qing subjects had become problematic now that they were returning as 
Vietnamese subjects.82 
The Qing intervention on behalf of Lê Duy Kỳ shows how far the Qing state could go in 
the name of protecting its tributary ruler. The Qing first took in Le refugees and gave them a 
place of refuge. There was a precedent for this, as Kangxi had also given this level of protection 
for Mạc Kính Vũ. But then the Qing went as far as launching a large-scale military campaign 
against the Tây Sơn regime in the name of the Lê restoration. The only precedents for this came 
from the Ming period, when the Yongle (永樂; r. 1403-1424) emperor launched a campaign 
against the Hồ regime and incorporated Vietnam as a Ming province and when the Jiajing 
emperor (嘉靖; r. 1522-1567) seriously contemplated a campaign against the Mạc regime.83 
When the Tây Sơn campaign failed, Qing acknowledged the Lê loyalists’ precarious situation 
and took in hundreds of them, protecting them as Qing subjects for 13 years. This was certainly 
unprecedented, but then Qianlong was not one to shy away from creating new precedents.  
Indeed, there is reason to think Qianlong’s actions widened the scope of Qing 
intervention on behalf of tributary rulers. When the Tây Sơn regime was on the verge of falling 
to the Nguyễn regime led by Nguyễn Phúc Ánh, for example, the Jiaqing court briefly 
entertained the idea of intervening on the behalf of the Tây Sơn regime. In an August 15th, 1802, 
edict to the Grand Council, the Jiaqing emperor made it clear that Nguyễn Quang Toản (阮光纘; 
r. 1792-1802), the second Tây Sơn ruler, was to be settled in the Qing domain following the 
precedent of Lê Duy Kỳ if he surrendered to the Qing. If he asked for military assistance, 
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however, provincial officials were to memorialize and wait for imperial decision.84 In the end, 
the Tây Sơn regime perished without asking for Qing assistance, but the very discussion of its 
possibility within the Qing court is significant. We could even extend this line of thinking to see 
Qianlong’s actions as providing an early modern precedent for the Qing decision to intervene on 
the behalf of Vietnam in the Sino-French War. 
As Truong Buu Lam has pointed out, Qing justified its decision to send troops to 
Vietnam by portraying the restoration of Lê Duy Kỳ to the Vietnamese throne as a tribute 
obligation. I agree with Lam’s observation: “In short, the principle of ‘Heaven has divided up 
territories but not peoples’ . . . gave China a highly flexible tool with which to conduct her 
external relations. She could recognize independent rulers because territories could be 
independent, but she could also intervene whenever and wherever she judged it necessary 
because the Chinese emperor was responsible for all the peoples under Heaven and because their 
rulers were viewed as his appointed representatives.”85  
This observation highlights the universal worldview of Tianxia that provided China a 
highly flexible tool in its relationship with tributary states. Having a tool and wielding it, 
however, are two different matters. Without an emperor who was willing to use this tool, the 
flexibility remained on the level of discourse and theory. In that sense, it is not surprising that the 
Qianlong emperor, whose universal pretensions have been examined by many scholars, used this 
tool to intervene on the behalf of the Lê loyalists to an unprecedented degree.  
In fact, the use of this tool during the Qianlong period was not limited to tributary rulers. 
The Qing state during the Qianlong reign used it on a regular basis to intervene on the behalf of 
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Vietnamese subjects and give them refuge, much to the dismay of the Vietnamese state. In these 
cases, Vietnamese subjects were treated as universal subjects who formed a part of the Qing-
centered universe called Tianxia (All Under Heaven) and thus had a patron-client relationship 
with the Qianlong emperor, who stood on top of that universe. 
 
2. Tributary Subjects 
My analysis here again builds on Sun Hongnian’s study. I do so by looking at Chinese- 
and Manchu-language palace memorials not consulted by him. In addition, I go beyond just 
detailing how the refugees became “Vietnamese diaspora (Yue qiao)” in China as Sun did to 
focus on the unilateral decision by the Qianlong court to transform Vietnamese tributary subjects 
into Qing imperial subjects. More specifically, I argue that the ambiguous nature of imperial and 
tributary sovereignties as well as the elastic boundary between them created the space in which 
such a transfer of subjecthood could take place.  
The first such case happened in 1739, when Yunnan provincial officials were observing 
the rebellion in Vietnam of He Trường (矣長), who had gone so far as to call himself a king. The 
initial report from Yunnan provincial officials merely noted that they were defending the passes 
and that they had sent a lateral communication to Lê Ý Tông, reassuring him that they would not 
help He Trường. This defensive border policy pleased the Qianlong emperor. The second report 
from Yunnan, however, surprised the emperor. Apparently, Yunnan provincial officials, seeing 
no end to this rebellion, had sent out a public note (bangwen) to the rebels guaranteeing they 
would not die upon surrender. The rebels, in turn, had accepted the offer and surrendered to 
Yunnan border officials. In reporting their surrender, the Yunnan governor-general Qing-fu 
(慶復; d. 1749) justified his action by employing a humanitarian rhetoric that perfectly captures 
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the elasticity of imperial sovereignty: “The Celestial Court’s benevolence extends everywhere 
(Tianchao gu wubu bian zhi ren).” The Qianlong Emperor was greatly displeased with this turn 
of events, noting that Vietnam was an outer tributary (waifan) and that the bandits posed no 
actual threat to Yunnan. He stressed that there was no need for Qing-fu to “accept the rebels 
(pan) of that state and forgive the enemies (chou) of that state.” But he also added that now that 
the rebels had surrendered, Vietnam could not interfere (buneng guowen).86 
Qing-fu, apparently sensing this imperial displeasure, interrogated the rebels and 
recommended extraditing them to Vietnam. As we saw above, however, Qianlong had already 
acknowledged the acceptance of the rebels as a fait accompli. Now he insisted that the case could 
be concluded in the Qing domain, as Vietnam was a vassal state (shuguo) and the guilt of these 
rebels had already been determined. The Grand Council agreed with this imperial assessment, 
emphasizing the fact that the provincial officials had already vouched for the lives of the rebels. 
If they were extradited, they would surely die, and provincial officials would have broken their 
own promise.  
Adjudication on this case placed the rebels in three distinct categories: 11 main culprits 
who had actively participated in the rebellion, 21 confederates coerced into joining the rebellion, 
and five who had never agreed to surrender to the Qing state. The adjudication and review 
processes for the principals are especially interesting because they show their position 
somewhere in between being criminals of the Qing court and foreign subjects. Qing-fu, in his 
original adjudication, sentenced them to a hundred blows of heavy bamboo and three years of 
penal servitude according to a Qing statute on rebellion. The Board of Punishment, however, 
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commuted their sentence in consideration of their “foreignness” to forty days in the cangue, forty 
blows of heavy bamboo, and life under surveillance by local officials in Guangdong and 
Sichuan. Among the 21 accomplices, Qing subjects were sent back to their native places in 
Guangnan and those from Vietnam relocated to various places in Yunnan. The five Vietnamese 
subjects who refused to surrender were all repatriated to Vietnam to be handled as Lê Ý Tông 
wished.87  
This episode is interesting in at least three ways. First, it is striking that the Yunnan 
provincial officials even thought about granting amnesty to foreign rebels based in a foreign 
domain. They justified their action by citing the need to protect the Qing borderland and the 
universality of imperial benevolence, and here we see yet another instance where imperial 
agenda overruled concern for the tributary sovereignty of Vietnam. Second, the Vietnamese 
subjects who surrendered, because of the offer of partial amnesty, became “naturalized” as 
subjects of the Qing state and punished as such, while those who did not surrender remained 
Vietnamese subjects and were repatriated. In this way, the episode reveals an interesting point of 
intersection between tributary sovereignty and imperial sovereignty that resulted in a transfer of 
subjecthood. Third, there is the interesting assumption that the Vietnamese state could not 
interfere with its own subjects receiving imperial protection, a clear show of interstate 
asymmetry.  
Indeed, our next case shows how seriously the Qing state took that assumption. When the 
Mạc refugees were sent back to Vietnam in 1682-1683, a few members of the Mạc family 
escaped and settled in Sicheng (泗城) native department in the Guangxi-Vietnam borderlands. 
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The habitation of the Mạc family there under the protection of the Sicheng native chieftain 
grabbed the attention of the Yongzheng court in 1728 due to the Mạc cross-border activities 
against the Lê regime. Instead of sending these Mạcs back to Vietnam, the court first planned to 
resettle them in Nanjing and then decided to let them stay in Sicheng. The Sicheng Mạcs, 
however, kept engaging in cross-border activities against the Vietnamese state. The Qing 
authorities seem to have relocated some members of the Mạc family to Anhui in 1741, but some 
Mạcs remained in Sicheng and kept causing trouble.88 
In 1751, however, a Mạc Thành Trần (莫成陳) was arrested by Vietnamese authorities 
and confessed that his family members lived in Sicheng. Later that year, when Nguyễn Ngọc 
Hán and others were being handed over to a Vietnamese official, this Vietnamese official 
presented the Qing officials with a document requesting the investigation of the Sicheng Mạcs. 
The Qianlong emperor, after reading memorials from Guangxi, flatly refused this request, saying 
that Sicheng Mạcs were Qing subjects (neidi baixing). Su-chang (蘇昌; d. 1768), the acting 
Liangguang governor-general, agreed with the imperial assessment by calling the Mạcs Qing 
subjects (Tianchao chizi). Following the imperial instruction, Guangxi provincial officials 
ordered the Vietnamese officials to never bring up this issue again. This is another episode that 
highlights the transfer of subjecthood from Vietnam to Qing, a transfer that was understood by 
the Qing court to be inviolable.89 
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Our next case further highlights the permanent transformation of Vietnamese subjects 
from foreign subjects to universal subjects and then eventually Qing subjects. In May/June 1769, 
Hoàng Công Toản (黃公纘), with over 400 followers, arrived in Pu’er (普洱) prefecture, 
Yunnan, after having been driven out of Luang Prabang by Trịnh troops. In Pu’er, he asked for 
asylum, claiming to be descended from the Mạc family. The initial Qing reaction was 
ambivalent. In his first edict on the matter, the Qianlong emperor reflected that on principle these 
people should not be allowed refuge, since they were subjects of a respectful and submissive 
tributary state. At the same time, he reasoned, refusing these people who have come to submit in 
a dire situation would be against the principle of “treating all peoples equally” (yishitongren). In 
short, this dilemma brought to the fore the ever-shifting and elastic status of tributary subjects: 
Should they be treated as foreign subjects or universal subjects? Qianlong decided to accept them 
on a temporary basis until Lê Hiển Tông could be consulted on the matter.90 
Soon, however, the Qing court decided on its own. Just ten days after his first edict, 
Qianlong issued another edict in which he presented a hypothetical rebuttal to Lê Hiển Tông’s 
request for repatriation of Hoàng Công Toản and his followers: “Your state is a vassal (fanchen). 
Your subjects (shuren) are no different from registered Qing subjects (neidi bianmeng).” His 
opinion was shared by the grand councilor Fuheng (傅恆; d. 1770), who argued that the principle 
of unbounded imperial benevolence should be a sufficient answer for any possible inquiry or 
protest from Vietnam. After all, if the king were to label these people rebels (panni), the Qing 
court would be forced to decide between rejecting a tributary king’s request and sending these 
people to certain death. Within a month, the Qing court decided to settle Hoàng Công Toản as a 
                                                          
90 QSL, Gaozong 834: 130b-131a (QL34.5.4=6/7/1769). 
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native chieftain (tusi) in Pu’er. At this point, the transformation of these Vietnamese subjects 
from foreigners to Qing subjects was complete.91  
By late 1770, the news that these people had been settled in Pu’er had reached the Lê 
court, and Lê Hiển Tông began to request that the Qing state repatriate these rebels to Vietnam. 
The Qing state repeatedly refused Vietnamese demands on two main grounds. First, the 
Vietnamese state was faulted for not requesting repatriation as soon as Toản and his followers 
had entered the Qing domain and instead waiting till they had already been settled. Second, it 
was inappropriate for Lê Hiển Tông, a tributary king, to make such a demand of Qing (xiang 
neidi suoqu). The language contained in Lê Hiển Tông’s lateral communications was also 
deemed drastic (guoji).92 The information contained in the second lateral communication from 
Hiển Tông, however, led to a revelation that Hưng Hóa (興化) officials had already demanded 
from Lin’an officials the repatriation of this group between November and December of 1769. In 
response, Lin’an officials had falsely claimed that Toản and his followers had never entered 
Yunnan, without reporting this interaction to their superiors. This information in effect 
invalidated the grounds for the Qing refusal to send Toản and his followers back to Vietnam.93 
At this point, in summer of 1771, the Qing state made the curious choice of relocating 
Toản and his followers rather than repatriating them to Vietnam. First, Toản and 125 of his 
                                                          
91 QSL, Gaozong 834: 140a-141a (QL34.5.14=6/17/1769), 836: 167b-168a (QL34.6.15=7/17/1769); JJCD 010184 
(Fuheng, Arigūn, Agūi; n.d./QL34.7.14).  
 
92 QSL, Gaozong, 870: 669b-670a (QL35.10.10=11/26/1770), 878: 762b-763a (QL36.2.13=3/27/1771), 878: 764b-
765a (QL36.2.14=3/28/1771); JJCD 012621 (Agūi and Jangboo?; QL35.9.24/35.10.9), 012624 (Yengišan et al; 
n.d./QL35.10.10), 013171 (zi from Lê Hiển Tông to Li Shiyao; QL35.12.6=1/21/1771). 
 
93QSL, Gaozong 880: 792-793a (QL36.3.14=4/28/1771), 882: 814a-b (QL36.4.6=5/19/1771); JJCD 013174 (Zhang 
Yanlie to Hưng Hóa governor; QL35.1.24=2/19/1770), 013342 (Hưng Hóa governor; n.d.), 013403 (Li Shiyao; 
QL36.1.27/?), 013662 (Jangboo; QL36.3.1/36.3.15), 013771 (Jangboo; QL36.3.20/36.4.6), 013879 (Jangboo; 
QL36.4.7/36.4.18), 013880 (Jangboo; QL36.4.7/36.4.18). 
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followers were moved from Pu’er to the Yunnan provincial capital of Kunming (昆明) on the 
grounds that Pu’er was too close to Vietnam and too desolate. Jangboo (彰寶; d. 1777), the 
Yunnan governor and acting Yun-Gui governor-general, who coordinated this move, then 
memorialized the Qianlong emperor with his plan of moving Toản’s group to Urumchi 
(烏魯木齊), Xinjiang. Qianlong commended his plan as being well thought out, and steps were 
taken to relocate Toản and his followers from Kunming to Urumchi. The journey itself took 
more than half a year, with the Toản’s band finally arriving at Urumchi in February 1772.94 
Throughout the whole planning and relocation process, Lê Hiển Tông continued requesting their 
repatriation. His requests, now deemed to be more “polite,” were not rebuked but were still 
refused. The Qing state reasoned that these people were settled far away from Vietnam and that 
they were no different from Qing subjects and as such out of Hiển Tông’s reach. In the end, the 
Qing state stopped even responding to Hiển Tông’s demands, citing his “persistence in error.”95 
Hoàng Công Toản and his followers made Urumchi their permanent home. Upon their 
arrival at Urumchi, they were settled in a place called Tudunzi (土墩子). Every household was 
given 30 mu of government land and provided with housing, horses, farming tools, and seeds.96 
The continued habitation of this group in Urumchi is confirmed in 1777 and 1804. In 1777, we 
see two palace memorials from the Urumchi commander-in-chief Sonomcering (索諾木策凌; d. 
                                                          
94 QSL, Gaozong, 880: 793a (QL36.3.14=4/28/1771), 884: 846a-b (QL36.5.6=6/18/1771), 888: 891b-892b 
(QL36.7.5=8/14/1771), 892: 970a-b (QL36.9.11=10/18/1771), 897: 1055b-1056a (QL36.11.19=12/24/1771), 904: 
84a-b (QL37.3.13=4/15/1772), 938: 641a-642a (QL38.7.5=8/22/1773). 
 
95 JJCD 013980 (Lê Hiển Tông to Li Shiyao; QL36.4.24), 014372 (Li Shiyao; QL36.6.12/36.7.5), 014501 (Jangboo; 
QL36.7.6/36.7.20), 015684 (Lê Hiển Tông; QL36.10.13), 016825 (zi from Lê Hiển Tông to Li Shiyao; QL37.1.4). 
 
96 QSL, Gaozong 893: 996a-b (QL36.9.30=11/6/1771); JJCD 014967 (Wu-da-shan; QL36.9.21/36.9.30), 015923 
(Wen-shou; QL37.1.19/37.1.28), 015997 (Wen-shou; n.d./QL37.2.8), 016032 (Ba-yan-bi and Mingšan; 
QL37.1.25/37.2.15), 016462 (Ba-yan-bi and Mingšan; QL37.3.13/37.3.30). 
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1782) that mention this group. In a July 30th memorial, Sonomcering writes about sending 61 
Vietnamese to Ili to work on a military farm there. In the second memorial near the end of the 
year, Sonomcering reports on the death of Hoàng Công Toản. In an edict to the Grand Council, 
Qianlong reaffirmed that these people were no different from common people (qimin). But since 
Hoàng Công Toản had always acted as their head (touren), his male heirs could inherit that 
title.97 In 1804, while the Lê refugees were being repatriated to Vietnam for the second and last 
time, the Urumchi commander-in-chief sent a lateral communication to the Board of 
Punishments on whether 22 households of the relocated Vietnamese should also be repatriated. 
In the end, the Jiaqing emperor decided that their situation was different from that of the Lê 
refugees. From Jiaqing’s understanding, Hoàng Công Toản had been the enemy of the Lê house, 
and Nguyễn Phúc Ánh, an old minister of the Lê house and the new Vietnamese king, would not 
look upon these people favorably. The commander-in-chief was not to bring up the issue to the 
Vietnamese and to dissuade them if they wished to return to Beijing. This is the last we hear of 
them from the Qing records.98 
What do these cases tell us about subjecthood? First, we see just how far the Qing state 
could encroach upon the sovereignty of Vietnam by accepting enemies of the Vietnamese state 
as refugees and eventually as its own subjects. He Trường, for example, had called himself a 
king and was leading an open rebellion against the Lê/Trịnh court. Even though there were Qing 
subjects among the ranks of the rebels, the rebellion took place solely within the Vietnamese 
domain. And yet the Yunnan governor Qing-fu made an offer of amnesty to the rebels simply 
                                                          
97 QSL, Gaozong 1046: 1011a (QL42.12.3=1/1/1778); Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan and Zhongguo bianjiang 
shidi yanjiu zhongxin, eds., Qingdai Xinjiang Manwen dang’an huibian (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 
2012), 129: 257-8 (Sonomcering; QL41.6.16/41.7.10) 
 
98 QSL, Renzong 133: 804a-b (JQ9.8.6=9/9/1804).  
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because he wished to secure the Qing frontier. Lê Ý Tông was never consulted about this matter 
and was only notified after the fact.  
Likewise, Hoàng Công Toản and his followers were granted asylum in Qing territory and 
eventually became naturalized, even though they were rebels from Lê/Trịnh point of view. 
Vietnam was never consulted about this process, and repeated requests from the Lê court for the 
repatriation of these rebels were only met with scoffing and rebuke from the provincial officials 
and the Qing emperor. Lê Hiển Tông’s demand itself was considered improper, and the language 
used in his communications even more so. In these two cases, Vietnam was essentially deprived 
of the chance to punish its own rebellious subjects. 
Second, these cases show that the Qing state looked at Vietnamese subjects as both 
Vietnamese subjects and universal (Tianxia) subjects. When the Qing state repatriated 
Vietnamese subjects, it was highlighting Vietnamese subjects as the rightful subjects of their 
king. Yet when the Qing state accepted Vietnamese fugitives as Qing subjects, it was treating 
them as universal subjects deserving imperial benevolence, since “all peoples should be treated 
equally” (yishitongren). Indeed, the Qing did not hold a monopoly over this multifaceted and 
elastic space of imperial and tributary subjecthood. If we step back from the courts in Beijing 
and Thăng Long, we can see how borderland residents could find niches in this imperial space 
for their own benefit. Refugees of the Lê court, for example, ceased to be Vietnamese subjects 
and were instead given new life as Qing subjects when they wished to be. When some of these 
refugees decided that it was in their best interest to cease being Qing subjects, they successfully 
appealed to be turned back into Vietnamese subjects.  
Third, it is interesting that all the most extreme cases of Qing intervention in the name of 
tributary duty happened during the Qianlong period. Even though the Jiaqing emperor briefly 
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entertained the idea of accepting Tây Sơn refugees as Qing subjects, it never happened. In fact, 
the Qing state during the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns was qualitatively different from the Qing 
state during the Qianlong reign in its approach to Vietnamese subjects. As we have seen, 
Qianlong’s empire emphasized both the “foreignness” and the “universality” of Vietnamese 
subjects. Jiaqing’s and Daoguang’s empires, on the other hand, seem to have emphasized the 
foreignness of Vietnamese subjects over the universality. Even though there are only a few 
recorded instances of repatriation, the sources during the Jiaqing and Daoguang eras are replete 
with specific imperial instructions on not accepting the surrender of Vietnamese subjects and 
instead turning them away from the border. As Alexander Woodside pointed out, imperial 
overreach during the Qianlong period might well have pointed out the limits of imperial 
sovereignty over tributary subjects to rulers in the following periods.99 
 
C. Qing Sojourners in the Vietnamese Domain 
 As we have seen in the cases above, the Qing-Vietnamese territorial boundary was more 
porous than the authorities of either state would have liked. The Vietnamese state policy towards 
Qing subjects made this border even more accessible. Throughout the Lê, Tây Sơn, and Nguyễn 
periods, the Vietnamese state provided space for Qing subjects to live in the Vietnamese domain 
as sojourners. This resulted in a frequent and sustained influx of Qing sojourners engaging in 
economic activities in the Vietnamese domain throughout the Qing period. To be sure, as we will 
see in chapter five, the Vietnamese state repatriated Qing sojourners who caused trouble in 
Vietnam or Qing fugitives who could be easily identified. Still, it was their criminality, not their 
foreignness, that resulted in the repatriation.  
                                                          
99 Woodside, “The Ch’ien-Lung Reign,” 293-309.  
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 After the Ming-Qing transition, there emerged two main categories of Chinese residing in 
Vietnam from the perspective of the Vietnamese state. The first category was Ming loyalists 
known as Minh hương (明香, “Ming incense”) They were partially assimilated, having been 
allowed to marry Vietnamese and not having adopted Qing hairstyle and attire. The second 
category was unassimilated Qing sojourners, who were variously called bắc nhân (北人, 
“northern people”), Thanh nhân (清人, “Qing people”), or khách nhân (客人, “guest people”). 
They were also further categorized into their places of origin in Qing, living in their own native 
place communities under their own chiefs. As a whole, however, these sojourners were 
distinguished from their Vietnamese neighbors because of their hairstyle and attires and were not 
allowed to marry Vietnamese subjects.100 To a large degree, the distinction between these two 
groups continued under the Tây Sơn and Nguyễn dynasties as well, although the exigencies and 
limited state apparatuses of both states meant that this distinction was crossed every now and 
then.101 
 It is not my purpose here to provide a comprehensive analysis of Qing sojourners in 
Vietnam. I will merely emphasize how the presence of Qing sojourners in Vietnam resulted in a 
significant divergence between the two sets of Qing-Vietnamese boundaries we have talked 
about in this chapter: territorial and subjecthood. Qing authorities were aware of and uneasy 
about this disjunction. As Giersch has shown, Qing officials in the Yunnan-Burma borderland 
feared that the crossing of geographical boundaries would result in a crossing and muddling of 
cultural boundaries. The Han migrants who had crossed those boundaries, in their mind, were 
                                                          
100 Charles Wheeler, “Identity and Function in Sino-Vietnamese Piracy: Where Are the Minh Hương?,” Journal of 
Early Modern History 16, no. 6 (2012): 503–21.; Ch’oe Pyŏng-uk (Choi Byung Wook), “19segi Pet’ŭnam ŭi 
tanilminjok mandŭlgi,” Tongbuga yŏksa nonch’ong 23 (2009): 73–97 
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most likely to turn against imperial interests and commit treason, and they were thus called “Han 
traitors” (Hanjian).102  
Such fear was present in Qing-Vietnam borderland as well, and the Qing authorities saw 
their worst fear materialize in Tang A’ai (唐阿矮). Tang was a Qing subject who had moved to 
southwestern Vietnam in 1773. There he had married a Vietnamese woman and raised a family. 
After the Tây Sơn takeover, he changed into Vietnamese dress and received a title from the Tây 
Sơn regime to work as a local official. Following the Tây Sơn civil war in 1783, Tang 
encountered 24 Chinese sailors who had been arrested by local Vietnamese officials. Tang, 
wishing to make a fortune by selling the cargo on their ship, conspired with three of the sailors. 
He helped the sailors escape, take the ship, and head to Macao to sell off the goods. Tang and the 
sailors met their demise after returning to Chenghai (澄海) county, Guangdong, in early 1784, as 
the owner of the ship and cargo proceeded to bring a case against them to the Chenghai 
magistrate.103  
This incident astonished the Qing court and led Qianlong to comment: “It is impossible to 
seal off Han traitors going beyond the border completely. But Tang A’ai, as a Qing subject, has 
dared to receive a false foreign title, get married and birth a daughter, and engage in plundering 
this ship . . . The circumstances are indeed hateful.” Tang, in short, was the epitome of a Han 
traitor who had betrayed his political loyalty and cultural roots. He reminded the Qing authorities 
of the dangers that crossing a geographic boundary might engender. Guangdong officials 
accordingly sentenced Tang to immediate death by beheading and exposure of his head in Macao 
                                                          
102 C. Pat Giersch, “‘A Motley Throng’: Social Change on Southwest China’s Early Modern Frontier, 1700-1880,” 
Journal of Asian Studies 60, no. 1 (2001): 67–94. 
 
103 JJCD 035844 (Bayansan and Li Tianpei; QL49.2.10/n.d.), 036196 (Šucang and Sun Shiyi; n.d./ QL49.i3.15). 
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to serve as a warning. The Board of Punishments, Three Judiciaries, and Qianlong all affirmed 
the original adjudication.104 From the perspective of the Qing judiciary, Tang was executed as a 
subject-turned-traitor. After all, as Lauren Benton remarks in her chapter on treason law, “in 
most situations only a subject could commit treason.”105   
But did Tang, who had a family in Vietnam, cut off his queue, and worked as a local 
official in Vietnam, really consider himself a Qing subject? Or did Zhou Gui, whose case we will 
examine in chapter five, really consider himself a Qing subject after living in Vietnam all his 
life? It is true that both Tang and Zhou came to be identified as Qing subjects who had turned on 
the imperial state and died as traitors. But the Qing-Vietnam borderland, even more than the 
Qing-Chosŏn borderland, was full of people constantly on the move, and it is questionable 
whether they saw themselves as living in a binary world neatly divided between Qing and 
Vietnam. Their personal histories point to the very complicated nature of “cultural” boundaries 
and the repertoire of options such areas provided for one’s self-identity. It is important to keep in 
mind that subjecthood was only one of many ways one could identify oneself and that 
subjecthood as a status was neither fixed nor straightforward. Forgetting this would give 
subjecthood a very state-centered and juridical status, an undue importance that might not reflect 
the lived experiences of people inhabiting the Qing-Vietnam borderland. As Giersch pointed out, 
cultural complexity and ambiguity were the norm in Qing’s Yunnan frontier.106  
                                                          
104 Three sailors who were complicit in the plundering of the cargo, were sentenced to immediate death by 
strangulation. Ten others who participated in dividing up the booty were sentenced to penal servitude.  
QSL, Gaozong 1200: 44a-b (QL49.3.4=3/24/1784). 1202: 85b-86a (QL49.i3.15=5/4/1784), 1205: 128a-b 
(QL49.4.28=6/15/1784); MQSL geng bian 1: 95b-97b (Board of Punishments; QL49.i3.20/49.i3.23). 
 
105 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 64.  
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IV. Conclusion 
 To sum up, the Qing-Vietnam borderland remained very much a “middle ground.” As we 
saw in chapter two, the nature of the Qing state as a frontier khanate in 1637, when it forced the 
Chosŏn state to accept its terms of delineation on subjects and domains of the two states, 
contributed a great deal to the destruction of this middle ground in the Qing-Chosŏn borderland 
in the rest of the seventeenth century. Transfrontiersmen in this borderland—including 
borderland Jurchens, Chosŏn prisoners of war, Han Chinese refugees—now had to be 
incorporated as either Qing or Chosŏn subjects, leaving little room for ambiguity between the 
two state spaces. This delineation of peoples was accompanied by territorial delineation based on 
the natural frontiers of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, which culminated in interstate delineation of 
the Changbai Mountains in the 1710s.  
 In the Qing-Vietnam borderland, however, several factors led to the survival of this 
middle ground. First, there was a situation of split sovereignty resulting from existence of 
regional regimes on both sides of the borderland: the feudatories of Wu Sangui and Shang Kexi 
on the Qing side, and the Mạc regime on the Vietnamese side. Second, even after centralization 
efforts by both central governments eliminated these regional rivals, there remained numerous 
local native domains ruled by hereditary Tai lords on both sides of the borderland. Even the 
famous gaitu guiliu policy of the Yongzheng reign did not result in the full incorporation of these 
native domains into the Qing state space. After all, as James Scott has shown, these native 
domains formed a part of “Zomia,” at the periphery of nine modern states and at the center of 
none. Third, the emergent perspective of Qing as an expansionist, universal empire coexisted 
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with a view of Qing as a bounded state, adding to the complexity and elasticity of territorial and 
jurisdictional boundaries in this borderland.  
As we will see in chapter six, the Qing-Kokand borderland was even more of an open 
frontier, where movement of borderland residents was relatively free and territorial delineation 
was kept at a minimum. Then, we can say that the Qing-Vietnam borderland occupied an 
intermediate position between the fairly well-delineated Qing-Chosŏn borderland and the zonal 
Qing-Kokand borderland. All three borderlands, however, had these characteristics in common: 
multiple and shifting conceptions of boundaries, an asymmetrical relationship between Qing and 
tributary state, and an elasticity of imperial and tributary sovereignty that resulted from the first 
two characteristics. The implications of these characteristics will be discussed in more detail in 
the conclusion of this dissertation.   
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CHAPTER V.  
Jurisdictions in the Qing-Vietnam Borderland, 1660s-1840s1 
 
I. Introduction 
 There is a large gap in the scholarship on the tributary relationship between Qing and 
Vietnam. Among historians of Vietnam, there is a tendency to underplay the inequality of the 
relationship and emphasize Vietnamese “autonomy.” Insun Yu’s recent monograph on the 
history of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship is a good example, where the central theme is that of 
Vietnamese autonomy in the face of Chinese aggression.2 This tendency, of course, should be 
examined within its historical context. French colonial historiography, best exemplified by Henri 
Maspero (1883-1945), was happy to justify French rule over Indochina with the “little China” 
theory that depicted Vietnam as a smaller and less successful imitator of its bigger neighbor 
China. The image of an autonomous Vietnam is understandable when seen against this historical 
baggage.3 
Meanwhile, as discussed throughout this dissertation, historians of China have paid little 
attention to the praxis of the tributary relationship between Qing and its three “model” 
tributaries: Chosŏn, Vietnam, and Ryukyu. Neither John Fairbank’s model of “tributary system” 
                                                          
1 A portion of this chapter was previously published as Jaymin Kim, “The Rule of Ritual: Crimes and Justice in 
Qing-Vietnamese Relations During the Qianlong Period (1736-1796),” in China’s Encounters on the South and 
Southwest: Reforging the Fiery Frontier over Two Millennia, ed. James A. Anderson and John K. Whitmore 
(Leiden: Brill, 2015), 288–319. I have since then revised and rewritten that part of the chapter in its entirety.  
 
2 Yu In-sŏn (Insun Yu), Pet’ŭnam kwa kŭ iut Chungguk: Yangguk kwan’gye ŭi ŏje wa onŭl (Seoul: Changbi, 2012). 
 
3 Liam C. Kelley, Beyond the Bronze Pillars: Envoy Poetry and the Sino-Vietnamese Relationship (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 9-17. 
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nor the critiques of it by various scholars have had much to say about these model tributaries.4 
As a result, in much scholarship to date, the relationship between Qing and its “model” 
tributaries appears as one in which the ritualistic (i.e. theoretical) hierarchy had almost no impact 
on what was in fact an equal relationship between two sovereign states. As we have seen in the 
previous chapters, however, the hierarchy in the tributary system had many real-life implications 
on issues of boundaries, subjecthood, and jurisdiction.  
 This chapter, along with chapter four, is in conversation with a recent attempt by scholars 
to revisit the Sino-Vietnamese tributary relationship by taking a serious look at its praxis. John 
Wills Jr., in a diversion from his usual focus on Qing-European tributary relationships, has 
examined how Qing maintained its tributary relationships with Vietnam and Siam. Liam Kelley, 
by studying the poetry of Nguyễn Vietnamese tributary envoys to Qing, has shown that these 
envoys accepted their kingdom’s position as a vassal state within the wider “Sinitic” cultural 
world. Kathlene Baldanza has shown how two visions of China—an unbounded China and a 
bounded China—manifested themselves in Ming relations with Lê Vietnam.5  
 This chapter is also in dialogue with Qing legal history. Since the opening of the archives 
in the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan in the 1980s, the field has seen much growth. The 
availability of rich archival materials has allowed Qing legal historians to use these legal cases as 
                                                          
4 John King Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign 
Relations, ed. John King Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 1–19.; John E. Wills, Jr., 
Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K’ang-Hsi, 1666-1687 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East 
Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984).; James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual And the 
Macartney Embassy of 1793 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995). 
 
5 John E. Wills, Jr., “Functional, Not Fossilized: Qing Tribute Relations with Đại Việt (Vietnam) and Siam 
(Thailand), 1700-1820,” T’oung Pao 98, no. 4–5 (2012): 439–78.; Kelley, Beyond the Bronze Pillars; Kathlene 
Baldanza, Ming China and Vietnam: Negotiating Borders in Early Modern Asia (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016). 
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a gaze toward the lower strata of Qing society.6 These archival materials, however, have not been 
fully utilized to re-examine old questions of Qing jurisdiction over foreigners before the 
imposition of extraterritoriality via unequal treaties. Part of the problem lies in our conceptual 
habit of equating foreigners with Westerners, at least in the context of Qing jurisdiction over 
foreigners. Of course, there are exceptions. Pär Cassel, for example, has looked at how Qing and 
Japan, far from being mere victims of extraterritoriality, willingly participated in mixed courts on 
their soils and established mixed courts in each other’s domain.7 
 Keeping all this in mind, this chapter seeks to analyze Qing-Vietnam interstate law in 
practice from the 1660s to the 1840s. R. Randle Edwards, in his pioneering study, emphasized 
three sets of basic principles of Qing border control law: territory and territorial sovereignty; 
impartiality, reciprocity, and equality in Qing foreign relations; and centralization and 
bureaucratization of the Qing border control system.8 Impartiality, reciprocity, and equality seem 
indeed to have been the assumption behind the mutual repatriation of fugitives between the Qing 
and Vietnamese states. But when we go beyond the initial repatriation, we see a fundamental 
asymmetry that existed between the Qing and Vietnamese judiciaries in how these cases were 
handled.  
 In what follows, I will look at how each of the two states handled fugitives and criminals 
from the other state. Beginning with the mutual repatriation of fugitives, we go on to examine 
Qing-Vietnamese interstate jurisdiction over Vietnamese criminals as well as interstate 
                                                          
6 Matthew H. Sommer, Sex, Law, and Society in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 1-
17. 
 
7 Pär Kristoffer Cassel, Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China 
and Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
 
8 R. Randle Edwards, “Imperial China’s Border Control,” Journal of Chinese Law 1 (1987), 34-42.  
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jurisdiction over Qing criminals. The picture of Qing-Vietnamese interstate jurisdiction that 
emerges is one of asymmetry and elasticity. The ritualistic hierarchy between the Qing empire 
and the Vietnamese tributary state had tangible consequences when their judiciaries encountered 
each other, consequences that from the perspective of modern Westphalian sovereignty 
encroached severely on Vietnamese sovereignty. 
 
II. Mutual Repatriation of Fugitives 
 Unlike in the Qing-Chosŏn case, where the two states agreed on mutual repatriation of 
trespassers in 1637, Qing and Vietnamese states had no written agreement on how to handle 
repatriation. As a result, repatriation of fugitives in the Qing-Vietnam borderland was a much 
less routine and more varied process than in the Qing-Chosŏn borderland. To explore this 
further, I will first look at a few cases of Qing repatriation of Vietnamese refugees. Next, I will 
examine Qing expectation of Vietnamese repatriation of Qing fugitives and refugees and look at 
cases where these expectations went both met and unmet. Finally, we will circle back around and 
ponder what this tells us about interstate relations between Qing and Vietnam, namely the 
asymmetry in the repatriation process.   
 
A. Qing Repatriation of Vietnamese Fugitives 
As briefly discussed in chapter four, the Qing state identified some Vietnamese subjects 
entering the Qing domain as fugitives on the run from the Vietnamese judiciary. Such 
identification played a key part in Qing decisions on how to handle these Vietnamese subjects 
and thus had a direct impact on the fates of these people. Often, the Qing state repatriated those it 
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identified as fugitives. In making the decisions to repatriate, the Qing state emphasized both their 
foreignness and their criminality as the reason for their repatriation.  
An early case from 1671 provides a good example of the Qing rationale for repatriation. 
That year, a Vietnamese subject named Nguyễn Phúc Lộc (阮福祿) sought refuge in Yunnan. 
Details are murky on the exact circumstances, but the Yun-Gui (Yunnan and Guizhou) governor-
general who memorialized on this incident identified Lộc as a criminal on the run (youzui tao lai) 
from a tributary state (shuguo). Noting that it was inappropriate to take him in (bubian shouliu), 
the governor-general suggested returning Lộc to Vietnam to be punished there. The Kangxi 
emperor approved this suggestion, and Lộc was repatriated to Vietnam and executed there. 
Given the timeline, this so-called Nguyễn Phúc Lộc was most likely Ma Phúc Điện (麻福淀), 
who had led a rebellion in Tuyên Quang (宣光) in fall 1669 along with his father and brother, 
fled to the Qing domain in summer 1670 upon the defeat of the rebel forces, and then been 
repatriated and executed in Vietnam in fall 1671.9 In this case, we see the governor-general 
emphasizing both the foreignness of tributary subjects in general and the criminality of Lộc to 
justify his decision to repatriate Lộc.  
By 1773, repatriation of Vietnamese fugitives was common enough that a protocol had 
emerged. That year, Bác Tam (博三) and his family members tried to enter Yunnan from Bảo 
Lạc (保樂) in far northern Vietnam and were at a border post in Guangnan (廣南) prefecture. 
Their interrogation revealed that Tam had helped his lord, Nguyễn Ngọc Huân (阮玉勛), in 
causing trouble and being lawless (shengshi bufa) in Vietnam. Yun-Gui governor-general 
                                                          
9 QSL, Shengzu 35: 478a (KX10.4.1=5/9/1671); Chin Keiwa (Chen Ching-Ho), ed., Daietsu Shiki Zensho: Kōgōbon 
(Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo Fuzoku Tōyōgaku Bunken Sentā, 1984) (DSZ hereafter), 3: 988-91, 
992. 
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Jangboo (彰寶; d. 1777) noted that it was inappropriate to allow them to remain in the Qing 
domain (bubian rongliu neidi) and recommended sending them back to Vietnam. The Qianlong 
emperor approved this recommendation, and Tam and his family members were repatriated to 
Vietnam. The repatriation followed the protocol: They were sent to Guangxi, with the 
Vietnamese ruler Lê Hiển Tông (黎顯宗; r. 1740-86) notified in advance so that his officials 
could receive them at the Guangxi-Vietnam border.10 
Sometimes the repatriation of Vietnamese fugitives followed explicit requests for 
repatriation by the Vietnamese court. In 1779, for example, Lê Hiển Tông sent lateral 
communications (zi) to the Liangguang (Guangdong and Guangxi) and Yun-Gui governors-
general, notifying them of his plan to suppress a rebellion led by a native chieftain named Hoàng 
Văn Đồng (黃文桐) and requesting the repatriation of the rebels in case they fled to the Qing 
domain to hide there or surrendered at a border pass. In making this request, Lê Hiển Tông cited 
several precedents, including the repatriation of Bác Tam and his family members mentioned 
above.11 Qianlong endorsed Lê Hiển Tông’s request, and periodic searches by officials in 
Yunnan and Guangxi ensued. In August 1780, officials of Kaihua (開化) prefecture, Yunnan, 
arrested 18 fugitives, including Hoàng Văn Dong’s sixth son, his daughter-in-law, and his 
deputy. According to precedent, they were sent to Guangxi and handed over to Lê officials on 
the Guangxi-Vietnam border.12  
                                                          
10 QSL, Gaozong, 929: 496a (QL38.3.22=4/13/1773); JJCD 024355 (Li Zhiying’s copy of zi from Le Hien Tong; 
QL44.6.24=8/5/1779); DSZ 3: 1190-3.  
 
11 QSL, Gaozong 1087: 607b-609a (QL44.7.27=9/7/1779); JJCD 024355 (Li Zhiying’s copy of Le Hien Tong’s zi; 
QL44.6.24=8/5/1779), 024893 (Guilin; QL44.8.22/44.9.22), 026080 (copy of Le Hien Tong’s zi; n.d.); GZD 
403038867 (Li Zhiying; 44.6.24/44.7.27); DSZ, 3: 1191-2. 
 
12 JJCD 026152 (Li Zhiying; QL44.12.29/45.1.28), 027282 (Šucang; 45.5.16/45.6.8); 027633 (Fuk’anggan; 
45.6.24/45.7.13), 028134 (Bayansan; 45.7.29/45.9.4).  
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It should be noted here that there is a strong possibility that the repatriation of these 
fugitives would have happened regardless of the request from Lê Hiển Tông. Li Shiyao (李侍堯; 
d. 1788), the Yun-Gui governor-general, had already stated in his initial memorial on the Hoàng 
Văn Đồng rebellion: “Every criminal fleeing from that state [i.e. Vietnam] must be arrested 
without exception . . . If [they] are bandits of that state (gai guo feitu), [they] should be promptly 
sent back according to precedent (ji ying zhaoli fahuan).”13 In any case, the language used by 
both states as well as their cooperation make it clear that the repatriation of Vietnamese fugitives 
was a customary practice that happened on a regular basis.  
 
B. Vietnamese Repatriation of Qing Fugitives 
The Qing state seems to have expected the Vietnamese state to reciprocate by repatriating 
Qing fugitives that entered the Qing domain. A 1666 edict issued in the name of the Kangxi 
emperor to Lê Huyền Tông (黎玄宗; r. 1662-1671) illustrates Qing expectations. This edict first 
reiterates the contents of a report from the Liangguang governor-general Lu Xingzu (盧興祖; d. 
1667). According to Lu’s report, Qing pirates led by Yang Er (楊二) and others were taking 
refuge in northern Vietnam and being supplied with ships and weapons by a local official there. 
When Lu sent officials to arrest them, they were met with closed fences and were fired upon as if 
they were from an enemy state (diguo). The edict then orders Lê Huyền Tông to do two things: 
first, extradite the pirates and their family members to the Liangguang governor-general; and 
second, punish the Vietnamese official for aiding the rebels and defying Qing authorities. Failure 
to do so, the edict concluded, might result in warfare (sheng bing duan).14  
                                                          
13 QSL, Gaozong, 1086: 594b (QL44.7.15=8/26/1779) 
 
14 QSL, Shengzu, 19: 270a-b (KX5.5.15=6/17/1666); DSZ 3: 982. 
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This edict shows that the Qing state expected the Vietnamese state to arrest and extradite 
Qing fugitives, or at least to aid in such arrests. The fact that this edict had to be issued in the 
first place, however, shows that the Qing state could not take Vietnamese cooperation for 
granted. Yang Er was never extradited to the Liangguang governor-general, for Yang Er was 
none other than Yang Yandi (楊彥迪; d. 1688), a transfrontiersman with his own sphere of 
influence in the Gulf of Tonkin area. His band of “pirates” kept harassing the coast of 
Guangdong until as late as 1681, when they attacked Hainan Island, before finally leaving this 
sea frontier for another frontier further south. Indeed, Yang Yandi is better known today for his 
subsequent submission to the Nguyễn lords based in central Vietnam and his role in securing the 
Mekong Delta area for their regime.15 
 The Yang Yandi episode, then, highlights the gap between Qing expectations and 
Vietnamese performance regarding repatriation of fugitives. In the following sections, I will first 
show the instances where the Qing expectations were met. I will then show the instances where 
the various Vietnamese regimes were either unable or unwilling to meet the Qing expectations. 
Finally, I will discuss what this says about asymmetry and elastic sovereignty. 
 
1. Repatriation of Qing Fugitives 
In several instances, Qing fugitives were repatriated according to Qing expectations. For 
example, in 1753, Qing authorities in Dongguan (東莞) county, Guangdong, cracked down on a 
group of bandits and arrested some 170 of them. Some who escaped, however, made their way 
                                                          
 
15 Robert J. Antony, “‘Righteous Yang’: Pirate, Rebel, and Hero on the Sino-Vietnamese Water Frontier, 1644-
1684,” Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 3, no. 2 (2014): 319–48; QSL, Shengzu 96: 1209a 
(KX20.5.14=6/29/1681) 
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into the Vietnamese domain. Even though the details are murky, it seems that a local Vietnamese 
official named Phan Hoãng Diệu (潘宏耀) coordinated with (xietong) Qing authorities on the 
arrest of these Qing fugitives. Reporting on the arrest of the fugitives, Liangguang provincial 
officials recommended to the Qianlong emperor that Phan Hong Dieu be rewarded for his sincere 
service (shixin xiaoli).16  
Even the dynastic transition in Vietnam from the Lê/Trịnh regime (1592-1788) to the Tây 
Sơn regime (1788-1802) did not change Qing expectations. In 1791, for example, a Qing 
crackdown on a group of pirates in Yazhou (崖州) department, Guangdong, revealed that many 
pirates were based in Quảng Nam (廣南), on the south central coast of modern Vietnam. 
Fuk’anggan (福康安; d. 1796), the governor-general of Liangguang, made two formal requests 
to Nguyễn Huệ (阮惠; r. 1788-92), the Tây Sơn ruler, to capture these pirates if possible or else 
drive them back toward the Qing seas. Huệ, recently recognized by the Qing court as the king of 
Annam, put on a show of cooperation by entrusting his trusted general Ngô Văn Sở (吳文楚; d. 
1795) with the task. Soon, a Tây Sơn officer named Lê Văn Nhận (黎文認) came to Guangdong 
to hand over two pirates and report on the killing of 20 more. The extradited pirates were 
promptly executed, and Nguyễn Huệ, Sở, and Nhận were all rewarded by the Qianlong emperor 
for their service to the Qing state.17  
What the Qing court did not realize, however, was that the Tây Sơn court was the sponsor 
of these pirates. In other words, these pirates, while fugitives from the Qing perspective, 
                                                          
16 QSL, Gaozong 430: 622-623a (QL18.1.9=2/11/1753), 431: 638a (QL18.1.30=3/4/1753), 435: 684a 
(QL18.3.29=5/2/1753). 
 
17 QSL, Gaozong, 1370: 380b-381a (QL56.1.9=2/11/1791), 1372: 419b-420a (QL56.2.14=3/18/1791), 1380: 517a-
518a (QL56.6.4=7/4/1791), 1381: 531a-b (QL56.6.22=7/22/1791), 1388: 634b-635a (QL56.10.3=10/29/1791). 
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maintained patron-client relations with Tây Sơn ruler Nguyễn Huệ. As such, the Qing court 
could not count the Tây Sơn court as a reliable partner in repatriating these pirates. In the next 
section, I will analyze the dynastic transition from the Tây Sơn regime (1788-1802) to the 
Nguyễn regime (1802-1945) with a focus on this issue.  
 
2. From Tây Sơn Dereliction of Duty to Nguyễn Cooperation 
Thanks to Dian Murray’s work on the pirates of the South China Coast, we now know a 
good deal more about the relationship between these pirates and the Tây Sơn regime than did the 
Qing court of 1791. However, the Qing court gradually learned of Tây Sơn complicity in this 
piracy problem. As the Qing court learned more, it became increasingly frustrated with the Tây 
Sơn regime. Analyzing this Qing change of attitude will reveal that, from the Qing perspective, 
repatriation of fugitives was a major duty of a tributary state like Vietnam. We will start, though, 
by examining the roots of piracy in this time and place. 
Because of geographical and economic factors that made piracy lucrative, pirates had 
always been active on a large scale in Sino-Vietnamese waters, with Giang Bình (江坪) acting as 
headquarters. Until 1790, however, piracy was still more of a survival strategy employed by 
residents of these waters on a short-term basis. The impetus for the growth of piracy had to come 
from outside, and the Tây Sơn uprising acted as the catalyst for the spectacular increase in piracy 
from 1790 to 1810. The Tây Sơn state sponsored the Chinese pirates in a systematic manner, 
providing them with a safe headquarters and protected bases of operation and establishing 
patron-client relations with pirate leaders through the granting of noble statuses and military 
ranks. By the mid-1790s, piracy in these waters had become a full-time career for many, and its 
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system was so well established that it went on to survive even after the defeat of the Tây Sơn 
regime by the Nguyễn regime.18 
By 1796, provincial officials of Guangdong and Fujian were already suspecting Tây Sơn 
complicity in the piracy. In a November 1796 memorial, for example, Liangguang governor-
general Giking (吉慶; d. 1802) reported how the pirates were hiding in Vietnam. Instead of 
asking the new Tây Sơn ruler, Nguyễn Quang Toản (阮光纘; r. 1792-1802), for their 
repatriation, however, Giking suggested concealing the matter from him in case he was the one 
hiding them.19 These suspicions deepened as more pirates were interrogated and more evidence 
accumulated. A month later, for example, Qing provincial officials found the seals granted to 
pirate leaders by Nguyễn Quang Toản.20 After this point, even Tây Sơn gestures of cooperation, 
such as the repatriation of 63 pirates from Giang Bình in summer 1797, could not completely 
erase the Qing court’s distrust.21 
By 1801, the evidence against the Tây Sơn regime was irrefutable. The surrender of Chen 
Tianbao (陳添保), one of the chief pirate leaders, was a watershed moment in that sense. Chen, 
upon his surrender, handed over seals and edicts that he had received from the Tây Sơn rulers 
and confessed to having received a military rank from Nguyễn Huệ. Reports on this matter 
caused the final shift of attitude in the Qing court, as can be seen in a December 1801 edict to the 
Grand Council. In the edict, the Jiaqing emperor commented that the Tây Sơn court had been 
                                                          
18 Dian Murray, Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790-1810 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 6-56.  
 
19 QSL, Renzong 11: 173b-174a (JQ1.11.21=12/19/1796). 
 
20 QSL, Renzong 13: 192b-193a (JQ2.1.9=2/5/1797). 
 
21 QSL, Renzong 17: 225a-b (JQ2.5.1=5/26/1797), 18: 239b (JQ2.6.15=7/9/1797); GZD 404002334 (Giking; 
JQ2.4.16=5/12/1797), GZD 404002368 (Zhang Chengji; JQ2.4.24=5/20/1797), GZD 404002481 (Zhang Chengji 
and Chen Dawen; JQ2.5.16=6/10/1797). 
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responsible for piracy from the very beginning. Given the imperial favor Nguyễn Huệ had 
received from the Qianlong emperor, Jiaqing stressed, this behavior was even more 
reprehensible. Even though this type of behavior should be punished with a punitive expedition, 
Jiaqing also noted that the Tây Sơn regime was on the brink of destruction by Nguyễn Phúc Ánh 
(阮福映), the last descendant of the Nguyễn lords that had ruled southern Vietnam before the 
Tây Sơn brothers. Thus, there was no need for a campaign, but neither was there a need to 
communicate with Nguyễn Quang Toản for him to repent and change his ways.22  
Indeed, the Tây Sơn regime soon collapsed, and Nguyễn Phúc Ánh, the future Gia Long 
emperor (嘉隆; r. 1802-20), began negotiating with the Jiaqing emperor for the establishment of 
a tributary relationship. Significantly, one of the first things that the Nguyễn lord did upon the 
collapse of the Tây Sơn regime was to repatriate Mo Guanfu (莫觀扶) and two other pirate 
leaders to Guangdong. In a September 1802 edict responding to this turn of events, the Jiaqing 
emperor contrasted the Tây Sơn rulers and Nguyễn Phúc Ánh. Tây Sơn rulers, despite their 
positions as tributary kings and despite many edicts, had not only failed to capture and repatriate 
pirates but also had given them refuge and ranks. Now, Tây Sơn ruler Nguyễn Quang Toản had 
abandoned his state and lost the seal (chiyin) that his father had received from the Qianlong 
emperor. Nguyễn ruler Nguyễn Phúc Ánh, on the other hand, had respectfully handed over the 
seal of the Tây Sơn state as well as capturing and repatriating these pirates. Nguyễn Phúc Ánh, 
Jiaqing remarked, understood the principle of “serving the great” (shi da) and was completely 
sincere in his behavior.23  
                                                          
22 QSL, Renzong 89: 172b-173a (JQ6.10.18=11/23/1801), 90: 199b-200b (JQ6.11.14=12/29/1801); GZD 
404006211 (Giking and Hūturi; JQ6.9.23=10/30/1801), GZD 404006453 (Giking and Hūturi; 
JQ6.10.22=11/27/1801).  
 
23 QSL, Renzong 102: 361a-362b (JQ7.8.6=9/2/1802); GZD 404008517 (Giking and Hūturi; JQ7.7.14=8/11/1802). 
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Of course, it was in the Nguyễn lord’s interest to go after these formidable allies of the 
Tây Sơn regime in the first place, but his continued campaign against the pirates as well as his 
repatriation of Qing pirates pleased the Qing court. The repatriation of 11 Qing pirates to 
Guangdong by a Nguyễn official in September 1802, for example, was met by positive reaction 
from Guangdong provincial officials and the Jiaqing emperor.24 By August 1803, the Qing court 
had recognized Nguyễn Phúc Ánh as the king of Việt Nam (Ch. Yuenan), beginning a new 
tributary relationship between the Qing court and the Nguyễn court.25 The establishment of this 
relationship marked the return to the status quo from the Qing perspective. The Qing state could 
again expect a certain level of cooperation from the Vietnamese state regarding Qing fugitives 
entering the Vietnamese domain.  
Three events during the Jiaqing and Daoguang (1821-1850) reigns illustrate this point. In 
1808, the Qing state was still suppressing the pirate confederation organized by pirates formerly 
in the service of the Tây Sơn regime. In accordance with imperial edicts requesting assistance, 
the Nguyễn court captured and repatriated 50 some pirates to Guangxi.26 In 1833, while the 
Guangdong provincial officials were suppressing Sino-Vietnamese pirates based in the Gulf of 
Tonkin, the Nguyễn state answered a request from Lu Kun (盧坤; 1772-1835), the Liangguang 
                                                          
24 GZD 404008714 (Giking; JQ7.8.11=9/7/1802), 404008752 (Giking; JQ7.8.16=9/12/1802), 404009181 (Giking 
and Hūturi; JQ7.9.7=10/3/1802), 404008978 (Giking and Hūturi; JQ7.10.11=11/6/1802). 
 
25 QSL, Renzong, 115: 528b-529a (JQ8.6.26=8/13/1803). The state title of Việt Nam was a compromise between 
Nguyễn Phuc Anh, who wished to name his state Nam Việt, and the Jiaqing emperor. See Baldanza, Ming China 
and Vietnam, 1-11. 
 
26 QSL Renzong 199: 646b-647a (JQ13.7.27=9/17/1808), 201: 678a-b (JQ13.9.21=11/9/1808); GZD 404011878 
(Wu Xiongguang and Sun Yuting; JQ13.8.29=10/18/1808), 404012311 (Wu Xiongguang and Sun Yuting; 
JQ13.10.27=12/14/1808).  
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governor-general, for coordinated action against these interstate pirates and for the repatriation of 
pirates who were hiding in Vietnamese waters.27  
Finally, in 1843, the Nguyễn state captured Jin Erji (金二紀) and seven other Qing 
pirates who had drifted into Vietnamese seas and repatriated them to Guangdong, even without a 
request from the Qing state. There seems to have been an economic motive, as the Nguyễn 
official in charge of the repatriation demanded the privilege of duty-free trade in Guangdong and 
that demand was granted.28 Similarly, Choi Byung Wook, in a recent study, has shown that the 
annual Nguyễn “court vessel journeys” to Guangzhou from the 1820s to the 1840s constituted 
the second route of interstate Qing-Nguyễn interactions along with the Nguyễn tributary visit to 
Beijing.29 In light of the emphasis that the Nguyễn court put on the official voyage to 
Guangzhou, this repatriation could have served as an excuse for another voyage to Guangzhou 
and the economic, social, and political opportunities that came with it.  
Whatever the motive was, the Nguyễn repatriation of Qing fugitives fulfilled the Qing 
expectation that a proper tributary ruler would repatriate Qing fugitives within his domain. The 
Qing state, for the most part, itself repatriated Vietnamese fugitives within the Qing domain. As 
far as repatriation of the fugitives is concerned, there existed reciprocity and symmetry between 
the two states. As we will see, however, interstate jurisdiction over Qing criminals and 
Vietnamese criminals was in an asymmetric relationship. In the next two sections, I am going to 
demonstrate that asymmetry by first showing how the Qing state sought to retain its monopoly 
                                                          
27 QSL Xuanzong 230: 440b-441b (DG13.1.18), 233: 484b-485b (DG13.3.1), 234: 505b-506b (DG13.3.25); JJCD 
063000 (Lu Kun and Zhu Guizhen; DG13.3.4/13.3.25). 
 
28 QSL Xuanzong 395: 1090b-1091a (DG23.i7.23=9/16/1843), 395: 1093b (DG23.i7.28=9/21/1843), 401: 4b 
(DG24.1.8=2/25/1844). 
 
29 Ch’oe Pyŏng-uk (Choi Byung Wook), “19-segi Pet’ŭnam kwansŏn ŭi Kwangdong wangnae simal,” Tongnam 
Asia yŏn’gu 21, no. 3 (2011): 1–42. 
 
 
 
219 
 
on jurisdiction over Qing criminals and then illustrating how the Qing state did not acknowledge 
the Vietnamese monopoly on jurisdiction over Vietnamese criminals. 
 
III. Personal Jurisdiction over Qing Criminals 
 
A. “Extraterritoriality” of Qing Subjects in the Vietnamese Domain  
As we saw above, the Qing state sought to monopolize control over its subjects by 
requiring the Vietnamese state to repatriate Qing fugitives. The Qing state had a similar 
expectation for Qing subjects who committed crimes in the Vietnamese domain. Even as it 
recognized that the crime had taken place outside its domain, the Qing state still insisted that the 
proper thing for the tributary ruler of Vietnam to do was to repatriate these Qing subjects to be 
tried and punished by the Qing judiciary. In short, the Qing state emphasized the personal 
principle of jurisdiction and insisted on maintaining jurisdiction over its subjects even beyond its 
territorial boundaries. As we will see below, this Qing expectation often met with the 
cooperation of various Vietnamese regimes that maintained tributary relations with Qing from 
the 1660s to the 1840s. 
 
1. Vietnamese Repatriation of Qing Criminals 
For the most part, Vietnamese regimes from the 1660s to the 1840s did not openly claim 
jurisdiction over Qing subjects who committed crimes in the Vietnamese domain. After arresting 
Qing subjects suspected of criminal activities, Vietnamese authorities would first interrogate 
them to determine their culpability. Those who were deemed innocent or petty criminals were 
released. Those found guilty, however, were repatriated to three Qing provinces bordering 
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Vietnam—Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan—with Qing provincial officials notified in 
advance. By repatriating these criminals, the Vietnamese state surrendered jurisdiction, as it had 
no way of participating in the trials of the Qing suspects turned over to the Qing state. The Qing 
state usually did notify the Vietnamese state of the outcome of the trials, but even that could not 
be taken for granted. We might even venture to say that Qing subjects enjoyed an extraterritorial 
status in Vietnam during the period in question.  
Such a status is even more astounding when we consider the wide range of criminal 
activities that Qing subjects were engaged in the Vietnamese domain. The details of the illicit 
activities in which Qing subjects engaged in the Vietnamese domain reveal the Vietnamese 
state’s tenuous reach over this borderland. As we have seen in chapter four, this was a borderland 
that belonged to the region known as “Zomia,” the highland region at altitudes above 300 meters 
stretching all the way from the Qing-Vietnam borderland to northeastern India. As James Scott 
has shown, this is the largest remaining region of the world outside the reach of the modern 
nation-state, populated by those who made the political choice of leaving the state cores of 
lowland river valleys. It is no wonder then that the Qing-Vietnam borderland, part of this Zomia, 
was much farther outside the reach of state cores than the Qing-Korea borderland.30 
At one extreme, there were Qing subjects involved in rebellions against the Vietnamese 
court or in banditry. In 1753, Lê Hiển Tông repatriated Yang Xingxiu (梁行修) for his role in a 
rebellion against the Lê/Trịnh regime.31 In 1758, Lê Hiển Tông repatriated Zhang Funeng (張甫
能) and Wang Budu (王布督), bandit leaders based in far northern Vietnam. While thirty-some 
                                                          
30 James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2009). 
 
31 QSL, Gaozong, 445: 793a (QL18.8.20=9/16/1753). 
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subordinates of theirs had also been arrested and interrogated, the Vietnamese court had freed 
them with only a light warning, considering them unwilling accomplices. 32 In 1763, a group of 
bandits led by Yang Yadao (楊亞道) was apprehended by Vietnamese authorities for robbing 
and murdering three Qing subjects in the Vietnamese domain the year before. Lê Hiển Tông 
repatriated them to Guangxi in 1764.33 These instances of repatriation are remarkable due to the 
nature of these acts—violence aimed against the Vietnamese state—as well as the fact that both 
banditry and rebellion were punishable by death under Lê law.34 
Violence was an endemic part of this borderland. One phenomenon of violence that 
became commonplace in eighteenth-century South China was large-scale armed feuds (xiedou) 
between groups organized along the lines of ethnicity, lineage, and other markers of identity.35 
When Qing sojourners from this region came to Vietnam searching for work, they sometimes 
recreated these feuds in their host society. Events in Tống Tinh (送星), a silver mine in the far 
northern province of Thái Nguyễn (太原), provide perfect examples. Vietnamese sources depict 
a world of anarchy and violence at Tống Tinh, where some 10,000 Qing subjects sojourned. 
Most of these miners came from Chaozhou (潮州) and Shaozhou (韶州) prefectures in 
Guangdong, and fighting and killing among them was commonplace. The Vietnamese court, 
however, did not intervene as long as they paid their taxes. In 1767, however, following the 
                                                          
32 QSL, Gaozong, 567: 195a-b (QL23.7.26=8/29/1758). 
 
33 QSL, Gaozong, 715: 973b (QL29.7.16=8/13/1764); GZD 403018071 (Su-chang; QL29.6.13=7/11/1764). 
 
34 Nguyễn Ngọc Huy and Tạ Văn Tài, The Lê Code: Law in Traditional Vietnam (Athens, OH: Ohio University 
Press, 1987), Volume II: 23, 239, 242, 249. 
 
35 Stevan Harrell, “From Xiedou to Yijun, the Decline of Ethnicity in Northern Taiwan, 1885-1895,” Late Imperial 
China 11, no. 1 (1990): 99–127; Liu Guoliang, Zuqun xiedou zhong xingfa quanwei de xukong: Yi Hainan Lizu 
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proposal of the Thái Nguyễn official Ngô Thì Sĩ (吳時仕; 1726-80), the Vietnamese state began 
to intervene more actively in the lives of these miners.36     
The very same year, in 1767, an armed conflict among Qing miners at Tống Tinh 
grabbed the attention of Vietnamese authorities. The attack, led by Zhang Renfu (張任富) and 
involving more than 100 miners, had left Gu Lao’er (古老二) and eight people dead, with even 
more injured.37 The year 1774 saw an even bigger and more fatal feud among the Qing miners at 
Tống Tinh. According to the Vietnamese sources, this was a dispute between the two main 
lineages of the Qing miners: the Zhang and the Gu. The details of the previous case suggest some 
continuity, and we may assume that this was an ongoing conflict at this mine. The Vietnamese 
authorities apprehended 18 miners, including Zhang Deyu (張德裕), Li Qiaoguang (李喬光), 
and Gu Tangyu (古宇湯), as the main instigators and expelled all Chinese workers from the 
mine. Reports from Liangguang and Yunnan record about 2,000 miners in all returning there due 
to this case.38 In both cases, Lê Hiển Tông repatriated the main instigators to Guangxi. 
Other criminal cases point to the high mobility of this Qing sojourner community in 
northern Vietnam. A murder case from 1775 provides a vivid portrayal of this community. Li 
Qizhen (黎奇珍), a long-time sojourner in Lạng Sơn (諒山), the far northern Vietnamese 
province bordering Guangxi, visited a fellow sojourner named Xie Ganru (謝幹孺) to collect his 
debt. When the two got in an argument, Xie accused Li of having kidnapped Lin Yamei 
(林亞妹), Li’s new wife, and threatened to report this to the Vietnamese authorities. In fact, Lin 
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had fled her abusive husband in Guangxi and married Li while staying at the house of Ma Ya’er 
(馬亞二), another Guangxi native. Li, enraged and terrified by Xie’s threat, killed Xie after 
plotting the murder with a few friends and ambushing Xie on the road. This case was reported to 
the local official in Văn Uyên (文淵), and two relatives of the victim also visited the official to 
help with the investigation. Li and the two relatives of the victim were sent to the Lạng Sơn 
governor for interrogation. Afterwards, Li was repatriated to Guangdong by the command of Lê 
Hiển Tông. Lin and Ma were also arrested after evading Vietnamese authorities for a year and 
repatriated.39 
Vietnam detected other crimes committed by Qing subjects as well. In 1762, for example, 
Li Guang (李光) and Li Shijue (李仕爵) were arrested in Vietnam after extorting money from 
various people on the pretense that they were on official Qing business. They were repatriated to 
Guangxi by a local Vietnamese official.40 In 1773, Huang Longyun (黃龍雲) and two others 
entered the far northern province of Hưng Hóa (興化) pretending to be yamen (government 
office) runners from the Yunnan surveillance commissioner’s office on a mission to arrest two 
Qing fugitives. After extorting money from several groups of people, they were arrested and 
interrogated. He Wanzhu (何萬珠) and Cai Xinrui (蔡辛瑞), who were implicated in a separate 
extortion case, were also arrested and interrogated. All five criminals were repatriated to Shuikou 
Gate (水口關) at the Vietnam-Guangxi border at the order of Lê Hiển Tông.41 Shortly 
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afterwards, Yao Guoqin (姚國欽) and nine others were arrested in Hưng Hóa after rescuing 
Qing criminals in the custody of Sơn La (山羅) authorities by force, a flagrant show of disrespect 
to the Vietnamese judiciary. All ten were repatriated to Guangdong.42  
 
2. Qing Fugitives from Vietnamese Law Apprehended in the Qing Domain    
 At this point, it is worth emphasizing that the Qing and Vietnamese judiciaries had major 
disagreements in their legal interpretations of the movement of people across the state 
boundaries. The Vietnamese state did not view the migration of Qing subjects into Vietnam as an 
illegal act. In fact, the cases above paint a picture of vibrant Qing sojourner communities in far 
northern Vietnam during the eighteenth century. This view conforms with Li Tana’s recent study 
on northern Vietnam, in which she considers mountain market towns in the Qing-Vietnam 
borderland as well as maritime networks.43 If these sojourners did not cause trouble, they seem to 
have been able to live their lives in northern Vietnam without much interference from the 
Vietnamese state. The level of freedom accorded to them even prompted one Lê official to 
comment, regarding the Qing miners at Tống Tinh: “Guest people, that is, Qing subjects, shave 
their heads, wear their attire, and return home after gathering silver, contributing nothing to our 
state.”44 It was not until they committed crimes that they were considered criminals to be 
repatriated to Qing.  
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As Philip Kuhn and Diana Lary pointed out in their studies on migration in Chinese 
history, however, Qing law considered all intentional crossing of boundaries not endorsed by the 
state to be illegal.45 Thus, the Qing judiciary considered all movement of Qing subjects into 
Vietnam without prior authorization as illegal. As a result, some Qing sojourners who eluded the 
Vietnamese judiciary were arrested by Qing border officials on their way back into the Qing 
domain. The Qing judiciary handled these cases unilaterally, even though the criminal activities 
had happened within the Vietnamese domain. 
Because of the legal discrepancy, the Qing judiciary sometimes got its hands on 
otherwise innocent travelers who had committed no criminal acts in Vietnam. For example, in 
the Zhang Funeng case (1758), even though the subordinates of Zhang and Wang Budu were 
released by the Vietnam judiciary, the Qianlong emperor still considered them bandits who could 
not be allowed to stay in Vietnam. Thus he ordered the Yun-Gui governor-general Li Shiyao to 
notify Lê Hiển Tông to arrest and repatriate them to Guangdong. There they would be tried and 
sent to Barkol (巴里坤), Xinjiang, and a few other places to be put under the strict supervision of 
local officials. While the sources do not tell us whether this repatriation ever happened, these 
conflicting legal views across the boundary highlight the interaction between the two different 
legal interpretations.46 In short, the Qing court always expected to get its way in trying and 
punishing its own subjects. 
A case in 1738 provides another example of unilateral action by the Qing judiciary. This 
case involved some Hakkas living in Qiongzhou (瓊州) prefecture, Guangdong—today’s Hainan 
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Island—kidnapping and trafficking in Vietnamese men, women, and children. As Li Tana has 
pointed out, traffic in slaves was a mainstay of regional trade in the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin 
area in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.47 This illicit trade seems to have continued onto the 
eighteenth century. After being reported to on the matter, the Qing court took charge of the trial, 
not notifying Lê Ý Tông (黎懿宗; r .1735-40) until after the trial, even though these criminals 
had committed crimes against Vietnamese subjects on Vietnamese soil.48  
We do have one case that suggests Vietnamese jurisdiction over Qing subjects was a 
possibility, at least in the mind of one Qing official. In 1742, Ye Zhen (葉蓁) and Zhou Laoliu 
(周老六) were arrested while trying to enter Guangxi from Lạng Sơn. Tan Xingyi (譚行義; d. 
1753), the provincial military commander (tidu) of Guangxi, accused them of training Lạng Sơn 
rebels led by the Lộc Bình (祿平) native official Vi Phúc Quan (韋福琯) and recommended that 
they be either executed at the border or sent to Vietnam to be tried there.49 The Qianlong 
emperor, however, ignored Tan’s recommendation, instead delegating the trial to the Liangguang 
governor-general and the Guangxi governor. After interrogation, they determined that the two 
suspects had not played significant roles in the rebellion and released them.50  
Tan Xingyi’s suggestion was an exception. The norm for Qing criminals arrested in the 
Qing domain continued to be their trial and punishment by the Qing judiciary. In 1743, Zhou 
Daonan (周道南) and two other Qing subjects were arrested in Guangxi after helping Mạc 
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Khang Võ’s (莫康武) rebellion in Bảo Lạc. After the initial interrogation by Yang Xifu (楊錫紱; 
1701-68), the Guangxi governor, they were kept in prison so that they might be tried after more 
arrests were made.51 Later the same year, Lu Ying (盧英) and Lin Pengming (林鵬鳴) were 
arrested in Guangxi after having served as officials for the Vietnamese rebel He Duong (矣揚). 
They were imprisoned until their confederates were arrested so that all might be tried together.52 
In 1776, 72 natives of Chaozhou (潮州) prefecture, Guangdong, led by Li Aji (李阿集) were 
arrested in Guangdong after serving Nguyễn Nhạc (阮岳; 1753-93), the eldest Tây Sơn brother, 
in the Tây Sơn uprising and engaging in piracy against the Lê/Trịnh troops.53  
In all cases, there was neither a Vietnamese request for the extradition of these Qing 
criminals nor any suggestion for their repatriation from among the Qing provincial officials and 
the Qing court. In short, the norm was clearly Qing monopoly on jurisdiction for Qing criminals 
who committed crimes in the Vietnamese domain whether they were apprehended in Qing or 
Vietnamese domains. 
 
B. Imperial Justice for All: Between Summary Executions and Regular Trials  
The Qing monopoly of jurisdiction over Qing criminals, however, did not result in 
leniency. In his study on Qing jurisdiction over Europeans in Guangzhou and Macau, R. Randle 
Edwards pointed out that even Europeans were generally satisfied with Qing handling of cases 
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involving Chinese perpetrators.54 Likewise, the Qing state made sure that its subjects committing 
crimes in Vietnam would meet swift justice in a manner that served as a warning to future 
criminals and reassured the Vietnamese state. This imperial justice was served in two main ways: 
summary executions and regular trials.  
 
1. Summary Executions 
In the Zhou Daonan case (1743), summary execution happened because of a 
miscommunication between the central and provincial governments. When Guangxi governor 
Yang Xifu reported to the Qianlong emperor on the interrogation of the culprits, who had 
confessed their involvement with the rebellion of Mạc Khang Võ, and recommended having 
them locked up for further interrogation, Qianlong instructed Yang to make an example out of 
them with heavy punishment without dragging the case on. Yang mistakenly took it as an order 
for immediate execution of the culprits and had them beaten to death in Sicheng (泗城) and 
Zhen’an (鎮安) prefectures without a proper trial. Qianlong later called it a “grave error” on 
Yang’s part, remarking that he simply meant to speed up the regular judicial process under Qing 
law.55  
In all other cases ending in summary execution, however, we can see the Qing state 
intentionally deciding to execute the Qing subjects who had committed crimes in Vietnam 
without regular trials. By looking at the Qing rationale for these summary executions, we can see 
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the ways that the Qing state conceptualized these interstate cases as fundamentally different from 
regular criminal cases. As Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris have noted, procedures governing 
capital cases were not applicable to those cases deemed “outside the law.”56 Prominent examples 
of cases outside the law were those involving large-scale banditry, piracy, and rebellion, a 
categorization which has parallels in many other judicial systems as well.57 
Take, for example, the Yang Xingxiu case (1753). When Bandi (班第; d. 1755), the 
acting Liangguang governor-general, reported to the Qianlong emperor on the arrest and 
extradition of Yang from Vietnam and his plan to escort Yang to Guangdong for a trial, 
Qianlong specifically ordered Bandi to execute Yang immediately following his repatriation (jie 
dao shi ji ying zhengfa). He gave two reasons. First, immediate execution would also serve as a 
warning to Qing subjects against crossing into Vietnam and causing trouble. Second, it would 
appease Lê Vietnam, which had always been respectful and submissive and had now extradited 
this criminal, not daring to kill him. Since the people of Vietnam were not familiar with the Qing 
Code (lüli) and thus lacked a deep understanding of the Qing judicial process, immediate 
execution would suit this occasion better.58 In fact, this was not entirely true, as both the Lê Code 
and the Qing Code were based on the Ming Code. But in any case, this was Qianlong’s 
rationale.59 
The Qianlong emperor also specifically ordered the summary execution of the culprits in 
the Zhang Funeng case (1758). Qianlong first praised the action of Lê Hiển Tông: “The king did 
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not immediately punish them and repatriated them to await imperial justice. He should be 
commended for being so respectful and submissive.” Then Qianlong instructed Li Shiyao, the 
acting Liangguang governor-general, to appoint an official to oversee the execution of the 
culprits on the Qing-Vietnam border in the presence of the Vietnamese official who escorted 
them.60 
The Qing rationale behind the summary execution of these criminals resembles the Qing 
attitude towards Qing fishermen from Shengjing and Shandong who caused trouble in the 
Chosŏn waters. In chapter three, we saw how the Kangxi and Yongzheng emperors considered 
these fishermen no longer Qing subjects but bandits instead, free to be arrested and punished by 
the Chosŏn judiciary in theory, though in fact they were always returned to Qing for punishment. 
Similarly, the Qing sojourners in Vietnam seem to have crossed the line that separated bandits 
from regular criminals by leaving the Qing domain in an illicit manner and further engaging in 
criminal activities in a foreign domain.  
 
2. Regular Trials 
More often, though, these criminals went through the regular judicial process. Qianlong’s 
August 13, 1764, edict to the Grand Council regarding the Yang Yadao case is perhaps the most 
elaborate imperial rationale for punishing criminals according to law (mingzheng dianxing). As 
such, it is worth quoting at length: “Qing subjects (neidi minren) committing robbery in foreign 
domains (yi jing) cannot escape their crime. But [they should] only be punished in the Qing 
domain (neidi) according to law (an lü) and cannot be just executed where they committed 
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robbery.” He further reasoned that following the usual legal procedures would reinforce Qing 
law (guofa de shen) and acquaint foreigners with imperial justice for future cases of the sort. In 
insisting on a regular trial, then, Qianlong was asserting at least two judicial principles. First was 
the principle of personal jurisdiction: Qing criminals, wherever they may have committed their 
crimes, should only be punished by the Qing judiciary. Second was the principle of routinization. 
The trial of Yang Yadao and his followers would follow the established Qing judicial process.61 
 What, then, did that process look like? First, the criminals were tried in the provinces of 
their origin. Often, the provincial officials in charge delegated the initial interrogation to their 
subordinates before personally interrogating the culprits themselves. In the Zhang Renfu case 
(1767) above, the culprits were interrogated first by the Guangdong judicial commissioner before 
they were personally interrogated by Li Shiyao and Junggin (鐘音; d. 1778), the Liangguang 
governor-general and the Guangdong governor, respectively.62 In the Yao Guoqin case (1773), 
the culprits were tried by the surveillance commissioner and provincial administration 
commissioner of Guangdong first and then by Liangguang governor-general Li Shiyao and 
Guangdong governor De-bao (德保; 1719-89).63 
After personal interrogation, the provincial officials would adjudicate on the case. The 
Qing Code often served as the statutory basis for terms of adjudication. In the Zhang Renfu case 
above, for example, Li Shiyao and Junggin used two different substatutes in the Qing Code to 
sentence Zhang Renfu to immediate death by beheading, six accomplices to enslavement in 
Urumchi (烏魯木齊), Xinjiang, and seventeen other accomplices to penal servitude according to 
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the same substatute. In sentencing Zhong Nanhua and eleven other accomplices to 100 strokes of 
beating by heavy bamboo and three years of banishment, however, Li Shiyao and Junggin used 
the precedent of the Zhang Shanlong (張善籠) case, which I have been unable to verify from my 
sources.64 Precedents, however, did often provide statutory bases for these trials on Qing 
criminals.  
 Reflecting the Qing sensitivity towards unsanctioned cross-boundary movement, Qing 
provincial officials habitually sentenced the Qing subjects who committed crimes in Vietnam 
more harshly than was called for in the Qing Code and precedents. In the Yao Guoqin case 
(1773), for example, Li Shiyao and De-bao applied a substatute on associating with foreign 
countries or the Miao and engaging in illegal activities to sentence Huang Wenxiang (黃文詳) 
and seven other accomplices to penal servitude. For the chief criminal Yao Guoqin, however, 
they mused that Yao’s status as a national university student (jiansheng) made his crime of 
secretly entering a foreign domain and causing trouble particularly heinous. As a result, they 
asked for imperial approval for Yao’s immediate execution, explicitly acknowledging that this 
was a harsher punishment than prescribed by the statute on injuring people that they used in their 
adjudication.65 
We see a similar development in the Li Qizhen case (1774-1775), where Li had murdered 
a man who accused him of having acquired his wife through kidnapping. When Lin Yamei, the 
wife, and Ma Ya’er, their friend, were repatriated, they and the two relatives of Xie Ganru, the 
victim, were all summoned to Guangdong to be interrogated personally by Liangguang 
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governor-general Li Shiyao. When Li’s interrogation produced confessions that corroborated the 
original investigation made by Lê Hiển Tông, Li memorialized the Qianlong emperor on his 
adjudication. Here again, while Li Shiyao followed a statute in the Qing Code in his sentencing 
of Lin Yamei, he recommended a harsher penalty than usual for Ma because of the nature of his 
“heinous” crime. Even though Li used the same statute in sentencing Ma, his adjudication of 100 
strokes of beating by heavy bamboo and enslavement in Heilongjiang was more severe than 100 
strokes of beating by heavy bamboo and life exile of 3,000 li dictated by the statute.66  
 Because of specific circumstances of the criminal activities, ruling by analogy was also 
common. The Qiongzhou Hakkas who were arrested in 1738 for trafficking Vietnamese slaves 
into the Qing domain were punished in this manner. Because there was no specific statute that 
could be applied to this case, a statute on kidnapping within China Proper was cited to sentence 
all criminals to 100 strokes of beating by heavy bamboo and banishment of 3,000 li.67 
 Sometimes, the emperor himself devised policies for specific cases from the very 
beginning of the trial. In these cases, imperial edicts outlining these policies acted as the 
statutory basis for adjudication. It is tempting to see these as instances of “qadi justice,” which 
Max Weber saw as the antithesis of rule of law, where the dispensation of justice depended on 
the whim of the judge. As Philip Huang noted, however, it might be more fruitful to go beyond 
the dichotomy of formalistic and rational “rule of law” and substantive irrational “Oriental 
despotism.” Huang himself took up Weber’s idea of “substantive rationality” in conceptualizing 
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the Qing legal system, where routinization and imperial authority could coexist.68 As we saw in 
chapter three, for example, routinization and imperial ability to create precedents could coexist in 
interstate law in the Qing tributary world. In any case, we see within these imperial edicts a 
general drive to make the punishment fit the crime. Two cases from the 1770s provide good 
examples.  
The first example is the case involving about 2,000 miners from the Tống Tinh mine 
(1775). For this case, the Qianlong emperor set a general course of action for provincial officials 
in response to a report that about 320 miners, who had been expelled from the mine by the 
Vietnamese state, had returned to Guangxi. First, they were to interrogate these miners and 
separate the criminals who had caused trouble (qixin zishi zhi fan) from those driven by poverty 
(wuchu mishi). The trouble-causing criminals were to be handled according to law (anlü banli), 
whereas the others would be settled in various places. They could not be settled in Guangdong or 
Guangxi, however, as they would revert to their old ways. Instead, they would be sent out to 
Xinjiang, the Central Asian frontier that was the most recent addition to the Qing empire, to 
work on military farms (tun zhong yingsheng).69 
In the end, more miners were apprehended after their return to Qing, and about 2,000 
miners in all were interrogated by provincial officials. Li Shiyao, the Liangguang governor-
general, categorized the miners into four groups and accorded them punishments commensurate 
with their crimes. 63 miners who had caused trouble (zishi) were sent to Ili (伊犁), Xinjiang, to 
be given as slaves to soldiers stationed there. Another 903 miners who were deemed rough and 
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fierce (guanghan) were sent to Urumchi and a few other places to work on military farms 
(tuntian chuli). Further, 807 traders who merely happened to be near the mine were sent to four 
provinces (Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, and Henan) to be settled far away from the Qing-Vietnam 
borderland. Lastly, 208 people who had a permanent residence and means of livelihood were 
returned to their native places (yuanji). Notably, the provincial officials in charge of relocating 
these people were given imperial orders to arrest those who escaped on the way to their assigned 
locations and execute them on the spot.70  
The second example of a policy derived for a specific case is the Li Aji case (1775-1776), 
where 72 Chaozhou natives had been arrested for serving the Tây Sơn regime. From the outset, 
the Qianlong emperor ordered Li Shiyao to interrogate the offenders and punish them according 
to their different degrees of guilt. Those who had a hand in robbing and killing were to be 
executed immediately. The rest were divided into three groups: those to be sent to Ili as slaves 
for the Oirats, those to be sent to Urumchi and other places as slaves for the soldiers there, and 
those to be relocated to provinces outside of Guangdong. Here again, Qianlong ordered the 
provincial officials to kill on the spot those trying to escape.71 
Here, it is worthwhile to recall briefly from chapter four how Hoàng Công Toản (黃公纘) 
and his followers were accepted as Qing subjects and then relocated to Xinjiang. Here, we again 
see the Qianlong emperor employing a similar tactic to achieve peace in the Qing-Vietnam 
borderland: relocation of the troublesome borderland residents to Xinjiang, the newest Qing 
borderland and the farthest from the Qing-Vietnam borderland. The shuffling of its subjects from 
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Southeast Asia to Central Asia over the distance of thousands of miles says something about the 
extraordinary size of the Qing empire and the continental scale of the Qing imperial worldview.  
What happened after the original adjudication? As mentioned in chapter three, a regular 
criminal case in the Qing judiciary went through the appellate system. To recap, cases in which 
punishment was heavier than penal servitude or cases involving homicide were automatically 
sent to the Board of Punishments for review, while death penalty cases were sent further up to 
the Three Judicial Offices and the emperor for review.72  
 In these cases, the original adjudication was reviewed by metropolitan offices designated 
by imperial command. In the Li Guang case (1762) involving extortion, for example, Qianlong 
delegated the review of the Guangxi governor’s adjudication to the Grand Council and the Board 
of Punishments.73 For the Huang Longyun and He Wanzhu cases (1773), another extortion case, 
the adjudication by Yun-Gui governor-general Jangboo and Yunnan governor Li Hu (李湖; d. 
1781) was reviewed by the Three Judicial Offices.74 The emperor reviewed the adjudication for a 
final time in both cases, and the imperial review was then sent down to the provincial officials so 
that they could mete out the sentences. This could be a protracted process. The adjudication on 
the Yang Yadao case was reviewed first by the Board of Punishments and then by the Qianlong 
                                                          
72 Bodde and Morris, Law of Imperial China, 113-22.  
 
73 GZD, 403018940 (Xiong Xuepeng; QL27.i5.22=7/13/1762). 
 
74 Huang Longyun was sentenced to immediate death by beheading according to a substatute on spreading 
hereadical words and agitating feelings. Liu Mingdeng and Wang Yiguan were also sentenced to immediate death 
by beheading but according to a substatute on entering the Miao region without authorization and engaging in 
bullying. He Wanzhu and Tang Qingbai, He’s relative, were sentenced to immediate death by beheading according 
to a statute on privately entering a foreign domain and, whereas Cai Xinrui was sentenced to death by beheading 
after the Autumn Assizes according to the same statute. QSL, Gaozong, 937: 609b-610a and 940: 702b-704a; GZD 
403026943 (Jangboo and Li Hu; QL38.11.1=12/14/1773), 403026944 (Jangboo and Li Hu; 
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Emperor, with the result that more than a year had passed between the initial report on their 
repatriation and their final execution.75 
 As we saw above, one of the main concerns of the Qing state in punishing these criminals 
after regular trials was to reassure the Vietnamese state of imperial justice. The most common 
way of reassuring the Vietnamese tributary state was by carrying out the execution in presence of 
Vietnamese officials. Thus, as soon as the sentence of immediate death by decapitation for Li 
Guang and Li Shijue was confirmed in 1762, the criminals were escorted to the Shuikou Gate, 
while Lê Hiển Tông was notified of the execution schedule and instructed to send his official to 
the Shuikou Gate. The execution took place on June 17th, 1762, outside the Shuikou Gate.76 For 
the Yang Yadao case, the Qing judiciary went one step further. The confirmation of the sentence 
was followed by the escorting of the criminals to the region of Vietnam where they had 
committed banditry. The three criminals were executed there in presence of Vietnamese officials 
and subjects, with their heads displayed as a warning to residents on both sides of the border.77  
 
3. Qing Monopoly of Jurisdiction 
 From above, we can see that the Qing state recognized the interstate dimension of these 
cases. Whether the Qing criminals were punished through summary executions or regular trials, 
the Qing state recognized the special nature of Qing subjects committing crimes against 
Vietnamese subjects and/or in the Vietnamese domain. At the same time, the fact remains that 
these trials were largely unilateral affairs. As soon as the Vietnamese judiciary repatriated Qing 
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subjects, the Qing judiciary retained its personal jurisdiction over Qing subjects, with no input 
from the Vietnamese judiciary.  
 
IV. Jurisdiction over Vietnamese Criminals: Between Personal and Territorial Principles 
How, then, did the Qing court deal with Vietnam subjects who committed crimes in the 
Qing domain or against Qing subjects? As we will see below, the Qing court saw such 
Vietnamese subjects as its criminals, whose trials and punishments could be determined by the 
Qing judiciary.  
 
A. Personal Jurisdiction: Repatriation of Vietnamese Criminals  
 As we have already seen in chapter three, the Qing prohibition against illegal travel 
applied to foreigners as well. Consequently, all Vietnamese subjects found in the Qing domain 
without prior authorization from the Qing state were considered criminal suspects. Upon initial 
arrest, Qing authorities would interrogate Vietnamese subjects to determine whether they had 
engaged in further illicit activities while in the Qing domain.  
The Qing judiciary repatriated Vietnamese subjects deemed to have harbored no criminal 
intent. In 1754, Hoàng A Xã (黃亞社) and six other Vietnamese subjects were arrested while 
performing music and begging for food in Lingyun (凌雲) county, Guangxi. An initial 
interrogation by the Lingyun authorities revealed all of them to belong to a family originally 
from Cao Bằng (高平), a Vietnamese province bordering Guangxi. After entering the Qing 
domain in 1745 to take refuge from the internal strife in Cao Bằng, this family had been 
wondering about and begging in the Qing borderland for the past nine years. Lingyun authorities 
concluded that there was no sign that they had engaged in any criminal activity. Agreeing with 
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this assessment, Guangxi provincial officials decided to repatriate them, merely noting that it 
was inconvenient to allow these Annamese foreigners (Annan yi min) to stay in the Qing domain 
any longer. Thus, the repatriation of these people was arranged according to precedent, with the 
Taiping (太平) prefect handing them over to the Cao Bằng governor at the Shuikou Gate.78 From 
this use of precedents, we can tell that the Qing-Vietnamese repatriation process had become a 
routine matter by 1754.  
Not all such cases were so straightforward. In 1778, authorities in Xunhua (宣化) county, 
Guangxi, arrested two suspicious-looking men named Trần Đình Huyên (陳廷暄) and Nguyễn 
Văn Phú (阮文富). Upon interrogation by the Xunhua magistrate, they claimed to be servants of 
the Vietnamese envoy Hồ Sĩ Đống (胡士棟; 1739-85). According to their story, they were told 
to go back to Vietnam when the tributary embassy entered the Qing domain because the quota 
for the number of attendants had already been filled. Because they missed their master, the story 
continued, they had snuck into the Qing domain after shaving their heads (titou) and changing 
into Qing attire (gaihuan neidi fushi). To confirm this story, the Xunhua magistrate brought them 
to the envoy Hồ Sĩ Đống, who recognized them. This case could well have ended here, with the 
two men returning to Vietnam with the embassy, but this investigation did not satisfy Guangxi 
governor Wu Hubing (吳虎炳; d. 1779). Afraid that there was more to this incident, he 
summoned the culprits to interrogate them personally and reported the incident to the Qianlong 
emperor.79 
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What happened next reveals the two options available to the Qing judiciary regarding 
Vietnamese subjects deemed to have engaged in criminal activities. In an edict promulgated in 
reaction to Wu Hubing’s palace memorial, Qianlong expressed his displeasure with the initial 
investigation in Xunhua. He doubted that these two men, who changed their appearance and 
trespassed into the Qing domain, harbored no criminal intent. According to him, these two could 
have just concocted a story while meeting with the Vietnamese envoy, since the magistrate had 
no way of understanding the Vietnamese language. In another edict to the Grand Council, 
Qianlong even voiced his suspicion that these two might be spies (jianxi) from Vietnam. Most 
importantly, Qianlong decided to exert Qing jurisdiction over this case: “Even if there is no other 
circumstance, [they] must be retained in the Qing domain (neidi) to be punished (zhi) according 
to their crimes (zui).”80 Even though he did add that Lê Hiển Tông should be notified about this, 
there is no doubt that Qianlong was asserting the principle of territorial jurisdiction here. 
Further interrogation by Wu Hubing and his subordinates confirmed Qianlong’s 
suspicion about Trần Đình Huyên and Nguyễn Văn Phú. Even though it was true that they were 
servants of the Vietnamese envoy Hồ Sĩ Đống, they had entered the Qing domain in pursuit of 
profit rather than pure devotion to their master. Moreover, they had been aided by Zhou Gui (周
貴), whom Wu identified as a Qing subject (min ren) but whose great-grandfather had settled in 
Lạng Sơn. Offering guidance for money, Zhou had shaved the heads of Huyên and Phú, dressed 
them in Qing attire, and led them personally into the Qing domain. Even though Zhou was still at 
large, Wu Hubing adjudicated on this case. Wu’s adjudication here showed all the characteristics 
from cases involving Qing subjects committing crimes in Vietnam. Wu used a statute in the Qing 
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Code on privately going beyond the frontiers into a foreign domain in analogy to sentence Huyên 
and Phú to death by strangulation after the Autumn Assizes. For Zhou Gui, Wu used a precedent 
from 1764 on intentionally guiding a runaway bandit and sentenced him to immediate death by 
strangulation. Moreover, Wu requested imperial permission for the immediate execution of 
Huyên and Phú so that this case could serve as a warning.81 There could not be a clearer 
demonstration of Qing territorial jurisdiction than Wu’s adjudication.   
It was at this point that Qianlong changed his mind. In his rescript to Wu’s memorial, 
Qianlong transferred the case to the Board of Punishments to be reviewed. In an edict to the 
Grand Council on Wu’s adjudication, Qianlong mused that it was Zhou Gui, not the two 
Vietnamese criminals, who was the main culprit. He also commented that the guilt of the two 
criminals, while serious, did not merit death. And then he announced what had purportedly been 
his intention all along: “We . . . originally wished to let these two men return to Annam (fahui 
Annan) and order the king to punish [them] himself (zixing zhizui).” Qianlong asserted this 
would constitute an act of imperial grace for the traditionally respectful and submissive tributary 
king of Vietnam. Even if Qianlong’s pronouncement was not sincere, this episode still reveals 
the second course of action that the Qing state could take: repatriating criminals to Vietnam to be 
punished there.82  
It is tempting to see the trial of Trần Đình Huyên and Nguyễn Văn Phú as a mere front 
when we consider that the final imperial approval to repatriate them was given after Lê Hiển 
Tông had arrested Zhou Gui in Vietnam and agreed to send him to Qing. In fact, Qianlong 
specifically praised Lê Hiển Tông’s action as proper before ordering Wu Hubing to repatriate the 
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Vietnamese criminals to be punished by the king. Was it merely a case of exchanging criminals 
to be tried in their respective states? While we may never learn the answer to this question, the 
fact remains that the Qing judiciary was fully capable of asserting jurisdiction in this case.83 
Also, as we will see below, there were a few cases in which the Qing judiciary did follow 
through and assert jurisdiction over Vietnam subjects. 
 
B. Qing Jurisdiction over Vietnamese Criminals: Territorial Jurisdiction and Beyond 
 
1. Extradition of Vietnamese Criminals 
Even when Vietnamese criminals were not arrested in the Qing domain, the Qing 
judiciary could still try to exert jurisdiction over them by asking the Vietnamese judiciary for 
their arrest and extradition. It is true that the Qing judiciary had to rely on the cooperation of its 
Vietnamese counterpart. As we have seen in chapter three and above, such cooperation could not 
be taken for granted, which made this process more of a two-way negotiation than a one-way 
imposition. As we will see below, however, the Qing state could use a combination of forceful 
and conciliatory gestures to bring about the extradition of the Vietnamese criminals to the Qing 
domain.  
In 1753, for example, authorities in Kaihua prefecture, Yunnan arrested a group of Qing 
subjects who were distributing printed pamphlets urging people to join a fight against the 
Lê/Trịnh regime. Interrogation by Kaihua authorities revealed that a group of Yao bandits based 
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in far northern Vietnam was recruiting fighters from among Qing subjects in Kaihua. Astonished 
that these bandits would ignore the clear boundary between the inner (nei, i.e. Qing) and outer 
(wai, i.e. Vietnam) domains, Yun-Gui governor-general Šose (碩色; 1687?-1759) reported this 
matter to the Qianlong emperor and vowed to get to the bottom of it.84 Further arrests and 
investigations followed, but to Šose’s dismay, the Yao bandits, including a ringleader named Bàn 
Đạo Kiềm (盤道鉗), had already fled back to Vietnam. In his reaction to this report, the 
Qianlong emperor commented that to ignore the matter just because the bandits were in Vietnam 
would be improper. Then he commanded Šose to communicate with Lê Hiển Tông on their arrest 
and extradition: “Bàn Đạo Kiềm, originally of Giao Chỉ (Jiaozhi), has been lawless in your 
domain and collaborating (goujie) with Qing bandits . . . If Qing dispatches troops to arrest 
[Ban], [we are] afraid that your state will be disturbed (gaiguo buwu saodong). You should 
pursue and capture [Ban] in haste.”85 Lê Hiển Tông responded to this thinly-veiled imperial 
threat, arresting and extraditing Kiềm and Đặng Thịnh Vượng (鄧盛王) to Yunnan along with 
their family members.86  
In 1760, a group of Vietnamese sha bandits (sha fei) led by Quan Tam (郡尋) attacked 
two Yunnan border towns in Yuanjiang (元江) prefecture and returned to Vietnam when Qing 
soldiers finally came to the rescue. Ai-bi-da (愛必達; d. 1771), the Yun-Gui governor-general, 
sent a lateral communication to Lê Hiển Tông ordering him to arrest and extradite these bandits. 
In his memorial to the Qianlong emperor, Ai-bi-da claimed that Vietnam would be apprehensive 
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if he sent out his troops beyond the interstate boundary to chase the bandits. This was not a 
satisfactory justification to Qianlong, who rebuked Ai-bi-da: “Those entering [i.e. Vietnamese 
bandits] dared to encroach on the imperial boundary (gan yue Tianchao zhi jie), and yet those 
chasing [them] [i.e. Qing soldiers] would not dare cross the foreign boundary (bu gan wen waiyi 
zhi jie)?”87 In the end, even though no troops were dispatched from Yunnan, Lê Hiển Tông had 
ordered the Hưng Hóa governor Đinh Văn Thản (丁文坦) to arrest Quan Tam. A year and a half 
later, Quan Tam was finally captured in Vietnam, and Lê Hiển Tông extradited him to Yunnan.88 
These two cases show that dispatching troops into the Vietnamese domain was a viable option 
from the Qing perspective. 
In one case, the Vietnamese judiciary almost refused to hand over the suspects. Referred 
to as the Hoàng Phúc Vệ (黃福衛) case after the name of the main culprit, it started one night in 
October 1747 when some Vietnamese soldiers approached a border patrol in Guishun (歸順) 
department, Guangxi, in pursuit of bandits. A few Qing soldiers at the patrol station heard the 
commotion outside, and a confusing skirmish ensued in the dark, leaving two Qing soldiers dead. 
Memorials from Guangxi provincial officials all recognized this as an accident. Liangguang 
governor-general Ts’ereng (策楞; d. 1756), however, still decided to request Lê Hiển Tông for 
the arrest and extradition of those responsible for the killing according to the precedent set by the 
Phạm Thuần Hậu (范純厚) case in 1746. 
I have been unable to find trial records on the Phạm Thuần Hậu case itself, so the details 
of this precedent are murky. Apparently, though, the Vietnamese criminals led by Phạm Thuần 
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Hậu had injured Qing soldiers and robbed Qing subjects. Lê Hiển Tông eventually arrested and 
extradited them to Qing, and they were summarily executed on the border. Even though these 
two cases were not exactly comparable, Ts’ereng explained his decision in the following way: 
“[This is] a matter of border post (bian’ai) and thus of imperial propriety (Tianchao titong). 
Therefore it is inappropriate to regard it as an accident (wu).”89  
But in the Hoàng Phúc Vệ case, four months passed without any sign of extradition. The 
Qianlong emperor, exasperated, even suggested that Ts’ereng should have kept a few 
Vietnamese subjects who had come to a Guangxi border post to lodge a complaint on a totally 
unrelated issue as hostages until the killers were produced. When three more months passed, 
Ts’ereng recommended in a palace memorial making a show of force if the suspects were not 
delivered within the next months. His suggestion, however, met with the disapproval of the 
emperor, who urged caution.90 
Soon after, a lateral communication from Lê Hiển Tông arrived. Citing the investigation 
by his officials, Hiển Tông emphasized the accidental nature of the killing. He also argued that 
following the Phạm Thuần Hậu precedent was unfair, since that case involved pirates who had 
deliberately committed criminal acts. Appealing to the concept of “treating all peoples equally” 
(yishitongren) and asking for mercy, the king sent 100 taels of silver as compensation instead of 
extraditing the culprits. We have seen a few cases where the Qing emperor invoked this principle 
for more favorable results to Vietnamese subjects. But as we have seen in chapter two and as we 
will see in chapter six, the Qing state did not react well to the appropriation of this imperial 
rhetoric by its tributaries. In response, Guangdong governor Šulu (舒輅; d. 1752), who was 
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filling in for Ts’ereng at the time, gave Hiển Tông an ultimatum. Calling Hiển Tông’s action 
extremely improper (shu fei li), Šulu asserted that Hiển Tông had one month to produce the 
criminals. In the end, Hiển Tông extradited three soldiers who had participated in the killing of 
the two Qing soldiers to Guangxi.91  
This case offers a point of comparison to the Lady Hughes case of 1784 in many aspects. 
First, there is the accidental nature of the killing. The Lady Hughes case started when an 
honorary salute from a British merchant ship accidentally killed a Qing sailor and wounded 
another. Qianlong’s invocation of the principle of collective responsibility is the next point of 
similarity. As in the above case, Qianlong held the entire British merchant community in 
Guangzhou (Canton) responsible, and it ultimately surrendered the culprit under imperial threat. 
As we will see below, however, the fates of the Vietnamese soldiers and the British gunner 
would diverge widely.92 
Perhaps taking this case as a lesson, the Vietnamese judiciary acted much more quickly 
in a later case of a similar nature. In 1750, a Qing native soldier (tulian) from Yunnan named Yi 
Nian (矣念) crossed into the Vietnamese domain to collect firewood. There he encountered 
Vietnamese soldiers who had been chasing sha bandits (sha fei). Since Yi Nian was wearing 
attire like that worn by the bandits, Vietnamese soldiers mistook him for a bandit and killed him. 
Even though Yi Nian had died in the Vietnamese domain by mistake, Yun-Gui governor-general 
Šose made an extradition request to Lê Hiển Tông. A Vietnamese soldier named Nguyễn Thế 
Khôi (阮世魁) was eventually, although with less drama and delay, extradited to Yunnan by a 
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Vietnamese official.93 This case shows just how far the reach of Qing jurisdiction could extend 
over Vietnamese subjects. In making the extradition request, Šose was going even beyond the 
principle of territorial jurisdiction. Although the criminal act had happened in the Vietnamese 
domain, the Qing judiciary claimed jurisdiction because the victim was a Qing subject. We might 
also briefly contrast the Qing nonchalance toward its subjects crossing into the Vietnamese 
domain to collect firewood with the Qing sensitivity toward Chosŏn subjects logging trees in the 
Qing domain. 
One case from 1763-1764 provides another interesting example. In 1763, Chen Guojian 
(陳國監) and some 20 Qing subjects from Qinzhou (欽州) department, Guangdong, were 
robbed by pirates while fishing in the Vietnamese waters near Giang Bình, which borders 
Qinzhou. Two Qing subjects drowned during this encounter. Even though Qing soldiers from the 
nearby garrison witnessed the interaction and chased away the pirates, the offenders got away in 
the end. When the subsequent investigation by local officials revealed that the pirates were 
Vietnamese subjects who had sailed from Yên Quảng (安廣) on the northeastern coast of 
Vietnam, Liangguang governor-general Su-chang (蘇昌; d. 1768) took steps to ascertain two key 
facts: the location of crime and the subjecthood of the culprits. Even when the investigation by 
his subordinates revealed that the robbery had happened in the Vietnamese domain (yi jing) and 
that there were no Qing subjects among the pirates, Su-chang still demanded that Lê Hiển Tông 
arrest and extradite the Vietnamese pirates according to the precedent set in the Phạm Thuần Hậu 
case.94 
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Again, this is an extraordinary request that went beyond the principle of territorial 
jurisdiction. How was this position justified? Fortunately for us, Su-chang defended his position 
at length in his palace memorial. Su-chang did acknowledge that this was a case of foreign 
pirates (yi fei) committing robbery in the foreign domain (yi jing). Thus, this could not be on the 
same level as if these pirates had entered the Qing domain. At the same time, Su-chang 
emphasized that the victims were Qing subjects. That fact alone, he argued, made this case a 
matter for the imperial system (Tianchao tizhi). Su-chang got his answer from Lê Hiển Tông 
within three months. Đỗ Kiên Nhất (杜堅一) and 26 pirates had been arrested and confessed to 
everything, and Lê Hiển Tông would extradite them via the Shuikou Gate.95 
 From the above, we can see that Qing jurisdiction over Vietnamese subjects was based 
first on the concept of territorial jurisdiction. Unlike in the Qing-Chosŏn borderland, where 
decades of close interaction between the two courts beginning in the 1630s had created a joint 
jurisdiction over Chosŏn subjects, the Qing jurisdiction here was mostly unilateral. We can also 
see that Qing jurisdiction over Vietnamese subjects was much more comprehensive and elastic 
than the territorial principle of jurisdiction. In the end, all it took to trigger extradition to Qing 
was for the Qing to construct a certain act by Vietnamese subjects as a crime against the Qing 
imperial system. Here, we may again recall the early phase of the Qing-Chosŏn legal interactions 
we saw in chapter three, where any Chosŏn action that the Qing state deemed to be against its 
interest was constructed as a criminal act and punished as such. 
 
2. Qing Handling of Extradited Vietnamese Criminals 
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What happened to these extradited Vietnamese criminals? Some went through an 
expedited judicial process due to security concerns. In the Đỗ Kiên Nhất case (1763-4), Lê Hiển 
Tông was the first to suggest immediate execution. In his lateral communication to Su-chang, the 
Liangguang governor-general, Lê Hiển Tông requested that the 27 extradited pirates be executed 
on the border according to the Phạm Thuần Hậu precedent, which had been invoked for the 
extradition process. Su-chang, in turn, recommended executing the Vietnamese pirates 
immediately after the initial trial for security reasons. Waiting for the appellate review on the 
case before executing this multitude of criminals, Su-chang reasoned, would leave them at the 
border passes (guankou) for too long. The Qianlong emperor approved Su-chang’s request, 
reasoning that “cases handling foreign bandits and criminals (waiyi feifan) cannot be handled in 
the same way as [those of] the interior (yu neidi butong).”96  
Others were punished after a proper trial. Bàn Đạo Kiềm and Đặng Thịnh Vượng, the 
Vietnamese subjects involved in Yao banditry, as well as their family members, went through a 
regular judicial process after their extradition in 1754. They were all interrogated by Yun-Gui 
governor-general Šose. Kiềm and Vượng were found to be guilty of plotting a rebellion, 
collaborating with Qing subjects, and recruiting followers in the Qing domain. Accordingly, 
Šose sentenced Kiềm to death by slicing (lingchi), the harshest punishment in the Qing Code, 
and Vượng to immediate execution by beheading, with both their heads to be displayed as a 
warning to borderland residents. Their family members, however, were found to have played no 
role in this affair, and Šose recommended sending them back to Vietnam. Šose’s adjudication on 
                                                          
96 QSL, Gaozong, 707: 900b (QL29.3.24=4/24/1764); GZD 403017243 (Su-chang; 29.3.4=4/4/1764). 
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the case, in turn, was reviewed and then affirmed by both the Board of Punishments and the 
Qianlong emperor.97  
Going through the regular judicial process could make a crucial difference in whether a 
Vietnamese criminal lived or died. The Hoàng Phúc Vệ case (1747-1749), in which Qing 
soldiers were mistakenly killed during an accidental skirmish, is perhaps the perfect example. As 
we have seen above, Lê Hiển Tông requested a pardon for the three culprits even as he was 
extraditing them to Guangxi. The Qianlong emperor, however, rejected that request and ordered 
Guangxi provincial officials to proceed with the trial. A crime of this nature, Qianlong reasoned, 
could not be pardoned, and only after the adjudication would there be a possibility of mitigating 
the sentence as a special imperial favor. Provincial officials, accordingly, interrogated the 
criminals and then sentenced all of them to death using specific statutes and substatutes in the 
Qing Code. Hoàng Phúc Vệ and Lý Phúc Trị (李福治), the two soldiers behind the killing, were 
sentenced to immediate death by beheading according to a substatute on soldiers on campaigns 
violating law and acting recklessly, with the execution to take place on the border. Nùng Công 
Phai (農公派), who had cut off the head of a dead Qing soldier, was sentenced to beating and 
banishment according to a statute on the mutilation of a corpse.98 
This adjudication was reviewed and confirmed by the Board of Punishments. In his final 
imperial review, the Qianlong emperor reiterated that these two criminals deserved death. Citing 
the accidental nature of the crime and the proper conduct of Lê Hiển Tông as grounds for 
                                                          
97 QSL, Gaozong, 459: 963b (QL19.3.20=4/12/1754); GZD 403005702 (Šose; QL19.1.21=2/12/1754), 403006376 
(Ai-bi-da; QL19.i4.1=5/22/1754). On death by slicing, see Timothy Brook, Jérôme Bourgon, and Gregory Blue, 
Death by a Thousand Cuts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
 
98 QSL, 333: 579a-b (QL14.1.29=3/17/1749); JJCD 003739 (Šulu; n.d./13.12.13), 003921 (Wei Wenju; 
13.11.25/14.1.21). 
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leniency, however, Qianlong commuted the death sentences and allowed for their repatriation so 
that Lê Hiển Tông could punish the criminals on his own.99 Again, this case offers a very 
interesting counterpart to the Lady Hughes case, in which the surrendered British culprit was 
summarily executed. Although the nature of the incident was similar, the result could not have 
been more different. It was from that point on that the British in Guangzhou refused to submit to 
Qing jurisdiction.100 We may remember from chapter three and from above that Chosŏn and 
Vietnam, both tributary states represented by tributary kings, had more regular systems of 
interstate law with Qing, with the result that their subjects often had an advantage in the outcome 
of the trials. 
The Nguyễn Thế Khôi case (1751-53), in which a Qing subject collecting firewood in the 
Vietnamese domain was accidently killed by the Vietnamese soldier Khôi, was resolved in an 
analogous manner to the Hoàng Phúc Vệ case. After his extradition to Yunnan, Nguyễn Thế 
Khôi was tried by Šose and sentenced to death by strangulation after the Autumn Assizes. Šose’s 
adjudication was reviewed and confirmed by the Board of Punishments. Again, however, in his 
final imperial review, the Qianlong emperor pardoned Nguyễn Thế Khôi from death and allowed 
Lê Hiển Tông to punish him on his own, citing three factors as grounds for leniency. First, the 
Qing soldier was in the Vietnamese domain and wearing the same outfit as the sha bandits, so 
Khôi’s action was truly accidental. Second, Vietnam had always been a proper tributary state. 
Third, the Vietnamese official had been prompt in extraditing Khôi. In the end, Nguyễn Thế 
                                                          
99 QSL, 341: 715b-716a (QL14.5.20=7/4/1749); JJCD 004006 (Šulu; n.d./QL14.2.17), 004081 (Šose; 
QL14.2.3/14.3.6).  
 
100 Edwards, “Ch’ing Legal Jurisdiction over Foreigners,” 238-43; Li Chen, Chinese Law in Imperial Eyes, 25-68. 
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Khôi was returned to Vietnam, where he was punished by 40 strokes of beating by a copper club 
and cashiered according to Vietnamese law.101  
As in the Trần Đình Huyên case (1778) of the two men claiming to be heartsick for their 
master, the envoy Hồ Sĩ Đống, however, it is important not to look at these cases as evidence of 
the Vietnamese judiciary working independently from the Qing judiciary in practice. We need to 
remember that the repatriation of these Vietnamese criminals was always portrayed as an act of 
mercy based on the merits of Vietnam as a tributary state. It was not something that the 
Vietnamese judiciary could take for granted, as is evident from the above cases in which the 
Qing judiciary did punish Vietnamese subjects. Rather than looking at the resolution of these 
cases through a dualistic prism of myth and reality, it would be more fruitful to see both imperial 
and tributary jurisdiction as elastic, the very character that allowed for ample room for variation 
in the resolution of cases.  
 
V. Conclusion 
What can we learn from the interstate legal cases discussed above? The empirical 
evidence we have from these cases points to the asymmetric status of the Qing and Vietnamese 
judiciaries when they interacted. Vietnam was, with or without prompts from Qing, giving up its 
territorial jurisdiction when it repatriated Qing criminals committing crimes on its soil. 
Vietnamese repatriation of the Qing criminals also meant that the Qing state could maintain 
jurisdiction over its own subjects even beyond its borders. The Qing state saw that very 
jurisdiction as something that was inviolable.  
                                                          
101 QSL, Gaozong, 387: 85b-86a (QL16.4.22=5/17/1751); SLXK 40: 1457a-b (Šose; QL18.5.29=6/30/1753). 
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On the other hand, the Qing state perceived the jurisdiction of the Vietnamese king as 
something that could be given or taken away by the Qing emperor. When the Qing state tried 
Vietnamese subjects accused of committing crimes against Qing subjects or on Qing soil, it was 
essentially taking from the Vietnamese king his jurisdiction over his own subjects. In a sense, 
then, when the Qing state sent Vietnamese criminals back to Vietnam to be tried and punished 
there, it was only giving back what it had taken. 
What we see here are two judiciaries, normally independent of each other, interacting in 
an asymmetric, hierarchical manner in cases of interstate crime. It is significant that the 
Vietnamese act of conceding jurisdiction was considered “proper” and “respectful” by the Qing 
state. Even though we see no treaty or written agreement between the two states on matters of 
interstate jurisdiction, the Qing and Vietnamese states seem to have shared a set of ideas and 
practices that were decidedly Qing-centered and mutually binding. This asymmetry and 
inequality were at the heart of the Qing-Vietnamese relationship, which was but one 
manifestation of the rule of ritual built into the Qing tributary world. Rather than being merely 
metaphysical, ritual could have very real consequences in this early modern East Asian world.  
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CHAPTER VI. 
Territorial and Personal Boundaries in the Qing-Kokand Borderland, 1760s-1840s 
 
I. Introduction 
 
A. Qing Conquest of Xinjiang 
 The Qing conquest of Xinjiang came in three phases. The first phase began in 1755, 
when the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-95) sent 50,000 soldiers against the Zunghars led by 
Dawaci (達瓦齊; r. 1752-55). The Zunghar state, by then, had been suffering from ten years of 
internal division after the death of the last Zunghar khan Galdan Tseren in 1745. In fact, leading 
the Qing campaign against Dawaci was Amursana (阿睦爾撒納; d. 1757), the former ally of 
Dawaci who had submitted to the Qing in 1753. Mainly due to this internal division, the Qing 
achieved an easy and swift victory over its archnemesis: Dawaci was captured in Ush (烏什), 
escorted to Beijing, and then coopted into the Qing nobility. What was the Qing state to do with 
Xinjiang? Despite Amursana’s demand that he become khan of the Zunghars, Qianlong had a 
coherent policy of divide and rule. He planned to divide northern Xinjiang, the center of the 
Zunghar Khanate also known as Zungharia, among four different rulers including Amursana. 
Southern Xinjiang, also known as Altishahr (“six cities”) and the Tarim Basin, was to be ruled 
by the brothers Burhan al-Din and Khoja-Jahan, khojas of the Naqshbandi Sufi order whose 
family had ruled the region before the Zunghars. 
 The second phase of the Qing conquest began with Amursana’s “rebellion” in October 
1755. Unhappy with Qianlong’s rejection of his demand, Amursana decided to build a khanate 
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for himself by attacking the Qing forces stationed in Ili (伊犁). Even though Amursana’s revolt 
coincided with the revolt of the Khalkha prince Chingünjav in Mongolia, there was little 
coordination between the two forces. This lack of coordination would doom both revolts, and the 
Qing forces were again in control of Zungharia by 1757. Even though Amursana escaped the 
Qing forces by fleeing to Russia, he died from smallpox in Tobolsk in September 1757. The third 
phase of the Qing conquest began with the rebellion of the Khoja brothers in Altishahr, which 
lasted from 1757 to 1759. Thus, by 1759, the Qing state had conquered both Zungharia and 
Altishahr, which it had planned to rule indirectly through clients.1 
 
B. Qing Xinjiang 
 Upon its conquest, the Qing state did not incorporate Xinjiang as a regular province in the 
model of the junxian system, subdivided into prefectures and counties. Rather, the administration 
of the region was an amalgam of different systems—military, beg, junxian, and jasak—
coexisting with one another in three regions of Xinjiang: Altishahr, often recorded in Qing 
sources as Huibu (回部; Muslim region) or Nanlu (南路; Southern route); Zungharia, often 
recorded in Qing sources as Zhunbu (准部; Zunghar region) or Beilu (北路; Northern route); and 
Eastern March (eastern Xinjiang).2 Because this study concerns Qing relations with other Central 
Asian polities, which most often affected Altishahr and, to a degree, Zungharia, I will limit the 
present survey to those two regions. 
                                                          
1 Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2005), 256-301. 
 
2 James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), 150-1. 
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 The military was the most important administrative system in Xinjiang from the 
perspective of the Qing court, to the extent that Joseph Fletcher has even characterized Xinjiang 
as a huge garrison under the command of the military governor (jiangjun) stationed at Ili in 
Zungharia. Assisting the military governor were the councilors (canzan dachen). Two were 
stationed in Zungharia, one each in Ili and Tarbagatai. The councilor stationed in Altishahr, often 
in Kashgar (喀什噶爾) but sometimes in Yarkand (葉爾羌), oversaw Altishahr. Reporting to the 
councilor were the superintendents (banshi dachen) stationed in other major cities of Altishahr 
and the commandants of the forces (lingdui dachen) stationed throughout Xinjiang. Answering 
to all the officials mentioned above, often collectively called ambans (Ch: dachen, meaning high 
officials), were military personnel of the Eight Banners (baqi) and Green Standards (luying).3 
 Because of the linguistic and cultural gaps between the residents of Xinjiang and the 
Qing officials stationed there, however, the Qing state incorporated local Muslim elites (beg) 
into its bureaucracy for day-to-day administration of the region, instituting what is often called a 
beg system. At the top of this system were the hakim beg, the governor in charge of a city, and 
the ishikagha beg, the assistant governor. Below them were the begs whose duties were more 
specizlied, such as the shang beg (commerce) and the qadi beg (the sharia). These begs held 
Qing bureaucratic ranks ranging from the 3rd to the 7th. Some of them, especially those from 
Eastern March who had helped the Qing conquest of Xinjiang and their descendants, even held 
the titles of imperial nobility (jue). The court also allowed the begs to participate in tributary 
missions to Beijing (rujin) on a regular basis. In these ways, the begs and the ambans gradually 
developed an interdependent relationship. Even though the prerogative to memorialize the 
                                                          
3 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 20-43; Joseph Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c. 1800,” in John K Fairbank, ed., The 
Cambridge History of China, Volume 10, Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1978), 35-106. 
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emperor was often limited to the ambans, they were expected to work in tandem with the begs in 
important matters. Especially in the matters of foreign relations, as we will see in detail below, 
the ambans depended almost entirely on the begs to engage in diplomacy and intelligence 
gathering.4 
 During the 1757-59 Qing campaign against the Khoja brothers (Burhān al-Dīn and 
Khōja-Jahān) in Altishahr, several Central Asian rulers came to the Qing generals in charge to 
submit to Qing rule. Among them were the rulers of oasis polities such as Irdana Beg (額爾德尼; 
r. 1751-70), the ruler of Kokand (Ma: Hoohan; Ch: 霍罕), and the rulers of nomadic tribes such 
as two Kirghiz (Ma: Burut; Ch: 布嚕特) chieftains named Mahmud Quli and Hajji Biy 
(阿濟比).5 From the Qing perspective, these newly submitted polities did not qualify as “states” 
(Ch: guo; Ma: gurun) comparable to Chosŏn Korea or Lê/Nguyễn Vietnam. They were outer 
tribes (tulergi aiman), dwelling in pastures (nukte), and most importantly, ruled and represented 
by begs and biis, not kings. The Qing state treated the rulers of such “tribes” as equals of 
Xinjiang begs and subordinate to the Qing ambans stationed in Xinjiang. Korean and 
Vietnamese kings, we might recall, communicated with Qing provincial officials on an equal 
footing.  
 Even though Qing regarded Kokand and the Kirghiz as belonging in the same category, 
there was a substantial difference between the two polities. For one, though Mahmud Quli and 
Hajji Biy had claimed rule over the Eastern and Western Kirghiz, this was a wildly exaggerated 
                                                          
4 L. J. Newby, “The Begs of Xinjiang: Between Two Worlds,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 
61, no. 2 (1998): 278–97; Kwangmin Kim, Borderland Capitalism: Turkestan Produce, Qing Silver, and the Birth 
of an Eastern Market (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016) is a recent study that recognizes a much bigger 
role that the beg played in Qing Xinjiang.  
 
5 Newby, The Empire and the Khanate, 21-44. 
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claim due to the structure of Kirghiz society. The Kirghiz were pastoral nomads who were 
divided into tribes (Ma. aiman or otok), themselves ruled by several different chieftains. In 
contrast, Kokand was a centralizing polity based in the urban centers of Fergana Valley and was 
at least nominally under one ruler. By the early nineteenth century, centralizing efforts by 
Kokand rulers had advanced to the point that they could style themselves as khans ruling over a 
khanate. This difference would come to play a significant role in Qing relations with its Central 
Asian neighbors, as Kokand would emerge as the regional player competing with Qing for 
control over territory and peoples, forcing the Qing state to retreat from its conception of Qing 
Xinjiang as unbounded and unlimited. The real losers in this contest, however, were the Kirghiz 
tribes, whose pastures were vulnerable to attempts to regulate and control the steppe frontiers by 
Qing, Kokand, and then Russian states.6 
 
II. Territorial Boundaries 
 
A. Karun: The Clearest Territorial Marker 
 
1. The Karun as the Border Post 
 Even though historians have moved away from the modernist concept of sharply defined 
borders when looking at premodern and early modern state formation and interstate relations, 
there is still a tendency to look for physical markers of boundaries or documented evidence of 
                                                          
6 Russian attempts to colonize the steppe are most well-documented. Cf. Willard Sunderland, Taming the Wild 
Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Michael 
Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2002). 
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them, whether textual or cartographic.7 In that sense, it is not surprising that the boundaries of 
the Qing empire in Central Asia are most often equated with the karuns (Ch: kalun), Qing border 
posts in Central Asia. The karuns were always manned by bannermen and often worked as the 
boundary distinguishing between what lay within the karun line (ka nei) and what lay outside (ka 
wai).8  
 According to Ma Changquan’s comprehensive study of the karun, the karun developed as 
a military institution in Manchuria before the Qing conquest of China proper. Its original role 
included patrol of the borderlands, prevention of foreign invasions, suppression of internal 
upheaval, and preservation of peace in the borderlands. By the time karun made their way to 
Xinjiang, their role had been expanded to encompass non-military affairs such as the supervision 
of trade, management of tribal and foreign affairs, information gathering, and prevention of 
trespassing.9 Locally, a karun was managed first by the amban in charge of the district and then 
by the Ili military governor, the highest-ranking official in Xinjiang. In Beijing, the Lifanyuan, 
often translated as the Court of Colonial Affairs but understood more accurately in its Manchu 
rendition tulergi golo be dasara jurgan (Ministry That Rules Outer Provinces), oversaw 
administration of karuns across the entire Qing domain. 
 One of the most crucial functions of karuns in Xinjiang was regulating the movement of 
people and goods by functioning as border checkpoints for people entering and leaving the area 
inside the karuns. Let us look at one example from 1762. Qing personnel at the Šatu (沙土) 
                                                          
7 For one example, see Jordan Branch, The Cartographic State: Maps, Territory, and the Origins of Sovereignty 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
 
8 This inner-outer distinction was one of the roles played by the Great Wall. See Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian 
Frontiers of China (New York: American Geographical Society, 1940) and Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of 
China: From History to Myth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
 
9 Ma Changquan, Qingdai kalun zhidu yanjiu (Ha’erbin: Ha’erbin chubanshe, 2005), 36-64, 144-189.  
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karun in Ush checked the baggage of some Kirghiz who had traded in Ush and found that they 
had bought 14 matchlocks, side swords, and suits of cotton armor. Yungking (永慶; d. 1805), the 
Ush superintendent, confiscated these weapons, reimbursed the Kirghiz, and memorialized the 
Qianlong emperor. This report caused Qianlong to order a collective investigation throughout 
Altishahr on whether the trade in weapons between Altishahr Muslims and Kirghiz had been 
banned during the Zunghar period and how the Qing state should regulate this trade. 
Investigation by Altishahr ambans, who consulted the Muslim hakim begs and Kirghiz 
chieftains, revealed that there was no law prohibiting sales of weapons by Altshahr Musliims to 
people of outer tribes (tulergi aiman) in the regions bordering Kirghiz pastures (Kashgar, 
Yengisar, Yarkand, Aksu, and Ush). Even the inspection of possessions was a new practice 
introduced by the installation of the karuns in Xinjiang. These officials, therefore, proposed 
banning the sale of weapons like flintlocks and putting the hakim begs of these regions in charge 
of inspection. The emperor approved this recommendation.10  
 This series of events shows how the Qing conquest of Xinjiang gradually distinguished 
Xinjiang from its neighboring regions. First, installation of the karuns demarcated a physical 
boundary between Xinjiang and its neighboring regions. Second, this physical demarcation was 
accompanied by the new custom of inspection of people and goods. Finally, this new custom 
would give rise to a body of codified regulations that prohibited the movement of certain people 
and commodities in and out of Qing Xinjiang. Below and in chapter seven, we will encounter 
further examples of these historical developments. 
                                                          
10 Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan and Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin, eds., Qingdai Xinjiang Manwen 
dang’an huibian (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2012) (QXMDH hereafter) 67: 439-443 (Yunggui, 
Sinju, Haiming, Emin Khoja, Iletu, Hokijung; QL27.8.9/QL27.9.11); Qing shilu (QSL hereafter), Gaozong 663: 
416b-417a (QL27.i5.18=7/9/1762), 670: 491b (QL27.9.10=10/26/1762). 
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2. The Karun Line as an Administrative Division  
 As L. J. Newby has shown, however, the karuns did not represent the territorial limits of 
the empire, at least in the early decades after the conquest.11 Most importantly, the Qing state 
more than once refused requests from Kokand to delineate territorial boundaries between Qing 
and Kokand at the karun line of Kashgar. In early 1763, for example, Irdana Beg sent an envoy 
to Kashgar to express his desire to delineate the boundary between Altishahr and Kokand at the 
Kashgar Mountains, at the feet of which stood the karun line in Kashgar. The Qianlong emperor 
considered this an insolent request that compromised Qing territoriality in Central Asia and 
blamed Irdana Beg’s attitude on the supposedly soft language of Kashgar superintendent 
Yunggui (永貴; d. 1783).12 
 Moreover, the Qing government in Xinjiang engaged in many official activities beyond 
the karuns. Most obviously, Qing troops in Xinjiang went on seasonal patrols to lands outside 
the karun line. Troops stationed in Ili, for example, patrolled the Kazakh pastures beyond the 
karuns every year, usually departing in the seventh month of the lunar year and returning in the 
ninth month of the lunar year.13 They also patrolled the Kirghiz frontier annually, usually 
departing in the fifth month of the lunar year and returning in the seventh month of the lunar 
year.14 Troops stationed in Kashgar, for their part, patrolled the lands outside the karun line that 
                                                          
11 Newby, The Empire and the Khanate, 31-32.  
 
12 Ibid, 33-6; QXMDH 60: 302-6 (Yunggui, Yangsangga; QL28.1.17/28.2.17). 
 
13 Jin Noda, The Kazakh Khanates Between the Russian and Qing Empires: Central Eurasian International 
Relations during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 260-303. 
 
14 QXMHD 224: 95-6 (Narsungga; JQ14.3.25/14.4.26). 
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connected to various Kirghiz pastures and areas under Kokand control.15 Ush troops in four 
karuns west of the city patrolled the Kirghiz pastures outside the karuns every spring and fall.16  
 Finally, the karun line, like any administrative creation, could be modified over time 
according to the needs of the Qing state. Benjamin Levey documents one example of such 
modification in his dissertation. He writes that the Qing court implemented a “flexible karun 
regime” in 1767 in response to the continuous problem of Kazakhs crossing the karun line in 
pursuit of their seasonal migration routes. Instead of driving away all Kazakhs found inside the 
karun line, which had been the official policy up to that point, the court first decided to allow the 
Kazakhs to spend winters inside the karun line if they paid 1 percent of their livestock as taxes. 
The court showed the administrative nature of the karun line with its next decision. By moving 
its karun line inwards between late fall and spring, the court would allow the Kazakhs to spend 
the winter technically “outside” the karun line, although they still had to pay the 1 percent tax. In 
the summer, the Kazkahs would have to leave, the karuns would move back to their original 
line.17 
 
B. Qing Xinjiang as a Zunghar Inheritence 
 Another reason we cannot equate the karun line with the Qing territorial boundary in 
Xinjiang is the Qing imperial pretension to universal rule. As we have seen in chapters two and 
four, two visions of the Qing realm coexisted: a vision of a bounded Qing domain and a vision of 
an unbounded “All Under Heaven” (Tianxia). The balance between these two visions leaned 
                                                          
15 QXMDH 67: 319 (Nasiton et al; QL29.3.10/29.4.11). 
 
16 QXMDH 105: 308-9 (Antai, Tusangga; QL37.2.30/37.3.25). 
 
17 Benjamin Samuel Levey, “Jungar Refugees and the Making of Empire on Qing China’s Kazakh Frontier, 1759-
1773” (Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2014). 198-208.  
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decidedly toward this second vision during the 1750s and 1760s. This was the height of Qing 
expansionism, with the defeat of its archnemesis, the Zunghars, followed by the conquest and 
incoprorationn of Xinjiang into the Qing realm. The empire now was a qualitatively different 
empire from that of the 1630s and the 1640s, when Qing was establishing a tributary relationship 
with Chosŏn as a frontier khanate trying to protect its hard-won territory and subjects, and from 
that of the 1660s and the 1670s, when Qing was establishing a tributary relationship with Lê 
Vietnam as a successor state to Ming trying to inherit former Ming territory, subjects, and 
tributaries. 
 As many scholars have noted, the Qianlong emperor was intensely proud of this imperial 
expansion and extremely self-conscious of his place in the history of Chinese dynasties and on 
the world stage. Thus, the conquest of Xinjiang was followed by the writing of official histories, 
the erection of stelai in Xinjiang and elsewhere in the imperial realm, the production of 
copperplate engravings, and the publication of geographic and linguistic surveys of the region, 
all of which celebrated the unique historical achievement of the conquest and the universality of 
Qing rule.18 
 On a more practical level was the Qing claim to all former Zunghar lands. It is true, as 
Benjamin Levey has demonstrated, that the Qing empire did not lay claim to the former Zunghar 
lands under Russian control.19 It is also true, however, that Russian expansion into Central Asia 
was fairly limited in the eighteenth century. Before the nineteenth century, Russia was busy 
                                                          
18 Mark C. Elliott, Emperor Qianlong: Son of Heaven, Man of the World (New York: Pearson Longman, 2009), 86-
106; Perdue, China Marches West, 409-94; Enoki Kazuo, “Researches in Chinese Turkestan during the Ch’ien-Lung 
Period, with Special Reference to the Hsi-Yü-T’ung-Wen-Chih,” Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo 
Bunko 14 (1955): 1–43; Takata Tokio, “Qianlong Emperor’s Copperplate Engravings of the ‘Conquest of Western 
Regions,’” Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko 70 (2012): 111–23. 
 
19 Levey, “Jungar Refugees and the Making of Empire on Qing China’s Kazakh Frontier, 1759-1773,” 185-191. 
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transforming its steppe frontier with the Nogays, the Kalmyks, and the Small Horde and Middle 
Horde of the Kazakhs, far from the Qing karun lines.20 There was no “Russian Turkestan” until 
1867, when the Russian state created a new Governor-Generalship from recently conquered 
lands.21 As a result, many of the limits that the Qing empire claimed in theory and reinforced in 
practice lay well beyond the karuns. 
 Lake Issyk Kul (Ma: Temurtu Noor; Ch: 特穆爾圖諾爾) in today’s Kyrgyzstan was one 
such territorial limit. During an imperial audience in 1758, Kirghiz envoys requested that the 
Qianlong emperor grant the Kirghiz their old pasture (jiu youmu) at Issyk Kul. Qianlong initially 
rejected the request. To the Kirghiz envoys, he explained that since Issyk Kul had long belonged 
to the Zunghars, the Kirghiz could not still regard it as their domain. To Jao Hūi (兆惠; d. 1764) 
and Fude (富德; d. 1776), generals stationed in Ili, the emperor revealed other reasons behind his 
refusal: Issyk Kul was close to Ili and might even have suitable land for military farming 
(tuntian), thus it could not be given away easily (duan bu qing yu). Five years later, Qianlong 
was still concerned about the possibility that Issyk Kul might be occupied by non-Qing peoples. 
Responding to Tulbingga (圖爾炳阿; d. 1765)’s memorial from Ush regarding a rumor that 
some Kirghiz and Kazakhs might have moved to Issyk Kul, Qianlong reaffirmed his Issyk Kul 
policy. Recollecting his previous edict to Ili military governor Mingšui (明瑞; d. 1768), which 
had ordered that the Qing troops patrolling the Chu (吹) and Talas (塔拉斯) regions in today’s 
                                                          
20 Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier; Allen J. Frank, “The Qazaqs and Russia,” in The Cambridge History of 
Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo, Allen J. Frank, and Peter B. Golden (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 363–79. 
 
21 Richard A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1960), 17-45. 
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Kyrgyzstan drive away any Kirghiz and Kazakhs residing there, Qianlong ordered the same 
procedure for Issyk Kul. Any Kirghiz and Kazakhs found living there were to be expelled.22 
 Even in 1778, by which time Kazakhs had already been allowed to spend winters in Issyk 
Kul, Qianlong sought to reaffirm the Qing claim on Issyk Kul by firmly declining the request of 
Kirghiz chieftain Ma-mu-bo-te (瑪木伯特) to move to Issyk Kul. Reasoning that the Kirghiz, 
who often trespassed and farmed within the Qing domain, were not to be compared to Kazakhs, 
he expressed his worry that the Kirghiz might become entrenched in Issyk Kul. If this request 
were to be granted, he predicted, these Kirghiz would plant seeds in spring, harvest the fields in 
fall, and find an excuse in the winter weather to stay there all year.23 Whether or not his comment 
on the more agraraian and sedentary lifestyle of the Kirgzhi is valid, here we can see Qianlong 
drawing a distinction between seasonal pasturing and permanent settlement. Outer tribes were 
not to settle permanently in the Qing domain, which lay well outside the karun line.  
 At-Bashi (阿特巴什) in today’s Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, was determined to lie 
outside Qing territorial limits. In 1760, a mahacin (瑪哈沁; a Zunghar fugitive) testified that 
1,000 or so Kirghiz households had moved to At-Bashi. This At-Bashi, according to a Qing 
officer of Oirat (the Qing designation for former Zunghars) heritage, was originally a Zunghar 
pasture. If this were true, Qianlong reasoned, since the former pastures (jiu youmu) of the 
Zunghars were all his domain (jie wo bantu), this would constitute trespassing (yu yue) on the 
part of the Kirghiz. In Beijing, Khoja Si Bek (霍集斯; d. 1781), the former Ush governor under 
the Zunghars who had defected to the Qing, gave a different testimony. According to him, At-
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Bashi was originally a Kirghiz pasture before the Zunghars took it away from them, and the 
Kirghiz had been living there for three or four years already after the Qing pacification of 
Zungharia. Qianlong ordered the Ili officials Šuhede (舒赫德; 1710-77) and Agūi (阿桂; 1717-
97) to investigate the matter thoroughly and memorialize on it. The reinvestigation revealed that 
At-Bashi was not listed on a map of Issyk Kul compiled by Fude because it was far from Ili. 
Interrogation of more Oirats also revealed that it indeed was a Kirghiz pasture that had been 
occupied by the Zunghars. At-Bashi, thus, was determined to lie outside the Qing territorial 
limits in Xinjiang.24 
 
C. The Imperial Retreat: From the “Old Boundaries” to the Karun Line  
 As we have seen above, and as we will see in more detail below, Kirghiz migration 
networks across Central Asia, which more often defied than acknowledged Qing notions of 
territorial boundaries, were mostly beyond Qing control. The Qing state, regardless of the fact it 
was the regional hegemon in the eighteenth century, did not have enough personnel or developed 
institutions to control its borders in any systematic manner. In fact, we now know from recent 
studies that even modern colonial and national states have had immense difficulties in exerting 
control over various borderland groups and their movements across the borders.25  
 Kokand expansionism in the first half of the nineteenth century was also mostly beyond 
Qing control and resulted in shifting boundaries in and around Qing Xinjiang. In the 1830s and 
1840s, Kokand embarked on territorial expansion on all fronts in its quest for trade monopoly in 
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25 For one example, see Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast 
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eastern Central Asia. To the north, Kokand encroached on the Chu and Talas regions. To the 
south, Kokand moved on to the Pamir Mountains and Sariqol. Importantly for our discussion, 
these were the regions claimed by the Qing court that lay outside the karun line. As Newby has 
noted, the Daoguang (r. 1821-50) court was intent on avoiding confrontation with Kokand, 
choosing to focus solely on defending the karun. The Kokand expansion and the Qing response 
to it during this period effectively delineated the territorial boundary between Qing Xinjiang and 
Kokand at the karun line. As attested by Newby, “despite their scattered locations, unconnected 
by road, river or mountain, the karun were gradually becoming synonymous with the concept of 
a territorial boundary.”26 
 That is not to say that the Daoguang court openly acknowledged Kokand sovereignty 
over these regions. On the one hand, the Daoguang emperor did instruct his Xinjiang officials to 
exhort the Kokand ruler to maintain the “old boundaries (jiu jie)” whenever reports on Kokand 
territorial expansion arrived at Beijing. On the other hand, the Daoguang emperor was quick to 
point out to his Xinjiang officials that their business lay within the karun line, not beyond it. 
Thus, the Qing court of the first half of the nineteenth century acknowledged the karun line as 
the de facto, if not de jure, territorial boundary between its domain in Xinjiang and the Kokand 
domain.  
 
III. Subjecthood: “Outer Tribes” and the Meaning of Albatu 
 Further complicating this already complex interplay between different notions of 
territorial boundaries, there existed multiple, flexible, and changing boundaries between Qing 
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subjects and non-Qing subjects in Qing Central Asia. The status of the Kirghiz offers a perfect 
example of this flexibility and elasticity. 
 English-language scholarship on Qing imperialism has seen remarkable growth in depth 
and breadth in the past two decades. Among its many contributions, it has shown us that we 
cannot equate the Qing empire, with all its Inner Asian characteristics and pluralities, with the 
modern Chinese nation-state. Despite this acknowledgement, however, there is still a tendency in 
the field to unconsciously set the spatial and conceptual limits of the Qing empire at the national 
borders of the PRC and ROC. Thus, even though we see the Qing empire as an imperial state, we 
tend to focus more on Qing imperial projects inside today’s “Chinese” borders and pay less 
attention to Qing imperial projects outside those borders.  
 The Qing policy towards the Kirghiz is one of these understudied topics. The lack of 
available sources has played a part. Though Nicola Di Cosmo looked at Qing-Kirghiz relations 
in two pioneering studies, he was limited to the Manchu-language palace memorials from 1806 
to 1807.27 With the recent publication of the 283-volume collection of Manchu-language palace 
memorials from Xinjiang, which is the main source of materials used in this chapter and chapter 
seven, we can begin to look at the development of the Qing Kirghiz policy over a longer period. 
In this section, I will use Qing-Kirghiz relations as a case study of tributary subjecthood in Qing 
Central Asia.  
 
A. Kirghiz near the Karun 
                                                          
27 Nicola Di Cosmo, “Reports from the Northwest: A Selection of Manchu Memorials from Kashgar (1806-1807),” 
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Gift Exchange?” in Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries and Human Geographies in Chinese History, ed. Nicola 
Di Cosmo and Don J. Wyatt (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 351–72. 
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 In his seminal 2005 book, Peter Perdue analyzed how the Qing state systematically 
incorporated Qinghai (Kokonor) into its empire during the Yongzheng (r. 1723-35) period. A 
key point of the incorporation was organizing the Mongols “into fixed ‘tribes,’ defined as 
territorially and administratively circumscribed units, with leaders appointed by the state.”28 
Following the conquest of Xinjiang, we see the Qing state repeating that process, albeit on a 
much smaller scale and less thoroughly, with the Kirghiz who lived near the karun. 
 
1. Granting of Fixed Pastures  
 Many Kirghiz chieftains came to submit to Qing rule after the Qing conquest of Xinjiang 
in 1759. Of interest to us are the Kirghiz chieftains who submitted with hundreds of households 
and requested to be given pastures. When the Altishahr authorities reported these requests to 
him, Qianlong almost always accepted these Kirghiz groups and settled them near the karun. In 
the spring of 1761, for example, Hibcak (希布察克) Kirghiz chieftain Emur Bii (額穆爾比) 
submitted with 400-some households and was given Hūdusun as his personal pasture.29  
 In theory, and often in practice during the Qianlong period, these Kirghiz chieftains had 
to ask permission from the Qing amban who had jurisdiction over them to move to different 
pastures. In 1771, for example, the Hibcak imperial guardsman Esen (額森) came to Kashgar to 
request a new pasture due to hostilities within his current pasture. The Kashgar amban instructed 
the hakim beg Gadaimet to investigate the truth of the matter, and Gadaimet’s report matched 
                                                          
28 Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
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Esen’s story. Esen’s request to move to a new pasture was eventually approved by the amban 
and the emperor.30 In 1792, Cirik (齊哩克) and Hūšici (呼什齊) chieftains came to Ush to 
request relocation due to the growth in their numbers. Their request to Ush superintendent 
Funišan (富尼善; d. 1802) to use Sepurbai, unoccupied land outside the Baši Yahama 
(巴什雅哈瑪) karun, as their new pasture was approved.31  
 While it is true that requests for relocation were often approved by the Qing authorities, 
those who relocated without permission could be censured and punished, at least in principle, for 
doing so. In 1767, for example, when Yarkand authorities became aware of the relocation of the 
Hara Hibcak Kirghiz chieftain Tilyance from his pasture at Tagaram, the superintendent Jinggeri 
(旌額理; d. 1771) and the hakim beg Emin Khoja ruled that Tiliyance must remain in Tagaram 
as his father Gadai Bii had originally been instructed.32 As we will see below, in 1765 and 1783, 
the unsanctioned relocation of two Hūšici chieftains—Narabatu and his cousin Berke 
respectively—to the Kokand domain prompted an uproar within the Qing court.33 Qianlong’s 
plan to punish them severely to make an example out of these cases, however, was unsuccessful 
due to lack of cooperation on the part of Kokandi rulers.34 
                                                          
30 QXMDH 100: 290-3 (Fusembu, Tusangga, Suldei; QL36.6.2/36.7.5). 
 
31 QXMDH 195: 107-10 (Funišan; QL57.3.16/57.4.14). 
 
32 QXMDH 86: 202-6 (Jinggeri, Emin Khoja; QL32.11.11/32.12.13). 
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 The Altishahr ambans, in fact, were specifically charged with administration of the 
Kirghiz living near the karun under their jurisdiction. Until 1777, all Kirghiz tribes were under 
the jurisdiction of Kashgar (geren aiman i burut sebe gemu kasigar i harangga obufi), with the 
Kashgar amban making a seasonal (forgon aname) report to the Board of Work. Starting in 
1777, the Ush ambans were put in charge of the two groups of Kirghiz living near Ush and 
began to make seasonal reports to the Board of Work on those groups.35  
 
2. Granting and Inheritance of Rank Buttons and Feathers 
 The Qianlong emperor built a personal relation with Kirghiz chieftains by bestowing 
buttons (Ch: ding; Ma: jingse) and feathers (Ch: ling; Ma: funggala) that they could wear on 
their hats to indicate their ranks within the Qing bureaucracy. The privilege of wearing these 
buttons and feathers put the Kirghiz chieftains on a level with the local Muslim elites who were 
given posts as various begs. The beg posts had ranks corresponding to those of the regular Qing 
bureaucracy, with the hakim begs of the biggest Altishahr cities at rank 3. All these begs had the 
privilege of wearing buttons and feathers corresponding to their posts.36 
 Moreover, these buttons and feathers could be inherited with imperial approval as a sign 
of succession. The earliest record I have found for inheritance of buttons and feathers comes 
from 1762. After the death of the Hibcak chieftain Emur Bii in 1761, the Kashgar ambans  
Yunggui and Iletu (伊勒圖) recommended to Qianlong that Emur Bii’s brother Murut should be 
put in charge of Emur Bii’s pasture and people. With imperial approval, Murut came to Kashgar 
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with Emur Bii’s rank 3 button, which was then awarded to Murut as a sign of succession. With 
this case, the inheritance of buttons and feathers was linked to the succession of chieftaincy from 
the Qing perspective.37 
 Because of this practice of inheritance and succession, noble lines arose among the 
Kirghiz that were comparable to the lines of Xinjiang begs. The line of the Cungbagaši (充巴噶
什) chieftain Awal (阿瓦勒) is a good example. After his initial submission, Awal exerted 
himself by herding government livestock and assisting Qing troops in the suppression of the 
1765 Ush Rebellion.38 When Awal died in 1783, the Qianlong emperor allowed his son Bošihūi 
(玻什輝) to succeed Awal and inherit his rank 3 button, peacock feather (hualing), and garden.39 
Bošihūi outdid his father during his own lifetime, receiving a rank 2 button for his help in 
managing a large-scale Kirghiz horse robbery case in 1790.40 By the time Bošihūi died in 1811 at 
49 years of age, according to Kashgar ambans Tiyeboo (鐵保) and Hafungga (哈豐阿), he “took 
care of all Kirghiz tribes living outside the [Kashgar] karun (karun i tule de tehe geren aiman i 
burut sebe bargiyatame kadalara).” Bošihūi’s oldest son Suranci (蘇蘭奇) was allowed to 
succeed him.41  
 In general, the ambans did not play a decisive role in choosing successors. In most cases, 
their role was limited to confirming the favored successor within the tribe. At the same time, the 
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38 QSL Gaozong, 694: 776a (QL28.9.3=10/9/1763); QXMDH 64: 30-1 (Yunggui, Yangsangga; QL28.7.28/28.9.3), 
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ambans did try to inform themselves about succession patterns. For example, the death of the 
Edegene (額德格納) rank 3 bii Ajibii (阿濟比) in 1780 was reported to the Kashgar ambans in 
1781 by Ajibii’s second son Yeltiyebai (葉爾鐵拜) and four of Ajibii’s ahalakci (Ch. 阿哈拉克
齊: a title of minor Kirghiz chieftains). Perhaps because of Ajibii’s importance, the Kashgar 
ambans ordered an investigation from the top echelon of the bii and beg: Kashgar hakim beg 
Osman, Hibcak rank 2 bii Akim, and Cungbagaši rank 3 bii Awal. When their report confirmed 
the report of the Edegene ahalakci that Yeltiyebai was supported by his people, Yeltiyebai was 
allowed to succeed Ajibii and inherit his button and feather.42 
 This practice of asking for imperial permission for succession was not limited to the biis 
and ahalakcis who held the most prestigious buttons and feathers. Minor biis and ahalakcis who 
held buttons of rank 6 or gold buttons also diligently came to ask for imperial permission in the 
succession of positions and inheritance of these imperial gifts. Interestingly, even those 
chieftains who had not received any buttons and feathers would come to the nearest amban to 
report on the succession. In 1775, for example, Monggoldor bii Haraci’s sons Akyol and Jail 
came to Ush to report on the death of Haraci and the wish of the tribe to make Akyol his 
successor, even though Haraci had held no button and feather during his lifetime.43 
 
3. Regulated Trade with Qing Xinjiang 
 The Kirghiz near the karuns, then, constituted a buffer between the settled regions of 
Xinjiang within the karun line and the various peoples residing beyond. As such, the Kirghiz 
near the karuns interacted with the Xinjiang Muslims on a regular basis. In that sense, it is not 
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surprising that periodic memorials from the Kashgar or Ush ambans on the state of the regions 
under their jurisdiction employed the stock phrase “Muslims and Kirghiz living together in 
harmony.”44 
 Already in 1762, there were reports of land transactions between Yengisar (英吉沙爾)  
Muslims and Kirghiz who had been given lands west of Yengisar as pastures. When disputes 
between these two groups arose over the issue, the representatives of these groups—Hibcak 
chieftain Akim and Yengisar hakim beg Sultanhojo—turned to Kashgar ambans for mediation.45 
Other types of commercial transaction between Kirghiz and Xinjiang Muslims were also 
common. For one thing, the Kirghiz sent periodic envoys to Kashgar and Ush, and they were 
often allowed to conduct duty-free trade of horses and other goods that they brought with them. 
They were also allowed to conduct trade with residents of Kashgar and Ush at regular intervals. 
This trade was regular enough that both parties could trade on credit, which sometimes led to 
violent encounters requiring Qing intervention. A murder case in 1794 provides a good example. 
Cungbagaši Kirghiz Abulaka and Seti had drawn up a contract with a Kashgar cloth weaver 
named Iburaim. Despite their advance payment, Abulaka and Seti found that Iburaim had no 
cloth product to give them, and a dispute arose over the unfulfilled contract obligations. The 
dispute turned violent when Iburaim killed Abulaka, and Seti escaped to report the incident to the 
Kashgar authorities. Iburaim was eventually executed at the Kashgar bazaar in front of Kirghiz 
merchants, while Seti was reimbursed for his loss.46 
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 The 1794 regulations on the Xinjiang Muslims trading beyond the karun also show that 
the Kirghiz living near the karun line held a different position from outer tribes who lived far 
beyond the karuns. In his proposal, the Kashgar councilor Yungboo (永保) allowed Xinjiang 
Muslim traders to go as far as the pastures of certain Kirghiz tribes: the Cungbagaši, Edegene, 
Sarbagaši (薩爾巴噶什), Buku (布庫), and Cirik. These traders, however, were not allowed to 
enter more distant Kirghiz pastures.47  
 
4. Kirghiz Services and Rewards 
 These inner Kirghiz also performed many services for the Qing state in Xinjiang and 
received rewards for their services. In this capacity, they frequently interacted with the 
bannermen ambans and Muslim nobles of Xinjiang. As such, they formed an important and 
understudied part of Qing rule in Xinjiang.  
 Some Kirghiz participated in various building projects. In 1761, for example, Kashgar 
superintendent Šuhede (舒赫德; 1710-77) sent Kirghiz residing in Yengisar and Sarikol to Isil 
Kul to erect a stele commemorating the Qing conquest of Xinjiang. The Hibcak chieftain Akim 
was put in charge of this work.48 In 1793, a 100-year-old Kirghiz named Jontomas was granted a 
gold button for building a bridge on the Naryn River.49 
 Other Kirghiz were responsible for taking care of government livestock. In 1763, 
Kashgar ambans put the Hibcak chieftain Akim and the Cungbagaši chieftain Awal in charge of 
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herding government livestock. From then on, we see periodic records of the Kirghiz fulfilling 
this role. In 1767, for example, Akim’s brother Yaksa was rewarded for herding government 
livestock along with 15 of his subordinates. In 1769, Hibcak chieftain Esen was rewarded for 
herding government livestock. From a memorial in 1776, we also learn that Kirghiz pastured 
government horses outside the karun line that year, following precedent.50  
 One of the most important services these Kirghiz provided was military. During the Ush 
rebellion of 1765, many Kirghiz helped Qing troops put down the rebellion. The Sarbagaši 
chieftain Cirikci, for example, informed Xinjiang officials how Ush Muslims were propagating 
“false rumors” to draw supporters among Sarbagaši Kirghiz, and he was entrusted with their 
capture. Hearing that these Muslims were doing the same thing in the pasture of the Monggoldor 
Kirghiz, Cirikci sent three of his brothers to capture them. They captured two of these Muslims 
and handed them over to Bekun, the Kashgar superintendent. As far as Xinjiang authorities were 
concerned, Kirghiz service during this campaign was comparable to the service provided by 
Xinjiang Muslims. Thus, the list of meritorious individuals during the campaign drawn up for the 
Qianlong emperor included both Xinjiang Muslims and Kirghiz.51  
 From the Qing perspective, then, the services of and the rewards for the Kirghiz and 
Xinjiang Muslim nobles were comparable. An episode of Kirghiz succession in 1782 even shows 
family connections between these two groups. In September 1782, Noigūt rank 3 bii Osman, 
who had just succeeded his father Eimer, died of headache and dysentery. Maimat Sedik, 
Eimer’s only son, was only two years old, but Noigūt chieftains wished to have him succeed his 
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father. It is in this petition that we see Osman’s impressive family network. Osman’s father-in-
law was Akim, the leading Kirghiz noble at the time, and his maternal uncles were Yarkand 
hakim beg Setib Aldi (色提巴爾第) and Aksu hakim beg Akbek, Xinjiang Muslim nobles. 
Perhaps due to these connections, Maimat Sedik succeeded Osman and inherited his rank 3 
button and peacock feather.52  
 
B. Kirghiz on the Move 
 
1. Relocation as “Kirghiz Nature” 
 Kirghiz nomads were, by definition, a mobile people. Even at the height of the Qing 
Kirghiz policy during the Qianlong reign, there was no systematic attempt to turn the Kirghiz 
into a settled population. Indeed, a focal point of Qing Xinjiang policy was distinguishing 
Kazakh and Kirghiz nomads from settled populations of Kokand and Xinjiang, ruling each group 
in a distinct manner. This was in line with Qing imperial rule in general, which differentiated the 
borderlands from China Proper and ruled each borderland in a manner that suited the local 
conditions. The Qing state, as a result, was often forced to accept the Kirghiz migratory tendency 
as Kirghiz “nature.”  
 In spring of 1762, the Baskis bii Murat (伊穆喇特比), who had come to Kashgar to 
submit to Qing rule in 1761 and had just been settled in Aksai (阿克賽) with his 300 households, 
sent an envoy to Kashgar to give a report. He had apparently sent 200 households under three of 
his ahalakci to Yasai (雅賽) to farm there in summer and return to Aksai in winter. Kashgar 
                                                          
52 QXMDH 151: 329-32 (Cokto, Falingga; QL47.5.17/47.6.16), 152: 408-12 (Cokto, Falingga; QL47.9.9/47.10.8), 
153: 376-9 (Cokto, Falingga; QL47.11.18/). 
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councilor Iletu was disturbed by this report of unauthorized movement outside the pasture 
assigned to this group of Kirghiz and asked the Baskis envoy for the true reason of relocation. 
The envoy replied that Yasai merely was their old pasture, and that it was just a case of confused 
Kirghiz being unaware of regulations (kooli). In contrast to Iletu’s grave concern, however, 
Qianlong’s response in the rescript was nonchalant: “How is this important?” He elaborated on 
his position in an edict. The Kirghiz, according to him, were ignorant and only followed water 
and grass (wei zhi shuicao zhi li). Applying Qing regulations (neidi dingzhi) would only make 
them unnecessarily apprehensive. Besides, he continued, Yasai was only one postal station 
(zhan) away from Aksai. He instructed Yunggui, the Kashgar superintendent, and Iletu to not be 
sticklers in future cases of Kirghiz relocating for different pasture as long as the new pasture was 
not too far off. Qianlong turned out to be right in the short run, as these Baskis households 
returned to Aksai after the harvest.53  
 This exchange is significant in two ways. First, from Iletu’s position we see an attempt by 
the Qing state to regulate nomadic behaviors and put nomads in fixed pastures. Qing history is 
indeed full of precedents in which such attempts were successful. The Khalkha Mongols, for 
example, were transformed from “foreign state” (tulergi gurun) to “outer province” (tulergi 
golo) after the Dolon Nor assembly of 1691. Khalkha leaders were given fiefs and Manchu noble 
titles, and Khalkhas were enrolled in banners that were linked to separated territories with no 
freedom of movement.54 From Qianlong’s position, however, we also see an admission from the 
                                                          
53 QXMDH 53: 211-4 (Yunggui and Iletu; QL26.10.23/26.11.29), 54: 26-8 (Yunggui and Iletu; QL26.11.29/27.1.3), 
54: 126-7 (Yunggui and Iletu; QL26.12.20/27.1.11), 54: 228-34 (Yunggui, Iletu; 26.12.29/27.1.29), 55: 252-6 (Iletu; 
QL27.3.8/27.4.9), 55: 436-40 (Iletu; QL27.4.4/27.5.6), 58: 282-3 (Yunggui and Iletu; QL27.9.25/?); QSL, Gaozong 
658: 366b-367a (QL27.4.8=5/1/1762). 
 
54 Charles R. Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia (New York: Praeger, 1968), 39-8; Yi Sŏn-ae, 
“Oeguk(tulergi gurun) esŏ oebŏn(tulergi golo) ŭro,” Myŏng-Ch’ŏngsa yŏn’gu 43 (2015): 129–69; Perdue, China 
Marches West, 175-80. 
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Qing state that Kirghiz incorporation into the Qing empire was incomplete at best. Second, we 
see how these two positions were reconciled: a conditional acceptance of Kirghiz nomadism. If 
the Kirghiz did not relocate too far from their original pasture, they were not to be interfered 
with. This is one of the most perfect illustrations of the ambiguous status of the Kirghiz within 
the Qing empire as an outer tribe (tulergi aiman), intermediate between foreign state and outer 
province. 
 
(B) Relocation as Betrayal of Imperial Grace 
 In other cases, however, Kirghiz relocation was constructed as an act of betrayal that 
went against imperial grace. The relocation of Hūšici bii Narabatu in 1765 prompted a 
unanimous uproar within the Qing court. There seem to have been two main reasons. First, 
Narabatu was fleeing instead of relocating, with an intention never to return to his old pasture. 
Narabatu and his cousins Berke (博爾克) and Ebaidula (額拜都拉) were all prominent Hūšici 
Kirghiz chieftains. Narabatu had a suspicion that Ebaidula, whose pasture lay close to where the 
Qing generals suppressing the Ush Rebellion of 1765 were stationed, would be put in charge of 
the tribe afterwards. Thus, he attempted to incite Ebaidula to move to Kokand, but to no avail. 
Fearing that his plan was going to be revealed, Narabatu led 200 households in a flight from his 
pasture to Kokand. This, from the Qing perspective and perhaps in Narabatu’s own, was not a 
mere nomadic migration. Second, from the Qing perspective, the illegality of Narabatu’s action 
was only aggravated by the imperial grace accorded to him in the past. Narabatu, as mentioned 
above, had come to Kashgar to submit to Qing rule and been granted a pasture only three years 
prior. He had also been rewarded, along with his cousin Berke, for his service in the suppression 
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of the Ush Rebellion. Both these reasons made Narabatu’s action “hateful” (kewu), and Qianlong 
was determined to capture Narabatu and bring him to justice to warn all the Kirghiz.55 
 Thus, Qianlong made the following orders to Ili officials. If the Edegene Kirghiz, who 
lived between Narabatu’s pasture and Kokand, arrested Narabatu and handed him over, the 
officials were to punish Narabatu immediately. If Narabatu made his way to Kokand, the 
officials were to demand that Kokand ruler Irdana Beg return Narabatu. In the end, Narabatu was 
accepted into Kokand by Irdana Beg. The report from Edegene Kirghiz that Narabatu and Irdana 
were pasturing together at Ak Horhan (阿克霍爾罕), which lay between Osh and Margilan, 
turned out to be true despite Irdana Beg’s denial. Even when Xinjiang officials promised that 
Irdana could keep Narabatu’s people and possessions if Narabatu was returned, and could expect 
further rewards, Irdana kept evading the issue, even suggesting that he had rebuked Narabatu to 
return to his pasture in person and had no idea what had happened afterwards. In the end, 
Qianlong’s plan to make an example out of this case was unsuccessful.56 
 Could these Kirghiz who betrayed imperial grace ever return to imperial grace? We do 
not know what would have happened had Narabatu come back to submit to Qing rule again, but 
we do know what happened to some of his followers who returned to their old pasture. In 1772, 
seven years after Narabatu’s migration to Kokand, his people were in disarray. He had died of 
illness by then, and the 200-some households had dwindled to 50-odd households, barely getting 
                                                          
55 QXMDH 75: 46-51 (Mingšui, Agūi, Yunggui, Emin Khoja; QL30.7.9/30.7.28), 75: 280-5 (Bekun; 
QL30.8.10/30.9.6), 76: 40-1 (court letter from Fuheng et al to Mingšui et al; QL30.9.5); QSL, Gaozong 744: 186a-b 
(QL30.9.5=10/19/1765). 
 
56 QXMDH 75: 417-22 (Mingšui, Agūi, Emin Khoja; QL30.8.29/), 76: 40-1 (court letter from Fuheng et al to 
Mingšui et al; QL30.9.5), 76: 55-62 (Mingšui, Agūi, Yunggui, Emin Khoja; QL30.9.7/30.9.28), 76: 301-3 
(Yunggui; QL30.10.12/30.11.12), 76: 309-13 (Agūi, Yunggui, Emin Khoja; QL30.10.16/30.11.12), 76: 395-400 
(Agūi, Yunggui, Emin Khoja; QL30.10.24/30.11.22; QSL, Gaozong 744: 186a-b (QL30.9.5=10/19/1765), 748: 
237a-238a (QL30.11.12=12/23/1765), 749: 245a-b (QL30.11.22=1/2/1766). 
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by under the joint leadership of his wife Aifuliyat, his son Mamut, and his brother ahalakci 
Baidolot. When their return to the Hūšici Kirghiz who had stayed was reported to Ush 
superintendent Antai (安泰), they were allowed to live with their old tribesmen. Narabatu’s line, 
however, was not to enjoy its old prestige. The current leaders of the pasture—rank 6 Šukur and 
rank 6 Arbas—convinced Antai that Mamut, despite being 20 years of age, was not a capable 
leader and continued to oversee the pasture.57 
 In 1783, it was Narabatu’s cousin Berke that led hundreds of households away from his 
pasture and migrated to Kokand. After receiving initial reports from Kashgar superintendent 
Booceng that he had sent envoys to Kokand to demand Berke’s return and also dispatched troops 
to chase after Berke, Qianlong thought Booceng had overreacted. He reasoned that the Kirghiz, 
like Kazakhs, liked to move around and could not be compared with Xinjiang Muslims (fei neidi 
Huimin kebi). Qianlong, however, soon changed his position and ordered the Ili military 
governor Iletu and Ush councilor Cokto to take over. If Narbuta Beg, the Kokand ruler, were to 
comply and give up Berke, then they were to send Berke to Beijing. If Narbuta were to resist, 
however, Iletu and Cokto were to select one imperial bodyguard (shiwei), one Muslim beg, and 
one Kirghiz bii and send them to Narbuta’s pasture (youmu) to put more pressure on Narbuta.58 
 Booceng’s envoys to Kokand came back with a letter from Berke. In this letter, Berke 
explained his reasons for moving away from his pasture. According to him, his people had 
recently been broken in two because of Maimat and Šukur, two of his albatu (subject, client). He 
reported the matter to the Ush hakim beg, but the hakim beg drove him away without reporting it 
                                                          
57 QXMDH 107: 400-3 (Antai; QL37.7.24/37.8.20).  
 
58 QSL Gaozong: 1189-900b-901a (48.9.22=10/17/1783), 901a-b (48.9.24=10/19/1783), 902a-b 
(48.9.25=10/20/1783), 903a-b (48.9.26=10/21/1783); QXMDH 157: 52-4 (letter from Usihada to Narbuta; 
QL48.9.10). 
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to the ambans. The amban Falingga had also rented camels from him without returning them to 
him. Then, he concluded the letter by using the universalistic rhetoric of the Qing empire to his 
own advantage: “That land is the great lord’s land, and this land is also the great lord’s land 
(tubai ba oci, amba ejen i ba, ubai ba oci, inu amba ejen i ba).” 
 Qianlong did not accept this appropriation of imperial rhetoric, and we might recall from 
chapter two that Qing imperial envoys sent to investigate the An Ch’u-wŏn/Xiao Er case did not 
accept the Chosŏn king’s similar invocation of imperial rhetoric. But pursuit of Berke was put on 
hold because of the upcoming winter. During the winter of 1783-1784, the Ush amban reviewed 
the situation of Hūšici Kirghiz. As Berke had stated in his letter, the tribe indeed seemed to have 
split in half. Berke had led about 300 households away, but 400 households and 1,000 people led 
by three chieftains holding rank 6 buttons and blue feathers (lanling)—Maimat, Šabak, and 
Šukur—had stayed in their original pasture. They were the ones who initially reported on 
Berke’s flight from the pasture, and they were granted rank 5 buttons and peacock feathers for 
their loyalty.59 
 With the spring of 1784 came an envoy from Narbuta Beg. Contrary to Qing 
expectations, the envoy came not with Berke but with Narbuta’s request that Berke be forgiven 
and allowed to stay in Kokand. The next envoy from Narbuta asserted that Narbuta had 
personally rebuked Berke to return to his own pasture. Xinjiang officials, however, knew from 
Kirghiz informants that Berke was still in Kokand. Xinjiang officials repeatedly demanded that 
Narbuta send Berke back, even suggesting that Narbuta could have all of Berke’s people and 
                                                          
59 QXMDH 157: 191-8 (Booceng, Dunfu; QL48.10.4/48.11.1), 157: 302-8 (Booceng, Dunfu; QL48.10.18/48.11.11), 
158: 41-4 (Cokto, Falingga; QL48.11.13/48.12.3). 
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belongings if he just returned Berke. But these demands, lacking military pressure, proved to be 
ineffective.60 
 Again, we do not know what would have happened to Berke had he returned to his 
pasture, but all Kirghiz who had followed Berke were allowed to submit to Qing rule again upon 
their return. In the fall of 1784, for example, Aliyarbek came to Ush with 100 households to 
submit to Qing rule. The Ush amban gave Hakšan’s Hara Bulak to Aliyarbek as his pasture and 
even provided him with livestock. In the summer of 1785, Berke’s own brother Ebeidula 
(額貝都拉; most likely Ebaidula 額拜都拉 mentioned above) came to Aksu to submit to Qing 
rule because of harassment by Narbuta Beg. Ebeidula and his people were allowed to live with 
Hūšici Kirghiz under the leadership of Maimat and Šukur. In 1792, Berke’s cousin Edegene 
(額德格訥), who had escaped Berke’s pasture with his own household to be rid of Berke’s 
tyranny, was allowed to live with Hūšici Kirghiz under Maimat (邁瑪特). He was even given the 
option of learning to handle the affairs of the tribe and regaining his button if he proved his 
merit. Even as late as 1800, Maltapar, who had previously held a rank 5 button and peacock 
feather, and his three households were settled with the Hūšici Kirghiz according to precedent.61 
 
C. The Failure of the Qing Kirghiz Policy and the Retreat of the Empire 
 This close relationship between Qing Xinjiang and the Kirghiz, however, had all but 
disappeared by the end of the Jiaqing reign (1796-1820). As is often the case, there were both 
                                                          
60 QXMDH 159: 159-82 (Cokto; QL49.1.25/49.2.19), 159: 417-9 (Narbuta’s letter to Cokto; QL49.2); QSL, 
Gaozong 1199: 33b-34b (49.2.20=3/11/1784). 
 
61 QXMDH 165: 158-66 (Hailu, Kingioi; QL49.9.15/49.10.7), 165: 166-8 (Hailu, Kingioi; QL49.9.15/49.10.7), 167: 
428-30 (Hailu; QL50.4.10/50.5.6), 168: 279-83 (Booceng, Dafu, Osman; QL50.6.13/50.7.16), 196: 114-8 (Funišan; 
QL57.6.24/57.7.22), 196: 119-20 (Funišan; QL57.6.24/57.7.22), 211: 27-30 (Durgiya; JQ5.9.3/5.9.30); QSL, 
Gaozong 1230: 499b-500a (QL50.5.5=6/11/1785), 1409: 943b-944a (57.7.22=9/8/1792). 
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internal and external factors. The internal factor was the deteriorating patron-client relationship 
between the Qing emperor and the Kirghiz chieftains, which Onuma Takahiro has called “ejen-
albatu relationship” (master-subject relationship).62 Starting from the 1780s, a series of 
prominent Kirghiz chieftains met their downfall and left a power vacuum within the inner 
Kirghiz society. The fall from grace for these chieftains resulted more from imperial 
mismanagement than from their own actions, although fault can certainly be attributed to the 
chieftains in some cases. We see this, for example, in the story of Akim’s downfall. 
 Between 1760 and 1784, the Hibcak bii Akim was by far the most influential Kirghiz 
client of the Qianlong emperor. In 1760, Akim was awarded the rank 2b post of grand minister 
assistant commander of imperial guardsmen (Ch: sanzhi dachen; Ma: sula amban) for his service 
during the Qing conquest of Xinjiang. In 1761, he was appointed as the hakim beg of Tasimilik 
(塔什密里克), located between Kashgar and various Kirghiz pastures. He also acted as the 
representative of the Kirghiz near the karun.63 His brothers too were showered with honors and 
responsibilities. Esen, who initially claimed to the Qing authorities that he was one of Akim’s 
brothers, attained a rank 3 button as well as the title of imperial guardsman (Ch: shiwei; Ma: 
hiya) for his role in the suppression of Ush rebellion in 1765. Bakti, another of his brothers, rose 
to wear a rank 4 button and the title of imperial guardsman in 1770. He was also put in charge of 
Sarikol, a mountainous region that lay outside the karun in Yengisar. After Bakti’s death in 1774, 
                                                          
62 Onuma Takahiro, Shin to Chūō Ajia sōgen: Yūbokumin no sekai kara teikoku no henkyō e (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku 
Shuppankai, 2014), 93-7. 
 
63 QSL, Gaozong 596: 638b-639a (QL24.9.4=10/24/1759), 620: 975a-b (QL25.9.11=10/19/1760), 629: 18b-19a 
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his son Kucuk (昆楚克) was allowed to succeed him and inherit his button and feather but with 
one degree’s reduction in rank.64 
 However, he met his downfall in 1784, when he and Yengisar hakim beg A-li-mu (阿里
木) brought a formal accusation against the Kashgar hakim beg Osman (鄂斯璊) before Kashgar 
councilor Booceng (保成; d. 1798), claiming that Osman had collaborated with Sarimsaq, the 
only living son of Burhan al-Din, who had rebelled against the Qing in 1757. When Booceng 
decided this was a false accusation, Qianlong ordered him to arrest and escort all the accusers to 
Beijing so that he could get to the bottom of this affair. Once they arrived, they were tried by the 
Grand Council and the Lifanyuan. The interrogation revealed that Akim’s brother Emur 
(額穆爾), not Osman, had been secretly communicating with Sarimsaq, and Akim, who had 
falsely accused Osman to cover up his brother’s crime, was sentenced to death. Emur was 
sentenced to immediate death by beheading. Akim and A-li-mu were also sentenced to 
immediate execution, but the Qianlong emperor changed Akim’s sentencing to death by 
beheading after the Autumn Assizes because of his previous service and old age.65 
 Because of Akim’s position at the top of Qing Kirghiz society, what happened to Akim 
the individual is almost less interesting than what happened to Kirghiz institutions. Qing Kirghiz 
leadership obviously could not stay with Akim’s family any longer. A Hibcak chieftain named 
Doliyan (多連) was instead appointed as acting hakim beg of Tasimilk.66 Doliyan eventually 
                                                          
64 QXMDH 75: 46-51 (Mingšui, Agūi, Yunggui, Emin Khoja; QL30.7.9/30.7.28), 98: 416-8 (Kicengge, Emin 
Khoja; QL35.12.28/36.1.25), 121: 151-4 (Cokto, Mahingga, Fusembu, Yade, Šuboo; QL39.9.19/39.10.15), 122: 
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65 QSL, Gaozong 1203: 87b-88b (QL49.i3.16=5/5/1784), 1203: 92b-93b (QL49.i3.23=5/12/1784), 1206: 137a-139b 
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66 QSL, Gaozong 1206: 137a-139b (QL49.5.7=6/24/1784), 1206: 140a (QL49.5.8=6/25/1784), 1207: 168a-169a 
(QL49.5.27=7/14/1784), 1209: 205b-206a (QL49.6.24=8/9/1784). 
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came to replace Akim as the top Kirghiz leader in front of the Kirghiz biis and ahalakcis 
assembled at the order of Kashgar ambans.67 Even though he seems never to have risen to 
Akim’s stature, Doliyan had attained a rank 3 button and a peacock feather by the time of his 
death in 1792. His button and peacock feather, along with the properties he had accumulated 
during his tenure, were transmitted to his son Turdimaimet (圖爾第邁莫特).68 
 Turdimaimet did even better, receiving a rank 2 button at some point. In 1815, however, 
he was implicated in the Ziyā al-Dīn uprising of 1815, in Tasimilik, by the Ili general Sungyun 
(松筠; 1754-1835). Even though a retrial by Cangling (長齡; 1758-1838), the new Ili general, 
proved his innocence, Turdimaimet had already been executed by slicing after a perfunctory 
trial. Turdimaimet’s position as the head bii of Hibcak (Xibuchake zong bi) was abolished as it 
was not a regular position whose vacancy needed to be filled.69 Thus, two Kirghiz chieftains who 
had enjoyed the highest standing within Qing Kirghiz society fell from power, and the Qing state 
made inadequate efforts to fill the resulting vacuum with new clients. Indeed, the degree of Qing 
mishandling of the Turdimaimet case is astounding.  
 This is where we turn to Jahāngīr Khoja’s conquest of western Altishahr in 1826, a 
turning point in the Qing Kirghiz policy, as indeed it was in many other aspects of Qing policy in 
Xinjiang. As Newby has shown, it was precisely the Kirghiz chieftains who had been mistreated 
by the Qing authorities who rallied behind Jahāngīr: family members of Turdimaimet; Suranci, 
                                                          
 
67 QXMDH 165: 192-8 (Booceng, Dafu, Osman; QL49.9.19/49.10.19), 306-8 (Booceng, Dafu; 
QL49.10.9/49.11.12). 
 
68 QXMDH 195: 173-5 (Minghing, Mingliyang; QL57.4.2/57.i4.3), 175-6 (Minghing, Mingliyang; 
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whose intelligence on Jahāngīr’s plan was met by a rebuke instead of a reward from Kashgar 
officials; and the Sayak chieftain Tāriq, whose family members had been massacred by Qing 
troops in 1825. Kwangmin Kim has also argued that Jahangir led a coalition of people who were 
dispossessed and uprooted by Qing authorities and the Altishahr begs.70 
 Jahāngīr’s conquest of western Altishahr and the Qing reconquest brought about a radical 
change in Qing Kirghiz policy. First, there was a shift in the classification of the Kirghiz. While 
there remained “loyal” Kirghiz beyond the karuns, now the dividing line was between the 
Kirghiz inside and outside the karun line, instead of between the Kirghiz near and far. This 
pattern of Qing retreat from Kirghiz affairs conforms with Newby’s observation on the general 
Qing retreat towards the karuns in the first half of the nineteenth century.71 Second, the number 
of “loyal” Kirghiz chieftains plummeted, as these figures bear out: Nine paid tribute visits to 
Kashgar in Qianlong year 35 (1770-71) and ten in Jiaqing year 5 (1800-01), but in Daoguang 
year 10 (1830-31), none at all came. In fact, Kirghiz chieftains stopped visiting Kashgar 
altogether, the last recorded visit being from February 12, 1826. It must be noted that the tribute 
visits to Ush by the chieftains living inside the karun did continue. Even there, however, the list 
is limited to a few chieftains of two Kirghiz tribes: Cirik and Hūšici.72 More importantly, the 
Daoguang emperor made virtually no effort to recruit new Kirghiz chieftains as his new albatu, 
paving the way for first the Kokand and then the Russian incorporation of the Kirghiz outside the 
karun. 
 
                                                          
70 Newby, The Empire and the Khanate, 84-94; Kim, Borderland Capitalism, 90-125. 
 
71 Newby, The Empire and the Khanate, 207. 
 
72 QXMDH 247: 131-2 (Mukdembu, Šurhašan; DG6.1.6/6.2.9).  
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IV. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have seen how the expansionist, universalist view of Qing Xinjiang in 
the eighteenth century was gradually replaced in the first half of the nineteenth century by a view 
of Qing Xinjiang bounded by the karun line. In conclusion, let us compare Qing imperial retreat 
in Xinjiang with what we found in the Qing-Chosŏn and Qing-Vietnam borderlands. Here, I will 
give one example for each borderland to illustrate this point. 
 In the Qing-Chosŏn borderland, as we saw in chapter three, the Qing state asserted 
jurisdiction over Chosŏn subjects who committed crimes on Qing soil on a regular basis from the 
1630s to the second half of the eighteenth century. Whichever form the trial took, the Chosŏn 
judiciary was incorporated as a lower court to the Qing judiciary for the duration of the trial, with 
the Qing metropolitan judiciary reviewing the terms of adjudication and the Qing emperor 
providing the final verdict. In the first half of the nineteenth century, by contrast, the Qing state 
did not assert jurisdiction over Chosŏn subjects, but simply repatriated them with no instruction 
for Chosŏn authorities on how to proceed with the trial. 
 In the Qing-Vietnam borderland, as we saw in chapter four, one perennial issue of 
contention during the Qianlong reign was the Qing acceptance of Vietnamese refugees, whether 
temporary or permanent, into the Qing domain as universal subjects. The well-known Qing 
campaign against the Tây Sơn regime began when the Lê royal family was given refuge in 
Guangxi and ended when the Lê loyalists were incorporated as Qing subjects in Beijing and in a 
few other provinces, for example. In the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns, however, the imperial 
reaction towards news of turmoil in northern Vietnam was one of caution. Qing troops were 
forbidden to enter the Vietnamese domain, and all Vietnamese subjects seeking refuge or 
assistance were to be turned away. 
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 In all three borderlands, then, we see a shift from a more universal Qing empire to a more 
bounded Qing empire. Even though we will need to learn more about the empire-wide situation 
in the first half of the nineteenth century to make a firm conclusion, I think we can make at least 
one observation here. Qianlong’s empire, with its universal pretensions and expansionist ethos, 
was, in some ways, fundamentally different from the empire of his successors. Qianlong’s 
grandiose imperial projects may have highlighted for his successors, as Alexander Woodside has 
shown, the physical and political limits of imperial power—to put in vernacular terms they may 
have gotten spooked.73 In that sense, is it possible that the 1840s does not constitute as much of a 
watershed in Qing foreign policy and modern Chinese history as we have previously thought? 
Based on the evidence presented in this dissertation, I think we can make an argument that the 
Qing state in the first half of the nineteenth century was making a decisive move away from 
being a universal empire in praxis. Of course, this trend was to be coupled with the other trend 
that began in the 1840s: colonial encroachment by Western and Japanese empires.  
                                                          
73 Alexander Woodside, “The Ch’ien-Lung Reign,” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 9, Part 1: The 
Ch’ing Empire to 1800, ed. Willard J. Peterson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 230–309. 
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CHAPTER VII.  
Judiciaries and Jurisdictions in the Qing-Kokand Borderland, 1760s-1840s 
 
I. Introduction: On Kokand “Extraterritoriality” 
 In American historiography, the First Opium War (1839-42) served as the starting point 
for what Paul Cohen calls the “China’s response to the West” framework of interpreting modern 
Chinese history.1 In mainland China, the modern history of China still begins with the First 
Opium War and the Treaty of Nanjing (1842), the first of many unequal treaties imposed by 
Western and Japanese colonial empires on Qing China (1636-1912) continuing into the 
Republican period (1912-1949). Arguably the most important feature of these unequal treaties 
was the extraterritoriality enjoyed by foreigners on Chinese soil. From the modern perspective of 
public international law, extraterritoriality was a fundamental encroachment on Westphalian 
sovereignty, and the international relations scholar Turan Kayaoğlu goes so far as to posit it as 
the foundation of Western “legal imperialism” in his comparative study of extraterritoriality in 
Japan, the Ottoman empire, and China.2 
 Due to the centrality that extraterritoriality is accorded in modern Chinese historiography, 
Qing relations with Kokand (1709-1876) have received some attention from historians of Qing. 
Joseph Fletcher was the first to notice similarities between the 1835 Qing settlement with 
Kokand and the Treaty of Nanjing, observing that the settlement gave Kokand subjects in Qing 
Xinjiang full extraterritoriality by giving Kokand aqsaqal, the heads of Kokand merchant 
                                                          
1 Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 9-55. 
 
2 Turan Kayaoğlu, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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communities, jurisdiction over Kokand subjects in Qing Xinjiang. From his view, this settlement 
was China’s first “unequal treaty.”3 L. J. Newby, more recently, has challenged Fletcher’s 
interpretation: “[T]here is little to suggest that the Qing court had wittingly conceded anything 
that might be termed extraterritoriality, in the modern sense. What it had done was to afford, or 
re-afford, to Khoqand [Kokand] several privileges which the empire had traditionally employed 
to regulate relations with foreign traders.”4  
 Neither scholar, however, has conducted a careful analysis of how the Qing state in 
Xinjiang handled criminal activities by Kokand subjects before and after 1835. As in the Kirghiz 
case, the lack of available sources has played a part. When Fletcher was writing in 1978, none of 
the mainland Chinese archives were available to foreign scholars. Newby has made use of many 
Chinese-language palace memorials from the First Historical Archives in Beijing but only a 
limited number of Manchu-language palace memorials. With the recent publication of the 283-
volume collection of Manchu-language palace memorials from Xinjiang, we now know that 
most palace memorials from Xinjiang were written in Manchu only and never translated into 
Chinese.5 
 Using this newly available body of materials, we can begin to look at the Qing judicial 
interaction with Kokand subjects in practice. In this chapter, I will revisit this issue of Kokand 
extraterritoriality by exploring two different areas of intersection between the Qing judiciary and 
                                                          
3 Joseph Fletcher, “The Heyday of the Ch’ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet,” in The Cambridge History of 
China, Volume 10, Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part 1, ed. John K. Fairbank (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1978), 375-85. 
 
4 L. J. Newby, The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand, C. 1760-1860 
(Leiden: Brill, 2005), 199. 
 
5 Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan and Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin, eds., Qingdai Xinjiang Manwen 
dang’an huibian (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2012) (QXMDH hereafter). 
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Kokand subjects. First, I will analyze how the Qing state dealt with Kokand subjects who had 
been arrested for engaging in illicit activities. This analysis will show that Kokand 
“extraterritoriality” was merely one of the possibilities afforded by elasticity in the Qing imperial 
worldview from the very beginning of Qing rule over Xinjiang. It will also show that the notion 
of territorial jurisdiction loomed large within those possibilities. Next, we will turn to Qing 
jurisdiction over Kirghiz criminals, who often but not always targeted for robbery Kokand 
merchants on their caravan journeys between Kokand and Qing Altishahr (southern Xinjiang). 
This will show that Qing took its role as a protector of long-distance caravan merchants 
seriously, which necessarily took Qing jurisdiction beyond the karuns at times.  
 
II. Qing Jurisdiction over Kokand Subjects: Between Extraterritorial and Territorial 
 Kokand merchants had been residing in Xinjiang for a while before Qing conquest of the 
region—at least since the time of the Zunghars. In 1759, when Qing troops entered Yarkand 
during a campaign against the Khoja brothers’ rebellion, they found some Kokand merchants 
residing in the city. These merchants had semi-permanent residence in major Altishahr cities 
such as Kashgar and Yarkand, and they engaged in seasonal caravan trade that linked Altishahr 
with its surrounding regions. Jao Hūi (兆惠; d. 1764), the Qing general in charge of the 
campaign, and Emin Khoja (額敏和卓; d. 1777), who was well on his way to becoming the most 
influential beg in Qing Xinjiang, decided to maintain the status quo and let Kokand merchants 
maintain their residence in the city.6  
                                                          
6 QXMDH 41: 223-4 (Jao Hūi, Emin Khoja; QL24.9.15/24.10.10). 
 
 
 
293 
 
 In the context of this study, Kokand subjects were distinct from Chosŏn and Vietnamese 
subjects in two main ways. First, as already mentioned, Kokand subjects had a semi-permanent 
residence in Xinjiang that was sanctioned by the Qing state. Chosŏn and Vietnamese subjects, on 
the other hand, either travelled as members of tributary embassies to Beijing or maintained illicit 
residence in the Qing domain. Second, Kokand subjects shared many religious and linguistic 
affinities with the Altishahr Muslims of the Qing domain, whereas Altishahr and China Proper 
were culturally and institutionally very distinct. To give just two examples, the Qing state ruled 
the Altishahr Muslims indirectly through local Muslim elites who were given posts as various 
begs. The beg posts had ranks corresponding to those of the regular Qing bureaucracy, with the 
hakim begs (Muslim governors) of the biggest Altishahr cities at rank 3. But unlike the regular 
members of the Qing bureaucracy, they were regional bureaucrats who could not serve outside 
Xinjiang.7 Moreover, the non-beg Muslims could not sport queues, which were arguably the 
most important marker of Qing subjecthood in China Proper. This semi-permanent residency and 
the ambiguous status of Altishahr were frequently factors behind Qing decisions on whether or 
not to assert jurisdiction over Kokand criminals.  
 In fact, Qing law in Xinjiang showed characteristics of legal pluralism. As Sally Merry 
has noted, legal pluralism was originally a concept developed in the colonial context, where 
colonial law and customary law coexisted. Subsequently, however, it has developed into a 
concept that can describe other relations between dominant and subordinate groups as well.8 This 
concept is useful in studying empires, “polities that maintain distinction and hierarchy as they 
                                                          
7 L. J. Newby, “The Begs of Xinjiang: Between Two Worlds,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 
61, no. 2 (1998): 278–97. 
 
8 Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law & Society Review 22, no. 5 (1988): 869–96. 
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incorporate new peoples,” in the words of Jane Burbank and Frederic Cooper.9 Qing, as an early 
modern empire, certainly fit this mold of an “empire of difference” and showed many signs of 
legal pluralism.10 Separate legal codes for different groups of subjects existed, of which those for 
the Altishahr Muslims and those for the Mongols have received some attention. Moreover, there 
are sections in the Qing Code (Da Qing lüli) and the Collected Institutes (Da Qing Huidian) that 
were geared to specific groups of subjects such as bannermen.11 
 In the following section, I will show that Qing legal pluralism applied to Kokand subjects 
in Xinjiang as well. “Extraterritoriality” was one of the possibilities that awaited Kokand 
suspects under the legally pluralistic Qing regime in Xinjiang. As I will demonstrate with actual 
legal cases, Kokand subjects could be handled by not only their own aqsaqals but the hakim 
begs. But at the same time, the Qing state did not hesitate to try and punish Kokand subjects 
involved in cases that it deemed serious. 
 When we look at actual cases, we begin to see that there existed a realm of “customary 
law” for minor criminal offenses committed by Altishahr Muslims and Kokand subjects in Qing 
Xinjiang, especially in its early decades. These were cases that posed only minor concern for the 
Qing amban, the bannermen officials who oversaw the affairs of Altishahr, or for the Qing court 
in Beijing. The Qing state was often willing to let the Kokand merchant community in Xinjiang 
                                                          
9 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010), 8.  
 
10 Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
 
11 For Qing legal pluralism in general, see Pär Kristoffer Cassel, Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and 
Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15-27. For the 
code for the Mongols, see Dorothea Heuschert, “Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire: Manchu Legislation for the 
Mongols,” The International History Review 20, no. 2 (1998): 310–24. For the code for the Altishahr Muslims, see 
Wang Dongping, Qingdai Huijiang falü zhidu yanjiu (1759-1884nian) (Ha’erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 
2003), 25-62 and Huan Tian, “Governing Imperial Borders: Insights from the Study of the Implementation of Law 
in Qing Xinjiang” (Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2012), 29-76. 
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or the Kokand state itself handle these minor cases involving Kokand subjects. The most 
common such crime was tax evasion. As discussed in chapter six, the karun, or the guard post, 
acted as a kind of a border checkpoint. The Qing karun personnel would inspect the baggage of 
Kokand merchants passing through and tax them according to the inventory. Some, 
unsurprisingly, sought to bypass the karun when entering and leaving Qing Xinjiang and thereby 
avoid paying customs.  
 In 1767, for example, a group of Kokand and Kashgari merchants used a small mountain 
road near the Akdaši karun to avoid paying taxes at the karun but were soon detected and 
arrested by Muši karun personnel. Upon being escorted to Kashgar, the merchants were first 
interrogated by two mid-level officials and then by the Kashgar ambans Iletu (伊勒圖; d. 1785) 
and Cin Hūwang (秦璜; n.d.). In the end, the amban decided to tax the goods that these 
merchants were carrying according to the set rates (5 percent on goods going out of the karun 
and 1/30 of the value for the goods coming in). In their adjudication, however, the amban made a 
distinction between the four Kokand merchants and six Kashgari merchants. They decided to 
hand over the Kokand merchants to the Kokand merchant community in Kashgar so that they 
could punish them heavily (sede afabufi ujeleme isebuhe). As for the Kashgari merchants, the 
amban ruled that they should be sent to the bazaar for heavy punishment and be put in cangues 
for a month as a warning to other Muslims. In justifying this adjudication, they stated simply that 
Kashgari merchants could not be compared to Kokand merchants.12  
 The subsequent tax evasion cases, however, make it clear that this was not an instance of 
extraterritoriality. In 1775, for example, Jamba and other Kokand merchants were arrested after 
                                                          
12 QXMDH 88: 128-31 (Iletu, Cin Hūwang; QL33.5.15/33.6.17). 
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attempting to evade taxes. According to the precedent set in the above case, the Kashgar ambans 
Šemboo (申保; d. 1781) and Šuboo (淑寶; n.d.) taxed their goods at the set rate of 1/30 of the 
value. In contrast to the case above, however, they let Gadaimet (噶岱默特; d. 1775), the hakim 
beg of Kashgar, handle these Kokand criminals. The sources merely mention that Gadaimet 
gathered people at the bazaar and punished the five Kokand criminals severely as a warning to 
the populace.13 
 In 1789, two Kokand merchants were arrested after sneaking past the Šatu (沙土) karun 
with 60 horses they had bought at a Sarbagashi Kirghiz pasture. They were sent to Ush along 
with their belongings. According to the Ush superintendent Minghing (明興; d. 1807), there 
existed a different precedent on tax evasion: taxing the goods at 10 percent, fining the Kokand 
merchants, and giving them a warning.14 The next year, in 1790, another tax evasion case in 
Kashgar was handled according to this precedent.15 
 Our next case involves both Kokand subjects and the karun personnel and greatly 
interested both the Qing amban and the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-95). This case is illuminating 
for showing the Qing self-conception of its jurisdiction over Kokand subjects in Xinjiang and 
warrants a close analysis. In March 1794, Qing authorities in Kashgar noticed an inconsistency 
in the amount of merchandise that Awas and other Kokand merchants had brought into Kashgar. 
The report from the karun had noted they had 32 bundles of merchandise, but they had appeared 
in Kashgar with only 30 bundles. This inconsistency led to an interrogation of the merchants, 
who confessed that they had collaborated with karun personnel to underreport the amount of 
                                                          
13 QXMDH 125: 241-3 (Šemboo, Šuboo; QL40.8.18/40.9.19). 
 
14 QXMDH 185: 425-9 (Minghing; QL54.6.28/54.7.27). 
 
15 QXMDH 190: 261-5 (Mingliyang, Funišan; QL55.12.5/56.1.8). 
 
 
 
297 
 
their merchandise. They had originally brought 40 bundles of goods with them, declared only 32 
bundles at the karun, and hid two more bundles before declaring their goods to the Kashgar 
authorities.16 
 The letter from the Kashgar ambans Yungboo (永保; 1747?-1808), Fan Giyan Jung, and 
Iskandar (伊斯堪達爾; d. 1811), who concurrently served as the hakim beg, to the Kokand ruler 
Narbuta Beg (r. 1763–99) illustrates a range of possible actions that the Qing state could take. 
The ambans emphasized that these merchants had done more than simply evade taxes by 
collaborating with karun personnel, underreporting the amount of their goods, and further hiding 
their goods. Their original plan had been to parade them to the various karuns to serve as a 
warning to the personnel there, put them in cangues (amba selhen) along with Qing personnel, 
and punish them with life exile (falabume icihiyaha) afterwards. But then the Kokand aqsaqal 
(hūdai da) Namajan intervened on their behalf, continually kowtowing for mercy. This led the 
ambans to finally decide to simply drive the merchants away from the karuns and permanently 
ban them from Xinjiang. The ambans concluded the letter by exhorting Narbuta Beg to instruct 
his merchants clearly so there would be no future infractions.17 
 This letter and the Qianlong emperor’s reaction to the palace memorial by the Kashgar 
ambans show the deep interest of the Qing state in this case. The imperial response to all the 
previous palace memorials on tax evasion had been the default imperial response of “noted” 
(saha). This time, however, Qianlong carefully reviewed the terms of adjudication for the 
                                                          
16 QXMDH 201: 1-6 (Yungboo, Iskandar, Fan Giyan Jung; QL59.3.9/59.4.13). 
 
17 QXMDH 201: 6-10 (Kashgar amban to Narbuta Beg; n.d.); On Narbuta Beg, see Scott C. Levi, “The Ferghana 
Valley at the Crossroads of World History: The Rise of Khoqand, 1709-1822,” Journal of Global History 2, no. 2 
(2007): 225–32. 
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complicit karun personnel.18 Similarly, in previous cases, the Qing ambans had not bothered to 
communicate with the ruler of Kokand. This case also raises the option the Qing state had to 
assert jurisdiction over Kokand subjects, and that is where I will turn next. Below, I will show 
that there existed a realm of cases, ones the Qing state deemed important, in which that option 
was taken. 
 The Qing state did not hesitate to assert jurisdiction over Kokand subjects for these 
serious illicit activities. Jade smuggling was one such activity. The year 1778 saw the exposure 
of the most famous jade smuggling ring in Qing history, run by the Yarkand superintendent 
G’aopu (高樸; d. 1778). Scholars have already examined this case in detail, and I will briefly 
summarize their findings here. This case came to light when Yarkand hakim beg Setib Aldi 
exposed G’aopu’s jade smuggling ring to the Ush councilor Yunggui (永貴; d 1783). G’aopu 
apparently had collaborated with Yarkand begs and merchants from Suzhou (蘇州), Jiangsu, 
collecting jade from a mountain in Yarkand without authorization and smuggling it to Suzhou, 
almost 5,000 kilometers away, for sale there.19 The uncovering of this smuggling ring caused 
quite an uproar within the Qing court for its wide scale, both geographically and financially, and 
the main culprits were severely punished. G’aopu, for one, was executed in Altishahr, and his 
corpse was barred from China Proper as an extra measure of punishment. Many Altishahr 
                                                          
18 QSL Gaozong 1450: 338a-b (QL59.4.13=5/11/1794) 
 
19 Preston M. Torbert, The Chʻing Imperial Household Department: A Study of Its Organization and Principal 
Functions, 1662-1796 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1977), 136-71; James 
A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), 180-91. 
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Muslims, merchants from China Proper, and personal servants of G’aopu were also executed for 
their role in this affair.20  
 What interests us here, however, is the fact that a Kokand merchant named Abula 
(阿布拉) was implicated in this case. We first hear about him in 1783, five years after the 
exposure of the smuggling ring. We learn that this Abula had been sentenced to death in 1778 
and in 1783 was still imprisoned in Beijing. The sentence would never be carried out, as the 
Kokand ruler Narbuta Beg successfully interceded on Abula’s behalf through his envoy 
Obulkesama (鄂布勒克色木), who was in Beijing for an imperial audience. Qianlong granted 
Narbuta’s request that Abula be returned to Kokand and constructed this as an act of imperial 
grace. Abula’s crime, Qianlong began, deserved a capital punishment, but the execution had not 
been carried out because Abula was an ignorant Muslim in a remote region (bianyuan wuzhi 
Huiren). This act of pardoning Abula and returning him to Kokand, Qianlong continued, was an 
extraordinary grace that could not be requested again (gewai kuan dian, fei ke lü yao). Narbuta 
was to take care of Abula after his return so that he would not cause more trouble and to do the 
same for the rest of his subjects.21 We might note the similarity between the language here and 
the cases involving Vietnamese criminals we looked at in chapter five: the extension of a special 
imperial grace and the charge to manage his subjects better in the future. 
 Jade smuggling would turn out to be a perennial problem in Qing Xinjiang, and in spite 
of Qianlong’s charge, participation in this illicit business by Kokand subjects did not stop after 
                                                          
20 QSL Gaozong 1067: 270a-b (QL43.9.16=11/4/1778), 1067: 271a-271b (QL43.9.17=11/5/1778), 1067: 272b-273b 
(QL43.9.19=11/7/1778), 1067: 274a-275a (QL43.9.20=11/8/1778), 1067: 286a-b (QL43.9.28=11/16/1778), 1069: 
318b (QL43.10.19=12/7/1778), 1070: 350a-352a (QL43.11.7=12/25/1778). 
 
21 QSL, Gaozong 1172: 725a (QL48.1.15=2/16/1783), 1173: 728b-729a (QL48.1.20=2/21/1783); QXMDH 156: 
195-9 (Booceng, Dunfu; QL48.7.14/48.8.15). 
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Abula’s pardon. The very next year, the Kokand subject Maimadimin was arrested in Kashgar 
for jade smuggling. Kashgar superintendent Booceng (保成; d. 1798), recalling previous edicts, 
sent Maimadimin to Beijing to be tried and punished there.22 In 1786, another jade smuggling 
ring was detected in Ili when the Kokand merchant Karabai was discovered with 23 uncut pieces 
of Persian jade. The Ili amban entrusted brigade commander (youji; rank 3b) Hailongga and 
hakim beg Akbek, who had arrested Karabai, with the initial interrogation of Karabai. Their 
interrogation and the amban’s personal interrogation revealed that Karabai had been 
commissioned by two Hui Muslims (hoise irgen, i.e. Muslims from China Proper) and one 
Xinjiang Muslim. Karabai’s employers were also brought in and corroborated Karabai’s 
testimony. The amban claimed to follow “rules” (kooli) in his adjudication. The Hui were to be 
sent to the Shaan-Gan governor-general, Karabai was to be beaten with 40 lashes, and the 
Xinjiang Muslim was to be beaten with 30 lashes. Akbek was put in charge of Karabai’s 
punishment.23 Even though it is unclear what the amban meant by “rules” here, one thing is clear 
from the examination of these three jade smuggling cases: The Qing state was fully willing and 
able to try and punish Kokand subjects who had committed serious crimes.  
 Qing-Russia trade was another serious matter that led the Qing state to assert jurisdiction 
over Kokand subjects. As mentioned in chapter two, Russia was the first European state to sign a 
treaty with the Qing state. This Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) was followed by the Treaty of 
Kyakhta (1727), which among other things designated Kyakhta as an official Qing-Russia trade 
site. As was often case with Qing foreign trade, politics and trade were intertwined. The Qing 
                                                          
22 QXMDH 161: 166-7 (Booceng, Dafu; QL49.4.14/49.5.6), 161: 409-11 (Booceng to the Grand Council; 
QL49.4.22=6/9/1784). 
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state often used closure of the trade as a political weapon against the Russian state, shutting 
down the trade on three separate occasions: 1764-8, 1779-80, 1785-92.24 The closing of the 
official trade, however, had the unintended impact of further encouraging an already vibrant 
black market. In 1765, there were already reports of large-scale smuggling. A Qing subject 
named Zhao Li (趙立), for example, was arrested while transporting 20 carts full of Russian 
pelts.25 
 The eighteenth-century Qing state was a Eurasian empire, and as Matthew Mosca has 
shown, it was keenly aware of Eurasian interconnections both within and beyond its domain.26 
Thus, efforts by the Qing state to crack down on illicit trade had empire-wide ramifications. 
During the third Kyakhta embargo, which lasted from 1785 to 1792, the Xinjiang officials and 
then the Qing court became aware of the role of Kokand subjects as middlemen in this illicit 
trade. In October 1790, for example, four Kokand merchants were arrested at the Šatu karun for 
bringing pelts from Russia.27 To uphold the Russia embargo, the Qing state in these cases did not 
hesitate to try and punish Kokand subjects. 
 During the third Kyakhta embargo, smuggling centered on rhubarb. Though rhubarb is 
mainly used in cooking these days, it was prized for its perceived medicinal benefits as laxative 
in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. Among its many varieties, the Chinese variety 
was considered the “true rhubarb.” Russia had a virtual monopoly on this variety in the European 
                                                          
24 Mark Mancall, Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
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25 QSL, Gaozong 734: 88a-b (QL30.4.14=6/2/1765), 738: 131b-132a (QL30.6.6=7/23/1765) 
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market, which made the rhubarb trade extremely profitable for the Russian state.28 The Qing 
state, aware of the Russian demand for this rhubarb, was determined to teach the Russian state an 
imperial lesson by cutting off its supply. Thus, authorities in Xinjiang began investigating the 
alternate routes through which rhubarb could flow into the Russian domain. Kokand merchants 
constituted one of those routes.  
 Indeed, an investigation in Aksu during January 1789 revealed a shocking amount of 
rhubarb in the city. Rahamet (喇哈默特) and eight Kokand merchants had 7,080 jin (a jin is 
approximately 1.3 pounds) of rhubarb on them, while Ma Chengxiao (馬成孝) and four 
merchants from China Proper had 840 jin of rhubarb on them—more than 10,000 pounds in all. 
This report worried the Qianlong emperor, who feared the rhubarb could find its way into Russia 
via Kirghiz or Kokand and effectively nullify his embargo.29 Further reports on the discovery 
and confiscation of rhubarb piled up from other regions of Xinjiang. In Kashgar, six Kokand 
merchants and seven Kashgar merchants were found with 4,000 or so jin of rhubarb on them. In 
Urumqi, around 5,000 jin of rhubarb was found on Hami merchants, who had carried it from 
Suzhou (肅州), Gansu.30 
 Qianlong’s initial instructions on how to punish rhubarb smugglers, in an edict on 
January 29, 1789, shows two lines of delineation among the culprits. Kokand “foreigners” were 
to be distinguished from Qing subjects in general. After having their rhubarb confiscated, they 
would be punished (zhizui) by the Xinjiang authorities and then expelled from Xinjiang. Qing 
                                                          
28 Clifford M. Foust, Rhubarb: The Wondrous Drug (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 34-45, 136-57; 
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subjects, on the other hand, were to have their rhubarb confiscated and then punished within the 
Qing domain. Among the Qing subjects, however, was another distinction. Qianlong ordered 
Altishahr Muslims to be first sent to Urumqi to be interrogated by Urumqi military lieutenant-
governor (dutong) Šanggan (尚安) and then to Lanzhou (in Gansu) to be punished by the Shaan-
Gan governor-general Leboo (勒保). Qing subjects from China Proper (neidi), on the other hand, 
were to be sent directly to Lanzhou to be interrogated and punished by Leboo. By March 22, 
1789, when Qianlong crafted an edict to be promulgated throughout Xinjiang, Qianlong 
reinforced the boundary between Qing subjects and Kokand subjects. Here, Qianlong declared 
that these Kokand subjects might not have known the prohibition well and thus would be let off 
lightly with simple confiscation of goods. In the future, however, all Kokand subjects arrested 
smuggling rhubarb would be sent to China Proper (neidi) to be punished severely (zhong 
zhizui).31 
 Some of his Xinjiang officials, however, still put emphasized in their trials the difference 
between Altishahr Muslims and Qing subjects from China Proper. Aksu superintendent Fusung 
(福崧; 1747-93), in his March 8, 1789, adjudication, recommended that Kokand subjects be 
warned and expelled and that Altishahr Muslims be punished by being put in cangues for two 
months. In his response on April 4, Qianlong emphasized the status of Altishahr Muslims as 
Qing subjects: “Those Muslims of cities such as Kashgar, Yarkand, Ush, and Aksu are the same 
as merchants from China Proper (yu neidi shangmin xiangdeng).” Altishahr Muslims, as Qing 
subjects, were ordered to be sent to Leboo for punishment.32 The Kashgar councilor Mingliyang 
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(明亮; 1736-1822) further emphasized the affinity between Kokand subjects and Altishahr 
Muslims in his March 20 adjudication, in which he recommended a month in cangues and 
expulsion for Kokand subjects and two months in cangues for Kashgar Muslims. Calling this 
adjudication an erroneous mistake (cuomiu), Qianlong commented: “Kashgar Muslims have 
received Our favor for many years and are no different from commoners of China Proper (yu 
neidi minren wuyi). [They] cannot be compared to Kokand Muslims (fei Anjiyan Huimin kebi).” 
Again, he ordered Mingliyang to send Kashgar Muslims to Leboo for punishment, even though 
Mingliyang’s adjudication on the Kokand merchants was approved.33 
 Fluctuations in the boundaries among Kokand subjects, Altishahr Muslims, and Qing 
subjects from China Proper did not stop there. From palace memorials by Leboo, we find that 
among those Leboo tried and punished were Kokand subjects. Indeed, Leboo’s logic during this 
trial shows the fundamentally flexible nature of Kokand subjecthood. In his May 23, 1789, 
adjudication, Leboo ruled that Yu-su-pu (玉素普), although a Kokand subject, had lived in 
Kucha for a long time and thus was no different from Kucha Muslims. Based on this collapsing 
of the boundary, Leboo used a statute from the Qing Code on non-manifest theft to sentence Yu-
su-pu to death by strangulation after the Autumn Assizes.34 Kokand subjects, at different 
junctures, were and were not comparable to Altishahr Muslims. This collapse between imperial 
and tributary subjecthood shows the remarkable reach of Qing jurisdiction and the elasticity of 
Qing imperial sovereignty. The fate of Yu-su-pu is unclear from my sources. The last time we 
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hear about him is July 18, 1789, when Leboo reported to the Qianlong emperor that Yu-su-pu 
was being escorted to Beijing.35 
 Illicit forms of boundary crossing, which from the Qing perspective could broadly be 
construed as aiding and abetting treason, constituted another type of serious crimes. A case in 
1786 is instructive. In 1786, some Altishahr Muslims were suspected of communicating with 
Sarimsaq (薩木薩克; 1755-1809). Sarimsaq, as mentioned in chapter six, was the son of Burhan 
al-Din (布拉呢敦; d. 1759), who with his brother Khoja-Jahan (霍集占; d. 1759) rebelled 
against Qing in a bid to establish an independent regime in Altishahr. After the suppression of 
the rebellion and death of his father in the 1750s, Sarimsaq had been living in exile in various 
Central Asian cities.36  
 Here again, what interests us is a Kokand subject, one Idzibasar, who was suspected of 
being complicit. Even though interrogations in Kashgar revealed that Idzibasar was not actually 
involved in the affair, Kashgar councilor Mingliyang judged him to be guilty of not reporting on 
the case when he first became aware of it. While noting that Kokand subjects residing in 
Yarkand, Kashgar, Aksu, and Ush were handled by their aqsaqal (hūdai da), Mingliyang still 
insisted on trying and punishing Idzibasar. In his adjudication, Mingliyang reached a 
compromise between the nature of the crime, which warranted a sentence of life exile, and the 
nature of the culprit, who was of an outer tribe (tulergi aiman) with no knowledge of the law in 
China Proper (dorgi ba i fafun kooli be sarkū), by sentencing Idzbiasar to wearing a cangue for 
three months. Afterwards, the Kashgar aqsaqal Rudzihūli was instructed to drive him away from 
                                                          
35 GZD 403057469 (Leboo; QL54.i5.26=7/18/1789) 
 
36 Saguchi Tōru, “The Revival of the White Mountain Khwājas, 1760 to 1820 (from Sarimsāq to Jihāngīr),” Acta 
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the Qing domain (musei jecen ci bašame tucibufi) back to his “original pasture” (da nukte). The 
Qianlong emperor, using a familiar rhetoric of imperial benevolence, pardoned Idzibasar, merely 
expelling him from Xinjiang.37 Here again, we might recall that the Qing court has used this 
“foreign” ignorance of Qing law as a justification for not using regular Qing legal procedures in 
punishing Chosŏn and Vietnamese subjects—when it so chose. 
 The next case of boundary crossing happened in 1824. Hai Changlu (海常祿), a Green 
Standard soldier stationed in Kashgar, deserted his post and was soon arrested by Qing soldiers 
who had been tipped off. Hai was in possession of two copies of the Quran and foreign attire at 
the time of his arrest, and this transformed the case from an attempt at simple desertion to 
defection to a foreign state. Interrogation revealed that Hai had frequented the market in the 
Kashgar Muslim city and often read scriptures with Kokand subjects there. At some point, he 
conceived the idea of changing his attire and secretly leaving the karun in the direction of 
Kokand. The Kashgar ambans Yong Kin (永芹; 1769-1826) and Bayanbatu (巴彥巴圖; d. 1825) 
tried Hai Changlu and the Kokand subject involved in this defection attempt. Even though the 
Kokand ruler Muhammad Ali Khan (r. 1822-42) sent envoys to Kashgar to insist that the Kokand 
suspect should not be handled in the Qing domain (buying neidi banli), Yong Kin and the 
Daoguang emperor (r. 1821-50) seem to have pressed on with the case.38 
 As our last “serious” cases are from 1840, this is a good place to pause and ponder the 
implications of the 1835 Qing-Kokand agreement, which purportedly gave Kokand subjects in 
Xinjiang full extraterritoriality. We have seen above that something comparable to 
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extraterritoriality existed for Kokand subjects who committed minor crimes even before 1835. 
For more serious cases, however, we saw Qing jurisdiction asserted over Kokand subjects time 
and time again. Our next cases, then, are a good opportunity to observe how the extraterritoriality 
granted by the 1835 agreement worked in practice. 
 These cases take us back to the First Opium War. As David Bello has shown in his 2005 
book, opium was “an empirewide crisis that spread among an ethnically diverse populace and 
created regionally and culturally distinct problems of control for the Qing state.”39 One of these 
regions was Xinjiang. By January 1840, Xinjiang authorities had alerted the Daoguang emperor 
about opium being carried into Xinjiang by Central Asian and South Asian merchants, and the 
emperor declared that the ban on opium would apply to Xinjiang as well. From then on, all 
foreign merchants carrying opium into Xinjiang would have it confiscated and be expelled from 
Xinjiang, never to be allowed back.40 
 From then on, Xinjiang authorities accelerated their crackdown on the possession of 
opium by foreign merchants. Here, in accordance with the focus of this chapter, I will look at 
Kokand merchants in possession of opium. In Khotan, there were two instances in which Kokand 
merchants voluntarily handed over opium. In January 1840, Khotan superintendent Da-ming-a 
(達明阿; n.d.) memorialized the Daoguang emperor on how the Kokand aqsaqal had handed 
over about 540 taels (liang, approximately 1.3 ounces) of crude opium once he had learned about 
the ban on opium through the hakim beg. Da-ming-a, consulting the new substatute on the opium 
ban, asked for imperial instruction on whether these Kokand merchants should be pardoned 
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(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005), 1. 
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according to the stipulation on giving oneself up within the time limit (xian nei zishou). The 
Daoguang emperor allowed Da-ming-a to pardon them. Four months later, four Kokand 
merchants arrived at a karun in Khotan in possession of crude opium. At the karun, they heard 
about the new ban on opium and gave up their opium to the authorities there. Da-ming-a, again, 
asked to pardon them according to the new substatute. Daoguang approved this suggestion as 
well and proclaimed a new procedure for opium in Xinjiang. From then on, all opium discovered 
in northern Xinjiang (beilu) was to be sent to Ili so that officials there could verify and destroy it. 
All opium discovered in southern Xinjiang (nanlu, i.d. Altishahr), on the other hand, was to be 
sent to Yarkand.41 In this latter stipulation, we see the lingering possibility of Qing jurisdiction 
over Kokand subjects. Even if the 1835 agreement had technically granted Kokand subjects in 
Xinjiang extraterritoriality, Qing cooperation on that matter seems far from a foregone 
conclusion in 1840.   
 
III. Qing Jurisdiction over Kirghiz Nomads  
 As Lauren Benton and Adam Clulow have shown, protection was an important part of 
interpolity law in the early modern period: “The discourse of protection—what we call 
‘protection talk’—represented a basic currency of interpolity relations, pervading the language of 
treaties, diplomatic correspondence, tribute ceremonies, appeals for military assistance, voyage 
narratives, and petitions from individual subjects to sovereigns.”42 This element of protection 
was an important part of interstate jurisdiction between Qing and Kokand states as well. In fact, 
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as Scott Levi has shown, caravan traders and rulers in Central Asia had a symbiotic relationship. 
Caravan traders provided revenue for Central Asian rulers. Central Asia rulers, in turn, provided 
many services for the merchants to promote long-distance caravan trade. They built and 
maintained infrastructure essential for this trade: roads and caravanserais. More importantly for 
our purpose, they ensured the safety of travel, protecting the merchants with laws and soldiers.43  
 In the Qing-Kokand context, this usually meant protecting Kokand traders from Kirghiz 
robbers. Qing provided for the safety of traders with periodic patrols of trade routes by karun 
personnel. Moreover, Qing took a proactive role in recovering stolen goods belonging to Kokand 
merchants, sometimes even bringing Kirghiz culprits to justice. In this section, we will approach 
Qing-Kokand interstate jurisdiction from two perspectives. First, we will look at the symbiotic 
relationship between the Qing state and Kokand merchants in Xinjiang by analyzing how Qing 
provided legal protection to Kokand merchants even beyond the karuns. Second, we will look at 
the ways in which Qing asserted jurisdiction over Kirghiz nomads and compare them with the 
ways in which Qing asserted jurisdiction over Kokand subjects in the previous section.  
 
A. Qing Protection of Caravan Merchants 
 As we have seen in chapter six, pastures of various Kirghiz tribes lay between Kokand 
and Altishahr. Kokand and Altishahr merchants had to pass through these pastures on their 
commercial trips and were frequent targets of robbery by Kirghiz tribesmen. Interestingly, it 
seems to have mattered little to the Qing state whether the victims of these robberies were 
Kokand subjects or Altishahri Muslims. Instead, the Qing ambans in Altishahr understood these 
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robberies as attacks on innocent Muslim merchants by unruly nomadic Kirghiz, offering equal 
protection to all who were robbed. 
 Robbery by Kirghiz presented itself as the major problem in the earliest years of Qing 
rule in Xinjiang. In January 1761, two separate cases of Kirghiz robbery from 1760 were 
resolved. The first case involved Kirghiz nomads from Sayak and Sarbagashi tribes who had 
robbed 30 or so Altishahr and Kokand traders in Chongbagashi pasture within the karun line 
during the winter of 1760. Haiming (海明; d. 1772), the official in charge of Kashgar 
(Kashiga’er banshi dutong shilang; this was before the superintendent became an official 
position), entrusted a subordinate officer with the investigation. This officer contacted 
Sarbagashi bii Mingilha, who then captured chief criminal Ma-er-ka-bai (瑪爾喀拜) and 
accomplice Sha-ba-tu (沙巴圖) and sent them to Kashgar. In Kashgar, Haiming and his 
subordinate officials got the robbers to confess their crimes and assented to the earnest request of 
the Muslim crowd for their punishment. The chief criminal, Ma-er-ka-bai, was promptly 
beheaded, with his head publicly displayed, while his accomplice Sha-ba-tu had his finger cut off 
“according to the Muslim law (zhao Hui fa).” The stolen goods in their possession were returned 
to the merchants.44 
 The second case involved the Chongbagashi chieftain Umer Bii (烏默爾比), who robbed 
Kokand merchants outside the karun line in the summer of 1760. This had happened while 
another Chogbagashi chieftain, Awal, was on his way back from his imperial audience in 
Beijing, and Umer Bii had already fled by the time Awal came back to the Chongbagashi 
pasture. Awal cooperated with Qing officials as soon as he returned and succeeded in arresting 
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Umer Bii and other robbers, eventually bringing Umer Bii’s band to Kashgar. In Kashgar, 
Haiming initially thought that this case was somewhat different from the Ma-er-ka-bai case 
because the location of robbery lay outside the karun line. Thus, he recommended a lighter 
punishment, requesting that Umer Bii be stripped of his rank and title (zhixian) and be handed 
over to either the Chongbagashi chieftain Awal Bii or the Hibcak chieftain Akim. In other words, 
Umer’s punishment would be handled by Kirghiz chieftains.  
 Qianlong found this suggestion inappropriate. As Ma-er-ka-bai had already been 
executed, Qianlong reasoned, Umer deserved death as well, and letting him off this way would 
be overly lenient. As for letting Kirghiz chieftains handle this trial, Qianlong saw no reason to do 
so: “Chonggabashi [sic] Kirghiz belong to Kashgar and are different from foreign Muslims 
(Chonggabashi zhi Bulute nai Kashiga’er suoshu, yu waifan Huiren bu tong).” Thus, asserting 
direct jurisdiction in the case was perfectly acceptable. Qianlong concluded his edict by ordering 
that Umer and his accomplices be sent to Beijing for a trial there. In Beijing, the Board of 
Punishments was put in charge of the trial, and its adjudication was approved by the emperor: 
life exile to a malarial place for Umer and enslavement for the women in his family. The women 
in his family were distributed among the hakim begs of various places and Awal Bii.45 
 In the two cases above, we can already see two different perspectives on asserting 
jurisdiction on Kirghiz crimes. The first, represented by Haiming, sought to limit assertion of 
jurisdiction to crimes committed within the karun line. The second, represented by the Qianlong 
emperor, did not see the karun line as representing the limit of Qing jurisdiction over Kirghiz 
criminals. As we will see below, these two perspectives coexisted throughout the reign of the 
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Qianlong emperor (1736-95). Gradually, during the reigns of the Jiaqing (1796-1820) and 
Daoguang (1821-50) emperors, however, the first perspective would come to dominate Qing 
policy in Xinjiang. More importantly, however, this shows the Qing commitment to the 
protection of caravan commerce that transcended the boundaries delineated by the karuns. We 
might see this as another manifestation of the universalist imperial jurisdiction of the Qianlong 
reign.  
 For now, though, let us focus on more cases of Kirghiz robbing merchants. In the second 
half of the eighteenth century, both Qing protection of merchants against Kirghiz robbers and 
Qing assertion of jurisdiction over these robbers were constant features of Qing jurisdiction in 
the region. In the eighteenth century, Qing proved its role as the legal protector of commerce 
against Kirghiz robberies outside the karun line in three main ways. First, Qing ambans 
facilitated the recovery of stolen goods and their return to the victims. Second, Qing ambans 
asserted direct jurisdiction over the Kirghiz robbers, personally trying them and punishing them 
in their cities. Third, Qing ambans asserted jurisdiction by proxy, letting the Altishahr begs and 
Kirghiz chieftains try and punish the robbers.  
 The first of these was arguably the most important. In fact, bringing robbers to justice 
seems to have been secondary to recovering stolen goods sometimes, when both Kokand 
merchants and Altishahr ambans focused on the return of goods to their owners. In the summer 
of 1762, a case of Kirghiz robbing Kokand merchants came to the attention of Kashgar officials 
when the Kokand envoy Babasik (巴巴什克) reported to Kashgar hakim beg Gadaimet on how 
the Sarbagashi Kirghiz had robbed seven Kokand merchants of 80 horses at a place called 
Tuguruk Tala. Gadaimet then reported the incident to Kashgar ambans Yunggui and Iletu, who 
in turn entrusted Gadaimet with the investigation. Gadaimet sent begs under his command to the 
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Sarbagashi pasture to inquire after the Kirghiz there, and they returned with 55 horses and a 
report from a Saru bii named Šabtu, who confessed that one of his men was responsible for the 
robbery. Back in Kashgar, Yunggui and Iletu were troubled by the fact that only 55 of the 80 
horses had been recovered. Their subsequent interview of the Kokand merchants revealed that 
they were uncertain about both the robbers’ identity and the number of horses stolen. The 
ambans subsequently rebuked the merchants for their fuzzy reporting and then let them return to 
Kokand. It is telling that the main concern of the ambans here was not punishing the robbers but 
recovering the stolen goods.46 
 Again, in 1768, Kirghiz of the Edegene and Kartigin tribes robbed 74 Kokand merchants. 
The Kashgar ambans entrusted the following Kirghiz chieftains with the recovery of the 
plundered goods: Edegene biis Ajibii and Hūsibii, Hūsibii’s son Šabtu, and Kartigin bii Samanci. 
Of 300-some horses stolen, Edegene chieftains successfully recovered 68 horses and brought 
them to Kashgar, where the horses were handed to the Kokand aqsaqal Rudzihūli. Even though 
this resulted in a discussion on the limited number of horses that had been recovered, there was 
no mention of punishing the Kirghiz robbers.47 
 Second, as shown in the Umer Bii case above, the Qing ambans asserted full jurisdiction 
in cases that it deemed more important. As the cases below will show, however, such assertion of 
full jurisdiction required the cooperation of the Altishahr begs and Kirghiz chieftains who were 
responsible for investigating the cases. In 1772, a group of Kashgar and Kokand merchants who 
were robbed by Kirghiz at Isilik made a report to Ush authorities. As the initial interrogation of 
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the victims had identified two Cirik Kirghiz and one Monggoldor Kirghiz, Ush superintendent 
Antai put Kirghiz imperial guardsman Esen (rank 3) and Aksu mirab beg Markatula (rank 5) in 
charge of the investigation. Esen and Markatula came back with the criminals after about a 
month of investigation. In the meantime, they had personally gone to the pastures of Cirik and 
Monggoldor tribes. In those pastures, they had summoned the biis of the tribes and interrogated 
suspects, which eventually led to the arrest of and confession by 11 Monggoldor robbers and two 
Buhu robbers (for a reason unknown to me at this point, Buhu and Sarbagashi were 
interchangeable terms in these sources). At that point, Antai personally reviewed and adjudicated 
the case.48 
 One robbery case in 1790 was notable for its scale. Kirghiz under the rule of Cakar Sayak 
(察喀爾西雅克) ahalakci Jampolat (占頗拉特) had stolen about 1,000 horses from groups of 
Kokand and Kashgar traders. Upon receiving a memorial on the arrest of the robbers, the 
Qianlong emperor noted that even though Kirghiz committing robbery was an ordinary matter 
(changshi), it was unusual (hanyou) for them to assemble in such large numbers as to be able to 
steal so many horses. Unless they were punished, Qianlong concluded, other incidents might 
follow.49 
 The robbers who had already been arrested were thus tried and punished. Jampolat, 
however, was to remain imprisoned in Kashgar until his sons could arrest the robbers who had 
gotten away. Other Kirghiz who had been arrested and proven to be innocent over the course of 
the trial also remained imprisoned in Kashgar until further imperial instruction arrived. Judemiši 
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(珠德彌什), one of these Kirghiz prisoners, bribed a prison guard and attempted to escape but 
failed and was rearrested. Kashgar councilor Mingliyang and others escorted Judemiši to Shaan-
Gan governor-general Leboo and sentenced him to exile and hard labor (faqian chongdang 
kuchai). Qianlong bristled upon learning of this ruling, and his reaction clearly shows the priority 
he placed on punishing Kirghiz for these criminal behaviors. Judemiši, Qianlong stated, even 
though he was found innocent and should have been sent back to his pasture, was still in custody 
and should have abided by the law and waited quietly (shoufa jinghou) for the imperial 
instruction. By attempting to escape, Qianlong continued, Judemiši had committed a hateful 
(kewu) crime and should have been executed right after his capture so that tribes in Xinjiang 
would all know the seriousness of the laws (Xinjiang ge buluo ren deng gong zhi faling yansu). 
Qianlong ordered Mingliyang to execute Judemiši immediately and to inform the Kirghiz of the 
real reason behind his execution: his flouting of law and discipline (muwufaji), not the robbery 
he did not commit.50 
 Third, Qing also asserted jurisdiction over Kirghiz criminals by proxy, essentially 
delegating the entire judicial process to Altishahr begs and Kirghiz chieftains. The first such 
instance I have found is from 1773. It began like those cases in which the Qing state asserted full 
jurisdiction. Once the Kokand and Altishahr victims of robbery pointed out that the culprits 
belonged to five Kirghiz tribes (Sayak, Buku, Adak, Sarbagashi, and Cirik), the Kashgar ambans 
appointed a Kirghiz chieftain (Esen) and a Muslim beg (mituwali beg Hūtuluktus) as 
investigators. These investigators went to Kirghiz pastures and worked in concert with Kirghiz 
biis to find the criminals responsible for the robbery. Once the criminals were produced and 
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confessions gained, however, the investigators allowed the Kirghiz biis and ahalakci to try and 
punish these criminals on their own. Ringleader Adzak Baimurat was beheaded, while his 
lieutenant Baiir had his arm cut off at the shoulder. Their 37 accomplices were beaten with 50 
lashes.51 
 In 1776, five Kashgar Muslims were robbed by seven people at a place called Layanggar 
Tiyeriyek. They came to Ush to report on the robbery and testified that the robbers were Kirghiz, 
judging by their speech. The Ush amban deputed Ush hakim beg Alahuli and two Kirghiz 
chieftains (Cirik chieftain Esen and Hūšici chieftain Maimat) with the investigation, and they 
were soon joined by Hūšici bii Berke’s brother Arbas. After an extensive investigation, they 
found in the Hūšici tribe seven robbers, interrogated them one by one, and then punished them 
on their own. The two main culprits had their limbs severed, and five accomplices were each 
whipped 60 to 80 times. The worth of the stolen goods was calculated and reimbursed to the 
owners, and the chieftains of the tribe were warned and rebuked by the investigators.52 
 In 1781, three Kokand merchants who resided in Aksu came to Ush to report that they 
had been robbed near the pasture of the Solton Kirghiz. As usual, the Ush ambans entrusted the 
investigation to Kirghiz chieftains and Muslim begs. Of the four investigators, Cirik imperial 
guardsman Esen (rank 3) headed the investigation, as he outranked the others. This is another 
detail that shows that the rank buttons given to Kirghiz chieftains, discussed in chapter six, were 
not devoid of meaning to the Qing state in Xinjiang. In any case, the investigators went to the 
Solton pasture, where the chieftains were notified and shown a letter with the seal of the ambans. 
The Solton chieftains soon produced 30-some robbers, and a trial took place on the spot. Three 
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main culprits had their limbs cut off, and the accomplices were beaten hard according to their 
degrees of guilt. The investigators warned the chieftains to not let this happen again, then came 
back to Ush to report to the ambans. The ambans also got a letter from Solton bii Niša on the 
trial, which they noted in their memorial to the Qianlong emperor was identical to Esen’s 
report.53 
 In the nineteenth century, however, both Qing protection of caravan merchants and Qing 
assertion of jurisdiction over Kirghiz robbers became rarer, then nonexistent. Several factors that 
may have led to this development have already been mentioned in chapter six and above: 
expansionism of the Khanate of Kokand, which strengthened its quest for jurisdiction over 
caravan merchants; Qing imperial retreat to the karun line as the territorial and personal 
boundary between Qing and its neighbors; and the breakdown of the Qing Kirghiz policy. 
Significantly, however, both Qing protection of merchants and Qing jurisdiction over Kirghiz 
who committed crimes within the karuns continued into the first half of the nineteenth century. 
This is where we turn next.  
 
B. Qing Assertion of Jurisdiction over Kirghiz Criminals within the Karun 
 Throughout the period in question, Xinjiang officials were decisive and swift in asserting 
jurisdiction over Kirghiz who committed crimes within the karun line. Often, such criminal acts 
were robberies committed by Kirghiz who slipped past the karun. Unsurprisingly, it was often 
the Qing karun personnel who detected such criminal acts. In 1763, for example, the personnel at 
the Arho karun detected and arrested a Kirghiz named Cinasi, who had stolen a horse from a 
Kashgar Muslim. The karun officer sent Cinasi to Kashgar, where the ambans first deputed their 
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subordinate officials to interrogate Cinasi. After the initial interrogation by the subordinate 
officials, the ambans, along with the top Kirghiz chieftain Akim and the hakim beg Gadaimet, 
personally interrogated Cinasi. Concluding that Cinasi’s crime was very hateful (ubiyada), the 
ambans decided to punish him in a way that would serve as a warning. Cinasi was taken to the 
bazaar and executed there, in front of the area Kirghiz populace that had gathered at the 
command of the ambans. His ahalakci (the Kirghiz title for minor chieftains) Baraši was 
pardoned because of his old age.54 
 In 1769, personnel at the Cikman karun arrested Chongbagashi Kirghiz Baimet after his 
act of robbery in the Togusak village of Artusi and sent him to Kashgar. This case was handled 
in a comparable manner as the Cinasi case. Subordinate officials—bureau vice director 
(yuanwailang; rank 5b) Gilyangga and subprefectural magistrate (tongpan; rank 6a) 
Yungliyang—conducted the initial investigation. Then Kashgar ambans Antai (安泰; d. 1775) 
and superintendent Cin Hūwang (秦璜; n.d.) interrogated Baimet personally and adjudicated on 
the case. In their adjudication, they relied on two factors. First was the precedent established in 
the Cinasi case, where immediate execution at the bazaar served as a warning to the populace. 
Second was what they called “Muslim custom.” Combining these two factors, they sentenced 
Baimet to be hanged immediately at the bazaar in accordance with “Muslim custom” (hoise i 
kooli songkoi lakiyame bucebuki).55 Here, barely 10 years after the Qing conquest of Kashgar, 
we see use of precedents in trying Kirghiz criminals committing crimes within the karun line.  
 The next case, in 1772, also clearly shows the continued use of precedents. This case 
involved Turdu and two other Chongbagashi Kirghiz who stole five horses in a Cirik pasture and 
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were arrested at Yustu Artuši karun on their way back to their own pasture. The case was again 
handled in an analogous way: transfer of the criminals to Kashgar, initial interrogation by 
subordinate officials, and personal interrogation and adjudication by the ambans. Here again, 
Kashgar councilor Fusembu (福森布, 富森布) and superintendent Suldei (蘇爾德) used the 
Baimet precedent to sentence these three Kirghiz to immediate execution at the bazaar, reasoning 
that Kashgar was at a western extremity of the empire (wargi dubei jecen).56 
 Interestingly, Xinjiang authorities sometimes even asserted jurisdiction over crimes that 
happened among the Kirghiz themselves within the karun line. In 1781, for example, Noigūt bii 
Eimer reported to Aksu hakim beg Akbek on an uncontrollable servant of his named Niyasbaba 
who had originally been given to him by Akim in 1772. Now Eimer was requesting that 
Niyasbaba be sent back to Akim. When Akbek reported this matter to the Ush amban, Niyasbaba 
was brought to Ush and first interrogated by subordinate officials and Akbek and then personally 
interrogated by the amban. Taking into consideration his behavior under Eimer, and perhaps his 
history of following the Khoja brothers in their rebellion, the Ush amban sentenced Niyasbaba to 
exile in Yunnan’s miasmic (i.e., malarial) region.57 Here, we are reminded of Vietnamese 
refugees who were settled in Xinjiang as Qing subjects. The Qing-Vietnam borderland and the 
Qing-Kokand borderland lay at the opposite extremes of the transcontinental imperial domain.  
 In 1795, when A-yu-ta-si (阿玉塔斯) and four other Kirghiz stole government horses in 
Ili, a banner officer arrested them in their own pasture and brought them back to Ili. Booning (保
寧; 1734?-1808), the Ili military governor, interrogated them and adjudicated the case. A-yu-ta-
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si, as the ringleader, was immediately executed. The four accomplices were sentenced to exile to 
a miasmic place (fawang yanzhang difang). This adjudication was approved by the emperor.58  
 Here we might pause and reflect on the statutory basis of these trials. In the second half 
of the eighteenth century, Kirghiz crimes within the karun line were commonplace, but most of 
them were petty crimes involving a few destitute Kirghiz. Because they happened often enough, 
previous cases could be used as precedents in adjudications of new cases. Reflecting the legally 
pluralistic nature of Qing rule in Xinjiang, however, a strict application of the Qing Code (Da 
Qing lüli) on Kirghiz criminal cases seems to have been discouraged. In the 1764 case involving 
false information on the killing of Qing troops by Kirghiz, Yangsangga (揚桑阿; n.d.), the 
Kashgar superintendent, tried to use the Qing Code to punish Cirikci, the source of the false 
information. When Cirikci came to Kashgar to admit his guilt in making a false report, 
Yangsangga used a Qing substatute on making a false report to reprimand him and send him 
back. Qianlong found Yangsangga’s handling very inappropriate. When a man of an outer tribe 
(waibu zhi ren) heard news and promptly reported Qing authorities, that should be considered as 
a respectful and submissive (gongshun) behavior. Because of a stickler like Yangsangga, 
Qianlong mused, Kirghiz chieftains like Cirikci might not report on real news out of fear in the 
future. Qianlong thus ordered Yangsangga to relay the imperial message to Cirikci that the fault 
here lay with officials, not Cirikci, and that Cirikci should report all the news immediately 
regardless of its truth.59 
 In the first half of the nineteenth century, we see a dramatic increase in the scope of 
Kirghiz criminal activities within the karun line. Of course, petty crimes persisted. For example, 
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in 1837, Sa-er-bai (薩爾拜) and two other Kirghiz entered Sha-er-ya-si (沙爾雅斯) karun in Ili 
and stole five horses and six cows.60 Just the next year, Tu-lu-du (圖魯都) and six other Kirghiz 
rode past a karun in Ili and stole 20 camels from a Mongol pasture.61 In 1845, two groups of 
Kirghiz robbers stole livestock inside the karun line. Tui-hun-bai (推渾拜) and two other Kirghiz 
came inside the karun line at Ili and stole 65 horses from an Oirat pasture. In another case, Tuo-
hu-za-ke (托呼雜克) and four other Kirghiz stole nine horses from the same pasture.62  
 A robbery case in 1839, however, represented a new kind of criminal case that worried 
Qing authorities in Xinjiang because of the large scale and because they resulted in Qing deaths. 
Even though the exact number was not given because they were never captured, these Kirghiz 
robbers had come in large numbers (chengqun). Moreover, their crime was not limited to stealing 
livestock inside the karun. When Qing troops gave them chase after their theft, they engaged the 
Qing troops and even killed three Qing soldiers. Even after they had been driven away, they 
came back again and stole about 100 horses from the government ranch in a clear show of 
defiance.63 
 Things got worse in the 1840s, as both large-scale Kirghiz raids and Kirghiz killings of 
Qing soldiers became increasingly common. In 1845, 200-some Hibcak Kirghiz forcefully 
entered Tu-mu-shu-ke (圖木舒克) karun in Yengisar and killed Qing soldiers in the process.64 In 
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1846, another group of Kirghiz robbers engaged Qing soldiers, killing some in the process.65 In 
short, we see the same imperial retreat at work here that we witnessed in chapter six. The Qing 
troops in Xinjiang were having greater difficulties maintaining order within the karun line, let 
alone beyond.  
 Second, we see the Qing state, perhaps in reaction to this increase in large-scale and fatal 
Kirghiz raids, asserting jurisdiction in those cases in an even more systematic manner. In 1821, 
for example, Kashgar councilor Ulungga (武隆阿; d. 1831) proposed applying the procedure for 
cases of kaici (開齊) encroachment in Ili for cases of kaici encroachment in Kashgar. Kaici is a 
Manchu word that means a boundary between two patrol areas. Combined with the Manchu 
word jugūn, meaning road, it was used to denote patrol route.66 The Daoguang emperor approved 
this suggestion. As the nature of the crimes in both cases was identical, he reasoned, adjudication 
should also be identical. In short, the ambans in charge were to sentence those who encroached 
on the kaici in the future to banishment. Then they were to send the criminals to the Shaan-Gan 
governor-general so that he could decide on the location of their eventual banishment, while also 
notifying the Board of Punishments and the Lifanyuan in the capital for the case to be 
reviewed.67  
 In 1830, kaici encroachment cases were further codified through a tea smuggling case 
involving a Qing subject from China Proper, an Altishahr Muslim, and two Kirghiz. Yang 
Shengfa (楊生發), a Qing subject from China Proper, had brought tea to Kashgar and traded 
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with Hu-da-ba-er-di (胡達巴爾底) and A-bu-du-er-ha-li (阿布都爾哈里), two Kirghiz who had 
secretly entered the karun (touyue jin ka) with silk, pelts, and gold thread (jinxian). Altishahr 
Muslim A-ba-si (阿巴斯) had acted as a middleman, hiding the smuggled goods and selling the 
tea on the market. After the trial, Yang was sentenced to penal servitude in a far frontier, the two 
Kirghiz were sentenced to penal servitude in a miasmic place in either Liangguang or Yun-Gui, 
and A-ba-si was sentenced to penal servitude in a far frontier. All four were to wear cangues for 
three months at the site of the crime before their banishment so that their case might serve as a 
warning.  
 More importantly, this case was codified as a precedent for all future cases where 
merchants traded with Kirghiz trespassers in places like Kashgar. All those who carried weapons 
would be executed, and the rest would be sentenced to penal servitude according to the 
substatute on private trade with the Miao. If the merchants carried tea, a Qing state monopoly, 
they would be sentenced to penal servitude in a miasmic region according to the substatute on 
private tea trade with foreigners. Those merchants who carried the goods outside the karun line 
or the Kirghiz who entered the karun line to trade were to be sentenced to penal servitude in a 
miasmic region in Liangguang or Yun-Gui.68 
 It is not surprising, then, that all cases of Kirghiz crimes within the karun line were 
handled in an extremely routinized way after 1830. By 1837, Teišumboo, the Ili military 
governor adjudicating on the Sa-er-bai case, could already state that precedents for trying 
Kirghiz criminals who had encroached on the kaici and stolen livestock had long been on record. 
He immediately executed Sa-er-bai, the chief criminal, in the market so that this case could serve 
                                                          
68 QSL, Xuanzong 164: 542b-543a (DG10.1.18=2/11/1830); Xing’an huilan 12: 899-901.  
 
 
 
324 
 
as a warning. He sentenced the two accessories to penal servitude in a miasmic place. According 
to precedent (zhaoli), he tattooed them and sent them to Gansu so that the Shaan-Gan governor-
general could pick the place for their penal servitude.69 The Ili authorities handled the Tu-lu-du 
case the next year in the same way. Tu-lu-du, as the chief criminal, was immediately executed in 
the market. Three accessories who had been arrested with Tu-lu-du were tattooed and sent to 
Gansu for eventual penal servitude in a miasmic place.70 
 Saingga, the Ili military governor, and I Šan, the Ili councilor, also had plenty of 
precedents to consult when adjudicating on the two robbery cases from 1845. In adjudicating on 
the Tui-hun-bai case, they looked at a Mongol substatute (Menggu li) that dealt with Kazakhs 
entering the karun line without permission and committing robbery. They also noted how all 
previous cases of Kirghiz robberies had been handled according to this substatute. Tui-hun-bai 
was escorted to the market and immediately executed there. They applied the same substatute in 
the Tuo-hu-za-ke case, tattooing Tuo-hu-za-ke and sending him to the Shaan-Gan governor-
general for eventual penal servitude in a miasmic region.71 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 Overall, we can see that the Qing state treated Kirghiz criminals and Kokand criminals in 
very different ways even though Kirghiz and Kokand both were classified as “outer tribes” 
(tulergi aiman). As we have seen in chapter six, the Qing state in Xinjiang had in mind different 
degrees of “outer tribe” subjecthood as well as different degrees of Qing imperial subjecthood. 
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Likewise, Qing law in Xinjiang distinguished between various types of territorial and personal 
jurisdiction, making it hard for one to talk of extraterritoriality in a definitive sense. A more 
fruitful approach, as I have suggested throughout this chapter, is to see Qing Xinjiang as a legally 
pluralistic regime with many options from which the state could choose.  
 As “outer tribes,” both Kokand and Kirghiz lay between the status of “outer state” 
(tulergi gurun) and “outer province” (tulergi golo). As Nicola Di Cosmo has pointed out and as I 
have shown above, some of these Kirghiz were clearly closer to the status of “outer province” 
than other “outer tribes” such as Kokand. It is not surprising, then, to see that the Qing assertion 
of jurisdiction over Kirghiz nomads was both more routine and more complete than that over 
Kokand subjects. Similarly, the existence of these “outer tribes” in and around Xinjiang shows us 
that the category of Qing subjecthood was neither singular nor fixed. Take Altishahr Muslims for 
example. As James Millward has shown, Altishahr Muslims were distinguished from “regular 
Qing subjects” from China Proper.72 As we have seen above, however, if the distinction is 
between “regular Qing subjects” and Kokand Muslims, Altishahr Muslims approximated more 
closely the status of “regular Qing subjects.” On yet another level, Altishahr Muslims and 
Kokand Muslims constituted the category of Muslim merchants in distress when set against 
“nomadic” Kirghiz robbers. 
 Of course, this flexibility decreased over time as the Qing state had to compete with the 
Kokand state in the first half of the nineteenth century and then with the Russian state in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. As we have seen in chapter six, the Qing state retreated to 
the karun line in its definition of territorial boundaries and subjecthood. The Qing assertion of 
jurisdiction over criminals from “outer tribes” and offer of protection to merchants also retreated 
                                                          
72 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 194-231. 
 
 
 
326 
 
to the karun line. Moreover, based on the increased intensity of Kirghiz robberies inside the 
karun line and the increased demands of the Kokand state for extraterritoriality, the Qing state of 
the nineteenth century seems to have struggled to maintain its jurisdiction even within the karun 
line. This, in fact, was only a preview of things to come. From 1864 to 1877, the Qing state 
totally lost control over Altishahr as the Altishahr Muslims and Chinese Muslims (Tungans) 
rebelled against the state and a young Kokand officer named Yaqub Beg established an 
independent regime in modern Xinjiang.73 Even after the Qing reconquest of the region, Xinjiang 
would remain a colonial frontier contested between the Russian/Soviet empire, the Qing/Chinese 
empire, and the emergent Uyghur nation for seven decades.74 
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CHAPTER VIII. 
Conclusion 
Throughout this dissertation, we have seen different ways interstate interactions have 
manifested in three Qing borderlands in terms of boundaries, subjecthood, and jurisdiction. To 
conclude this dissertation, I will adopt a comparative perspective. First, I will compare the three 
borderlands studied in this dissertation, highlighting their differences as well as similarities. 
Then, I will compare the Qing empire with two contemporary Eurasian empires: Romanov 
Russia (1613-1917) and the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922). The comparison with Russia will 
focus on Qing-Russian imperial competition from the mid-seventeenth century to the second half 
of the nineteenth century. The comparison with the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, will 
focus more on the general features of imperial rule. 
 
I. Comparing Borderlands 
 The three borderlands studied in this dissertation each represent Qing’s Northeast Asian, 
Southeast Asian, and Central Asian borderlands. In that sense, it is not surprising that each 
borderland manifested characteristics of boundaries, subjecthood, and jurisdiction that were 
distinct to that borderland.  
 
A. Differences 
 First, the historical context behind the establishment of each tributary relationship was 
vastly different. To take the relationship with Qing as the common denominator, each 
relationship was formulated in one of three distinct stages of Qing empire-building. Chosŏn 
became the first Qing tributary state after a protracted process that lasted for more than four 
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decades and involved two wars. After the first war in 1627, the Jin and Chosŏn states agreed to 
recognize each other as legitimate states on equal footing. This relationship, however, barely 
lasted a decade, as conflicts between the two states over the territorial boundary and the 
subjecthood of certain borderland people mounted. After its self-professed transformation in 
1636 from a frontier khanate to an empire with universal aspirations, Qing waged another war 
against Chosŏn in December 1636 to force Chosŏn’s entry into the new Qing tributary world. 
Qing’s easy victory made Chosŏn the first Qing tributary state in February 1637. 
 Lê Vietnam, on the other hand, became a Qing tributary state in the 1660s, after Qing had 
driven the last Ming claimant out of China Proper and inherited two Vietnamese polities—the 
Lê/Trịnh regime in northern Vietnam and the Mạc in far northern Vietnam—from its imperial 
predecessor Ming. The establishment of the tributary relationship here did not involve a war or a 
formal interstate agreement on the delineation of the domains and subjects of the two states. 
Lastly, Kokand entered the Qing tributary world at the height of Qing expansion in the 1750s. 
Perhaps due to the corollary imperial self-confidence, the Qing court of the 1750s did not 
recognize Kokand as a state represented by a king, as Chosŏn and Vietnam were. Instead, it was 
regarded as an “outer tribe” (tulergi aiman) ruled by a chieftain (beg), comparable in status to 
Xinjiang begs but subordinate to the Qing officials stationed in Xinjiang. Korean and 
Vietnamese kings, on the other hand, interacted with Qing provincial officials on equal footing.  
 Second, distinct chronological and regional contexts further contributed to different 
contours of the three sets of tributary relations. Despite its self-proclamation, the Qing court in 
1637 still ruled over a regional polity that it had carved after decades of state-building and 
campaigns against Ming, Chosŏn, and various Mongol polities. As such, it above all sought to 
protect its newly acquired territories and subjects. These imperatives governed the ways the Qing 
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and Chosŏn polities handled two recurrent issues. The first issue was subjecthood. Qing claimed 
three groups of people—Jurchens residing in the Chosŏn domain, Han Chinese refugees, and 
former Chosŏn subjects captured and enslaved during the two wars mentioned above—as its 
subjects. The Chosŏn state initially protected these people, thus passively competing with Qing 
imperial claims. After Qing pressures gradually intensified, however, Chosŏn gave up its claim 
over Jurchens and Han Chinese refugees. The sporadic Chosŏn protection of former Chosŏn 
subjects continued until 1666, when the Qing court taught the Chosŏn court an imperial lesson 
by fining King Hyŏnjong (r. 1659-74) for hiding a former Chosŏn subject. Humiliated by this 
outcome, the Chosŏn state never failed to send back runaway Chosŏn captives from then on, 
labeling them as “Qing subjects” rather than “returners” as it previously had done. The line 
between Qing imperial subjects and Chosŏn tributary subjects had finally been drawn. 
 This acknowledgment also influenced the second issue, territorial delineation. At the 
outset of the tributary relationship in 1637, both states agreed to consider the Yalu River as the 
interstate territorial boundary. As the Qing presence north of the Tumen River grew, both states 
came to regard these two rivers as the interstate territorial boundary. After decades of state-
driven measures banning the unauthorized crossing of the rivers, the notion of the territorial 
boundary had become common knowledge in this borderland. This transformation culminated in 
a 1712 joint survey and demarcation of the Changbai Mountains, the grey zone that lay between 
these two rivers. As a result, the Qing-Chosŏn borderland came to exhibit a much clearer level of 
delineation of boundaries than did Qing frontiers with Vietnam or Kokand. 
 The Qing-Vietnam borderland in the 1660s, on the other hand, was still an untamed 
frontier from the perspectives of Qing and Lê Vietnamese courts, ruled by autonomous (in 
Vietnam) or semi-autonomous (in Qing) regimes at the regional level and by hereditary native 
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chieftains at the local level. It was not until the 1720s, when both Qing and Vietnamese courts 
had eliminated regional competitors and were pursuing centralization policies, that the issue of 
interstate demarcation was even brought up in the Kaihua-Vị Xuyên borderland. While 
remarkable in its modern characteristics, such as the use of rivers as natural borders and the 
linear conceptualization of the boundary, this demarcation took place in a small portion of 
Yunnan-Vietnam territorial boundary and did not result in the systematic interstate delineation 
that we saw in the Qing-Chosŏn borderland. The Qing-Vietnamese territorial boundary was 
further complicated by two factors. First, native chiefdoms in the borderland survived well into 
the nineteenth century. These polities were only indirectly ruled by either state and constituted a 
“middle ground,” which had been eliminated in the Qing-Chosŏn borderland. Second, the 
consolidation of Qing rule over China Proper in the 1680s gave rise to the Qing perception of its 
realm as unbounded and universal, which came to coexist with the early seventeenth-century 
view of a bounded Qing realm.  
 The coexistence of these universal and bounded worldviews manifested itself in at least 
two ways. First, the Qing state often encroached on the Vietnamese domain in cases concerning 
security and imperial prestige. There existed not one but at least two territorial boundaries in this 
borderland: one for entering the Qing imperial domain and the other for entering the Vietnamese 
tributary domain. The Qing state did not respect these boundaries equally. Second, asserting its 
theoretical claim to rule over “all peoples under heaven,” the Qing often accepted Vietnamese 
tributary refugees as Qing imperial subjects. This transformation of subjecthood was not limited 
to tributary Vietnamese rulers on the losing side of civil wars but also ordinary Vietnamese 
subjects. The Qing-Vietnam borderland remained very much a “middle ground,” occupying an 
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intermediate position between the well-delineated Qing-Chosŏn borderland and the zonal and 
fluid Qing-Kokand borderland. 
 The Qing-Kokand borderland, as mentioned above, was incorporated into the Qing 
domain during the height of imperial expansion in the 1750s. Here, an imperial vision of 
unbounded and unlimited frontier initially overshadowed the more linear and modest 
administrative boundaries of karun (guard post) lines. Moreover, the Qing state allowed Kokand 
caravan traders to reside in Xinjiang on a semi-permanent basis, as was the custom prior to the 
Qing conquest, even as it restricted the movement of Xinjiang Muslims beyond the karun. The 
existence in this region of nomadic Kirghiz tribes, some of whom moved freely between Kokand 
and Qing, further defied an easy demarcation of peoples and domains. The Qing state, consistent 
with its expansive late seventeenth-century self-image, tolerated this ambiguity until the death of 
the Qianlong emperor in 1799. But his successors, recognizing the imperial overreach of the 
Qianlong reign (1736-95), gradually retreated to rely on fixed karun lines as the Qing-Kokand 
boundaries. 
 Third, the different contours of interstate relations finally gave rise to different protocols 
of interstate relations. The Chosŏn court, for example, had early and frequent legal interactions 
with the Qing court, which jealously protected its interests by investigating and punishing 
Chosŏn subjects who illegally entered the Qing domain or engaged in illicit activities on Qing 
soil. This produced a joint jurisdiction, wherein Qing and Chosŏn judiciaries cooperated based 
on routine procedures drawn from precedents. Whether it took the form of the joint trial or the 
trial by the Chosŏn king subject to Qing reviews, the trial of Chosŏn criminals involved 
protracted interactions between the representatives of Qing and Chosŏn judiciaries. As some of 
these interstate trials even predated the compilation of Qing legal codes, results of the early trials 
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were often used as legal bases in later trials. This form of joint jurisdiction is something not 
found in the other two borderlands, where interstate trials often were improvisational and 
unilateral.  
 The Qing-Vietnam borderland, for example, was farther from the administrative centers 
of both states and saw only sporadic attention to interstate crimes until the early eighteenth 
century. With the Qing attempt in the 1720s to replace some native chieftains with Qing 
bureaucrats, however, interstate crimes began to receive more scrutiny. Compared to the Qing-
Chosŏn interstate jurisdiction, interstate jurisdiction in this borderland lacked clear precedents 
stipulating protocols of joint jurisdiction. As a result, it was less routine, improvisational, and 
unilateral than the one in the Qing-Chosŏn borderland. For example, mutual repatriation of 
fugitives, while still considered the norm, happened on a much less regular basis. The Qing state, 
continuing the trend of accepting Vietnamese refugees as imperial subjects, often gave refuge to 
Vietnamese fugitives. On the Vietnamese side, most notably, the Tây Sơn regime (1778-1802) 
was the patron of pirates from South China and shielded them from the Qing judiciary on a 
regular basis.   
 
B. Commonalities 
 But more important than their differences are four characteristics these borderlands had in 
common. First, the cases examined here show multiple, flexible, and shifting forms of 
jurisdiction in the Qing borderlands. This jurisdiction could be shared, given up, or transferred. 
The Qing-Chosŏn borderland, with many instances of joint trials and general cooperation 
between Qing and Chosŏn judiciaries, shows the clearest examples of shared interstate 
jurisdiction. The Qing-Vietnam borderland, on the other hand, points to instances where 
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jurisdiction was given up or transferred. When the Qing state asserted jurisdiction over 
Vietnamese subjects, that jurisdiction operated on fluctuating degrees of territorial and personal 
jurisdiction. When the Qing state pressured the Vietnamese state to extradite Vietnamese 
suspects or tried and sometimes even punished Vietnamese suspects in the Qing domain, the 
territorial principle of jurisdiction prevailed. On the other hand, when the Qing state decided to 
repatriate the Vietnamese suspects to be punished by their own king, the personal principle of 
jurisdiction prevailed.  
From this understanding of flexible and elastic interstate jurisdiction, we can reappraise 
the 1835 Qing-Kokand agreement, which scholars have interpreted as the first unequal treaty 
signed by Qing that accorded extraterritoriality to foreign subjects residing in the Qing domain. 
In fact, as I have shown in chapter seven, the 1835 agreement was merely a continuation and 
affirmation of a Qing policy that dated back to the 1760s in Xinjiang and to the 1630s in other 
borderlands. The Qing state was willing to let the Kokand merchant community in Xinjiang or 
the Kokand state itself handle minor criminal cases involving Kokand subjects. But in cases that 
it deemed to be important such as large-scale smuggling or aid to rebellions by Xinjiang 
Muslims, the Qing state did not hesitate to assert jurisdiction over Kokand subjects. 
“Extraterritoriality” was merely one of these multiple and shifting versions of jurisdiction in 
Qing borderlands.  
Second, one can also see a fundamental asymmetry between the Qing empire and its 
tributary states. Within Qing-Chosŏn interstate jurisdiction, the Chosŏn judiciary always acted as 
the lower court to the Qing judiciary. The Qing judiciary retained a monopoly over reviewing the 
terms of adjudication, and as a result, made all final decisions. Moreover, while the Chosŏn 
judiciary knew the precedents at least as well as the Qing judiciary, the Qing emperor reserved 
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the authority to create precedents. This asymmetry resulted in situations where Chosŏn kings no 
longer had the final authority over their own subjects and were sometimes even liable to be 
punished by the Qing judiciary. Finally, the Chosŏn judiciary, in contrast to its Qing counterpart, 
never asserted formal jurisdiction over foreigners entering its territory, merely repatriating Qing 
subjects in its territory in response to ad hoc Qing demands. In short, the Qing emperor remained 
the sovereign who created precedents, made the final decision and, to borrow Weber’s definition, 
had a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within his domain. 
In the Qing-Vietnam borderland, the Qing state sought judicial monopoly over its 
subjects by expecting the Vietnamese state to repatriate Qing fugitives unconditionally, even as it 
often refused to repatriate Vietnamese fugitives. This asymmetric sense of jurisdiction extended 
towards Qing subjects committing crimes in Vietnam. For the most part, Vietnamese regimes 
from the 1660s to the 1840s did not openly claim jurisdiction over Qing subjects who committed 
crimes in the Vietnamese domain, simply repatriating them with or without prompt from Qing. 
As it had no way of participating in the trials of the repatriated Qing suspects, the Vietnamese 
state essentially surrendered its jurisdiction and ensured that the Qing state would retain its 
jurisdiction over Qing subjects. At the same time, the Qing state saw Vietnamese subjects 
committing crimes in the Qing domain or against Qing subjects as its criminals, whose trials and 
punishments were to be determined by the Qing judiciary.  
Third, these two characteristics made both imperial sovereignty and tributary sovereignty 
elastic. Terms such as quasi, shared, and layered can cover some of these aspects, but they still 
posit full, Westphalian sovereignty as the norm. A conventional account of sovereignty attributes 
this modern conception to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This concluded the Thirty Years War 
and is the source from which the principles of inter-state equality and non-interference emerged 
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as the norms of international relations in Europe. As recent revisionist views have shown, 
however, Westphalian sovereignty is closer to an ideal type than a reflection of historical 
realities even in the context of early modern and modern European history. A better way to 
understanding this situation is to see both imperial and tributary sovereignties as elastic. By 
elastic, I mean sovereignty that encompassed degrees of sovereignty ranging from, from a 
modern perspective, partial to full and beyond full.1 
And herein lies my answer to Rockhill’s question on whether Korea was a sovereign state 
or not. The elasticity within the Qing tributary world meant that a tributary state like Korea did 
not have a fixed status as either “an integral part of the Chinese empire” or “a sovereign state 
enjoying absolute international rights.” Elastic sovereignty, in contrast, encompassed all these 
fluctuating degrees of sovereignty within its praxes. Such elasticity left a large repertoire of 
historical precedents to draw from, which both colonial and nationalist historiographies have 
been happy to pick and choose to give simple and convenient answers to Rockhill’s question: 
Korea and Vietnam as little Chinas or as sovereign states. 
 Fourth, there was a general trend of imperial retreat in all three borderlands. While 
asymmetry was a constant feature of Qing-Chosŏn interstate jurisdiction, the characteristics of 
this asymmetry changed over time. During the seventeenth century, when Qing rule over 
Manchuria and China Proper was still being consolidated, Qing legal intervention in trials over 
Chosŏn criminals was consistent and piercing. When it intervened, the Qing state also delegated 
                                                          
1 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Luke 
Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2014); Turan Kayaoglu, “The Extension of Westphalian Sovereignty: State Building and the Abolition of 
Extraterritoriality,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2007): 649–75; Anthony Clark Arend, “The Evolution 
of International Law,” in The Cambridge World History, Volume 7: Production, Destruction and Connection, 1750–
Present, Part 1: Structures, Spaces, and Boundary Making, ed. J. R. McNeill and Kenneth Pomeranz (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 285–305. 
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a bigger role to the Qing judiciary than to the Chosŏn judiciary. In the eighteenth century, with 
Qing imperial might at its height and more initiative from the Chosŏn state in confronting its 
borderland criminals, interstate legal procedures became more routinized. This routinization gave 
a bigger role to the Chosŏn judiciary, which could compete with the Qing judiciary in the use of 
precedents. In the first half of the nineteenth century, however, Qianlong’s successors refrained 
from asserting jurisdiction over Chosŏn subjects. This imperial retreat in the first half of the 
nineteenth century is something we observed in the other borderlands as well. In the Qing-
Vietnam borderland, to give one example, we see something akin to a non-interference policy in 
repeated edicts from the Jiaqing and Daoguang emperors to focus on the defense of the border 
posts and pay no attention to events outside the border. In the Qing-Kokand borderland as well, 
these emperors cautioned Xinjiang officials from meddling in matters beyond the karun line.  
In these three borderlands, then, we see examples of pluralistic interstate jurisdiction, 
asymmetry in imperial-tributary relations, elastic sovereignty, and nineteenth-century Qing 
imperial retreat. Together, these commonalities show an early modern worldview that defies the 
post-Westphalian norms often posited as the natural norms of international relations: inter-state 
equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of fellow sovereign states. This is a 
worldview Qing might have shared with other early modern empires such as Russia and the 
Ottomans. It is to early modern imperial comparison that I turn next.  
 
II. Comparing Early Modern Empires 
 In the past two decades, the fields of Qing, Russian, and Ottoman history have gone 
through an “imperial turn.” Galvanized by the new imperial history that sought to neutralize the 
stark distinction between European (national) metropoles and (colonial) peripheries by replacing 
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the nation with the empire as the basic unit of historical analysis, the scholars in these fields have 
been re-envisioning these histories in imperial rather than national terms. To use Russian history 
as an example, the imperial turn has allowed historians of Russia to adopt a wider Eurasian 
perspective as well as to move away from considering 1917 as a radical, complete historical 
break. Indeed, growing works on the imperial dimensions of the Romanov dynasty and the 
Soviet Union have pointed out the imperial continuities between two imperial regimes. Based on 
these exciting new works, it is now possible for the historian to take the next step and compare 
these early modern empires.2 
 Comparing these empires is my answer to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s call to “provincialize” 
Europe. Rather than comparing Qing to the more well-known cases of the British and French 
empires, which are often used as the standards of imperial comparison and thus inadvertently 
become the center of historical analysis yet again, I follow the comparative approaches of Victor 
Lieberman and Dominic Lieven. Lieberman, in his two-volume magnum opus, has shown that 
long-term trends of integration were common across Eurasia from c. 800 to 1830. His 
comparative framework, which put mainland Southeast Asia at the center of his Eurasian 
analysis, made this discovery possible. Similarly, in a 2001 monograph widely considered to 
have played a significant role in the “imperial turn” in the historiography of Russia, Lieven 
approached the theme of empire from a Russia-centered perspective, comparing Russia with 
three imperial competitors: the British Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Habsburg Empire.3 
As I will show below, Qing was another imperial competitor of Russia worth considering.  
                                                          
2 Alan Mikhail and Christine M. Philliou, “The Ottoman Empire and the Imperial Turn,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 54, no. 4 (2012): 721–45; Durba Ghosh, “Another Set of Imperial Turns?,” The American 
Historical Review 117, no. 3 (2012): 772–93; Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Alexander M. Martin, “The 
Imperial Turn,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 7, no. 4 (2006): 705–21. 
 
3 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: 
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A. Qing and Russia as Imperial Competitors 
 Russia is perhaps the most obvious choice for comparison with the Qing case. Most 
importantly, Romanov Russia and Qing were in direct and indirect imperial competition for most 
of their existence. More than anything, it was the hunt for fur in Siberia that put the two empires 
in initial contact. The Cossacks, with political backing from the Russian court and the economic 
support of the Stroganovs, spearheaded a spotty but speedy Russian colonization of Siberia that 
was supported by rivers and forts. By the 1650s, they reached the Amur River area, and their 
attempt to subjugate the local tribes, some of whom were tributaries of the Qing court, resulted in 
the first military conflicts between the two states.4  
 At the core of the conflict lay the issue of the patron-client relationship. In this scarcely 
populated region far from both imperial centers, control over people was far more important than 
control over territory. For Russia, control over the people of the region was important because 
their fur tribute (iasak) was so profitable for the court. For Qing, the economic aspect seems to 
have been less significant than retaining the loyalty of the Amur natives and thus securing the 
northern frontier of its homeland.5 This obsession with such a small number of people suggests 
                                                          
1830, Volume 1: Integration on the Mainland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Victor Lieberman, 
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that the competition over these people might have been more valuable to Qing as a symbol of 
Qing subjecthood in general, as we saw was the case in the Qing-Chosŏn borderland in chapter 
two.  
 By the 1680s, Qing and Russian courts had come to know more about their counterparts. 
For one, each realized that the troops they were fighting in the Amur region had been sent by 
imperial courts in Beijing or Moscow. For example, the Qing court previously had not realized 
that the Russian court had sent both the troops in the Amur region and several envoys to Beijing. 
Moreover, the expansion of the Zunghar Khanate, led by Galdan Boshogtu Khan (r. 1678-97), in 
Central Eurasia posed a security threat to the Qing court that worried about the rise of a powerful 
nomadic confederacy that could challenge its hegemony. These factors, combined with the 
Russian desire for access to the Chinese market, made negotiations between the Qing and 
Russian states possible. These negotiations, which used Jesuits as intermediaries and Latin as the 
official language, resulted in the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. As Peter Perdue has pointed out, this 
treaty excluded the interests of the Mongols in general and specifically those of the Zunghar 
Khanate. The subsequent Treaty of Kyakhta in 1727 reaffirmed the shared interests of the Qing 
and Russian empires against those of the Zunghars. It further delineated the boundaries between 
the peoples and domains of the two empires while stipulating that there was to be no Russian 
support for the Zunghars in future conflicts between Qing and the Zunghars.6 While the final 
Qing victory over the Zunghars in the 1750s was of course contingent on many factors and not a 
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foregone conclusion by the 1720s, these treaties certainly paved the way for the future Qing and 
Russian conquests in Central Eurasia. 
 In the 1750s, Qing finally succeeded in vanquishing the Zunghars. With the Qing 
incorporation of the region known as Xinjiang today, Qing and Russia came to share a new 
borderland in Central Asia. Benjamin Levey and Noda Jin have shown how the two states 
approached this new inter-imperial borderland. The two states in the 1750s and 1760s generally 
respected the territorial claims of the other state. For example, even though the Qing court laid 
claim to all the lands that had ever been controlled by the Zunghars, it was careful not to 
encroach on Russia’s Central Asian frontier, which was protected by a set of fortresses known as 
the “Irtysh Line.” In fact, however, much of the Qing-Russia borderland in Central Asia was 
occupied by Kazakh and Kirghiz nomads. The imperial competition for control of people began 
anew within this context, and the Kazakhs were at the heart of this competition. According to 
Noda Jin, however, there was a key difference between the Russian and Qing approaches. In 
short, Russia sought to incorporate Kazakhs as Russian subjects, whereas Qing focused on 
controlling nomadic Kazakh behaviors for frontier security but effectively considered them 
“foreigners.”7 
 But as we have seen in chapter six with the Qing Kirghiz policy, especially during the 
Qianlong reign, there are some important parallels between Qing and Russian policies towards 
Central Asian nomads. The most important parallel is the patron-client relationship that both 
courts maintained with various nomadic chieftains. In the absence of full-scale colonial 
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administration, both states chose this form of indirect rule as a viable alternative. The fact that a 
few Kazakh khans sought and received investitures from both Qing and Russian courts 
highlights this imperial parallel. The second parallel is the attempt to criminalize certain forms of 
violence that worked against imperial interest. Both Qing and Russian states, conforming to the 
standards expected of Central Asian rulers, promoted caravan trade by protecting the merchants 
from Kazakh and Kirghiz raiding and punishing these nomadic bandits. Moreover, neither state 
would tolerate nomadic violence directed against the state apparatus, most notably the guard 
posts. The guard posts show the third parallel: the fundamentally military characteristic of 
imperial rule. Even Russia hesitated to introduce regular bureaucracy in its Central Asian 
frontier. In the case of Small and Middle Hordes of the Kazakhs, it was not until the 1820s that 
administrative change transformed the character of Russian rule in the region, which was driven 
by the new civil authority and the seizure of land from Kazakhs to support European settlers.8 
 Moreover, this imperial competition continued into the second half of the nineteenth 
century and onward. Russia’s Central Asian conquests in the second half of the nineteenth 
century made Russia the imperial successor to Qing in many parts of Central Asia. And yet, as 
David Brophy has demonstrated brilliantly in his recent monograph, Xinjiang remained a frontier 
“structured by the interplay of imperial and spiritual loyalties, institutions of autonomy and 
extraterritoriality, and negotiations between rulers and ruled.”9 At the same time, the “modern” 
Russian colonial rule in the second half of the nineteenth century was not fundamentally unlike 
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the “early modern” Qing imperial rule in certain places. Russian policy towards the Kirghiz 
tribes provides a good example. As Tetsu Akiyama has shown, the authority of Kirghiz 
chieftains (manap) did not deteriorate under the Russian rule. The Russian allocation of 
pastureland to each chieftain resembles the Qing allocation of pastureland to Kirghiz near the 
karun that I have described in chapter six. Moreover, the chieftains proactively collaborated with 
the imperial state, using Kokand and other tribes as bargaining chips and refusing to serve as 
administrators without loss of authority.10  
 Indeed, a multitude of possibilities was still present in Central Asia of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Many connections that existed between Xinjiang and the Ottoman 
Empire, recently highlighted by Brophy and Kim Ho-dong, point to one of these possibilities. 
The Ottoman Empire, which was trying to position itself as the protector of Muslims worldwide 
after its loss of Muslim territories and subjects to Russia, seems to have struck many Xinjiang 
Muslims as a more attractive alternative to Russia and China.11 It is to the Ottoman case that we 
turn now.  
 
B. Qing and Ottoman: From Victims of Imperialism to Empires 
 The phrases “sick man of Europe” and “sick man of Asia” can serve as a point of 
departure in comparing the Qing and Ottoman empires. By the second half of the nineteenth 
century, both the Qing and Ottoman empires had suffered defeats by European powers and were 
experiencing political and economic instability. Indeed, the Qing state would fall in 1912, and 
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the Ottoman state would follow suit just after a decade.12 This has led historians of China to look 
at Qing as the last premodern Chinese dynasty that failed to keep up with the West, which made 
the leap to modernity thanks to transformative processes of the Industrial Revolution and the 
French Revolution. The corollary view was that China had to be awakened by the Western 
impact that started with the First Opium War (1839-42). The prevailing question then became 
when China began to decline in comparison to the West, and there was not much impetus to 
consider the possibility that Qing had ever been a success story. As discussed in the introduction, 
New Qing History has done much to counter this view and show Qing as a successful early 
modern empire.  
 One can see a similar development within Ottoman historiography. The conventional 
historiography of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire focused more than 
anything on the theme of decline. The classical age or the golden age of the Ottomans was 
considered to have ended around 1600, from which point the empire experienced unstoppable 
decline in almost every aspect of its rule. This decline seemed to be most clearly reflected in the 
long-term trend toward the decentralization of Ottoman rule, in which the Ottoman court in 
Istanbul gradually lost control over provincial power-holders who created regional dynasties in 
the Balkans, Anatolia, and the Arab provinces. Of course, there is a mismatch between this 
picture of inevitable doom and the resilience of an empire that went on to survive for 322 more 
years. More recently, scholars have abandoned the decline thesis almost wholly by paying more 
attention to the longevity of the Ottoman Empire as well as to continuities between the periods 
before and after 1600. To give one example of this reorientation, scholars are beginning to look 
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at localization of Ottoman rule not as a process of decentralization but rather a process of 
“Ottomanization,” an expansion of Ottoman political forms at the provincial level.13  
 Findings in these recent works on Ottoman historiography point to a few similarities that 
the Ottoman Empire shared with Qing. First, both empires were fundamentally pluralistic. New 
Qing History, as mentioned throughout this dissertation, has emphasized the need to recognize 
Qing as a multiethnic and multicultural empire. By doing so, it has shown the striking diversity 
of regions and peoples that came under Qing rule as well as the flexibility of Qing rule over its 
domain and subjects. This acknowledgement is in sharp contrast with the earlier perspective that 
regarded Qing as the last premodern Chinese dynasty. According to this view, the Manchu ruling 
group conquered China Proper, inherited Ming institutions and norms of governance without 
much innovation, and gradually became Sinicized. By focusing on the intermediate zones of the 
Qing domain, rather than the core zone of China Proper, New Qing History has shown Qing 
distinctiveness in comparison to Ming. This Qing innovation was most evident on the Inner 
Asian frontiers of the Qing domain, most of which had never come under Ming rule.  
 The Ottomans ruled over a pluralistic empire as well. The Ottoman Empire was multi-
confessional from its beginning. Even though Muslims became the majority group beginning in 
the sixteenth century, Greek Orthodox and Armenian Christians constituted the majority in some 
parts of the empire. These three groups, along with the Jews, formed the core of the millet 
system that arranged for the coexistence of plural confessional groups within Ottoman society. 
Ottoman law reflected this pluralism as well by combining the Islamic law (şeri’at) with the 
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kanun, operational law based on custom and the commands of the sultans. Just as Qing was more 
than a Confucian state, the Ottoman Empire was more than an Islamic empire. Stretching over 
three continents, the Ottoman Empire was a multiethnic empire as well. Turks never constituted 
a majority of the imperial population at any point in Ottoman history. In fact, the Ottoman elites 
were cosmopolitan and did not even consider themselves Turks, which among them was a 
pejorative term referring to uncultured residents of the hinterland.14  
 Second, the ruling houses of both empires were products of the post-Mongol steppe 
legacy, which took different forms in various parts of Eurasia. They were classic examples of 
what Joseph Fletcher called “transplantation of the nomadic grand khan in the soil of a settled 
empire,” which combined “the centralized personal power of the nomadic polity at its height and 
the massive stability of the agrarian socioeconomic order.”15  
 In the Qing case, much of the Jianzhou Jurchen and early Manchu state-building took the 
form of direct competition with various Mongol polities. One polity of note was the Chakhar 
confederacy under the leadership of Ligdan Khan (r. 1604-34), who sought to revive the glory 
days of the Mongol Empire. For both Nurhaci and Hong Taiji, a central goal was countering 
Ligdan Khan’s influence among the Eastern Mongols through military campaigns and, more 
importantly, building alliances with various Mongol princes. Indeed, it is telling that Hong Taiji 
did not proclaim himself a universal emperor until after he defeated the Ligdan Khan and 
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acquired from him the imperial seal of the Yuan dynasty. The Mongol legacy was central to 
Qing empire-building.16 In the Ottoman case, the House of Osman was a product of the Turco-
Mongol legacy that had prevailed in the western half of Eurasia. The early Ottoman rulers started 
their political career as a modest Turkic principality in fourteenth-century Anatolia. As 
peripheral members of the Eurasian Turco-Mongol legacy, their early history was filled with 
successful attempts to ally with, restrain, and eventually control other nomads of Anatolia.17 
 Third, both courts claimed universal rulership that, at least in theory, framed their 
relations with other polities and power-holders as hierarchical and asymmetric. As we have seen 
throughout this dissertation, Qing tributary praxis demanded that tributary rulers acknowledge a 
fundamental asymmetry between themselves and the emperor in establishing and maintaining 
tributary relations. This asymmetry manifested itself in various instances in which the domains, 
peoples, and jurisdictions of Qing imperial and tributary states came into contact.  
 At the outset, the Ottoman case would seem to be somewhat different. For one, the 
Ottoman Empire experienced significant military setbacks from its European neighbors much 
earlier than Qing did. Parallel to that development was the rise of a more reciprocal, European-
style diplomacy, beginning with the Treaty of Karlowitz (1698) with the Habsburgs.18 At the 
same time, we must remember that this treaty-based diplomacy coexisted with the much older 
Ottoman tradition of capitulations (ahidname). Capitulations, as Edhem Eldem points out, were 
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1603–1839, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 81–117. 
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not bilateral treaties but were gifts from the Ottoman sultan to the foreign ruler that provided a 
legal framework for that ruler’s subjects. As such, they represented not proto-colonial 
concessions of commercial and legal privileges but rather asymmetric relations between the 
Ottoman sultan and foreign rulers. Indeed, the 1740 capitulations to France were the first to 
recognize fully and explicitly a foreign ruler as the sultan’s equal.19 Thus, there was still room 
for the eighteenth-century Ottoman court to preserve at least the ideal of universal rulership in its 
relations with other polities.  
 When we hold up this Ottoman situation against Qing tributary praxis, the picture 
becomes even more comparable. First, we might recall Qing’s 1835 “capitulations” to Kokand. 
In chapter seven, I have cautioned against taking the 1835 agreement between Qing and Kokand 
as the prototype of the system of unequal treaties that later enmeshed Qing and then Republican 
China (1912-49).20 Still, there is no question that the 1835 agreement was reached at a moment 
of weakness for Qing, a context that granted many privileges to the khan of Kokand and gave 
him much room to maneuver. The fact that these “capitulations” could be covered within the 
rubric of tributary relations has often been considered evidence of the illusionary nature of the 
Qing tributary system. But as I have stressed throughout the dissertation, it is also a testimony to 
elasticity and flexibility of the Qing tributary world. Second, the Qing court was also capable of 
complementing its tributary relations with other mechanisms of interstate relations. Again, the 
                                                          
19 Edhem Eldem, “Capitulations and Western Trade,” in The Cambridge History of Turkey, Volume 3: The Later 
Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 289-97, 319-
21. 
 
20 On the treaty system, see John K. Fairbank, “The Creation of the Treaty System,” in The Cambridge History of 
China, Volume 10: Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part 1, ed. John K. Fairbank (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1978), 213–63. Okamoto Takashi, Zokkoku to jishu no aida: kindai Shin-Kan kankei to Higashi Ajia no meiun 
(Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2004), provides a careful analysis of the transition from the tribute system 
to the treaty system with a focus on Qing-Korean relations.  
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Russian case is instructive. In times of imperial competition, Qing was more than happy to sign 
two equal treaties with Russia to achieve its geopolitical goals in Central Eurasia.  
 
III. Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I have placed Qing China in a global context by constructing a 
connective history of Asia and a comparative history of Northeast Asian, Southeast Asian, and 
Central Asian borderlands. As I have shown throughout this work, there is much to be gained 
from looking at the Qing empire beyond today’s Chinese borders. Qing had clear agendas as an 
imperial power when dealing with its smaller tributary states, and these agendas must be 
examined alongside Qing imperial projects within today’s Chinese borders.  
I have also briefly compared the Qing empire with Romanov Russia and the Ottoman 
Empire, a step toward further integrating China and the world as units of historical analysis. 
Comparison with Russia focused on the historical contexts of imperial competition between the 
two states. Most notably, the comparison of how Qing and Russia ruled their Central Asian 
frontiers highlighted many similarities that, at times, defied a sharp distinction between early 
modern empires and modern colonial empires. Comparison with the Ottoman case pointed out 
three overall commonalities between the two empires: pluralistic characteristics, a common post-
Mongol steppe legacy, and hierarchical frameworks of interstate relations.  
 To conclude this dissertation, then, I will return to questions I raised in the introduction. 
To what extent and in what ways did Qing China's official self-representation as a universal 
empire ruling “All under Heaven (Tianxia)” influence practical interactions along imperial 
frontiers? And how were the frontiers themselves perceived? Far from being a mere illusion with 
only symbolic importance, Qing claim to universal sovereignty had life-and-death consequences 
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for many borderland residents. At the one extreme, the Qing court could execute Chosŏn 
trespassers as its criminals. At the other extreme, Vietnamese refugees could save their lives by 
manipulating this concept to become Qing imperial subjects. Likewise, there was no one way to 
perceive these frontiers. In each frontier, both the Qing state and the tributary state had their own 
ideas on where the boundaries between their subjects and domains lay. These views variously 
defied, ignored, and acknowledged one another.  
 How did Qing conceptualize the East Asian political world? And how did Qing rulers 
understand “sovereignty?” The Qing conceptualization of this political world evolved over time. 
In 1637, Qing perceived it as a world of lands and peoples belonging to different rulers, although 
it sought to wrestle more of these lands and peoples away from other rulers. By the 1680s, this 
worldview of Qing among other states had come to coexist with a more universal worldview of 
unbounded Qing. By the 1750s, at the height of imperial expansion, Qing almost equated its 
imperium with this political world. By 1800s, the empire had retreated from its borderlands and 
saw itself as bounded once again, at least in practice. The coexistence of and tension between 
these different worldviews corresponded to the multiple Qing understandings of sovereignty, 
which made both imperial and tributary sovereignty fundamentally elastic.  
 Finally, how did the views of Qing and its tributaries compare with norms of sovereignty 
and territoriality in post-1648 Europe—and in non-European “world empires” other than China? 
Indeed, what is an “empire?” The tributary praxes we have seen in this dissertation defy the 
norms of sovereignty and territoriality in post-1648 Europe. Recent studies have shown the two 
tenets of Westphalian sovereignty—interstate equality and non-interference—as norms that were 
often violated even in early modern and modern Europe. Even with that revised view, the Qing 
tributary world differed from post-1648 Europe in so far as that asymmetry and elastic 
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sovereignty were norms that were often manifested in practical interactions. Indeed, comparisons 
with Russia and the Ottoman Empire have shown the norms of asymmetry to have been present 
in Russian and Ottoman worldviews as well. At the same time, the fact that Russia and Qing 
could interact on an equal basis highlights the flexibility of imperial systems. An empire, whose 
“center exercises political control through hierarchical and quasi-monopolistic relations” over 
peripheries, was also capable of identifying and recognizing another imperial center. But an 
empire without its inferiors cannot remain an empire, and that is why it always needs its 
asymmetric and hierarchical relations with its “others.”21 
 Indeed, this is exactly what Qing was able to do from the 1630s to the 1790s. In 1637, 
Qing needed to incorporate Chosŏn as an inferior other into its new tributary world. Otherwise, 
its self-transformation from a Jin khantate to a Qing empire would not have had much 
geopolitical currency. By the 1660s, Qing had succeeded in crushing the last of the Southern 
Ming regimes. This act in the Qing imperial drama, however, was not finalized until Qing 
claimed its inheritance of the Ming tributary states, as when it established tributary relations with 
two Vietnamese regimes. By the 1750s, Qing had incorporated regions and peoples never 
controlled by its Ming predecessor. This exceptional Qing success had its tributary counterparts 
as well, as the Qianlong emperor established tributary relations with Central Asian rulers who 
had been members of the Ming tributary world. Qing was able to thrive as an empire by 
maintaining the asymmetry of tributary relations and manipulating elastic sovereignty in the 
borderlands.  
 This success, of course, would not last forever. The disintegration of the Qing Kirghiz 
policy in the first half of the nineteenth century, along with other signs of imperial retreat in all 
                                                          
21 Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 9. 
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three borderlands around this time, was a sign of things to come. No longer able to manipulate 
asymmetry in tributary relations and elastic sovereignty in the borderlands as well as it once had, 
Qing had begun its decline as an imperial power. The challenges mounted by Western and 
Japanese colonial empires in the second half of the nineteenth century accelerated this decline, 
but the stage was already set.  
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APPENDIX 
Chinese Characters 
Annan/An Nam 安南 
baixing  百姓 
bangwen  榜文 
banshi dachen  辦事大臣 
bantu   版圖 
baqi   八旗 
bian’ai   邊隘 
bianyuan  邊遠 
buhuo jiesong  捕獲解送 
buzhengshi  布政使 
canling  參領 
canzan dachen  參贊大臣 
chaejo chi ŭn  再造之恩 
changshi  常事 
chaoting  朝廷 
Chaoxian/Chosŏn 朝鮮 
châu   州 
chengchuang  懲創  
chengqun  成群 
chengshouwei  城守尉 
chizi   赤子 
chŏmsa  僉使 
chuanpiao  船票 
chuhoe in  走回人 
chuli   出力 
cuomiu  錯繆 
Da Ming lü  大明律 
Da Qing lüli  大清律例 
dachen   大臣 
diguo   敵國 
ding   頂  
dingdai  頂戴 
dubiao   督標 
dusi   都司 
dutong   都統 
dutongshi si  都統使司 
dutongshi  都統使 
fa   法 
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fahui   發回 
fang pao quzhu 放炮驅逐 
fanren   犯人 
fei li   非禮 
feitu   匪徒 
fudutong  副都統 
fushi   服飾 
gaitu guiliu  改土歸流 
ganzhi   干支 
Gaoli/Koryŏ   高麗 
ge shou fengjiang 各守封疆 
gewai   格外 
gongshun  恭順 
goujie   勾結 
guanghan  獷悍 
guanhua  官話 
guankou  關口 
guo   國 
haijin   海禁 
Hanjian  漢奸 
hanyou  罕有 
haosheng zhi de  好生之德 
hualing  花翎 
Huangyu quanlan tu 皇輿全覽圖 
huanjue  緩決 
huanqu  寰區 
Hui fa   回法 
huidian  會典 
Huimin  回民 
huoqiying  火器營 
hyanghwa  向化 
jian fei   奸匪 
jiandeng  減等 
jiangjun  將軍 
jianhou  監候  
jiansheng  監生 
jianxi   奸細 
Jiaozi/Giao Chỉ 交趾 
jimin   飢民 
jimo   籍没 
jin    斤  
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Jin   金  
jue   爵 
junqi   軍器 
junxian  郡縣 
kalun   卡倫 
kalun   卡倫 
kebi   可比 
kewu   可惡 
kunsu   郡守 
kwanch’alsa  觀察使  
langzhong  郎中 
lanling   藍領 
li (distance)  里 
li (substatute)  例 
liang   兩 
Liangguang  兩廣 
libu   禮部 
lifanyuan  理藩院 
lijue   立決  
ling   翎 
lingchi   凌/陵遲 
lingdui dachen 領隊大臣 
liu   流 
lü/yul   律  
lüli   律例 
luying   綠營 
manho   萬戶 
mian shenjiu  免深究 
min   民 
Ming   明 
minren   民人 
mu   畝 
neidi   內地 
nianhao  年號 
pibyŏnsa  備邊司 
pijia   披甲 
qimin   齊民 
Qing   清 
qinwang  親王 
qiushen  秋審 
rujin   入覲 
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san guan bai ai 三關百隘 
Sanfasi  三法司 
sanzhi dachen  散秩大臣 
sha fei    沙匪 
shangguo/sangguk 上國 
shangmin  商民 
she   赦 
shengduan  生端 
shi da   事大 
Shiji   史記 
Shijing   詩經 
shiwei   侍衛 
shuguo   屬國 
shuicao  水草 
suoshu   所屬 
taegun   大君 
taejŏn   大典 
Tang hwa  唐貨 
taosheng  逃生 
Tây Sơn   西山 
Tianchao  天朝 
Tianxia  天下 
tiben   題本 
tidu   提督 
titong   體統 
titou   剃頭 
tizhi   體制 
tongpan  通判 
tu   徒  
tuiwei   推諉 
tulian   土練 
tumu   土目 
tuntian   屯田 
tusi/thổ ty  土司 
tuzhou   土州 
ŭigŭmbu  義禁府 
waegwan  倭館 
waibu   外部 
waifan   外藩 
waiguo  外國 
waiyi   外夷 
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wang   王 
weijin   違禁 
wiri anch’i  圍籬安置 
wuyi   無異 
wuzhi   無知 
xã   社 
xiangdeng  相等 
xiaobang/sobang 小邦 
xieling   協領 
xietong  協同 
xunfu   巡撫 
yamen   衙門 
yanxiao  鹽硝 
yejo   禮曹 
yi fei   夷匪 
yi jing   夷境 
yichu   議處 
yili   儀禮 
yiren   夷人 
yishitongren  一視同仁 
yizheng wang dachen 議政王大臣 
yŏngŭijŏng  領議政 
youji   游擊 
youmu   游牧 
yuanji   原籍 
yuanwailang  員外郎 
yuanzuo  緣坐 
Yun-Gui  雲貴 
zeikou   賊寇 
zhaoli   照例 
zhengfa  正法 
zhixian  職銜 
zhizui   治罪 
Zhongtu  中土 
Zhongyuan  中原 
zishi   滋事  
zishou   自首 
ziwen   咨文 
zixing zhizui  自行治罪 
zongbing  總兵 
zongdu  總督 
 
 
357 
 
zouzhe   奏折/摺 
zui   罪 
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